China–Pakistan Maritime Cooperation in the Indian Ocean

2019 ◽  
Vol 55 (03) ◽  
pp. 1940005
Author(s):  
GHULAM ALI
Keyword(s):  
Indian Ocean ◽  
Arms Race ◽  
Mutual Benefit ◽  
Military Assistance ◽  
Naval Power ◽  
Nuclear Component ◽  
The Indian Ocean

This paper argues that during the last two decades, China and Pakistan have strengthened their maritime cooperation in the Indian Ocean to their mutual benefit. Based upon its geostrategic location and vast maritime experience, Pakistan has promoted China’s growing interests in the Indian Ocean and received China’s economic, technological and military assistance in return. India has responded to these developments by expanding its naval power, adding a nuclear component and aligning with like-minded states. The paper concludes that a lack of institutional mechanisms, coordination and trust among the three can potentially expand their rivalry seawards, triggering a new naval arms race.

The Maritime Adventures of Grand Eunuch Ho

1964 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 25-42 ◽  
Author(s):  
William Willetts
Keyword(s):  
Indian Ocean ◽  
South Asia ◽  
Naval Power ◽  
The Indian Ocean ◽  
Mandate Of Heaven ◽  
To Receive

In 1368 a native Chinese dynasty, the Ming, received the Mandate of Heaven, and after a century and a half of alien rule a true son of Han ascended the Dragon Throne. A burst of diplomatic activity followed. It took the form of a grandiose series of naval expeditions designed to announce to the more-or-less petty rulers of South Asia the advent of a new native house, and to receive their tribute. Over the next hundred years the Chinese established themselves as the dominant naval power in the Indian Ocean.

scholarly journals India and China in the Indian Ocean: Changing Dimensions of Maritime Strategy

2021 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Anju Lis Kurian ◽  
◽  
C. Vinodan ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Indian Ocean ◽  
Driving Forces ◽  
New Delhi ◽  
Power Politics ◽  
Naval Power ◽  
Global Power ◽  
The Indian Ocean ◽  
Maritime Strategy ◽  
Security Affairs ◽  
India And China

In Asian and global power politics a maritime strategic angle concentrates on the value of fortifying and controlling sea lines of communications (SLOCs) for stability, economic growth, and development of nations. Consequently, both India and China are snooping to control SLOCs and safeguard their emergent and escalating worldwide interests. The advancement in and expansion of naval power satisfies the corresponding nationalist aspirations of Beijing and New Delhi. As a result, the development of their maritime capabilities would have a greater impact on the naval security architecture in the Indian Ocean. The hike in Chinese engagements across the Indian Ocean widely known as the String of Pearl’s stratagem is principally stimulated by a policy of maritime encirclement of India. Struggle to secure tactical energy resources which are quickly revolutionizing their navies could induce clashes and have major repercussions for global security affairs. Harmonious handling of both China’s and India’s cooperation will be crucial for regional as well as international peace and opulence shortly and everyone looks upon a fabulous Asia reflected in the world. Thus, this paper analyses the underlying factors that motivate both countries to have ambitious objectives in the Indian Ocean and could find out that securing energy is one of the driving forces in securing maritime dominance across the Indian Ocean.

China’s Evolving Strategy in the Indian Ocean Region

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jabin T. Jacob
Keyword(s):  
Indian Ocean ◽  
Communist Party ◽  
South Asian ◽  
Military Assistance ◽  
Asian Countries ◽  
Indian Ocean Region ◽  
Ocean Region ◽  
The Indian Ocean ◽  
Potential Failure ◽  
Economic Slowdown

Jabin T. Jacob, an Indian analyst on China, provides a more skeptical view on the MSR and the risks China faces in that initiative. Jacob argues that the challenge of the MSR initiative for China is not just the obvious strategic benefits, but also the consequences of the potential failure of the strategy. This might happen due to China’s current economic slowdown which would affect China’s neighbours too. The potential failure of Xi Jinping’s grand foreign policy project also has consequences for his own credibility at home and for the Communist Party of China. If the cash runs out and the going gets tough, might China resort to tested methods of focusing on military assistance, not only in Pakistan, but in other South Asian countries, with potential adverse consequences for India?

Naval power in the Indian Ocean

1975 ◽  
Vol 65 (257) ◽  
pp. 59-72 ◽  
Author(s):  
B. Vivekanandan
Keyword(s):  
Indian Ocean ◽  
Naval Power ◽  
The Indian Ocean

The Overrated adversary: Rhodes and Ottoman naval power

1993 ◽  
Vol 36 (3) ◽  
pp. 517-541 ◽  
Author(s):  
Palmira Brummett
Keyword(s):  
Sixteenth Century ◽  
Indian Ocean ◽  
Eastern Mediterranean ◽  
Diplomatic Relations ◽  
Relative Power ◽  
Naval Power ◽  
Great Fear ◽  
The Indian Ocean ◽  
Merchant Shipping ◽  
Defensive Measures

ABSTRACTThis essay examines the relative power of the Rhodian and Ottoman fleets in the first decades of the sixteenth century, taking as its context the commercial and diplomatic relations of the eastern Levantine states. After the Aegean wars of 1499–1503 Rhodes failed to mobilize a Christian alliance against the Ottomans. Nor did the rise of Ismail Safavi in Iran provide the hoped for relief from Ottoman expansion. While the Ottoman state was preoccupied with the succession struggle for Bayezid's throne and with plans to extend its hegemony to the Indian Ocean, Rhodes was fighting for survival. Although the development of the Ottoman fleet provoked great fear in Rhodes, Venice and the Mamluk kingdom, Ottoman naval power until the conquest of Cairo in 151J was directed primarily to defensive and transport activities. Further the Ottoman fleet provided security against corsairs for merchant shipping. By supporting the corsair activities of Order members, Rhodes alienated the Mamluk state, Venice and France (allpotential allies in an anti-Ottoman coalition) but refrained from directly challenging the Ottoman navy. Naval engagements during this period cannot be understood without taking into consideration the prolonged conditions of grain shortage in the Aegean and eastern Mediterranean. Both aggressive and defensive measures taken by the Ottoman, Venetian and Rhodian fleets Were ordinarily related to the competition for foodstuffs during this period rather than the conquest of territory or the establishment of commercial dominance (as in the Indian Ocean).

China and India in the Indian Ocean Region

China Report ◽  
2010 ◽  
Vol 46 (3) ◽  
pp. 311-318 ◽  
Author(s):  
C. Uday Bhaskar
Keyword(s):  
Indian Ocean ◽  
Indian Ocean Region ◽  
China And India ◽  
Naval Power ◽  
Political Ideologies ◽  
Ocean Region ◽  
The Indian Ocean ◽  
Future Outcomes ◽  
Dependency Index

China and India have divergent political ideologies, characteristics, aspirations, anxieties, and hence their strategic perceptions and orientations differ. Their strategic interaction in southern Asia has for its backdrop the 1962 border conflict. In terms of maritime security, the Pacific–Indian Ocean continuum has become the centre of gravity post-9/11 with both China and India having long-term growth trajectories in terms of naval power, a process skewed in favour of the PLA Navy (PLAN). Cognisance of the maritime dependency index for energy and anxieties about secure sea-lines of communication (SLOC) by China and India give rise to a ‘Malacca dilemma’ and a ‘Hormuz dilemma’ respectively. The firm belief at the politico-military apex that Beijing’s future strategic profile and relevance is inexorably linked with its naval capability gives the PLAN a steadily increasing footprint in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). Active political engagements and long-term port investments in the IOR by Beijing, though presented as benign, trigger concerns in India. These equations are influenced by a three-tiered strategic subalternity in Asia between the US (and its allies), China and India. The manner in which contested territoriality between the Asian neighbours will be resolved is the key on which future outcomes depend. While this may point towards China acquiring a military edge in the IOR, for India prudence, restraint and capacity-building remain vital.

Strategic-Maritime Triangle in the Indian Ocean: An Emerging Indo-US Naval Entente?

2018 ◽  
Vol 74 (3) ◽  
pp. 305-325
Author(s):  
Avinandan Choudhury ◽  
P. Moorthy
Keyword(s):  
Indian Ocean ◽  
Global Commons ◽  
Naval Power ◽  
The Us ◽  
Ocean Region ◽  
Potential Formation ◽  
The Usa ◽  
The Indian Ocean ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Strategic Autonomy

The increasing Chinese naval presence in and around Indian ocean, coupled with the rise of the home-grown Indian Navy and the US naval dominance over the global commons, has brought about a strategic maritime triangle in the Indian Ocean. This article looks into the evolving role, capacity and objectives of the Indian, Chinese and US Navy vis-à-vis their strategic interests in the Indian Ocean region. The article argues that the ascendency of China’s naval prowess in Indian Ocean will prod India to opt for a tactical naval entente with the USA. Few impediments to the potential formation of a close-knit Indo-US partnership like India’s fear of losing strategic autonomy, its aversion in being an east Asian naval power, US–Pakistan ties and the difference in the Indian and USA’s interpretation of the concept of ‘Freedom of Navigation’ have been discussed. The article contends that an effective Indo-US naval cooperation will depend on how these impediments are taken into considerations within the make-up of their partnership.

Opening to the East: Shipping Between Europe and Asia, 1770–1830

2013 ◽  
Vol 73 (3) ◽  
pp. 625-661 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter M. Solar
Keyword(s):  
Nineteenth Century ◽  
Eighteenth Century ◽  
Indian Ocean ◽  
Cost Reduction ◽  
Arms Race ◽  
Early Nineteenth Century ◽  
Price Differentials ◽  
Shipping Costs ◽  
The Indian Ocean ◽  
The Cost

Shipping costs between Europe and Asia were reduced by two-thirds between the 1770s and the 1820s. Copper sheathing and other technical improvements which allowed ships to make more frequent voyages over longer lifetimes accounted for part of the cost reduction. British hegemony in the Indian Ocean, which ended an eighteenth-century arms race, accounted for the rest by allowing the substitution of smaller ships which cost less to build and required fewer men per ton. These changes were at least as important as the elimination of monopoly profits in narrowing intercontinental price differentials during the early nineteenth century.

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