The Life of Law and the Law of Life

Author(s):  
Michael Naas

This chapter analyzes a large swath of Plato’s Statesman (287b–311c) in order to ask, with “Plato’s Pharmacy” in the background, about the Stranger’s claim that law—and especially written law, since writing is the essence of law—is at once inferior to rule without law and yet, in a world without divine rulers, absolutely necessary for human governance. This chapter returns to many of the insights from Chapter 2 on the myth of the two ages, since what that myth demonstrated was the desirability and yet impossibility of an age in which a truly divine being rules over human beings and the concomitant necessity of trying to imitate that age through laws. Once again, we see that what is at issue in the relationship between the two ages, as well as in the relationship between a regime without law and a regime with it, are two different valences or valuations of life—the values of pure life, fecundity, spontaneity, and memory, on the one hand, and the values of death in life, forgetting in memory, and sterility in fecundity, on the other.

Legal Studies ◽  
2011 ◽  
Vol 31 (3) ◽  
pp. 467-491 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew McGee

The aim in this paper is to challenge the increasingly common view in the literature that the law on end-of-life decision making is in disarray and is in need of urgent reform. The argument is that this assessment of the law is based on assumptions about the relationship between the identity of the defendant and their conduct, and about the nature of causation, which, on examination, prove to be indefensible. A clarification of the relationship between causation and omissions is provided which proves that the current legal position does not need modification, at least on the grounds that are commonly advanced for the converse view. This paves the way for a clarification, in conclusion, of important conceptual and moral differences between withholding, refusing and withdrawing life-sustaining measures, on the one hand, and assisted suicide and euthanasia, on the other.


2019 ◽  
Vol 66 (261) ◽  
pp. 5
Author(s):  
Sinivaldo Silva Tavares

Esta reflexão quer resgatar a antiga intuição eclesial expressa no princípio: legem credendi statuat lex supplicandi (“a lei da oração estabeleça a lei da fé”). Assim sendo, a norma do culto cristão determinará a lógica do crer, explicitando que entre a Liturgia e a Teologia vige uma relação de intrínseca reciprocidade. De um lado, concebe-se a Liturgia como fonte da Teologia e, do outro, a Teologia surge como a instância de verificação da Liturgia. As interpelações que a Liturgia lança à Teologia se reúnem em torno de três elementos: a eclesialidade como o húmus da teologia; o evento pascal de Cristo como a seiva da teologia; a criação, a história e o ser humano como o espaço vital da teologia. A conclusão frisa a necessidade de se aceitar a sacramentalidade da existência humana e a contingência de suas manifestações, e sugere que tanto a Liturgia como a Teologia se tornem mais simbólicas e se aproximem mais da poesia.Abstract: This reflection intends to retrieve and preserve the old ecclesiastical intuition expressed in the principle: legem credendi statuat lex supplicandi (“the law of the prayer should establish the law of faith”). Thus, the norm of the Christian cult will determine the logic of the belief, making it clear that between Liturgy and Theology there prevails a relationship of intrinsic reciprocity. On the one hand, Liturgy is conceived as the source of Theology and, on the other, Theology appears as the instance that confirms Liturgy. The challenges Liturgy places before Theology centre around three elements: the ecclesiastical principles as the humus of theology; the paschal event of Christ as the sap of Theology; and the creation, history and human beings as the vital space of Theology. The conclusion emphasizes the need to accept the sacramental character of human existence and the contingency of its manifestations and suggests that both Liturgy and Theology should become more symbolic and closer to poetry.


Land Law ◽  
2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ben McFarlane ◽  
Nicholas Hopkins ◽  
Sarah Nield

This chapter examines property rights in land and personal rights that may allow a party to make a particular use of land. It first considers the distinction between personal rights and property rights before addressing the content question: whether the type of right claimed by a party counts as a property right. To answer that question, a distinction is made between different types of property right. The most important distinction is between legal property rights, on the one hand, and equitable property rights, on the other. The chapter also discusses licences to use land and contrasts their operation and effect with those of property rights in land. It highlights the nature of licences and the controversy over contractual and estoppel licences and concludes with an analysis of the relationship between the law of leases and of licence.


Land Law ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 61-92
Author(s):  
Ben McFarlane ◽  
Nicholas Hopkins ◽  
Sarah Nield

This chapter examines property rights in land and personal rights that may allow a party to make a particular use of land. It first considers the distinction between personal rights and property rights before addressing the content question: whether the type of right claimed by a party counts as a property right. To answer that question, a distinction is made between different types of property right. The most important distinction is between legal property rights, on the one hand, and equitable property rights, on the other. The chapter also discusses licences to use land and contrasts their operation and effect with those of property rights in land. It highlights the nature of licences and the controversy over contractual and estoppel licences and concludes with an analysis of the relationship between the law of leases and of licence.


2012 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
pp. 759-770 ◽  
Author(s):  
SERENA FORLATI

AbstractIdentifying the range of lawful reactions to non-performance of treaties is still problematic, as shown by the case concerning the Application of the Interim Accord of 13 September 1995 (FYROM/Greece). After reviewing the current understanding of the relationship between the law of treaties and the law of international responsibility, the author analyses the legal regime pertaining to suspension and termination of treaties on grounds of breach, on the one hand, and, on the other, to countermeasures, arguing that the exceptio inadimpleti contractus may still play an independent, albeit limited, role as a reaction to lawful non-performance of international treaties.


Africa ◽  
1955 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
pp. 252-260 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Middleton

Opening ParagraphIn this paper I consider some Lugbara notions about witches, ghosts, and other agents who bring sickness to human beings. I do not discuss the relationship of these notions, and the behaviour associated with them, to the social structure. The two aspects, ideological and structural, are intimately connected, but it is possible to discuss them separately: on the one hand, to present the ideology as a system consistent within itself and, on the other, to show the way in which it is part of the total social system. Here I attempt only the former.


Author(s):  
Booysen Sandra

This chapter considers the relationships created by the issue of a letter of credit. In particular, it focuses on the relationship between the issuer and/or confirmer of the credit on the one hand, and the seller of the goods on the other. Although the letter of credit is typically referred to as creating a contractual obligation between these parties, and that characterisation is rarely disputed, a closer analysis from a common law perspective reveals that some elements for contract formation appear to be absent. The chapter re-examines this debate in the light of recent developments in the law. It concludes that the relationship is indeed contractual, albeit that some of the contractual prerequisites may be satisfied in an unorthodox way.


2021 ◽  
pp. 157-168
Author(s):  
Lawrence M. Solan

This chapter explores the relationship between how natural language expresses degrees of certainty in the truth of an assertion on the one hand, and how the law handles this issue on the other. This discussion focuses, in particular, on the hearsay doctrine and on the linguistic elements identified as “evidentials:” expressions that include information about how speakers came to know the assertions they make. The hearsay rule bars certain kinds of speech acts from serving as legal evidence, in particular, assertions that report what another person earlier said, and which are offered to express the truth about the events at issue in a case. The author links the law governing hearsay in terms of speech act theory, a connection also drawn by the philosopher John Langshaw Austin, who observed that statements offered to prove the fact of the speech act rather than the truth of the matter asserted are admissible.


Author(s):  
Adam I. P. Smith

This chapter describes the impact of the 1850 Fugitive Slave Act. It argues that the legal and moral demands being made by the Slave Power severed the relationship between law, on the one hand, and order on the other. Before 1850 it was antiabolitionists who were prone to use violence in Northern cities to break up antislavery meetings; afterwards the militancy was on the side of those, as in the notorious Anthony Burns case in Boston, who opposed slave catchers, even though the latter had the law on their side. Even Northerners who disdained antislavery agitation were driven to see slavery as an active threat to order and stability.


2020 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 243-265
Author(s):  
Christian F. Rostbøll

AbstractAn influential interpretation of Kant’s Doctrine of Right suggests that the relationship between public right and freedom is constitutive rather than instrumental. The focus has been on domestic right and members’ relations to their own state. This has resulted in a statist bias which has not adequately dealt with the fact that Kant regards public right as a system composed of three levels – domestic, international and cosmopolitan right. This article suggests that the constitutive relationship is between all levels of right, on the one hand, and ‘freedom in the external relation’ of all human beings, on the other hand.


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