Scenarios for the Transmutation of Actinides in CANDU Reactors

Author(s):  
Bronwyn Hyland ◽  
Brian Gihm

With world stockpiles of used nuclear fuel increasing, the need to address the long-term utilization of this resource is being studied. Many of the transuranic (TRU) actinides in nuclear spent fuel produce decay heat for long durations, resulting in significant nuclear waste management challenges. These actinides can be transmuted to shorter-lived isotopes to reduce the decay heat period or consumed as fuel in a CANDU® reactor. Many of the design features of the CANDU reactor make it uniquely adaptable to actinide transmutation. The small, simple fuel bundle simplifies the fabrication and handling of active fuels. Online refuelling allows precise management of core reactivity and separate insertion of the actinides and fuel bundles into the core. The high neutron economy of the CANDU reactor results in high TRU destruction to fissile-loading ratio. This paper provides a summary of actinide transmutation schemes that have been studied in CANDU reactors at AECL, including the works performed in the past [1–4]. The schemes studied include homogeneous scenarios in which actinides are uniformly distributed in all fuel bundles in the reactor, as well as heterogeneous scenarios in which dedicated channels in the reactor are loaded with actinide targets and the rest of the reactor is loaded with fuel. The transmutation schemes that are presented reflect several different partitioning schemes. Separation of americium, often with curium, from the other actinides enables targeted destruction of americium, which is a main contributor to the decay heat 100 to 1000 years after discharge from the reactor. Another scheme is group-extracted transuranic elements, in which all of the transuranic elements, plutonium (Pu), neptunium (Np), americium (Am), and curium (Cm) are extracted together and then transmuted. This paper also addresses ways of utilizing the recycled uranium, another stream from the separation of spent nuclear fuel, in order to drive the transmutation of other actinides.

Author(s):  
Krista Nicholson ◽  
John McDonald ◽  
Shona Draper ◽  
Brian M. Ikeda ◽  
Igor Pioro

Currently in Canada, spent fuel produced from Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs) is in the interim storage all across the country. It is Canada’s long-term strategy to have a national geologic repository for the disposal of spent nuclear fuel for CANada Deuterium Uranium (CANDU) reactors. The initial problem is to identify a means to centralize Canada’s spent nuclear fuel. The objective of this paper is to present a solution for the transportation issues that surround centralizing the waste. This paper reviews three major components of managing and the transporting of high-level nuclear waste: 1) site selection, 2) containment and 3) the proposed transportation method. The site has been selected based upon several factors including proximity to railways and highways. These factors play an important role in the site-selection process since the location must be accessible and ideally to be far from communities. For the containment of the spent fuel during transportation, a copper-shell container with a steel structural infrastructure was selected based on good thermal, structural, and corrosion resistance properties has been designed. Rail has been selected as the method of transporting the container due to both the potential to accommodate several containers at once and the extensive railway system in Canada.


Author(s):  
Wolfgang Botsch ◽  
Silva Smalian ◽  
Peter Hinterding ◽  
Holger Völzke ◽  
Dietmar Wolff ◽  
...  

As with the storage of all radioactive materials, the storage of spent nuclear fuel (SF) and high-level radioactive waste (HLW) must conform to safety requirements. Safety aspects like safe enclosure of radioactive materials, safe removal of decay heat, nuclear criticality safety and avoidance of unnecessary radiation exposure must be achieved throughout the storage period. The implementation of these safety requirements can be achieved by dry storage of SF and HLW in casks as well as in other systems such as dry vault storage systems or spent fuel pools, where the latter is neither a dry nor a passive system. After the events of Fukushima, the advantages of passively and inherently safe dry storage systems have become more obvious. TÜV and BAM, who work as independent experts for the competent authorities, present the licensing process for sites and casks and inform about spent nuclear fuel management and issues concerning dry storage of spent nuclear fuel, based on their long experience in these fields. All safety relevant issues like safe enclosure, shielding, removal of the decay heat or behavior of cask and building under accident conditions are checked and validated with state-of-the-art methods and computer codes before the license approval. It is shown how dry storage systems can ensure the compliance with the mentioned safety criteria over a long storage period. Exemplarily, the process of licensing, erection and operation of selected German dry storage facilities is presented.


2004 ◽  
Vol 824 ◽  
Author(s):  
James L. Jerden ◽  
Margaret M. Goldberg ◽  
James C. Cunnane ◽  
Theodore H. Bauer ◽  
Roald A. Wigeland ◽  
...  

AbstractHeat generated by radioactive decay of spent fuel represents a potentially important barrier to water accumulation on commercial spent nuclear fuel in breached waste packages. In the absence of water, fuel degradation and radionuclide release will be negligible. Thermal models for the proposed Yucca Mountain Repository suggest that, after a period of approximately 1000-4000 years (depending on loadingand ventilation conditions), the repository drift walls may decline to sub-boiling temperatures, thus allowing humidity in the drift to increase. The question thus arises, is the thermal gradient between the fuel and the drift sufficient to prevent water accumulation in a humid drift environment throughout the regulatory period? The answer depends on the balance between processes that oppose water condensation ontothe fuel (decay heat) and those that promote condensation such as the deliquescence of hygroscopic phaseswithin the fuel.Our experimental results indicate that deliquescence could lead to the condensation of water onto spent fuel despite the thermal “self-drying”effect if the following criteria are met: (1) the fission product salt CsI is present in the fuel or in the fuel-cladding gap, (2) the relative humidity in the driftexceeds 80% while temperatures in the waste package are around 90oC. Previous work suggests that these criteria may be met for some fuel pins within the proposed Yucca Mountain Repository. However,experiments that account for the role of U(VI) alteration phases suggest that deliquescence may be a self-limiting process in the sense that deliquescent components (e.g. Cs, Ba, Sr) may be incorporatedinto nondeliquescent U(VI) phases that form from the corrosion of spent fuel.


Author(s):  
Greg Morandin ◽  
Eric Araujo ◽  
David J. Ribbans

The International Atomic Energy Agency requires that the transport of spent nuclear fuel in containers be able to handle certain loads in the axial, lateral and vertical direction under normal off-site handling scenarios. During transport, CANDU nuclear fuel bundles may experience axial impact loads due to possible sliding within a transport tube resulting in impact with the container wall. This paper presents a series of postulated fuel bundle impact scenarios in order to determine the enveloping dynamic g load that a bundle can experience before possible plastic deformation to the bundle fuel sheath. The IAEA load factors for envelope design are used as a reference to ramp the impact velocities and are not equivalent to the dynamic loads used in the analysis. Based on the transportation induced g loads outlined in the IAEA regulations for safe transport of spent fuel under normal handling conditions (IAEA 1985), these g loads are used to calculate a terminal velocity for the bundle whose motion impacts a rigid plate. One type of CANDU nuclear fuel bundle consists of 28 Zircaloy-4 fuel pencils loaded with Uranium Dioxide fuel pellets. The ends of the pencils are fitted with end caps and each end cap is spot welded to a Zircaloy-4 end plate at either end. The finite element model of the fuel bundle consists of 4-noded shell elements representing the fuel sheaths and end plates and 8-noded continuum elements representing the Uranium Dioxide pellets. For the purpose of the analysis, the fuel bundle is housed inside a transport tube, which limits the bundle lateral and vertical motion during impact rebound. The impact target is conservatively modelled as an infinitely rigid plate. Contact surfaces are modelled between the fuel bundle and transport tube, between the fuel bundle and impact plate and between each individual fuel pencil. Two bundle scenarios are considered. The first is a single fuel bundle impacting the plate and the second is two fuel bundles in series in a single transport tube impacting the plate. The second scenario considers the interaction between the two bundles during initial impact and rebound. The analysis covers these scenarios under various magnitudes of applied dynamic loading including 2g, 5g, and 8g. The objective is to determine at what applied load the fuel bundle will experience plastic damage to the fuel pencil sheath. This will effectively provide a bounding g load for CANDU spent fuel transport. The results of the analysis show that for a single bundle in a transport tube, a dynamic load of 8g results in plastic deformation of and the target are modeled using 4-noded shell elements. The pencil end caps are attached to the endplates using an area of common nodes (Fig. 3). Although the actual endcap to endplate connection is through a round spot-welded cross section, for modeling ease the interface is several fuel pencil sheaths. For the two-bundle case, a dynamic load of 8g does not result in any plastic deformation in the fuel pencil sheaths. Thus, a limiting dynamic load between 5g and 8g is determined for the fuel handling scenarios. This paper presents the methodology and models used in the analysis as well as the results of the simulations.


2021 ◽  
Vol 247 ◽  
pp. 02021
Author(s):  
Teodosi Simeonov ◽  
Charles Wemple

Studsvik’s approach to spent nuclear fuel analyses combines isotopic concentrations, fluxes, and cross-sections, calculated by the CASMO5 neutron transport and depletion code, with irradiation history data from the SIMULATE5 reactor core simulator and tabulated isotopic decay data. These data sources are used and processed by the SNF code to compute the spent nuclear fuel characteristics. Recent advances in the system, including cross-sections and decay data from ENDF/B-VIII.R0, are presented in this paper, together with validation results against decay heat power and isotopic compositions measurements. Measurements conducted at the Swedish interim storage facility, CLAB, are used for validation of the decay heat power, while comparisons to the results of the international program ARIANE are used to demonstrate the capability of CMS5/SNF to accurately predict isotopic compositions. The paper shows the results calculated with ENDF/B-VIII.R0, and the effect on the spent fuel characteristics is evaluated by comparisons to the earlier ENDF/B-VII.R1 results.


2006 ◽  
Vol 985 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey A. Fortner ◽  
A. Jeremy Kropf ◽  
James L. Jerden ◽  
James C. Cunnane

AbstractPerformance assessment models of the U. S. repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada suggest that neptunium from spent nuclear fuel is a potentially important dose contributor. A scientific understanding of how the UO2 matrix of spent nuclear fuel impacts the oxidative dissolution and reductive precipitation of Np is needed to predict the behavior of Np at the fuel surface during aqueous corrosion. Neptunium would most likely be transported as aqueous Np(V) species, but for this to occur it must first be oxidized from the Np(IV) state found within the parent spent nuclear fuel. In this paper we present synchrotron x-ray absorption spectroscopy and microscopy findings that illuminate the resultant local chemistry of neptunium and plutonium within uranium oxide spent nuclear fuel before and after corrosive alteration in an air-saturated aqueous environment. We find the Pu and Np in unaltered spent fuel to have a +4 oxidation state and an environment consistent with solid-solution in the UO2 matrix. During corrosion in an air-saturated aqueous environment, the uranium matrix is converted to uranyl (UO22+) mineral assemblage that is depleted in Np and Pu relative to the parent fuel. The transition from U(IV) in the fuel to a fully U(VI) character across the corrosion front is not sharp, but occurs over a transition zone of ∼ 50 micrometers. We find evidence of a thin (∼ 20 micrometer) layer that is enriched in Pu and Np within a predominantly U(IV) environment on the fuel side of the transition zone. These experimental observations are consistent with available data for the standard reduction potentials for NpO2+/Np4+ and UO22+/U4+ couples, which indicate that Np(IV) may not be effectively oxidized to Np(V) at the corrosion potential of uranium dioxide spent nuclear fuel in air-saturated aqueous solutions.


MRS Advances ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 3 (19) ◽  
pp. 991-1003 ◽  
Author(s):  
Evaristo J. Bonano ◽  
Elena A. Kalinina ◽  
Peter N. Swift

ABSTRACTCurrent practice for commercial spent nuclear fuel management in the United States of America (US) includes storage of spent fuel in both pools and dry storage cask systems at nuclear power plants. Most storage pools are filled to their operational capacity, and management of the approximately 2,200 metric tons of spent fuel newly discharged each year requires transferring older and cooler fuel from pools into dry storage. In the absence of a repository that can accept spent fuel for permanent disposal, projections indicate that the US will have approximately 134,000 metric tons of spent fuel in dry storage by mid-century when the last plants in the current reactor fleet are decommissioned. Current designs for storage systems rely on large dual-purpose (storage and transportation) canisters that are not optimized for disposal. Various options exist in the US for improving integration of management practices across the entire back end of the nuclear fuel cycle.


2017 ◽  
Vol 153 ◽  
pp. 07035 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mikhail Ternovykh ◽  
Georgy Tikhomirov ◽  
Ivan Saldikov ◽  
Alexander Gerasimov

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