R&D INVESTMENTS AS PREBARGAINING STRATEGIES

2014 ◽  
Vol 16 (03) ◽  
pp. 1450003 ◽  
Author(s):  
WILFRIED PAUWELS ◽  
PETER M. KORT ◽  
EVE VANHAECHT
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Low Cost ◽  
Unit Cost ◽  
The Other ◽  
Nash Bargaining ◽  
Unit Costs ◽  
Bargaining Outcome ◽  
Nash Bargaining Game ◽  
Output Market ◽  
The Difference

This paper analyzes a semicollusive, differentiated duopoly. Firms first compete in cost reducing R&D and then cooperate on the output market. The sharing of the joint profit on the output market is modeled as a Nash bargaining game. We study an asymmetric setting in which one firm has a lower unit cost of production than the other firm, before any R&D expenditures. If firms do not agree on how to share their joint profit, they play a noncooperative Nash equilibrium. Assuming linear demand functions, we show that the Nash bargaining outcome is independent of whether firms play a Cournot or a Bertrand Nash equilibrium, as long as both firms supply positive outputs in these equilibria. If the two products are sufficiently differentiated, there is a unique equilibrium in which both firms supply a positive output, and in which the low cost firm always invests more in R&D than the high cost firm. If the two products are not very differentiated, and if the difference in unit costs between the two firms is not too large, there exist two equilibria. In each of these equilibria only one firm supplies a positive output. This can be the low cost or the high cost firm. In the latter case, the initially high cost firm invests so much in R&D that its unit cost after R&D is lower than that of the other firm. This firm then leapfrogs the other firm. If the two products are very similar and if firms apply Bertrand strategies when disagreeing, there exist equilibria in which only one firm supplies a positive output, while in the noncooperative Nash equilibrium that same firm can prevent the other firm from entering the market. We show that, in the context of the Nash bargaining model, this latter firm still has the power to claim a share of the joint profit.

scholarly journals Stochastic Brownian Game of Absolute Dominance

2014 ◽  
Vol 51 (2) ◽  
pp. 436-452
Author(s):  
Shangzhen Luo
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Value Function ◽  
The Other ◽  
Equilibrium Strategy ◽  
Minimax Criterion ◽  
Nash Equilibrium Strategy ◽  
Suitable Parameter ◽  
The Difference ◽  
The Value Function ◽  
Absolute Dominance

In this paper we study a reinsurance game between two insurers whose surplus processes are modeled by arithmetic Brownian motions. We assume a minimax criterion in the game. One insurer tries to maximize the probability of absolute dominance while the other tries to minimize it through reinsurance control. Here absolute dominance is defined as the event that liminf of the difference of the surplus levels tends to -∞. Under suitable parameter conditions, the game is solved with the value function and the Nash equilibrium strategy given in explicit form.

Stochastic Brownian Game of Absolute Dominance

2014 ◽  
Vol 51 (02) ◽  
pp. 436-452 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shangzhen Luo
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Value Function ◽  
The Other ◽  
Equilibrium Strategy ◽  
Minimax Criterion ◽  
Nash Equilibrium Strategy ◽  
Suitable Parameter ◽  
The Difference ◽  
The Value Function ◽  
Absolute Dominance

In this paper we study a reinsurance game between two insurers whose surplus processes are modeled by arithmetic Brownian motions. We assume a minimax criterion in the game. One insurer tries to maximize the probability of absolute dominance while the other tries to minimize it through reinsurance control. Here absolute dominance is defined as the event that liminf of the difference of the surplus levels tends to -∞. Under suitable parameter conditions, the game is solved with the value function and the Nash equilibrium strategy given in explicit form.

scholarly journals Consumer Dispute Resolution: A Comparative Study between Indonesia and Common Law System Countries

2017 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 327-333
Author(s):  
Keyword(s):  
Dispute Resolution ◽  
Low Cost ◽  
Common Law ◽  
The Other ◽  
Anglo Saxon ◽  
Law System ◽  
Presidential Decree ◽  
Small Claims ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Small Claims Court

Abstract Since 2001, based on the mandate of Article 49 paragraph (1) of Law no. 8 of 1999 on Consumer Protection, BPSK (Badan Penyelesaian Sengketa Konsumen/Consumer Dispute Resolution Institution) has been established based on Presidential Decree No. 90/2001 on the establishment of BPSK in several cities in Indonesia. In some countries that embrace the Anglo Saxon legal system, consumer dispute cases are resolved by an institution called The Small Claims Court (SCC) and The Small Claims Tribunal (SCT). The difference in settlement through three institutions is that BPSK is a formal institution which resolves small disputes with low-cost, but does not limit the size of the lawsuit filed by consumers. On the other hand, SCT provides clear restrictions on claims that can be filed by consumers. At the completion done by SCC, the assemblies that resolved the case come from active and retired judges, while in BPSK the assemblies come from government, businessman and consumer with different backgrounds.

scholarly journals Calculating constant-reliability water supply unit costs

Water Policy ◽  
2007 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 95-104 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gary Wolff
Keyword(s):  
Surface Water ◽  
Water Supply ◽  
Water Conservation ◽  
Financial Analysis ◽  
Low Cost ◽  
Demand Management ◽  
Unit Cost ◽  
Decision Criterion ◽  
Unit Costs ◽  
Reliability Characteristics

Water planners facing a choice between water “supply” options (including conservation) customarily use the average unit cost of each option as a decision criterion. This approach is misleading and potentially costly when comparing options with very different reliability characteristics. For example, surface water, desalinated seawater or recycled wastewater and some outdoor demand management programs have very different yield patterns. This paper presents a method for calculating constant-reliability unit costs that adapts some concepts and mathematics from financial portfolio theory. Comparison on a constant-reliability basis can significantly change the relative attractiveness of options. In particular, surface water, usually a low cost option, is more expensive after its variability has been accounted for. Further, options that are uncorrelated or inversely correlated with existing supply sources—such as outdoor water conservation—will be more attractive than they initially appear. This insight, which implies options should be evaluated and chosen as packages rather than individually, opens up a new dimension of yield and financial analysis for water planners.

scholarly journals Stochastic Brownian Game of Absolute Dominance

2014 ◽  
Vol 51 (02) ◽  
pp. 436-452
Author(s):  
Shangzhen Luo
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Value Function ◽  
The Other ◽  
Equilibrium Strategy ◽  
Minimax Criterion ◽  
Nash Equilibrium Strategy ◽  
Suitable Parameter ◽  
The Difference ◽  
The Value Function ◽  
Absolute Dominance

In this paper we study a reinsurance game between two insurers whose surplus processes are modeled by arithmetic Brownian motions. We assume a minimax criterion in the game. One insurer tries to maximize the probability of absolute dominance while the other tries to minimize it through reinsurance control. Here absolute dominance is defined as the event that liminf of the difference of the surplus levels tends to -∞. Under suitable parameter conditions, the game is solved with the value function and the Nash equilibrium strategy given in explicit form.

scholarly journals A Hierarchical Resource Allocation Scheme Based on Nash Bargaining Game in VANET

Information ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (6) ◽  
pp. 196
Author(s):  
Xiaoshuai Zhao ◽  
Xiaoyong Zhang ◽  
Yingjuan Li
Keyword(s):  
Resource Allocation ◽  
Bargaining Game ◽  
Allocation Problem ◽  
Nash Bargaining ◽  
Resource Allocation Problem ◽  
Allocation Scheme ◽  
Computational Overhead ◽  
Nash Bargaining Game ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Resource Allocation Scheme

Due to the selfishness of vehicles and the scarcity of spectrum resources, how to realize fair and effective spectrum resources allocation has become one of the primary tasks in VANET. In this paper, we propose a hierarchical resource allocation scheme based on Nash bargaining game. Firstly, we analyze the spectrum resource allocation problem between different Road Side Units (RSUs), which obtain resources from the central cloud. Thereafter, considering the difference of vehicular users (VUEs), we construct the matching degree index between VUEs and RSUs. Then, we deal with the spectrum resource allocation problem between VUEs and RSUs. To reduce computational overhead, we transform the original problem into two sub-problems: power allocation and slot allocation, according to the time division multiplexing mechanism. The simulation results show that the proposed scheme can fairly and effectively allocate resources in VANET according to VUEs’ demand.

scholarly journals Analisis Biaya Satuan Pelayanan Sectio Caesaria dan Upaya Efisiensinya di RSD Kol. Abundjani Bangko

2020 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Tetriadi Tetri Tetriadi ◽  
Atik Nurwahyuni
Keyword(s):  
Clinical Pathway ◽  
Unit Cost ◽  
Class Iii ◽  
Cross Sectional ◽  
Unit Costs ◽  
Service Efficiency ◽  
The Difference ◽  
The Government ◽  
Quantitative Descriptive ◽  
Universal Health

AbstrakStudi ini membahas laporan semester 1 tahun 2018 adanya selisih pendapatan pelayanan sectio caesaria BPJS dengan tarif rumah sakit sebesar Rp508.932.651. Tahun 2019 akan diberlakukan UHC (Universal Health Caverage) sedangkan BPJS kesehatan menurut Undang-undang no. 24 tahun 2011 ditunjuk pemerintah sebagai badan pengelola jaminan kesehatan. Rumah sakit perlu melakukan perhitungan biaya pelayanan menggunakan unit cost agar tigak mengalami devisit. Tujuan Penelitian ini adalah terciptanya unit cost layanan kasus sectio caesaria serta efisiensinya di RSD Kol Abundjani Bangko. Metode Penelitian merupakan penelitian deskriptif kuantitatif dengan metode cros sectional menggunakan double distribution dan dilajutkan dengan perhitungan RVU, sedangkan efisiensi layanan menggunakan clinical pathway (CP) rumah sakit ditambah tool CP dari FKM-UI. Sampel penelitian adalah pasien sectio caesaria kelas 3 tanpa komplikasi, menggunakan data retrospektif tahun 2017. Hasil Penelitian diperolehnya biaya layanan section caesaria di RSD Kol. Abundjani Bangko, ruang rawat VIP Rp6.704.891, kelas I Rp6.491.721, kelas II Rp6.320.449 dan kelas III Rp6.503.920 serta inefisiensi ruang OK/OKE Rp571.754, laboratorium Rp20.105, obat Rp203.608, alkes dan BHP Rp74.084. Kesimpulan diperolehnya unit cost pelayanan sectio caesaria serta inefeisiensinya di RSD Kol. Abundjani Bangko.Abstract This study discusses the semester 1 report of 2018 with the difference in income from the caesaria section BPJS service with the hospital rate of Rp 508,932,651. In 2019 UHC (Universal Health Caverage) will be implemented while health BPJS according to Law no. 24 of 2011 was appointed by the government as the health insurance management body. Hospitals need to calculate service costs using unit costs so that they experience devisit. The purpose of this study was to create unit cost services for caesarean sectio cases and their efficiency at RSD Kol. Abundjani Bangko. The research method is a quantitative descriptive study with cross sectional method using double distribution and continued with the calculation of RVU, while service efficiency uses the clinical pathway (CP) hospital plus CP tools from FKM UI. The sample of the study was uncomplicated class 3 sectio caesaria patients, using 2017 retrospective data. The results of the study obtained the service fee for the caesaria section at RSD Kol. Abundjani Bangko, VIP care room Rp.6,704,891, class I Rp.6,491,721, class II Rp.6,320,449 and class III Rp6,503,920 and inefficiency of OK / OKE space Rp571,754, laboratory Rp20,105, medicine Rp203,608, medical equipment and BHP Rp74,084. Conclusion obtained unit cost of sectio caesaria service and its inefficiency at RSD Kol. Abundjani Bangko.

Enhancement of ADP-induced Platelet Aggregation by Adrenaline in Vivo and Its Prevention

1973 ◽  
Vol 29 (02) ◽  
pp. 490-498 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hiroh Yamazaki ◽  
Itsuro Kobayashi ◽  
Tadahiro Sano ◽  
Takio Shimamoto
Keyword(s):  
Platelet Count ◽  
Platelet Aggregation ◽  
Platelet Rich Plasma ◽  
The Other ◽  
Endothelial Surface ◽  
Important Interaction ◽  
Blood Coagulability ◽  
The Difference

SummaryThe authors previously reported a transient decrease in adhesive platelet count and an enhancement of blood coagulability after administration of a small amount of adrenaline (0.1-1 µg per Kg, i. v.) in man and rabbit. In such circumstances, the sensitivity of platelets to aggregation induced by ADP was studied by an optical density method. Five minutes after i. v. injection of 1 µg per Kg of adrenaline in 10 rabbits, intensity of platelet aggregation increased to 115.1 ± 4.9% (mean ± S. E.) by 10∼5 molar, 121.8 ± 7.8% by 3 × 10-6 molar and 129.4 ± 12.8% of the value before the injection by 10”6 molar ADP. The difference was statistically significant (P<0.01-0.05). The above change was not observed in each group of rabbits injected with saline, 1 µg per Kg of 1-noradrenaline or 0.1 and 10 µg per Kg of adrenaline. Also, it was prevented by oral administration of 10 mg per Kg of phenoxybenzamine or propranolol or aspirin or pyridinolcarbamate 3 hours before the challenge. On the other hand, the enhancement of ADP-induced platelet aggregation was not observed in vitro, when 10-5 or 3 × 10-6 molar and 129.4 ± 12.8% of the value before 10∼6 molar ADP was added to citrated platelet rich plasma (CPRP) of rabbit after incubation at 37°C for 30 second with 0.01, 0.1, 1, 10 or 100 µg per ml of adrenaline or noradrenaline. These results suggest an important interaction between endothelial surface and platelets in connection with the enhancement of ADP-induced platelet aggregation by adrenaline in vivo.

Energy Approximation

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philip Isett
Keyword(s):  
Main Lemma ◽  
The Other ◽  
Coarse Scale ◽  
Continuous Solutions ◽  
Material Derivative ◽  
Energy Variation ◽  
Energy Approximation ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Derivatives Of

This chapter presents the equations and calculations for energy approximation. It establishes the estimates (261) and (262) of the Main Lemma (10.1) for continuous solutions; these estimates state that we are able to accurately prescribe the energy that the correction adds to the solution, as well as bound the difference between the time derivatives of these two quantities. The chapter also introduces the proposition for prescribing energy, followed by the relevant computations. Each integral contributing to the other term can be estimated. Another proposition for estimating control over the rate of energy variation is given. Finally, the coarse scale material derivative is considered.

Pengaruh Unsur Budaya Lokal dalam Ungkapan Berbahasa Perancis

Metahumaniora ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 378
Author(s):  
Vincentia Tri Handayani
Keyword(s):  
Mental Representation ◽  
Cultural Context ◽  
Oral Tradition ◽  
Minimal Element ◽  
The Other ◽  
Local Culture ◽  
Community Groups ◽  
Cultural Community ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Complex Words

AbstrakFolklor yang menghasilkan tradisi lisan merupakan perwujudan budaya yang lahirdari pengalaman kelompok masyarakat. Salah satu bentuk tradisi lisan adalah ungkapan yangmengandung unsur budaya lokal dalam konstruksinya yang tidak dimiliki budaya lainnya.Ungkapan idiomatis memberikan warna pada bahasa melalui penggambaran mental. Dalambahasa Perancis, ungkapan dapat berupa locution dan expression. Perbedaan motif acuansuatu ungkapan dapat terlihat dari pengaruh budaya masyarakat pengguna bahasa. Sebuahleksem tidak selalu didefinisikan melalui unsur minimal, tidak juga melalui kata-kata,baik kata dasar atau kata kompleks, namun dapat melalui kata-kata beku yang maknanyatetap. Hubungan analogis dari makna tambahan yang ada pada suatu leksem muncul dariidentifikasi semem yang sama. Semem tersebut mengarah pada term yang diasosiasikan danyang diperkaya melalui konteks (dalam ungkapan berhubungan dengan konteks budaya).Kata kunci: folklor, ungkapan, struktur, makna idiomatis, kebudayaanAbstractFolklore which produces the oral tradition is a cultural manifestation born out theexperience of community groups. One form of the oral tradition is a phrase that containsthe elements of local culture in its construction that is not owned the other culture. Theidiomatic phrase gives the color to the language through the mental representation. InFrench, the expression can consist of locution and expression. The difference motivesreference of an expression can be seen from the influence of the cultural community thelanguage users. A lexeme is not always defined through a minimal element, nor throughwords, either basic or complex words, but can be through the frost words whose meaningsare fixed. The analogical connection of the additional meanings is on a lexeme arises fromthe identification of the same meaning. The meaning ‘semem’ leads to the associated termsand which are enriched through the context (in idiom related to the cultural context).Keywords : folklore, idioms, structure, idiom meaning, cultureI PENDAHULUAN

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