scholarly journals Bayesian Models of Conceptual Development: Learning as Building Models of the World

2020 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 533-558
Author(s):  
Tomer D. Ullman ◽  
Joshua B. Tenenbaum

A Bayesian framework helps address, in computational terms, what knowledge children start with and how they construct and adapt models of the world during childhood. Within this framework, inference over hierarchies of probabilistic generative programs in particular offers a normative and descriptive account of children's model building. We consider two classic settings in which cognitive development has been framed as model building: ( a) core knowledge in infancy and ( b) the child as scientist. We interpret learning in both of these settings as resource-constrained, hierarchical Bayesian program induction with different primitives and constraints. We examine what mechanisms children could use to meet the algorithmic challenges of navigating large spaces of potential models, in particular the proposal of the child as hacker and how it might be realized by drawing on recent computational advances. We also discuss prospects for a unifying account of model building across scientific theories and intuitive theories, and in biological and cultural evolution more generally.

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tomer David Ullman ◽  
Joshua Tenenbaum

A Bayesian framework helps to address, in computational terms, what knowledgechildren start with and how they construct and adapt models of the worldduring childhood. Within this framework, inference over hierarchies of probabilisticgenerative programs in particular offers a normative and descriptiveaccount of children's model-building. We consider two classic settings in whichcognitive development has been framed as model-building: (i) Core knowledgein infancy, and (ii) The child as scientist. We interpret learning in both of thesesettings as resource-constrained, hierarchical Bayesian program induction withdifferent primitives and constraints. We examine what mechanisms childrencould use to meet the algorithmic challenges of navigating large spaces of potentialmodels, in particular the proposal of \the child as hacker" and how itmight be realized drawing on recent computational advances. We also discussprospects for a unifying account of model building across scientific theories andintuitive theories, and in biological and cultural evolution more generally.


2001 ◽  
Vol 24 (3) ◽  
pp. 496-497 ◽  
Author(s):  
Deborah Zaitchik ◽  
Gregg E. A. Solomon

The authors' model reduces the literature on conceptual representation to a single node: “encyclopedic knowledge.” The structure of conceptual knowledge is not so trivial. By ignoring the phenomena central to reasoning about living things, the authors base their dismissal of semantic systems on inadequate descriptive ground. A better descriptive account is available in the conceptual development literature. Neuropsychologists could import the insights and tasks from cognitive development to improve their studies.


Author(s):  
Ruth Garrett Millikan

This book weaves together themes from natural ontology, philosophy of mind, philosophy of language and information, areas of inquiry that have not recently been treated together. The sprawling topic is Kant’s how is knowledge possible? but viewed from a contemporary naturalist standpoint. The assumption is that we are evolved creatures that use cognition as a guide in dealing with the natural world, and that the natural world is roughly as natural science has tried to describe it. Very unlike Kant, then, we must begin with ontology, with a rough understanding of what the world is like prior to cognition, only later developing theories about the nature of cognition within that world and how it manages to reflect the rest of nature. And in trying to get from ontology to cognition we must traverse another non-Kantian domain: questions about the transmission of information both through natural signs and through purposeful signs including, especially, language. Novelties are the introduction of unitrackers and unicepts whose job is to recognize the same again as manifested through the jargon of experience, a direct reference theory for common nouns and other extensional terms, a naturalist sketch of uniceptual—roughly conceptual— development, a theory of natural information and of language function that shows how properly functioning language carries natural information, a novel description of the semantics/pragmatics distinction, a discussion of perception as translation from natural informational signs, new descriptions of indexicals and demonstratives and of intensional contexts and a new analysis of the reference of incomplete descriptions.


2010 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 329-345
Author(s):  
Hubert Markl

The reason why I wavered a bit with this topic is that, after all, it has to do with Darwin, after a great Darwin year, as seen by a German scientist. Not that Darwin was very adept in German: Gregor Mendel’s ‘Versuche über Pflanzenhybriden’ (Experiments on Plant Hybrids) was said to have stayed uncut and probably unread on his shelf, which is why he never got it right with heredity in his life – only Gregory Bateson, Ronald A. Fisher, and JBS Haldane, together with Sewall Wright merged evolution with genetics. But Darwin taught us, nevertheless, in essence why the single human species shows such tremendous ethnic diversity, which impresses us above all through a diversity of languages – up to 7000 altogether – and among them, as a consequence, also German, my mother tongue, and English. It would thus have been a truly Darwinian message, if I had written this article in German. I would have called that the discommunication function of the many different languages in humans, which would have been a most significant message of cultural evolution, indeed. I finally decided to overcome the desire to demonstrate so bluntly what cultural evolution is all about, or rather to show that nowadays, with global cultural progress, ‘the world is flat’ indeed – even linguistically. The real sign of its ‘flatness’ is that English is used everywhere, even if Thomas L. Friedman may not have noticed this sign. But I will also come back to that later, when I hope to show how Darwinian principles connect both natural and cultural evolution, and how they first have been widely misunderstood as to their true meaning, and then have been terribly misused – although more so by culturalists, or some self-proclaimed ‘humanists’, rather than by biologists – or at least most of them. Let me, however, quickly add a remark on human languages. That languages even influence our brains and our thinking, that is: how we see the world, has first been remarked upon by Wilhelm von Humboldt and later, more extensively so, by Benjamin Whorf. It has recently been shown by neural imaging – for instance by Angela Friederici – that one’s native language, first as learned from one’s mother and from those around us when we are babies, later from one’s community of speakers, can deeply impinge on a baby’s brain development and stay imprinted in it throughout life, even if language is, of course, learned and not fully genetically preformed. This shows once more how deep the biological roots are that ground our cultures, according to truly Darwinian principles, even if these cultures are completely learned.


2005 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-27
Author(s):  
Probal Dasgupta

Language and cognition both appear in humans not in their raw form, but framed in a certain pedagogy. In his classic work on the relation between early linguistic development and early cognitive development, Vygotsky pointed out that, right from its inception in an individual's development, language couples the initially (ontogenetically and functionally) independent functions of speech and thought. He stresses that, as the child grows into a full encounter with the world of work, her own private narratives give way to an adult-mediated, non-fantasy-laden access to the public articulation of what her words really mean. Recent lexical conceptual research reaffirms Vygotsky. Current work on the multicoded nature of adult scientific use of language also indicates that understanding the child's cognitive and linguistic growth can help make sense of the multisemiotic writings of science.


2020 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 116-152
Author(s):  
Leny Marinda

Cognitive development is a change processes of human life in understanding, managing information, solving problems and knowing something. Jean Piaget is one of a figures studied cognitive development and said about cognitive development steps. Jean Piaget is also a biologist who links the physical maturity development with cognitive development steps. These steps are the motoric sensory step (0–2 years), pre-operational (2-7 years), concrete operations (7–11 years) and formal operations (11–15 years). In understanding the world actively, a child uses a scheme, assimilation, accommodation, organization and equilibration. A child's knowledge formed gradually in line with the information experience found. According to Piaget, children undergo a definite sequence of cognitive development steps. In this theory, children predicted to have maturity quantity and quality based on the steps passed. a step of cognitive development is a continuation of previous cognitive development. Cognitive problems arise in elementary school children viewed from Piaget's cognitive development theory including dyslexia, dysgraphia and dyscalculia. Perkembangan kognitif adalah tahapan-tahapan perubahan yang terjadi dalam rentang kehidupan manusia untuk memahami, mengolah informasi, memecahkan masalah dan mengetahui sesuatu. Jean Piaget adalah salah satu tokoh yang meneliti tentang perkembangan kognitif dan mengemukakan tahapan-tahapan perkembangan kognitif. Jean Piaget yang juga ahli Biologi menghubungkan tahapan perkembangan kematangan fisik dengan tahapan perkembangan kognitif. Tahapan-tahapan tersebut adalah tahap sensory motorik (0–2 tahun), pra-operasional (2–7 tahun), operasional konkret (7–11 tahun) dan operasional formal (11–15 tahun). Dalam memahami  dunia secara aktif, anak menggunakan skema, asimilasi, akomodasi, organisasi dan equilibrasi. Pengetahuan anak terbentuk secara berangsur sejalan dengan pengalaman tentang informasi-informasi yang ditemui. Menurut Piaget, anak menjalani urutan yang sudah pasti dari tahap-tahap perkembangan kognitif. Pada teori ini, anak diprediksi memiliki kematangan secara kuantitas maupun kualitas berdasarkan tahapan-tahapan yang dilaluinya. Perkembangan kognitif pada satu tahap merupakan lanjutan dari perkembangan kognitif tahap sebelumnya. Problem kognitif yang muncul pada anak usia sekolah dasar dilihat dari teori perkembangan kognitif ala Piaget diantaranya disleksia, disgrafia dan diskalkulia.


1975 ◽  
Vol 45 (4) ◽  
pp. 475-506 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patricia Teague Ashton

Over the last twenty-five years children around the world have observed and responded to researchers who pour water from beaker to beaker, roll plasticene into snake-like figures, and arrange matchsticks into a potpourri of shapes. These cross-cultural experiments have been undertaken to test Piaget's theory of genetic epistemology, which posits a hierarchical, universal, and invariant sequence of stages of cognitive development. Piagetian research in varying cultures has revealed both striking similarities and marked differences in performance on cognitive tasks, some in apparent conflict with the basic assumptions of Piagetian stage theory. In this article Professor Ashton reviews a range of cross-cultural Piagetian research, analyzes the sometimes divergent findings from this research, and suggests methodological improvements which may help to resolve past dilemmas and to further future understanding of cognitive growth in different cultures.


Author(s):  
P. Kyle Stanford

This chapter seeks to explore and develop the proposal that even our best scientific theories are not (as the scientific realist would have it) accurate descriptions of how things stand in otherwise inaccessible domains of nature but are instead simply powerful conceptual tools or instruments for engaging practically with the world around us. It describes a number of persistent challenges facing any attempt to apply the American Pragmatists’ global conception of all ideas, beliefs, theories, and cognitions quite generally as such tools or instruments to only a restricted class or category of such entities (such as our best scientific theories) instead. It then seeks to overcome these challenges by regarding scientific instrumentalism as simply applying the scientific realist’s own attitude toward a theory like Newtonian mechanics to even the most empirically successful and instrumentally powerful theory we have in any given scientific domain.


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