Collegial Influence and Judicial Voting Change: The Effect of Membership Change on U.S. Supreme Court Justices

2007 ◽  
Vol 41 (4) ◽  
pp. 909-938 ◽  
Author(s):  
Scott R. Meinke ◽  
Kevin M. Scott
1993 ◽  
Vol 87 (1) ◽  
pp. 87-101 ◽  
Author(s):  
William Mishler ◽  
Reginald S. Sheehan

Although normative questions about the role of the Supreme Court as a countermajoritarian institution have long excited controversy in democratic theory, empirical questions about how far the Court acts contrary to majoritarian opinion have received less attention. Time series analyses for the period 1956–89 indicate the existence of a reciprocal and positive relationship between long-term trends in aggregate public opinion and the Court's collective decisions. The Court's ideological composition changes in response to previous shifts in the partisan and ideological orientation of the president and Congress. The Court also responds to public opinion at the margins even in the absence of membership change. Since 1981, the relationship has vanished or turned negative in direction. The Court's ideological balance has been upset by an unbroken string of conservative-to-moderate appointments, thereby undermining the dynamics that promote judicial responsiveness and raising questions about the majoritarianism of the contemporary and future Court.


2011 ◽  
Vol 32 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-36
Author(s):  
Alejandro N. Ciencia

The study tests the plausibility of an attitudinal account of the Philippine Supreme Court’s December 2004 ruling reversing its original decision invalidating the financial and technical assistance agreement (FTAA) provisions of the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 or Republic Act No. 7942. As a political science-informed depiction of Supreme Court decision-making, the attitudinal account argues that justices decide cases on the basis of their ideological attitudes (i.e., personal policy preferences), and ruling reversals result from (1) composition or membership change; (2) policy position change – i.e., a change in the personal policy preferences of the justices; or (3) issue change – i.e., a change in the way the justices appreciate the issues raised by the “facts” of the case. The author tested the plausibility and/or significance of each of the three aforementioned attitude-centered accounts as explanations for the Mining Act ruling reversal. To test for composition change, the researcher analyzed the voting summaries for the January and December 2004 Mining Act rulings with focus placed on the votes of justices who either left or joined the Court in the period between the two Mining Act rulings. To test for issue change, the author conducted a qualitative content analysis of the “case facts” and “issues” that the justices were responding to in their January and December rulings and opinions on the Mining Act case. To test for policy position change, a cumulative scale of judicial votes in economic cases involving the validity of executive actions was constructed and analyzed. Cumulative scaling revealed the existence of attitudinal differences among members of the Supreme Court in 2004. It also suggested that, for the most part, the personal policy preferences of the justices remained stable. Among the three attitude-centered explanations, issue change was shown to be most significant as an explanation for the Mining Act ruling reversal. The general finding of the study is that the attitudinal perspective offers a plausible account of the reversal.


2018 ◽  
Vol 52 (2) ◽  
pp. 343-362 ◽  
Author(s):  
Susan W. Johnson

AbstractStudies of the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) focus largely on its policy-making role and its interpretation of the Charter of Rights. However, less studied are the Court's decisions in earlier periods, especially in comparison to the Charter years and in cases beyond civil rights and liberties. This study fills a gap in the scholarship by analyzing the universe of decisions from 1945 to 2005 in criminal, tax and tort cases. Utilizing Baum's (1988, 1989) method to examine policy change, I explore policy trends on the Supreme Court. The findings suggest that, for the most part, the SCC has remained a stable, consistent body over the course of its modern history. It appears that most of the variation in judicial output across time is due to issue change with some shifts due to personnel and membership change.


1999 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 204-205
Author(s):  
Megan Cleary

In recent years, the law in the area of recovered memories in child sexual abuse cases has developed rapidly. See J.K. Murray, “Repression, Memory & Suggestibility: A Call for Limitations on the Admissibility of Repressed Memory Testimony in Abuse Trials,” University of Colorado Law Review, 66 (1995): 477-522, at 479. Three cases have defined the scope of liability to third parties. The cases, decided within six months of each other, all involved lawsuits by third parties against therapists, based on treatment in which the patients recovered memories of sexual abuse. The New Hampshire Supreme Court, in Hungerford v. Jones, 722 A.2d 478 (N.H. 1998), allowed such a claim to survive, while the supreme courts in Iowa, in J.A.H. v. Wadle & Associates, 589 N.W.2d 256 (Iowa 1999), and California, in Eear v. Sills, 82 Cal. Rptr. 281 (1991), rejected lawsuits brought by nonpatients for professional liability.


1999 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 203-203
Author(s):  
Kendra Carlson

The Supreme Court of California held, in Delaney v. Baker, 82 Cal. Rptr. 2d 610 (1999), that the heightened remedies available under the Elder Abuse Act (Act), Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 15657,15657.2 (West 1998), apply to health care providers who engage in reckless neglect of an elder adult. The court interpreted two sections of the Act: (1) section 15657, which provides for enhanced remedies for reckless neglect; and (2) section 15657.2, which limits recovery for actions based on “professional negligence.” The court held that reckless neglect is distinct from professional negligence and therefore the restrictions on remedies against health care providers for professional negligence are inapplicable.Kay Delaney sued Meadowood, a skilled nursing facility (SNF), after a resident, her mother, died. Evidence at trial indicated that Rose Wallien, the decedent, was left lying in her own urine and feces for extended periods of time and had stage I11 and IV pressure sores on her ankles, feet, and buttocks at the time of her death.


1999 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 197-198
Author(s):  
Joseph R. Zakhary

In California Dental Association v. FTC, 119 S. Ct. 1604 (1999), the U.S. Supreme Court reviewed a decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit that a nonprofit affiliation of dentists violated section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA), 15 U.S.C.A. § 45 (1998), which prohibits unfair competition. The Court examined two issues: (1) the Federal Trade Commission's (FTC) jurisdiction over the California Dental Association (CDA); and (2) the proper scope of antitrust analysis. The Court unanimously held that CDA was subject to FTC's jurisdiction, but split 5-4 in its finding that the district court's use of abbreviated rule-of-reason analysis was inappropriate.CDA is a voluntary, nonprofit association of local dental societies. It boasts approximately 19,000 members, who constitute roughly threequarters of the dentists practicing in California. Although a nonprofit, CDA includes for-profit subsidiaries that financially benefit CDA members. CDA gives its members access to insurance and business financing, and lobbies and litigates on their behalf. Members also benefit from CDA marketing and public relations campaigns.


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