scholarly journals COORDINATION IN GAMES WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION: EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS

2011 ◽  
Vol 13 (04) ◽  
pp. 461-474 ◽  
Author(s):  
TANGA MORAE MCDANIEL

We use experiments to study coordination in games with incomplete information. In the games, one player knows the payoffs, while the other player knows the probability of payoffs forming a prisoner's dilemma or a stag-hunt. When payoffs form a stag-hunt there are two Pareto ranked pure strategy equilibria. We ask whether cheap talk aids coordination on the socially optimal equilibrium and whether the informed player can use cheap talk to engineer her preferred outcome. Consistent with previous literature, the benefit of cheap talk depends on the relationship between payoffs and risks, and in the games we study; cheap talk benefits informed players only when the stag-hunt payoffs exhibit low risks.

Several experiments were devised to find out whether it is possible to measure the internal shearing stresses in a compressed disc, and the conditions under which it is possible to do so. Equations are developed for analysing shear stresses parallel to planes of slip and distortion due to double and single slipping. The relationship between shear stress and amount of shear is found for tensile and for compression specimens, when slipping is confined to one plane. The experimental results in the two cases are identical. The fact that the component of force normal to plane of slip is a pressure in one case and a tension in the other makes no measurable difference to resistance to slipping for given amount of slip. During double slipping resistance to shear increases more rapidly for a given total amount of slipping than when all slip is confined to one plane. The experiments cover a large range and show that resistance to shear goes on increasing up to greatest amounts of distortion used.


Sensors ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 352 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kairui Cao ◽  
Rui Li

Hysteresis is a kind of nonlinearity with memory, which is usually unwanted in practice. Many phenomenological models have been proposed to describe the observed hysteresis. For instance, the Prandtl-Ishlinskii (PI) model, which consists of several backlash operators, is the most widely used. On the other hand, the well-known Madelung’s rules are always used to validate hysteresis models. It is worth pointing out that the PI model obeys Madelung’s rules. In this paper, instead of considering these rules as criteria, we propose a modeling method for symmetric hysteresis by directly constructing the trajectory based on Madelung’s rules. In the proposed method, turning points are recorded and wiped out according to the input value. After the implementation of the recording and wiping-out mechanisms, the curve which the current trajectory moves along can be determined and then the trajectory can be described. Furthermore, the relationship between the proposed method and the PI model is also investigated. The effectiveness of the presented method is validated by simulation and experimental results.


2020 ◽  
Vol 110 (12) ◽  
pp. 3817-3835
Author(s):  
Takuo Sugaya ◽  
Alexander Wolitzky

We study anonymous repeated games where players may be “commitment types” who always take the same action. We establish a stark anti-folk theorem: if the distribution of the number of commitment types satisfies a smoothness condition and the game has a “pairwise dominant” action, this action is almost always taken. This implies that cooperation is impossible in the repeated prisoner's dilemma with anonymous random matching. We also bound equilibrium payoffs for general games. Our bound implies that industry profits converge to zero in linear-demand Cournot oligopoly as the number of firms increases. (JEL C72, C73, D83)


2010 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 19-22 ◽  
Author(s):  
Toko Kiyonari

We examined if naive observers can distinguish defectors from cooperators even when defectors may be motivated to present themselves positively. In Study 1, 150 participants played a “semi-sequential” Prisoner’s Dilemma Game (PDG) with real monetary incentives, half as first players and half as second players. First players decided to cooperate or defect, and second players made the same decision without knowing the first player’s choice. The first player was given a chance to present a video message to the second player before the latter made their decision. After the PDG, players played a separate one-shot, semi-sequential Stag Hunt Game (SHG), a coordination game where cooperation is the best choice insofar as the other also cooperates. In this game, the first player was not given a chance to send a video message. When the players had incentives to hide intentions or manipulate impressions of themselves, even motivated judges (whose monetary gain depended on the accuracy of cheater/cooperator detection) could not distinguish defectors from cooperators in either the PDG or SHG. However, they were able to discriminate “hard-core defectors” who defected in both games. In Study 2, however, in which judges had no monetary incentives to detect targets’ choices, participants were unable to discern even hard-core defectors. The contents of the messages did not provide help discerning defectors.


Sensors ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (8) ◽  
pp. 2170 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yuya Moroto ◽  
Keisuke Maeda ◽  
Takahiro Ogawa ◽  
Miki Haseyama

A few-shot personalized saliency prediction based on adaptive image selection considering object and visual attention is presented in this paper. Since general methods predicting personalized saliency maps (PSMs) need a large number of training images, the establishment of a theory using a small number of training images is needed. To tackle this problem, although finding persons who have visual attention similar to that of a target person is effective, all persons have to commonly gaze at many images. Thus, it becomes difficult and unrealistic when considering their burden. On the other hand, this paper introduces a novel adaptive image selection (AIS) scheme that focuses on the relationship between human visual attention and objects in images. AIS focuses on both a diversity of objects in images and a variance of PSMs for the objects. Specifically, AIS selects images so that selected images have various kinds of objects to maintain their diversity. Moreover, AIS guarantees the high variance of PSMs for persons since it represents the regions that many persons commonly gaze at or do not gaze at. The proposed method enables selecting similar users from a small number of images by selecting images that have high diversities and variances. This is the technical contribution of this paper. Experimental results show the effectiveness of our personalized saliency prediction including the new image selection scheme.


Author(s):  
Walter Wahl

The investigation of the crystalline properties of the simpler organic bodies, gaseous or liquid at Ordinary temperature, has been described in Parts I and II.* In this paper the experimental results will be discussed with regard to their bearing upon the problem of the relationship between molecular constitution and crystal symmetry. In order to facilitate a comparison the experimental results are summarised in the table on p. 2. As seen from the table, more than 50 per cent, of the substances investigated are polymorphic, and to this class nearly all the substances which contain only one carbon atom belong. The question therefore arises which one of the crystalline modifications of a substance is to be compared with the one or the other form of another substance, or with the crystals of a substance of which only one modification is known. In most of the cases investigated very little is known with regard to the modification stable at low temperature, and thus for practical reasons only the form crystallising directly out of the liquid state can be taken into account.


2019 ◽  
Vol 31 (3) ◽  
pp. 370-402 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brenton Kenkel

Incomplete information exacerbates the problems inherent in collective action. Participants cannot efficiently coordinate their actions if they do not know each other’s preferences. I investigate when ordinary communication, or cheap talk, may resolve mutual uncertainty in collective action problems. I find that the efficacy of communication depends critically on the relationship between contributions and the value of the joint project. The incentive barriers to honesty are highest when every contribution increases the project’s value. Participants then have a strict incentive to say whatever would induce others to contribute the most, so cheap talk lacks credibility. By contrast, when contributions may be marginally worthless, such as when the project has no value unless contributions hit a certain threshold, communication may help participants avoid wasted effort. Using these findings, I identify which collective action problems in politics might benefit from communication and which require more expensive solutions to overcome uncertainty.


2018 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 1-21
Author(s):  
Luis E. Castro ◽  
Nazrul I. Shaikh

This article presents the relationship between a firm's advertisement spending and sales in a duopoly when information about the competitors' advertisement spending is unavailable. The competitive interaction between the firms has been modeled as imperfect information Cournot and Stackelberg games and the conditions for subgame perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium are presented. The results suggest that when the firms are similar in size and advertisement effectiveness, both firms are better off sharing their advertising plans with each other. On the other hand, when one of the firms is a market leader, the follower may profit from the leader's advertisement spending and so is better off keeping the leader guessing. A practical approach to estimate the optimum advertisement budget based on the expected values of the competitors' historic advertising spending is presented as well.


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