Study on a Methodology of Human Factor Engineering Operating Experience Review for Nuclear Power Plant

2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Danying Gu ◽  
Shuhui Zhang ◽  
Zhonghe Ning
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Power ◽  
Power Plants ◽  
Human Factor ◽  
Operating Experience ◽  
Sources Of Information ◽  
Nuclear Facilities ◽  
Human Factor Engineering ◽  
Design Procedures ◽  
Function Allocation ◽  
Review Criterion

The reviewing of operating experience at nuclear power plants (NPP) is not only critically important to safe and reliable operations, but also useful to guide the design of new plants which are similar to the current one under review. How to identify and analyze the safety-related operating experience and then implement a more extensive review is a vital and challengeable issue. In this paper, a methodology of human factor engineering (HFE) operating experience review (OER) is proposed for NPP. The need for the application of HFE in the life cycle activities of NPP and other nuclear facilities has been demonstrated by plant operating histories and regulatory and industry reviews. As a very important element of HFE, the OER is performed from the beginning of the design process. The main purpose of performing an OER is to verify that the applicant has identified and analyzed HFE-related safety problems and issues in previous designs that are similar to the current one. In this way, negative features associated with predecessor designs may be avoided in the current NPP design while retaining positive features. The research of OER concentrates on the aspect of review criterion, scope and implementation procedure of the HFE-related operating experience. As the NRC requirement, the scope of operating experience can be divided into six types in accordance with sources of information. The implementation procedures of USA and China are introduced, respectively. The resolution of HFE OER issues involve function allocation, changes in automation, HSI equipment design, procedures, training, and so forth. The OER conclusions can contribute to other HFE activities and improve the safety, reliability and usability of the HSI design in NPP.

Methodology and Application of Human Reliability Analysis in CAP1400 Nuclear Power Plant

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yongping Qiu ◽  
Jiandong He ◽  
Juntao Hu ◽  
Yucheng Zhuo ◽  
Jie He
Keyword(s):  
Power Plant ◽  
Nuclear Power Plant ◽  
Reliability Analysis ◽  
Nuclear Power ◽  
Power Plants ◽  
Human Factor ◽  
Human Reliability ◽  
Human Reliability Analysis ◽  
Human Factor Engineering ◽  
Human Failure

It is well recognized that humans play an important role in the safety operation of nuclear power plants (NPPs). Usually three types of human interactions (HIs) are defined in the human reliability analysis (HRA) of probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) for NPPs, i.e., pre-initiating event HIs, initiating event-related HIs, and post-initiating event HIs. In this paper, a brief introduction of the HRA methodology for CAP1400 nuclear power plant is first presented, including internal events and external events (mainly internal fire and flooding) HRA. Next, the CAP1400 human failure event quantification content is given with a typical example, and some insights and proposals based on CAP1400 PSA/HRA results are discussed. Finally, the application of HRA in human factor engineering design of CAP1400 is described. The human actions (HAs) most important to safety are identified via a combination of probabilistic and deterministic analyses, and then addressed when conducting the human factor engineering program. The CAP1400 HRA is one of the most important PSA elements and provides fundamental support for CAP1400 PSA and the relevant applications.

An Integrated Approach to Human System Interface Design in New Nuclear Power Plants

2009 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jose´ Manuel Viguera ◽  
Alfonso Jime´nez ◽  
Juan Antonio Burillo
Keyword(s):  
System Performance ◽  
Nuclear Power ◽  
Power Plants ◽  
Nuclear Power Plants ◽  
Human Factor ◽  
Integrated Approach ◽  
Careful Consideration ◽  
Final Decision ◽  
Human System ◽  
Human Factor Engineering

Nuclear power plants design is moving toward a wider use of digital computers, especially microprocessors, in information and control systems. The amount of automation and the role of the operator are under discussion in many countries. The view of the operator’s role presently varies. The main opinions can be summarized as follows: 1. Move toward a high degree of automation, fostering the machine role. 2. Use of computer-generated procedures providing information to skilled operators for them to make the final decision. 3. Use of digital systems to help the operator identify problems, decide on the appropriate corrective actions and aid in the execution of those actions. Tecnatom, S.A. has developed an integrated Human Factor Engineering (HFE) methodology, based on international regulations and experience obtained from several national and international projects, combining technology, organization and human elements to generate a Human-Centered Design. Human Factor Engineering (HFE) is the application of the knowledge of human capabilities and characteristics to develop equipment, facilities and systems. With the application of this knowledge, human performance, and therefore system performance, can be dramatically improved. Man/machine systems designed with the human as a key element are inherently safer and more reliable than those that are not. Until recently, design of these human-equipment interfaces has been secondary to “pure hardware” design; that is, equipment and facilities were designed without formal consideration of the implications for operators. Our approach is to systematically apply an HFE methodology that will produce: a) Human-System Interfaces that are easy, friendly to and consistent for the operators. b) Simulator-Assisted Engineering platforms for validation activities in the logic, control and human-system interface areas. c) Training Programs based on the systematic analysis of job and task requirements. d) Procedures derived from the same design process and analyses as the Human-System Interface and Training. Application of good HFE methodology during system development, implementation and operation is, from our point of view, vital for optimal system performance regarding operation activities. “A disciplined approach to HFE helps ensure that humans are considered integral system components, requiring careful consideration of how they will interact with their equipment.”

Digital I&C Operating Experience in the US

2008 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bruce Geddes ◽  
Ray Torok
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Power ◽  
Power Plants ◽  
Nuclear Power Plants ◽  
Failure Modes ◽  
Operating Experience ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Common Cause ◽  
Hardware Failure ◽  
Common Cause Failure ◽  
Defensive Measures

The Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) is conducting research in cooperation with the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) regarding Operating Experience of digital Instrumentation and Control (I&C) systems in US nuclear power plants. The primary objective of this work is to extract insights from US nuclear power plant Operating Experience (OE) reports that can be applied to improve Diversity and Defense in Depth (D3) evaluations and methods for protecting nuclear plants against I&C related Common Cause Failures (CCF) that could disable safety functions and thereby degrade plant safety. Between 1987 and 2007, over 500 OE events involving digital equipment in US nuclear power plants were reported through various channels. OE reports for 324 of these events were found in databases maintained by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO). A database was prepared for capturing the characteristics of each of the 324 events in terms of when, where, how, and why the event occurred, what steps were taken to correct the deficiency that caused the event, and what defensive measures could have been employed to prevent recurrence of these events. The database also captures the plant system type, its safety classification, and whether or not the event involved a common cause failure. This work has revealed the following results and insights: - 82 of the 324 “digital” events did not actually involve a digital failure. Of these 82 non-digital events, 34 might have been prevented by making full use of digital system fault tolerance features. - 242 of the 324 events did involve failures in digital systems. The leading contributors to the 242 digital failures were hardware failure modes. Software change appears as a corrective action twice as often as it appears as an event root cause. This suggests that software features are being added to avoid recurrence of hardware failures, and that adequately designed software is a strong defensive measure against hardware failure modes, preventing them from propagating into system failures and ultimately plant events. 54 of the 242 digital failures involved a Common Cause Failure (CCF). - 13 of the 54 CCF events affected safety (1E) systems, and only 2 of those were due to Inadequate Software Design. This finding suggests that software related CCFs on 1E systems are no more prevalent than other CCF mechanisms for which adherence to various regulations and standards is considered to provide adequate protection against CCF. This research provides an extensive data set that is being used to investigate many different questions related to failure modes, causes, corrective actions, and other event attributes that can be compared and contrasted to reveal useful insights. Specific considerations in this study included comparison of 1E vs. non-1E systems, active vs. potential CCFs, and possible defensive measures to prevent these events. This paper documents the dominant attributes of the evaluated events and the associated insights that can be used to improve methods for protecting against digital I&C related CCFs, applying a test of reasonable assurance.

Cyber Security Assessment of NPP I&C Systems

2020 ◽  
pp. 221-238
Author(s):  
Oleksandr Klevtsov ◽  
Artem Symonov ◽  
Serhii Trubchaninov
Keyword(s):  
Control Systems ◽  
Cyber Security ◽  
Nuclear Power ◽  
Power Plants ◽  
Cyber Attacks ◽  
Security Assessment ◽  
Nuclear Facilities ◽  
Security Risks ◽  
Cyber Threats ◽  
And Control

The chapter is devoted to the issues of cyber security assessment of instrumentation and control systems (I&C systems) of nuclear power plants (NPP). The authors examined the main types of potential cyber threats at the stages of development and operation of NPP I&C systems. Examples of real incidents at various nuclear facilities caused by intentional cyber-attacks or unintentional computer errors during the maintenance of the software of NPP I&C systems are given. The approaches to vulnerabilities assessment of NPP I&C systems are described. The scope and content of the assessment and periodic reassessment of cyber security of NPP I&C systems are considered. An approach of assessment to cyber security risks is described.

scholarly journals The weak data on the water–energy nexus in Spain

Water Policy ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 382-393 ◽  
Author(s):  
Diego Sesma-Martín ◽  
M. d. Mar Rubio-Varas
Keyword(s):  
Water Supply ◽  
Energy Policy ◽  
Electricity Generation ◽  
Nuclear Power ◽  
Power Plants ◽  
Policy Instruments ◽  
Policy Agenda ◽  
Sources Of Information ◽  
Water Energy Nexus ◽  
Striking Fact

Abstract This paper focuses on the fact that the water–energy nexus remains an irrelevant issue on the energy policy agenda and on the priorities of the energy leaders in Spain. This is a striking fact given that this takes place in the most arid country in Europe, where almost two-thirds of electricity generation would have to be halted in the absence of an adequate water supply. We contend that part of the explanation may lie in the lack of official statistics and inconsistent sources of information on the water–energy nexus in Spain. To illustrate this point, we provide examples of the uneven data available for one of the most intensive freshwater users in the thermoelectric sector in Spain: nuclear power plants. Our research demonstrates the need for improved indicators as policy instruments in the water–energy nexus in Spain since it is impossible to improve what cannot be measured.

INTERCOMPARISON ON INTERNAL DOSE ASSESSMENT FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS IN KOREA

2019 ◽  
Vol 186 (4) ◽  
pp. 524-529
Author(s):  
Si Young Kim
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Power ◽  
Power Plants ◽  
Nuclear Power Plants ◽  
Evaluation Method ◽  
Dose Assessment ◽  
Assessment Procedure ◽  
Internal Dose ◽  
Nuclear Facilities ◽  
International Intercomparison ◽  
Selection Of

Abstract The intercomparison test is a quality assurance activity performed for internal dose assessment. In Korea, the intercomparison test on internal dose assessment was carried out for nuclear facilities in May 2018. The test involved four nuclear facilities in Korea, and seven exposure scenarios were applied. These scenarios cover the intake of 131I, a uranium mixture, 60Co and tritium under various conditions. This paper only reviews the participant results of three scenarios pertinent to the operation of nuclear power plants and adopts the statistical evaluation method, used in international intercomparison tests, to determine the significance values of the results. Although no outliers were established in the test, improvements in the internal dose assessment procedure were derived. These included the selection of intake time, selection of lung absorption type according to the chemical form and consideration of the contribution of previous intake.

scholarly journals Importance of Advanced Planning of Manufacturing for Nuclear Industry

2016 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 42-49
Author(s):  
Nick Shykinov ◽  
Robert Rulko ◽  
Dariusz Mroz
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Power ◽  
Power Plants ◽  
Regulatory Compliance ◽  
Pressure Vessels ◽  
Nuclear Industry ◽  
Project Schedule ◽  
Nuclear Facilities ◽  
Project Completion ◽  
Advanced Planning ◽  
And Performance

Abstract In the context of energy demands by growing economies, climate changes, fossil fuel pricing volatility, and improved safety and performance of nuclear power plants, many countries express interest in expanding or acquiring nuclear power capacity. In the light of the increased interest in expanding nuclear power the supply chain for nuclear power projects has received more attention in recent years. The importance of the advanced planning of procurement and manufacturing of components of nuclear facilities is critical for these projects. Many of these components are often referred to as long-lead items. They may be equipment, products and systems that are identified to have a delivery time long enough to affect directly the overall timing of a project. In order to avoid negatively affecting the project schedule, these items may need to be sourced out or manufactured years before the beginning of the project. For nuclear facilities, long-lead items include physical components such as large pressure vessels, instrumentation and controls. They may also mean programs and management systems important to the safety of the facility. Authorized nuclear operator training, site evaluation programs, and procurement are some of the examples. The nuclear power industry must often meet very demanding construction and commissioning timelines, and proper advanced planning of the long-lead items helps manage risks to project completion time. For nuclear components there are regulatory and licensing considerations that need to be considered. A national nuclear regulator must be involved early to ensure the components will meet the national legal regulatory requirements. This paper will discuss timing considerations to address the regulatory compliance of nuclear long-lead items.

The Regulatory Framework for Safe Decommissioning of Nuclear Power Plants in Korea

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sangmyeon Ahn ◽  
Jungjoon Lee ◽  
Chanwoo Jeong ◽  
Kyungwoo Choi
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Power ◽  
Power Plants ◽  
Nuclear Power Plants ◽  
Regulatory Framework ◽  
International Standards ◽  
Current Status ◽  
Nuclear Facilities ◽  
Safety Requirement ◽  
Regulatory Review ◽  
Safety Standards

We are having 23 units of nuclear power plants in operation and 5 units of nuclear power plants under construction in Korea as of September 2012. However, we don’t have any experience on shutdown permanently and decommissioning of nuclear power plants. There are only two research reactors being decommissioned since 1997. It is realized that improvement of the regulatory framework for decommissioning of nuclear facilities has been emphasized constantly from the point of view of IAEA’s safety standards. It is also known that IAEA will prepare the safety requirement on decommissioning of facilities; its title is the Safe Decommissioning of Facilities, General Safety Requirement Part 6. According to the result of IAEA’s Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS) mission to Korea in 2011, it was recommended that the regulatory framework should require decommissioning plans for nuclear installations to be constructed and operated and these plans should be updated periodically. In addition, after the Fukushima nuclear disaster in Japan in March of 2011, preparedness for early decommissioning caused by an unexpected severe accident became important issues and concerns. In this respect, it is acknowledged that the regulatory framework for decommissioning of nuclear facilities in Korea need to be improved. First of all, we focus on identifying the current status and relevant issues of regulatory framework for decommissioning of nuclear power plants compared to the IAEA’s safety standards in order to achieve our goal. And then the plan is established for improvement of regulatory framework for decommissioning of nuclear power plants in Korea. It is expected that if the things will go forward as planned, the revised regulatory framework for decommissioning could enhance the safety regime on the decommissioning of nuclear power plants in Korea in light of international standards.

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