Missile Talks Doomed from the Start: The U.S.-Soviet talks on European nuclear weapons had built-in flaws and both sides refused to compromise; a resumption is unlikely

Science ◽  
1984 ◽  
Vol 223 (4636) ◽  
pp. 566-570
Author(s):  
R. J. SMITH
1984 ◽  
Vol 17 (01) ◽  
pp. 33-40
Author(s):  
Robert Jervis

A rational strategy for the employment of nuclear weapons is a contradiction in terms. The enormity of the destruction, either executed or threatened, severs the nexus of proportionality between means and ends which used to characterize the threat and use of force. This does not mean, however, that all nuclear strategies are equally irrational. The nuclear policy of the Reagan administration—which is essentially the same as that of the Carter administration and which has its roots in developments initiated by even earlier administrations—is particularly ill-formed. As I will demonstrate, the basic reason for this is that the strategy rests on a profound underestimation of the impact of nuclear weapons on military strategy and attempts to understand the current situation with intellectual tools appropriate only in the pre-nuclear era.American strategy for the past several years—the “countervailing strategy”—has been based on the assumption that what is crucial is the ability of American and allied military forces to deny the Soviets military advantage from any aggression they might contemplate. The U.S. must be prepared to meet and block any level of Soviet force. The strategy is then one of counterforce—blocking and seeking to destroy Soviet military power. The goal is deterrence. Although it is concerned with how the U.S. would fight many different kinds of wars, both nuclear and non-nuclear, it is not correct to claim that the strategy seeks to engage in wars rather than deter them.


Author(s):  
Susan Courtney

Focused on the period of atmospheric (above-ground) nuclear weapons testing in the continental United States, from 1945 to 1963, this chapter, written by Susan Courtney, does two things. First, it describes some of the basic conditions and infrastructure that shaped the proliferation of films of nuclear weapons tests, including the U.S. government’s secret military film studio dedicated to this work in the hills above Los Angeles, known as Lookout Mountain Air Force Station or Lookout Mountain Laboratory. Second, it turns to the representational legacy that resulted, which was by no means limited to films made by or for the military. More specifically, it considers how footage of atomic tests in New Mexico and at the Nevada Test Site helped to shape the filmic record of nuclear weapons—and popular cultural memory—by framing the bomb in the desert West, arguably the screen space of American exceptionalism.


2020 ◽  
pp. 171-177
Author(s):  
Paul J. Magnarella

Paul Magnarella describes his legal work with the UN Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and his travel to Arusha, Tanzania, to work with the UN Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. He describes meeting the O’Neals and agreeing to become Pete O’Neal’s attorney. After examining Pete’s court records and trial transcript, Magnarella concludes that the presiding judge, Arthur J. Stanley, made a number of crucial errors that resulted in Pete’s wrongful conviction. Magnarella examines Judge Stanley’s previous famous case involving George John Gessner, a private first-class nuclear weapons specialist. Judge Stanley’s court found Gessner guilty of communicating restrictive data to a foreign nation. Federal appellate judges overturned the conviction, ruling that the U.S. military had coerced Gessner’s confession and the Stanley court had suspended Gessner’s constitutional protections to satisfy the needs of government.


Worldview ◽  
1971 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
pp. 12-14
Author(s):  
Frederick C. Thayer

The Treaty on the Nonprolrferahon of Nuclear Weapons (N.P.T) has been in effect since March of 1970, the debate over its wisdom has quietly passed into history, and we seem to be living comfortably with the notion that its ratification was a significant step toward international peace. I want to suggest here that we have yet to face up to the problems which almost inevitably lie ahead.The N.P.T. as Alliance. The N.P.T. concept dates from a time when most of us looked upon the nuclear world as truly bipolar. Both the U.S. and USSR felt that it would be better to deal with the certainties of this bipolarity than with the uncertainties of proliferation.


Author(s):  
Nany Tuor ◽  
Allen Schubert

The Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site is a former nuclear weapons production facility owned by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). Located in central Colorado near Denver, the facility produced nuclear and non-nuclear components for weapons from 1953 to 1989. During this period, Rocky Flats grew to more than 800 facilities and structures situated on 2,500 hectares. Production activities and processes contaminated a number of facilities, soil, groundwater and surface water with radioactive and hazardous materials. In 1989, almost all radioactive weapons component production activities at Rocky Flats were suspended due to safety and environmental concerns related to operations, and the site was placed on the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s National Priorities List (also known as the Superfund list). In 1992, the nuclear weapons production role at Rocky Flats officially ended and the mission changed from weapons production to one of risk reduction. In 1995, Kaiser-Hill, LLC (Kaiser-Hill) was awarded a five-year contract to reduce the urgent health and safety risks at the site, as well as begin the cleanup. At that time, the U.S. government estimated that it would cost more than $36 billion and take more than 70 years to cleanup and close Rocky Flats. Beginning in the summer of 1995, Kaiser-Hill developed a series of strategic planning models which demonstrated that accelerated cleanup of the site could be achieved while dramatically reducing cleanup costs. Within a few years, Kaiser-Hill developed a cleanup plan or lifecycle baseline that described how cleanup could be accomplished by 2010 for about $7.3 billion. Additionally, between 1995 and 2000, Kaiser-Hill made significant progress toward stabilizing special nuclear materials, cleaning up environmental contamination, demolishing buildings and shipping radioactive and hazardous waste for disposal. This initial contract was completed for approximately $2.8 billion. In January 2000, based its record of successes, Kaiser-Hill was awarded DOE’s first “closure contract” to close the site no later than December 2006, at a target cost of $3.96 billion. To date, some of the key enablers of the accelerated closure project concept and successful closure project execution include: • Shared vision of the end state; • Flexible, consultative regulatory agreement; • Credible project plan and robust project management systems; • Closure contract; • Empowered and motivated workforce; • Commitment to safety; • Closure-enhancing technologies. The scope of the closure project encompasses the following key completion metrics: • Disposition of 21 metric tons of weapons-grade nuclear materials; • Treatment of more than 100 metric tons of high-content plutonium wastes called residues; • Processing of 30,000 liters of plutonium and enriched uranium solutions; • Demolition of more than 800 facilities and structures totaling more that 325,000 square meters — many of which are contaminated with radioactive and/or hazardous materials; • Offsite shipment of more than 250,000 cubic meters of radioactive waste; • Disposition of approximately 370 environmental sites.


1995 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 244-247 ◽  
Author(s):  
David R. Franz

Proliferation of biological—as well as chemical and nuclear—weapons is a threat to the security of the U.S. in the post-Cold War era. The number of states with biological weapons (BW) programs or with a strong interest in having a BW program has increased significantly since the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) was signed in 1972 (Office of Technology Assessment, 1993). BW programs present difficult intelligence targets. Thus, the Soviet Union was a signatory to the BWC at the time of the Sverdlovsk incident in 1979, yet we knew little of the scope of its BW program until 1991 (Meselson et al., 1994). The spread of biotechnology throughout the world in recent years has made even more governments potentially BW capable.


1983 ◽  
Vol 35 (2) ◽  
pp. 194-215 ◽  
Author(s):  
R. F. Goheen

The issue of nuclear proliferation is replete with problems to which there are no surefire solutions. In this essay, this troublesome terrain is examined in three different but complementary ways: first, through case studies of the nuclear dealings of the U.S. with India and Pakistan; second, in a broad review of incentives toward and dampers on the spread of nuclear weapons; and third, in terms of implications for national policy.


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