scholarly journals Rebalancing Global Climate Governance and China’s Endeavor

2019 ◽  
Vol 05 (03) ◽  
pp. 417-435
Author(s):  
Yu Hongyuan

In December 2018, the 24th Conference of the Parties (COP) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was held in Katowice, Poland, and reached a package of agreements. It provided a new opportunity for the promotion of global climate negotiations and new momentum for the transformation of global climate governance as well. The Katowice conference continued the tradition of the previous conferences in enhancing policy coordination and contribution among various actors. The success of the conference depends on scientific reports of climate disasters, coordinated efforts by major countries, and the contribution of various non-state actors. However, as an ongoing process, global climate governance is still faced by many difficulties, such as weak synergy, staggering development of global environmental governance, daunting challenges to least developed countries (LDCs) in climate actions, and lack of fairness, which need to be tackled through joint endeavor by both developed and developing countries. As the second largest economy and biggest greenhouse gas emitter, China’s future engagement in global climate governance will be focused on promoting green competitiveness, enhancing its institutional power in the governance process, and strengthening pragmatic multi-stakeholder climate diplomacy, so as to promote common understanding among countries and help with their policy coordination for climate actions.

Author(s):  
Hongbo CHEN ◽  
Ying ZHANG

Since the 1990s, the global climate governance pattern has kept evolving from the initial two camps of developed and developing countries to the current pattern of multi-polarity, featuring the withdrawal and return of Paris Agreement by the United States, the declining leadership of the EU, the coalition of BASIC countries, and the rise of the least developed countries and small island developing states as newly emerging forces. This evolution mainly results from the combined effects of three factors: (i) The changes in the carbon emission pattern driven by population, economic growth, and technological progress; (ii) the stronger influences and power of discourse of the least developed countries and small island developing states as derived from the impacts of and vulnerability to climate change; and (iii) the impacts brought about by uncertain factors such as the uncertainties in terms of science, politics, and technological progress. These factors will still affect the trend of global climate governance in the future. The carbon emissions of developed countries will continue to take a less share in the world’s total, while the proportion of India and the least developed countries in this respect will rise rapidly, which will make global climate governance face a dilemma. Technological progress and the positive actions of non-state entities indicate that the international climate system needs reform and innovation. The rapid development of China over the past three decades has been synchronized with the evolution of the global governance structure, and has naturally become one of the internal factors driving the evolution of climate governance pattern. In the face of various pressure and challenges, China has been pushed to the forefront of global climate governance. China should observe the general trends within and outside the country, and respond to them rationally: (i) Set the proper role of China in the new pattern of global climate governance, i.e. a cooperation leader who should make positive contributions and avoid premature advance; (ii) innovate the concept and institutional system of global climate governance, and study and put forward the Chinese approach that is positive, pragmatic, and operable; (iii) help low-income countries cope with climate change by virtue of renewable energy technology and industrial cooperation, and achieve a win–win situation by encouraging Chinese enterprises to “go out” and helping low-income countries effectively control carbon emissions; and (iv) strengthen the climate cooperation with non-state actors, give play to their special role, and promote China’s comprehensive reform and opening-up.


2013 ◽  
Vol 01 (01) ◽  
pp. 1350008 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mou WANG

Drawing on the idea that countries are eligible to implement differentiated emission reduction policies based on their respective capabilities, some parties of UNFCCC attempt to weaken the principle of “Common but differentiated responsibilities(CBDR)” and impose carbon tariff on international trade. This initiative is in fact another camouflage to burden developing countries with emission cut obligation, which has no doubt undermined the development rights of developing countries. This paper defines Carbon Tariff as border measures that target import goods with embodied carbon emission. It can be import tariffs or other domestic tax measures that adjust border tax, which includes plain import tariffs and export rebates, border tax adjustment, emission quota and permit etc. For some developed countries, carbon tariffs mean to sever trade protectionism and to build trade barriers. Its theoretical arguments like “loss of comparative advantage”, “carbon leakage decreases environmental effectiveness” and “theoretical model bases” are pseudo-propositions without international consensus. Carbon tariff has become an intensively debated issue due to its duality of climate change and trade, but neither UNFCCC nor WTO has clarified this issue or has indicated a clear statement in this regard. As a result, it allows some parties to take advantage of this loophole and escape its international climate change obligation. Carbon tariff is an issue arising from global climate governance. To promote the cooperation of global climate governance and safeguard the social and economic development of developing countries, a fair and justified climate change regime and international trade institution should be established, and the settlement of the carbon tariff issue should be addressed within these frameworks. This paper argues that the international governance of carbon tariff should in cooperation with other international agreements; however, principles and guidelines regarding this issue should be developed under the UNFCCC. Based on these principles and guidelines, WTO can develop related technical operation provisions.


2017 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Douwe de Voogt ◽  

This paper investigates how intergovernmental dialogue forums addressing climate change outside of the UNFCCC are linked with the UNFCCC regarding their statements on adaptation. The discussed forums are the Major Economies Forum, G8, and G20. Three analytical points of comparison concerning the UNFCCC are established, namely: the UNFCCC gives adaptation the same priority as mitigation; there is increasing attention for the role of transnational actors in adaptation; and there is a clear distinction between the roles of developing and developed countries. A qualitative content analysis of forums’ documents was conducted to investigate the nature of the linkages between statements related to adaptation. The key conclusion is that there is much overlap regarding adaptation statements between the dialogue forums and the UNFCCC, but there could be complementarity as regards certain adaptation subjects about which the forums made statements prior to the UNFCCC.


2010 ◽  
Vol 53 (spe) ◽  
pp. 73-90 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ana Flávia Barros-Platiau

Due to its recent economic success, Brazil is considered an emerging country, but is it an emerging power concerning global environmental governance? This article argues that although Brazil has a sui generis profile, it can only be considered an emerging power in some environmental regimes, such as global climate change. Thus, international relations theory needs more analytical instruments to assess the impact of emerging powers in global environmental governance


Author(s):  
Nicole Scicluna

This chapter focuses on the intersection of law and politics in global environmental governance. A key characteristic of global environmental governance is its fragmentation. The regulatory landscape is populated by a variety of hard and soft law regimes, institutions, processes, and actors, which address particular environmental challenges, or address them in particular ways. Yet there are core principles that are common to many of these regimes, including the precautionary principle, the prevention principle, the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, and the concept of sustainable development. The chapter then turns to an in-depth analysis of global climate change governance. It traces the evolution of climate change governance from the creation of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change in 1994 to the present, focusing on the major legal-institutional milestones of the 1997 Kyoto Protocol and the 2015 Paris Agreement. Finally, the chapter returns to the problem of fragmentation, considering recent attempts to bring greater unity and coherence to global environmental governance.


2011 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 54-74 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael MacLeod ◽  
Jacob Park

This article examines the nexus between financial activism and global environmental governance, analyzing the emergence of what we call “investor-driven governance networks” (IGNs). Our paper seeks to probe the significance of IGNs as a particular manifestation of responsible investor activism and more generally as a financial instrument of environmental governance and sustain-ability. We argue that IGNs, many of which are concerned with climate change governance, have become important actors in the global economy and deserve more analysis by scholars concerned with new forms of authority in global environmental politics. As an example of emerging transnational private governance, IGNs utilize the power of the financial sector to shape the discourse on climate change within the business community and to link the long-term viability of environmental sustainability to the core strategic interests of corporations and investors.


2014 ◽  
Vol 02 (01) ◽  
pp. 1450010
Author(s):  
Dhanasree JAYARAM

India and China have been cooperating with each other at the climate change negotiations since the inception of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 1992. The paper makes a case that although the road has not been very smooth and has not been free of differences, the two powers have been at the forefront of decision-making in global climate governance and in this exercise, and cooperation has been more prominent than competition or rivalry. The paper analyzes the goals and positions of India at the negotiations within the larger framework of the North–South conflict and South–South cooperation. Whether it is the Common but Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR) or the bottom-up approach toward climate change mitigation, concerns expressed by both countries have largely been similar, especially since they have championed the cause of equity and climate justice for safeguarding the developing countries' right to develop. The paper explains the manner in which India and China have played an influential role in shaping the technicalities and modalities of various climate mechanisms in the context of their relations with the other developing and least developed countries (LDCs). The paper argues that by building more South–South cooperation mechanisms related to climate change issues, India and China can bring about a just and equitable global climate order that assists developing and LDCs in tackling climate change that affects them most.


Author(s):  
jiangyi liu ◽  
shiquan dou

Payments for ecosystem services (PES) provide innovative solutions for global environmental governance. China, the largest developing country, always faces serious ecological and environmental problems. China created an Ecological compensation mechanism which combines the PES mechanism with the government’s standardized management, which has achieved remarkable results. Government-led, social participation, and market-oriented operation are its main characteristics. More importantly, the mechanism helps China achieve its anti-poverty goals. Part of its experiences have been transformed into formal institutions, i.e., Grain-for-Green plan. However, some problems have also plagued further development of it, such as the lack of environmental property rights, the single source of funds and the shortage of standardized ecological value assessment technology. We suggest that it is necessary to further improve the stability of China’s Eco-compensation mechanism. The achievement of China’s Eco-compensation mechanism provides useful guidance for other developing countries. For example, improving the role of government administrative power, and the flexibility of the system through the policy “sandbox” i.e., the policy pilot, encouraging the participation of multi-stakeholder groups, and so on. Last but most important, the policy and institutions must be closely integrated with the state of the nation for it to be sustainable.


Author(s):  
Mark S. Williams ◽  
Julie Rorison

<p>This paper presents an inquiry into the state of conversations in international politics on the prospects for the global environmental governance of climate change. The essay reviews the literature on regime theory and its discontents to provide a working understanding of the authors’ conception of global environmental governance for climate change as a regime. The most recent cases of global environmental governance on climate change are discussed, focusing on the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change as the primary arena for governance-building discussions, leading up to the 2009 Copenhagen Summit. The paper then considers the conversations that posit the failures of Copenhagen and question a current existential crisis facing global environmental governance on climate change. Finally, it is suggested that these failures of the Copenhagen round can be understood within the context of regime theory and its limitations in International Relations. The experience of Copenhagen is representative of continuity with both regime theory and the recent history of global environmental governance on climate change. While the Copenhagen Accord may represent a failure as an international institution on climate change it is perhaps not a failure if interpreted more broadly as part of a governing global climate change regime.</p>


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