scholarly journals Thermal Aspects of Safety Analysis for Shipment of West Valley Melter

Author(s):  
James E. Laurinat ◽  
Matthew R. Kesterson ◽  
Jeffery L. England ◽  
Edward T. Ketusky ◽  
Charles A. McKeel ◽  
...  

The thermal aspects of a safety analysis for shipment of the West Valley melter are presented. The West Valley melter was used from 1996 to 2002 to vitrify regionally sourced high level radioactive waste. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) set up the West Valley Demonstration Project to encase this melter and grout it in low density cellular concrete, for disposal. DOE-West Valley requested the Savannah River National Laboratory to prepare a Safety Analysis Report. The thermal portion of the safety analysis covers Normal Conditions of Transport (NCT) and Hypothetical Accidents Conditions (HAC), as defined in the Code of Federal Regulations. For NCT, it is assumed that the encased melter is stored in either shade or direct sunlight at an ambient temperature of 311 K (100 °F). The defining HAC is exposure to a 1075 K (1475 °F) fire for 30 minutes. Finite element computer models were used to compute temperature profiles for NCT and HAC, given the thermal properties of the melter and its contents and tabulated radiolytic heating source concentrations. The resulting temperature conditions were used to estimate the pressurization due to evaporation of water from the concrete. The maximum calculated gauge pressures were determined to be 81 kPa (12 psig) for NCT and 580 kPa (84 psig) for HAC.

2001 ◽  
Vol 7 (S2) ◽  
pp. 498-499
Author(s):  
J. S. Young ◽  
Y. Su ◽  
L. Li ◽  
M. L. Balmer

Millions of gallons of high-level radioactive waste are contained in underground tanks at U. S. Department of Energy sites such as Hanford and Savannah River. Most of the radioactivity is due to 137Cs and 90Sr, which must be extracted in order to concentrate the waste. An ion exchanger, crystalline silicotitanate IONSIV® IE911, is being considered for separation of Cs at the Savannah River Site (SRS). While the performance of this ion exchanger has been well characterized under normal operating conditions, Cs removal at slightly elevated temperatures, such as those that may occur in a process upset, is not clear. Our recent study indicates that during exposure to SRS simulant at 55°C and 80°C, an aluminosilicate coating formed on the exchanger surface. There was concern that the coating would affect its ion exchange properties. A LEO 982 field emission scanning electron microscope (FESEM) and an Oxford ISIS energy dispersive x-ray spectrometer (EDS) were used to characterize the coating.


Author(s):  
Donald J. Trapp

Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) is replacing its 6M nuclear shipping fleet with 9977 shipping packages, which were designed by Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL). The new packages require PNNL to perform a preshipment leak test on the lid seals of the containment vessel before the package is shipped on public roads. Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) developed a preshipment leak test using a TM Electronics Solution leak tester for PNNL. The Solution is an automatic vacuum leak tester that uses the Gas Pressure Rise leak test method to check the O-ring lid seals and the test port plug seal. The two tests take three minutes each to perform. Because the Solution is fully automatic, the leak test can be done by operators after a few hours of training. This paper describes the test equipment and the testing sequence.


Author(s):  
Si Y. Lee

Primary objective of the work is to model resin particles within the column during the particle fluidization and sedimentation processes and to understand hydraulic behavior for particles within column during the resin fluidization and sedimentation processes. The modeling results will assist in interpreting experimental results, providing guidance on specific details of testing design, and establishing a basic understanding of resin particle’s hydraulic behavior within the column. The model was benchmarked against the literature data and the test data conducted by Savannah River National Laboratory at Savannah River Site (SRS). A scoping analysis effort has been undertaken to address the feasibility of simulating the basic fluidization and sedimentation aspects pertinent to the resin addition/removal process considered here. The existing computational fluid dynamics (CFD) code Fluent was chosen for this effort. Both fluidization and sedimentation of granular particles (i.e., of varying sizes) were based on an Eulerian model for granular flow. A two-dimensional axial symmetrical cylindrical geometry was chosen to perform the solid-fluid simulations. The column consisted of a fluid region of 48” in diameter by 94” in height where at both the top and bottom boundaries liquid fluid could pass through, but resin particle could not (i.e., assuming screens at both ends).


Author(s):  
Lucas L. Kyriazidis ◽  
Steve J. Hensel ◽  
Jeff M. Jordan

Storage of plutonium bearing materials at the US Department of Energy Savannah River Site (SRS) typically are packaged in DOE-STD-3013 welded containers which are stored in 9975 shipping packages. However, some materials are packaged in non-welded metal containers which consist of a can-bag-can configuration. These non-welded containers and the 9975 package provide safe containment of the plutonium bearing materials. Additionally, the materials must be stabilized such that adverse reactions do not occur during storage. Lastly, a surveillance program of these containers provides field and laboratory data with respect to package aging and potential degradation. The packaging, material stabilization, and surveillance requirements are identified in an Interim Safe Storage Criteria (ISSC) Program at SRS. This paper provides a high level overview of the ISSC program. Interim storage is defined as the storage prior to long term plutonium disposition.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marjan Meurisse ◽  
Adrien Lajot ◽  
Yves Dupont ◽  
Marie Lesenfants ◽  
Sofieke Klamer ◽  
...  

Abstract Background: With the spread of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19), an existing national laboratory based surveillance system was adapted to daily monitor the epidemiological situation of SARS-CoV-2 in the Belgium by following the number of confirmed COVID-19 infections, the number of performed tests and the positivity ratio. We present these main indicators of the surveillance over a one-year period as well as the impact of the performance of the laboratories, regarding speed of processing the samples and reporting results, for surveillance.Methods: We describe the evolution of test capacity, testing strategy and the data collection methods during the first year of the epidemic in Belgium.Results: Between the 1th of March 2020 and the 28th of February 2021, 9,487,470 tests and 773,078 COVID-19 laboratory confirmed cases were reported. Two epidemic waves occurred, with a peak in April and October 2020. The capacity and performance of the laboratories improved continuously during 2020 resulting in a high level performance. Since the end of November 2020 90 to 95% of test results are reported at the latest the day after sampling was performed.Conclusions: Thanks to the effort of all laboratories a performant exhaustive national laboratory based surveillance system to monitor the epidemiological situation of SARS-CoV-2 was set up in Belgium in 2020. On top of expanding the number of laboratories performing diagnostics and significantly increasing the test capacity in Belgium, turnaround times between sampling and testing as well as reporting were optimized over the first year of this pandemic.


Author(s):  
N. M. Askew ◽  
J. E. Laurinat ◽  
S. J. Hensel

As part of a surveillance program intended to ensure the safe storage of plutonium bearing nuclear materials in the Savannah River Site (SRS) K-Area Materials Storage, samples of these materials are shipped to Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) for analysis. These samples are in the form of solids or powders which will have absorbed moisture. Potentially flammable hydrogen gas is generated due to radiolysis of the moisture. The samples are shipped for processing after chemical analysis. To preclude the possibility of a hydrogen deflagration or detonation inside the shipping containers, the shipping times are limited to ensure that hydrogen concentration in the vapor space of every layer of confinement is below the lower flammability limit of 4 volume percent (vol%) [1]. This study presents an analysis of the rate of hydrogen accumulation due to radiolysis and calculation of allowable shipping times for typical K-Area materials.


Author(s):  
Mark R. Duignan ◽  
John R. Zamecnik

Bechtel National, Inc. has been contracted by the Department of Energy to design a Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP) to stabilize liquid radioactive waste that is stored at the Hanford Site as part of the River Protection Project (RPP). Because of its experience with radioactive waste stabilization, the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) of the Westinghouse Savannah River Company is working with Bechtel and Washington Group International, to help design and test certain parts of the waste treatment facility. One part of the process is the separation of radioactive solids from the liquid wastes by cross-flow ultrafiltration. To test this process a cross-flow filter was used that was prototypic in porosity, length, and diameter, along with a simulated radioactive waste slurry, made to prototypically represent the chemical and physical characteristics of a Hanford waste in tank 241-AY-102/C-106. To mimic the filtration process the waste slurry undergoes several steps, including dewatering and washing. During dewatering the concentration of undissolved solids (UDS) of the simulated AY102/C106 waste is increased from 12 wt% to at least 20 wt%. Once at the higher concentration the waste must be washed to prepare for its eventual receipt in a High Level Radioactive Waste Melter to be vitrified. This paper describes the process of washing and filtering a batch of concentrated simulated waste in two cycles, which each containing 22 washing steps that used approximately 7.7 liters of a solution of 0.01 M NaOH per step. This will be the method used by the full-scale WTP to prepare the waste for vitrification. The first washing cycle started with the simulated waste that had a solids concentration of 20 wt% UDS. This cycle began with a permeate filter flux of 0.015 gpm/ft2 (3.68 cm/hr) at 19.6 wt% UDS with a density of 1.33 kg/L, consistency of 19.1 mPa·s, and yield stress of 8.5 Pa. At the end of the 22 washing steps the permeate filter flux increased to 0.023 gpm/ft2 (5.64 cm/hr) at 20.1 wt% UDS with a density of 1.17 kg/L, consistency of 12.6 mPa·s, and yield stress of 10.4 Pa. The average permeate filter flux during the 7 hours of Cycle 1 washing was 0.018 gpm/ft2 (4.41 cm/hr). During Cycle 2 the simulated waste started at a permeate filter flux of 0.025 gpm/ft2 (6.13 cm/hr). Note that the starting flux for Cycle 2 was greater than the ending flux for Cycle 1. The period between the cycles was approximately 12 hours. While no filtering occurred during that period either solids dissolution continued and/or the filter cake was dislodged somewhat with the stopping and starting of filter operation. At the end of the second set of 22 washing steps, the permeate filter flux increased to 0.032 gpm/ft2 (7.84 cm/hr) at 20.6 wt% UDS with a density of 1.16 kg/L, consistency of 9.0 mPa·s, and yield stress of 8.2 Pa. The average permeate filter flux during the 4 hours of Cycle 2 washing was 029 gpm/ft2 (7.11 cm/hr).


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