scholarly journals Fatal remedies. How dealing with policy conflict can backfire in a context of trust‐erosion

Governance ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eva Elizabeth Anne Wolf ◽  
Wouter Van Dooren
Keyword(s):  
Author(s):  
Ankur Chowdhary ◽  
Abdulhakim Sabur ◽  
Dijiang Huang ◽  
James Kirby ◽  
M. Kang

Author(s):  
Giampaolo Bonomi ◽  
Nicola Gennaioli ◽  
Guido Tabellini

Abstract We present a theory of identity politics that builds on two ideas. First, when policy conflict renders a certain social divide—economic or cultural—salient, a voter identifies with her economic or cultural group. Second, the voter slants her beliefs toward the stereotype of the group she identifies with. We obtain three implications. First, voters’ beliefs are polarized along the distinctive features of salient groups. Second, if the salience of cultural policies increases, cultural conflict rises, redistributive conflict falls, and polarization becomes more correlated across issues. Third, economic shocks hurting conservative voters may trigger a switch to cultural identity, causing these voters to demand less redistribution. We discuss U.S. survey evidence in light of these implications.


2021 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Hamza Y. Garashi ◽  
Douglas T. Steinke ◽  
Ellen I. Schafheutle

Abstract Background As Arab countries seek to implement the ‘Guideline on Good Pharmacovigilance Practice (GVP) for Arab countries’, understanding policy implementation mechanisms and the factors impacting it can inform best implementation practice. This study aimed to explore the mechanisms of and factors influencing pharmacovigilance policy implementation in Arab countries with more established pharmacovigilance systems (Jordan, Oman), to inform policy implementation in a country with a nascent pharmacovigilance system (Kuwait). Results Matland’s ambiguity-conflict model served to frame data analysis from 56 face-to-face interviews, which showed that policy ambiguity and conflict were low in Jordan and Oman, suggesting an “administrative implementation” pathway. In Kuwait, policy ambiguity was high while sentiments about policy conflict were varied, suggesting a mixture between “experimental implementation” and “symbolic implementation”. Factors reducing policy ambiguity in Jordan and Oman included: decision-makers’ guidance to implementors, stakeholder involvement in the policy’s development and implementation, training of policy implementors throughout the implementation process, clearly outlined policy goals and means, and presence of a strategic implementation plan with appropriate timelines as well as a monitoring mechanism. In contrast, policy ambiguity in Kuwait stemmed from the absence or lack of attention to these factors. Factors reducing policy conflict included: the policy’s compliance with internationally recognised standards and the policy’s fit with local capabilities (all three countries), decision-makers’ cooperation with and support of the national centre as well as stakeholders’ agreement on policy goals and means (Jordan and Oman) and adopting a stepwise approach to implementation (Jordan). Conclusions Using Matland’s model, both the mechanism of and factors impacting successful pharmacovigilance policy implementation were identified. This informed recommendations for best implementation practice in Arab as well as other countries with nascent pharmacovigilance systems, including increased managerial engagement and support, greater stakeholder involvement in policy development and implementation, and undertaking more detailed implementation planning.


2007 ◽  
Vol 101 (2) ◽  
pp. 321-338 ◽  
Author(s):  
THOMAS M. KECK

This paper explores three competing accounts of judicial review by comparing the enacting and invalidating coalitions for each of the fifty-three federal statutes struck down by the Supreme Court during its 1981 through 2005 terms. When a Republican judicial coalition invalidates a Democratic statute, the Court's decision is consistent with a partisan account, and when a conservative judicial coalition invalidates a liberal statute, the decision is explicable on policy grounds. But when an ideologically mixed coalition invalidates a bipartisan statute, the decision may have reflected an institutional divide between judges and legislators rather than a partisan or policy conflict. Finding more cases consistent with this last explanation than either of the others, I suggest that the existing literature has paid insufficient attention to the possibility of institutionally motivated judicial behavior, and more importantly, that any comprehensive account of the Court's decisions will have to attend to the interaction of multiple competing influences on the justices.


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