Online-Retail Supply Chain Optimization with Credit Period and Selling Price-Dependent Demand

Author(s):  
Xu Chunming ◽  
Wang Changlong ◽  
Ren Jie ◽  
Kang Linyao ◽  
Du Donglei

Credit payment strategies have been implemented widely in the online retail industry. This work studies an online-retail supply chain involving credit period and selling price-dependent demands. The participants of the supply chain form a Stackelberg game where the supplier as a follower sells products to the customers through an online platform provider, who as a leader provides a credit period to customers and charges the supplier based on the quantity of goods sold. We study and compare the supply chains when the online platform provider adopts the cash payment and credit payment strategies, respectively, to investigate the effects of the credit period, the selling price and the default risk on supply chain system performance. We also investigate these supply chains under both the centralized and decentralized settings and provide an example to illustrate a simple allocation mechanism to coordinate the decentralized supply chain. Finally, an extension of the supply chain with credit payment is given.

Author(s):  
Chetansinh R. Vaghela ◽  
Nita H. Shah

This chapter focuses on uncooperative supply chain inventory models when a supplier offers a credit period to the retailer for a fixed period of time. The models are studied with trade credit in Nash game and Supplier-Stackelberg game respectively. First, the authors have presented optimal results for centralized and decentralized decisions with selling price dependent demand and without trade credit. Second, the authors have obtained optimal results under the two games using classical optimization. The total joint profit of the supply chain is maximized with respect to initial lot size, selling price, and trade credit period. Numerical examples are provided to authenticate the proposed model and to provide some managerial insights. Also through sensitivity analysis, important model parameters are examined.


Author(s):  
Rita Yadav ◽  
Sarla Pareek ◽  
Mandeep Mittal

This paper considers a supply chain model for imperfect quality items in which retail price of the buyer influences the demand of the product. The seller offers fix credit period for the buyer to stimulate his sales. Each delivered lot, goes through an inspection process at the buyer's end. After the inspection, items are separated into two parts, one is perfect quality items and another is imperfect quality items. The perfect quality items are sold at selling price and the imperfect items are sold at a discounted price immediately after the inspection process. The credit period offered by the seller and the selling price of the seller, both are considered as a decision variable. Relationship between seller and buyer is derived from the non-cooperative Seller- Stackelberg game approach. Optimal selling price, credit period and order quantity are determined by maximizing expected total profit of the supply chain. At the end, numerical examples with sensitivity analysis are given to explain the theory of the paper.


Mathematics ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 253
Author(s):  
Yuyan Wang ◽  
Zhaoqing Yu ◽  
Liang Shen ◽  
Runjie Fan ◽  
Rongyun Tang

Considering the peculiarities of logistics in the electronic commerce (e-commerce) supply chain (ESC) and e-commerce platform’s altruistic preferences, a model including an e-commerce platform, third-party logistics service provider, and manufacturer is constructed. Based on this, three decision models are proposed and equilibrium solutions are obtained by the Stackelberg game. Then, an “altruistic preference joint fixed-cost” contract is proposed to maximize system efficiency. Finally, numerical analysis is used to validate the findings of the paper. The article not only analyzes and compares the optimal decisions under different ESC models, but also explores the intrinsic factors affecting the decisions. This paper finds that the conclusions of dual-channel supply chains or traditional supply chains do not necessarily apply to ESC, and that the effect of altruistic behavior under ESC is influenced by consumer preferences. Moreover, there is a multiparty win–win state for ESC, and this state can be achieved through the “altruistic preference joint fixed-cost” contract. Therefore, the findings of this paper contribute to the development of an e-commerce market and the cooperation of ESC members.


Author(s):  
Dooho Lee

As awareness of environmental protection increases worldwide, enterprises have been building their supply chains in ways that conserve natural resources and minimize the creation of pollutants. One of the practical ways to make supply chains more sustainable is for enterprises to utilize green innovation strategies and to increase resource reuse. In this work, we focus on a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) consisting of a manufacturer, a retailer, and a collector. In the investigated CLSC, the manufacturer and the retailer drive the green innovation strategy either individually or simultaneously to boost market demand. In the reverse flow of the CLSC, the collector is responsible for collecting consumers’ used products and transferring them to the manufacturer for remanufacturing. By combining two types of the market leadership and three types of green innovation strategies, we establish six different Stackelberg game models and solve them analytically. Through an extensive comparative analysis, we show who should have market leadership and who should drive the green innovation strategy in the CLSC. Various numerical examples are also given to support our major findings. One of our key findings suggests that the supply chain members must participate in green innovation activities at the same time to achieve a win-win scenario in the CLSC.


2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 ◽  
pp. 1-8 ◽  
Author(s):  
Massimiliano Ferrara ◽  
Mehrnoosh Khademi ◽  
Mehdi Salimi ◽  
Somayeh Sharifi

In this paper, we establish a dynamic game to allocate CSR (Corporate Social Responsibility) to the members of a supply chain. We propose a model of a supply chain in a decentralized state which includes a supplier and a manufacturer. For analyzing supply chain performance in decentralized state and the relationships between the members of the supply chain, we formulate a model that crosses through multiperiods with the help of a dynamic discrete Stackelberg game which is made under two different information structures. We obtain an equilibrium point at which both the profits of members and the level of CSR taken up by supply chains are maximized.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mounir Bensalem

The evolution towards Industry 4.0 is driving the need for innovative solutions in the area of network management, considering the complex, dynamic and heterogeneous nature of ICT supply chains. To this end, Intent-Based networking (IBN) which is already proven to evolve how network management is driven today, can be implemented as a solution to facilitate the management of large ICT supply chains. In this paper, we first present a comparison of the main architectural components of typical IBN systems and, then, we study the key engineering requirements when integrating IBN with ICT supply chain network systems while considering AI methods. We also propose a general architecture design that enables intent translation of ICT supply chain specifications into lower level policies, to finally show an example of how the access control is performed in a modeled ICT supply chain system.


Complexity ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 ◽  
pp. 1-12 ◽  
Author(s):  
Junhai Ma ◽  
Wandong Lou

This paper studies the complex characteristics caused by the price competition in multichannel household appliance supply chains. We consider a two-level household appliance supply chain system consisting of a manufacturer with an Internet channel and a retailer with a traditional channel and an Internet channel. Each channel’s price-setting follows the bounded rational decision process in order to obtain the optimal profit or more market share. Considering that the price competition often leads to the demand and order fluctuation, we also investigate the bullwhip effect of the multichannel supply chains on the basis of the order-up-to-inventory policy. From the numerical simulation, we find a system in a chaotic state will suffer larger bullwhip effect than a stable system, and the manufacturer’s Internet channel is helpful to mitigate the bullwhip effect. Our results provide some useful managerial inspirations for the household manufacturer and retailers. Firstly, each channel should make their retail price with a suitable price adjustment speed in the stable region, and each time pricing cannot exceed the domain of attraction. Secondly, the manufacturer can adopt a more radical pricing strategy in their Internet channel to mitigate the bullwhip effect. Thirdly, the price adjustment should be reviewed and be appropriately reduced if the price adjustment is too large.


2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (15) ◽  
pp. 4237 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiaodong Zhu ◽  
Lingfei Yu ◽  
Wei Li

The closed-loop supply chain management model is an effective way to promote sustainable economic development and environmental protection. Increasing the sales volume of remanufactured products to stimulate green growth is a key issue in the development of closed-loop supply chains. By designing an effective warranty strategy, customer’s perceived value can be enhanced and market demand can be stimulated. This study cuts through the warranty period of closed-loop supply chain products. Based on the perspective of consumer behavior, game theory is used to construct the optimal decision-making model for closed-loop supply chains. The optimal warranty decision making for new products and remanufactured products under centralized and decentralized decision-making models is discussed. Further, the impact of the closed-loop supply chain system with warranty services and the design of contract coordination is also shown. We show that consumer preference has a positive impact on the sales of remanufactured products and the profits of enterprises; with the extension of the new product and remanufacturing warranty period, the profit of the supply chain system first increases and then decreases, and the value is maximized at the extreme point in the manufacturer-led decision-making model. Furthermore, the leader gains higher profits with bargaining power, but the profit of the supply chain system under decentralized decision model is less than that of the centralized decision model, reflecting the double marginalization effect. The revenue sharing contract and the two-charge contract designed in this study coordinate the closed-loop supply chain system with warranty services, so that the member companies in the supply chain can achieve Pareto improvement.


2021 ◽  
Vol 4 ◽  
pp. 45-69
Author(s):  
Houssein Hellani ◽  
Layth Sliman ◽  
Abed Ellatif Samhat ◽  
Ernesto Exposito

Modern IT technologies shaped the shift in economic models with many advantages on cost, optimization, and time to market. This economic shift has increased the need for transparency and traceability in supply chain platforms to achieve trust among partners. Distributed ledger technology (DLT) is proposed to enable supply chains systems with trust requirements. In this paper, we investigate the existing DLT-based supply chain projects to show their technical part and limitations and extract the tools and techniques used to avoid the DLT scalability issue. We then set the requirements for a typical DLT-based supply chain in this context. The analyses are based on the scalability metrics such as computing, data storage, and transaction fees that fit the typical supply chain system. This paper highlights the effects of Blockchain techniques on scalability and their incorporation in supply chains systems. It also presents other existing solutions that can be applied to the supply chain. The investigation shows the necessity of having such tools in supply chains and developing them to achieve an efficient and scalable system. The paper calls for further scalability enhancements throughout introducing new tools and/or reutilize the current ones. Doi: 10.28991/esj-2021-SP1-04 Full Text: PDF


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