scholarly journals Pricing in Information Orchestrators and Maximizing Stable Networks

2019 ◽  
Vol 21 (03) ◽  
pp. 1850013
Author(s):  
Bernardo C. Lustosa ◽  
Alberto L. Albertin ◽  
Fernando Moreira

In innovation networks based on information exchange, an orchestrating actor, or hub, captures information from peripheral actors, promotes innovation and then distributes it to the network in the form of added value. This paper identifies the pricing options proposed by the orchestrating hub that would result in the network’s stability and efficiency. Since all the companies in this ecosystem can be seen as rational agents, game theory is an appropriate framework for studying pricing as a mechanism to promote network stability. We analyze the equilibrium conditions in this context and conclude that the Nash equilibrium entails the network’s stability. Our findings indicate that, in order to maximize the innovation power of the network, the agents should be charged a price proportional to the financial benefit obtained by the net innovation. This study fills relevant gaps in the literature on monopolistic orchestrated innovation and the pricing structures of network connections.

Author(s):  
Herbert Gintis

This chapter uses epistemic game theory to expand on the notion of social norms as choreographer of a correlated equilibrium, and to elucidate the socio-psychological prerequisites for the notion that social norms implement correlated equilibria. The correlated equilibrium is a much more natural equilibrium criterion than the Nash equilibrium, because of a famous theorem of Aumann (1987), who showed that Bayesian rational agents in an epistemic game G with a common subjective prior play a correlated equilibrium of G. Thus, while rationality and common priors do not imply Nash equilibrium, these assumptions do imply correlated equilibrium and social norms act not only as choreographer, but also supply the epistemic conditions for common priors.


2011 ◽  
pp. 65-87 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. Rubinstein

The article considers some aspects of the patronized goods theory with respect to efficient and inefficient equilibria. The author analyzes specific features of patronized goods as well as their connection with market failures, and conjectures that they are related to the emergence of Pareto-inefficient Nash equilibria. The key problem is the analysis of the opportunities for transforming inefficient Nash equilibrium into Pareto-optimal Nash equilibrium for patronized goods by modifying the institutional environment. The paper analyzes social motivation for institutional modernization and equilibrium conditions in the generalized Wicksell-Lindahl model for patronized goods. The author also considers some applications of patronized goods theory to social policy issues.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Richter ◽  
Ariel Rubinstein

Abstract Each member of a group chooses a position and has preferences regarding his chosen position. The group’s harmony depends on the profile of chosen positions meeting a specific condition. We analyse a solution concept (Richter and Rubinstein, 2020) based on a permissible set of individual positions, which plays a role analogous to that of prices in competitive equilibrium. Given the permissible set, members choose their most preferred position. The set is tightened if the chosen positions are inharmonious and relaxed if the restrictions are unnecessary. This new equilibrium concept yields more attractive outcomes than does Nash equilibrium in the corresponding game.


Games ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 7
Author(s):  
Vassili N. Kolokoltsov

Quantum games and mean-field games (MFG) represent two important new branches of game theory. In a recent paper the author developed quantum MFGs merging these two branches. These quantum MFGs were based on the theory of continuous quantum observations and filtering of diffusive type. In the present paper we develop the analogous quantum MFG theory based on continuous quantum observations and filtering of counting type. However, proving existence and uniqueness of the solutions for resulting limiting forward-backward system based on jump-type processes on manifolds seems to be more complicated than for diffusions. In this paper we only prove that if a solution exists, then it gives an ϵ-Nash equilibrium for the corresponding N-player quantum game. The existence of solutions is suggested as an interesting open problem.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
S M Nazmuz Sakib

As may be seen, cryptography and game theory are the 2 primary parts of the phrase. game theory thinks about with optimizing a result involving 2 or a lot of well-defined parties, every with well-defined behavior. Nash equilibrium could be a notion in game theory that emphasizes the participants' mutual profit. , the unpredictability of the operational state of affairs, don't seem to be laid out in game theory. The goal of cryptography is to produce safe message transmission between genuine and approved parties. Multiparty computing could be a cryptographical technique that enables 2 or a lot of participants to calculate a perform conjointly. this can be kind of like the concept of reciprocal profit in game theory. throughout the employment of the protocol, all parties have a precise set of behavior determined, kind of like game theory. The parties, as an example, a probabilistic polynomials in nature. Cryptography doesn't specify however AN assailant could use it to breach the system just like the operation condition. In cryptography, multiparty interaction is outlined as parties communication to judge a perform on their inputs.


2016 ◽  
Vol 28 (5) ◽  
pp. 471-477
Author(s):  
Shumin Feng ◽  
Xianghao Shen ◽  
Baoyu Hu

As the two most important modes in public transportation, the coordinated development of bus and metro networks significantly influences the efficiency of public transportation. However, two parallel bus and metro lines belonging to different operators may lead to supply competition and consequently yield over-supply. Taking two parallel bus and metro lines in Harbin city, China as a case study, this paper, drawing on game theory, establishes a utility model based on the two lines’ frequencies, and reveals and explains the fundamental reason for the over-supply problem using a Nash equilibrium. In an attempt to resolve this issue, the study proposes a new operation mode: integrating frequencies of the two modes to obtain larger total profits then reallocating the total profits to the two modes. The case study shows that this new operation mode can effectively solve the over-supply problem while satisfying both operators of the two modes, and hence having practical value.


2013 ◽  
Vol 347-350 ◽  
pp. 3971-3974 ◽  
Author(s):  
Heng Xiao ◽  
Cao Fang Long

With the development of network application, network security is facing greater pressure. Based on the characteristics of intrusion detection in the wireless network of the Ad hoc working group, the article introduces the game theory, proposes a game model of network security, concluds the Nash equilibrium in the stage game, repeats game, the pareto Nash equilibrium, more attack both income and payment, so that they get the best choice.


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