When the Antidote is the Poison: Ironic Mental Control Processes

1997 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 148-150 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel M. Wegner
Keyword(s):  
Mental States ◽  
Mental Load ◽  
Mental Control ◽  
Operating Process ◽  
Monitoring Process ◽  
Ironic Processes ◽  
State Of Mind ◽  
Automatic Search ◽  
Time Urgency ◽  
Mental Contents

The theory of ironic processes of mental control holds that both the most and the least desired effects of attempts to control one's own mental states accrue from two processes an intentional operating process (a conscious, effortful search for mental contents that will produce a desired state of mind) and an ironic monitoring process (an unconscious, automatic search for mental contents that signal a failure to produce the desired state of mind) Although the monitoring process usually functions just to activate the operating process, during stress, distraction, time urgency, or other mental load, the monitor's effects on mind can supersede those of the operator, producing the very state of mind that is least desired An individual's attempts to gain mental control may thus precipitate the unwanted mental states they were intended to remedy

scholarly journals The Putt and the Pendulum: Ironic Effects of the Mental Control of Action

1998 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 196-199 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel M. Wegner ◽  
Matthew Ansfield ◽  
Daniel Pilloff
Keyword(s):  
Physical Load ◽  
Golf Ball ◽  
Mental Load ◽  
Mental Control ◽  
Monitoring Process ◽  
Ironic Effects ◽  
Undesirable Outcome ◽  
Do So

People sometimes find themselves making movement errors that represent the ironic opposite of what they intended to do. These studies examined this tendency in the case of putting a golf ball and swinging a handheld pendulum, and found that ironic errors were particularly likely when participants who were instructed to avoid them tried to do so under mental load or physical load. The idea that such errors may be prompted by a monitoring process that increases sensitivity to the most undesirable outcome of an intention was supported by the finding of a tendency for ironic errors to be more evident when participants were allowed to monitor their action visually than when they could not.

Ironic Mental Processes in Sport: Implications for Sport Psychologists

1999 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 201-220 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher M. Janelle
Keyword(s):  
Sport Psychology ◽  
Pain Perception ◽  
Mood State ◽  
Self Regulation ◽  
State Regulation ◽  
Specific Reference ◽  
Mental Control ◽  
Exercise Participation ◽  
Operating Process ◽  
Ironic Processes

The theory of ironic processes of mental control (Wegner, 1994) is reviewed in the context of typical issues confronted by sport psychology professionals. The theory maintains that mental control is achieved through the interaction of an operating process directed toward achieving thoughts, emotions, and actions that are consistent with particular goal states, and a monitoring process for identifying inconsistencies with the goal state, insuring that any threat to the operating process is recognized and handled accordingly. Moreover, mental control normally functions at a satisfactory level, but under conditions of cognitive load, the likelihood of effective self-regulation is reduced. Given the load-inducing circumstances of sport and exercise participation, reasons for the occasional failure of mental control in these settings are offered. Traditional and current sport psychology issues and interventions are interpreted considering the theory of ironic processes, with specific reference to imagery, self-confidence, pain perception, mood state regulation, anxiety, and attention.

Intentionality of movement: Mirror neuron system and theory of mind

2011 ◽  
Vol 26 (S2) ◽  
pp. 2113-2113 ◽  
Author(s):  
A.M. Borghi ◽  
F. Binkofski
Keyword(s):  
Mirror Neurons ◽  
Mirror Neuron System ◽  
Mirror Neuron ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Action Understanding ◽  
Imaging Studies ◽  
Motor Representation ◽  
Neuron System ◽  
State Of Mind ◽  
Additional Explanation

The ability to understand intentions of actions performed by others is one of the prerequisites for social interaction. This ability has been attributed to our capacity to mentalize others’ behaviour, by simulating or predicting their mental states that would cause that behaviour and make it comprehensible. Brain imaging studies revealed the so called “mentalizng network” including the pSTS/TPJ, the temporal poles and the medial prefrontal cortex. This network gets constantly activated anytime we try to take the perspective of others or try to simulate their state of mind. On the other hand the discovery of mirror neurons has provided an additional explanation for understanding of the content of actions. The functional properties of these neurons point out that action understanding is primarily based on a mechanism that directly matches the sensory representation of perceived actions with one's own motor representation of the same actions. We provide evidence that both systems interact closely during the processing of intentionality of actions. Thus mentalizing is not the only form of intentional understanding and motor and intentional components of action are closely interwoven. Both systems play an important role in the pathophysiology of schizophrenia.

scholarly journals Ferenczi and group analysis

2018 ◽  
Vol 52 (1) ◽  
pp. 23-35 ◽  
Author(s):  
Juan Tubert-Oklander
Keyword(s):  
Mutual Influence ◽  
Group Analysis ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Theory And Practice ◽  
Major Influence ◽  
Social Facts ◽  
Transference And Countertransference ◽  
The Family ◽  
State Of Mind ◽  
Essential Unity

Sándor Ferenczi did not work with groups, yet his thinking and practice can be conceived as a major influence on the origins and development of group analysis and as a seminal source of ideas for its further development today. In his approach to psychoanalysis, social facts have a bearing on psychological facts, and vice versa. This implies a constant interchange and mutual influence between individual and collective processes, inner and outer, psychological and social. This is one of the basic tenets of group analysis, which requires that social facts be given as much attention as the psychological. Ferenczi’s major contributions to the emergence of group analysis are his conceptual and technical revolutionary innovations, centred on the essential unity and mutual interchange between transference and countertransference. His emphasis on the fundamental importance of actual relations with other significant persons, such as the primary caregivers, the family, the analyst and society, and his description of the dynamic interplay of transference and countertransference anticipated the theoretical developments of group analysis. He introduced the holistic concept of the unity of transference and countertransference and of the family and the child. This implied an underlying but yet unformulated field theory, which is basic for group analysis. The essential unity and mutual interchange of ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ may be accounted for by Ferenczi’s concept of an originary undifferentiated state of mind, called ‘Thalassal’, from which all other mental states, experiences, perceptions and thoughts evolve, and which remains present but unseen, underlying the more differentiated states. This is the psychological basis for Foulkes’ conception of the matrix and Pichon-Rivière’s theory of the link (bond). Ferenczi’s memory was long repressed by the psychoanalytic world, but now that it has been recovered, his contributions may provide many of the missing pieces of group-analytic theory and practice and build the much-needed bridges between psychoanalysis and group analysis.

Functionalism, Computationalism, and Mental Contents

2004 ◽  
Vol 34 (3) ◽  
pp. 375-410 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gualtiero Piccinini
Keyword(s):  
Mental State ◽  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Functional Role ◽  
Mental Content ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Inferential Role ◽  
Functional Relations ◽  
Popular View ◽  
Functional Role Semantics ◽  
Mental Contents

Almost no one cites Sellars, while reinventing his wheels with gratifying regularity. (Dennett 1987, 349)In philosophy of mind, there is functionalism about mental states and functionalism about mental contents. The former — mental State functionalism — says that mentalstatesare individuated by their functional relations with mental inputs, Outputs, and other mental states. The latter — usually called functional or conceptual or inferential role semantics — says that mentalcontentsare constituted by their functional relations with mental inputs, Outputs, and other mental contents (and in some versions of the theory, with things in the environment). If we add to mental State functionalism the popular view that mental states have their content essentially, then mental state functionalism may be seen as a form of functional role semantics and a solution to theproblem of mental content,namely, the problem of giving a naturalistic explanation of mental content. According to this solution, the functional relations that constitute contents are physically realized — in a metaphysically unmysterious way — by the functional relations between mental inputs, outputs, and the mental states bearing those contents.

scholarly journals Does Telepathy Threaten Mental Privacy?

2020 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
pp. 199-208
Author(s):  
Stephen Braude
Keyword(s):  
Mental States ◽  
Stream Of Consciousness ◽  
Privileged Access ◽  
State Of Mind ◽  
State Of Affairs ◽  
Mental Privacy

A long-standing concern (or at least a belief) about ESP, held by both skeptics and believers in the paranormal, is that if telepathy really occurs, then it might pose a threat to mental privacy. And it’s easy enough to see what motivates that view. Presumably we like to think that we enjoy privileged access to our own mental states. But if others could come to know telepathically what we’re thinking or feeling, then (among other disquieting prospects) that would mean that our sins of the heart and most embarrassing or repulsive fleeting thoughts would potentially be available for public inspection. But how well-founded is that belief or concern? To get a grip on the issues, we should begin by considering the valuable distinction (perhaps first mentioned by C.D. Broad--Broad, 1953, 1962) between telepathic (or clairvoyant) cognition and telepathic (or clairvoyant) interaction. As you would expect, every instance of the former would be an instance of the latter, but the converse doesn’t hold—that is, ESP interaction may occur without ESP cognition. To see why this matters, we must take a closer look. If telepathic cognition occurs at all, it would presumably be a form of non-sensorial knowledge about another individual’s state of mind. More specifically, it would be a state of affairs in which so-called “percipient” A comes to know something about a telepathic interaction A has with another individual B.  And what kind of things might A telepathically come to know? Well, presumably, in its most robust (and most intrusively intimidating) form, A would learn what’s going on in B’s mind—that is, that B is having certain thoughts, perceptions, or emotions. But it would still be an instance of telepathic cognition—admittedly, less intimidating or threatening to one’s mental privacy—if A learned merely that B was the telepathic cause of A’s current thought or experience—that is, that B was directly influencing or interfering with A’s stream of consciousness, whether or not A’s resulting thoughts or experiences were those of B or known by A to be those of B.

scholarly journals Neuroergonomics on the go. A preview of the potential of mobile EEG for work-place evaluation and design

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Edmund Wascher ◽  
Julian Elias Reiser ◽  
Gerhard Rinkenauer ◽  
Mauro F. Larra ◽  
Felix Dreger ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Information Processing ◽  
Cognitive Processing ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Work Place ◽  
Experimental Setup ◽  
Mental Load ◽  
Mental Processes ◽  
Work Related ◽  
Modern Work

Modern work is increasingly characterized by information processing. Therefore, the examination of mental states, mental load or cognitive processing during work is becoming increasingly important for ergonomics. Mobile EEG is a rapidly developing technology that can objectifiably display mental processes and conditions without impairing the worker while working. In this paper we try to give an overview of the available technologies, problems of measurement and experimental setup, but also to show which mental aspects can be mapped with mobile EEG and which measures are available to quantify work-related constructs. The aim is to show the potential of mobile EEG for cognitive neuroergonomics.

The Irrationality of the Good

Philosophy ◽  
1926 ◽  
Vol 1 (4) ◽  
pp. 497-506
Author(s):  
C. E. M. Joad
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Specific Property ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Unique Property ◽  
The State ◽  
Specific Character ◽  
Unique Character ◽  
State Of Mind

The theories of most writers on Ethics, with whose works I am acquainted, appear to be based upon the assumption of the unique character of goodness or The Good. By the word unique these writers mean, I think, among other things that goodness cannot be analysed into or described in terms of anything other than itself, that it can be and is desired for its own sake and not for the sake of some other thing which is not goodness, and that the apprehension of or desire for goodness is a distinct and specific character of our mental states. By asserting, however, that the state of mind constituted by the apprehension of goodness, or that the state of emotion aroused by the desire for goodness, is distinguished by a specific and unique property, they do not, I think, necessarily mean that this property is the same as the specific property of goodness itself. Most writers on Ethics have also believed that man is free to desire goodness, and to act in accordance with his desire, that is to say, they have held in some form or other the doctrine of free-will.

scholarly journals Ironic or Overcompensation Effects of Motor Behaviour: An Examination of a Tennis Serving Task Under Pressure

2019 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 21 ◽  
Author(s):  
Recep Gorgulu
Keyword(s):  
Repeated Measures ◽  
Motor Behaviour ◽  
Mental Control ◽  
Tennis Players ◽  
Self Confidence ◽  
Paired Samples ◽  
Specific Direction ◽  
Ironic Processes ◽  
The Individual

With specific regard to the hypothesized effects of anxiety on performance in motor behaviour, the rival predictions emanating from the Wegner’s “ironic processes theory” and the “implicit overcompensation hypothesis” are largely indiscriminate. Specifically, Wegner’s theory predicts that self-instructions not to perform in a certain manner would lead to the very behaviour the individual seeks to avoid under pressure. On the other hand, the implicit overcompensation hypothesis predicts that avoidant instructions would produce the opposite outcome to that intended by the performer under pressure. The present novel study directly compared these predictions using a tennis serving task under manipulated instructions. The sample comprised 32 (20 men, 12 women; Mage = 20.81, SD = 2.20) experienced tennis players who performed a tennis serving task. Participants’ levels of cognitive anxiety, somatic anxiety and self-confidence were measured by using Mental Readiness Form-3. A 2 (anxiety: low, high) × 3 (serving zone: target zone, non-target ironic error zone, non-target non-ironic error zone) repeated measures of ANOVA revealed a significant anxiety × serving zone interaction F(2, 62) = 32.27, p < 0.001 which provides specific support for the Wegner’s ironic processes of mental control theory rather than implicit overcompensation hypothesis. More specifically, Bonferroni-corrected follow-up paired samples t-tests revealed that when instructed not to serve in a specific direction, anxious performers did so a significantly greater number of times (t31 = −5.15, p < 0.001). The present research demonstrates that ironic performance errors are a meaningful and robust potential concern for performers who are required to perform under pressure.

Ironic processes in the mental control of mood and mood-related thought.

1993 ◽  
Vol 65 (6) ◽  
pp. 1093-1104 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel M. Wegner ◽  
Ralph Erber ◽  
Sophia Zanakos
Keyword(s):  
Mental Control ◽  
Ironic Processes
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