scholarly journals Pricing Decisions of Two Complementary Products in a Fuzzy Environment

2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 ◽  
pp. 1-8 ◽  
Author(s):  
Li Wang ◽  
Jing Zhao ◽  
Jie Wei
Keyword(s):  
Closed Form ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Reference Model ◽  
Optimal Pricing ◽  
Pricing Model ◽  
Complementary Products ◽  
Nash Game ◽  
Retail Pricing ◽  
Pricing Decisions ◽  
Fuzzy Environment

Pricing decisions of two complementary products in a fuzzy environment are considered in this paper. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the changes of the optimal retail pricing of two complementary products under two different decentralized decision scenarios (e.g., Nash game case and Stackelberg game case). As a reference model, the centralized pricing model is also established. The closed-form optimal pricing decisions of the two complementary products are obtained in the above three decision scenarios. Some interesting management insights into how pricing decisions vary with decision scenarios are given.

scholarly journals Pricing Decisions of a Two-Echelon Supply Chain in Fuzzy Environment

2013 ◽  
Vol 2013 ◽  
pp. 1-11 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jie Wei ◽  
Guoying Pang ◽  
Yongjun Liu ◽  
Qian Ma
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Empirical Study ◽  
Closed Form ◽  
Reference Model ◽  
Optimal Pricing ◽  
Manufacturing Cost ◽  
Pricing Strategies ◽  
Pricing Decisions ◽  
Fuzzy Environment ◽  
The Future

Pricing decisions of a two-echelon supply chain with one manufacturer and duopolistic retailers in fuzzy environment are considered in this paper. The manufacturer produces a product and sells it to the two retailers, who in turn retail it to end customers. The fuzziness is associated with the customers’ demand and the manufacturing cost. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the effect of two retailers’ different pricing strategies on the optimal pricing decisions of the manufacturer and the two retailers themselves in MS Game scenario. As a reference model, the centralized decision scenario is also considered. The closed-form optimal pricing decisions of the manufacturer and the two retailers are derived in the above decision scenarios. Some insights into how pricing decisions vary with decision scenarios and the two retailers’ pricing strategies in fuzzy environment are also investigated, which can serve as the basis for empirical study in the future.

scholarly journals Game Theoretical Perspectives on Pricing Decisions in Asymmetric Competing Supply Chains

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-25
Author(s):  
Tao Li ◽  
Qi Tan ◽  
Weirong Liu
Keyword(s):  
Channel Model ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Dominant Strategy ◽  
Price Leadership ◽  
Nash Game ◽  
Pricing Decisions ◽  
Theoretical Perspectives ◽  
Horizontal Competition ◽  
Product Substitutability ◽  
First Mover

This paper investigates a dual exclusive channel model in which each manufacturer distributes its goods through a single exclusive retailer, but two goods are substitute. The decision rule between two channels is Nash game in Case 1, while it is Stackelberg game in Case 2. From manufacturer Stackelberg (MS), retailer Stackelberg (RS), and Nash game (VN) theoretic perspectives, nine game models are developed to examine the effect of product substitutability and relative channel status on pricing decisions at both horizontal competition and vertical competition levels. The analysis suggests that the type of price leadership scenarios, the level of product substitutability, and the relative channel status play a significant role in decision making. For instance, in case 1, the symmetric leadership (two manufacturers or two retailers are leaders) is always the dominant strategy and equilibrium for either two manufacturers or two retailers regardless of product substitutability and relative channel status. Nevertheless, the asymmetric leadership may lead channel members to encounter a prisoner’s dilemma if the relative channel status is small. By contrast, in Case 2, the symmetric leadership is not the unique dominant strategy for either two manufacturers or two retailers. In contrast to many earlier results, we also show that whether the first-mover and the late-mover advantages exist, depending on the level of related channel status.

Game-Theoretic Analysis of Pricing Models in a Dyadic Supply Chain With Fairness Concerns

2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-24 ◽  
Author(s):  
Abhishek Sharma
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Channel Coordination ◽  
Theoretic Analysis ◽  
Nash Game ◽  
Game Theoretic Analysis ◽  
Pricing Decisions ◽  
Fairness Concerns ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Fairness Concern

The existing studies on fairness in channel coordination assume markets as the group of oligopolies in which a few firms dominate, scant evidence has been provided where fairness concerns are investigated for a market scenario where all firms share equal dominance. This article considers a dyadic supply chain composed of one fair-minded manufacturer and one fair-minded retailer and investigate their pricing decisions under two different non-cooperative game-theoretic frameworks: manufacturer-led Stackelberg game and Vertical Nash game and provide a comparative analysis. The results show that the prices of the Stackelberg game model are always higher than that of the corresponding prices of the Vertical Nash game. We also find that the prices gap between the two models decreases with the retailer's fairness concern, and is uncertain with respect to manufacturer's fairness. In addition, the manufacturer's (retailer's) profit in the Stackelberg game is decreasing (increasing) in its own fairness and is uncertain in the Vertical Nash game. Furthermore, findings are illustrated through a numerical example.

Study on Discrimination Pricing Model of Closed-Loop Supply Chain with Product Remanufacturing

2012 ◽  
Vol 452-453 ◽  
pp. 663-668 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hong Wei Jiang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Environmental Protection ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
New Product ◽  
Coordination Mechanism ◽  
Optimal Pricing ◽  
Pricing Model ◽  
Supply Chain System ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Pricing Decisions

With awareness of environmental protection strengthens and constraints of regulations and laws to environmental protection increasing, more and more enterprises focus on the closed-loop supply chain management. Considering difference between new product and remanufactured product, this paper constructs closed-loop supply chain system with manufacturers recycling used products directly from the consumers based on game theory. The optimal pricing decisions and the optimal profit of centralized and decentralized closed-loop supply chain are obtained. It is found that the efficiency of decentralized closed-loop supply chain decreases by 25%. At last, the coordination mechanism is designed to solve the profit conflict in the decentralized closed-loop supply chain by the two-part tariff contract.

PRICING DECISIONS FOR A CLOSED-LOOP SUPPLY CHAIN IN A FUZZY ENVIRONMENT

2012 ◽  
Vol 29 (01) ◽  
pp. 1240003 ◽  
Author(s):  
JIE WEI ◽  
JING ZHAO ◽  
YONGJIAN LI
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Retail Price ◽  
Economic Behavior ◽  
Optimal Pricing ◽  
Pricing Strategies ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Pricing Decisions ◽  
Fuzzy Environment

This paper studies pricing problem for a closed-loop supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer in a fuzzy environment. The purpose of this paper is to explore how the manufacturer makes his decisions about wholesale price and transfer price and how the retailer makes her decisions about retail price and collecting price in the expected value standard. Each firm's optimal pricing strategies are established by using game theory under the centralized and decentralized decision cases, respectively. Managerial insights into the economic behavior of firms are also investigated, which can serve as the basis for empirical study in the future. Moreover, we analyze numerically the results and give some insights on the influence of some parameters.

scholarly journals Pricing Strategies of Logistics Distribution Services for Perishable Commodities

Algorithms ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 11 (11) ◽  
pp. 186
Author(s):  
Tao Li ◽  
Yan Chen ◽  
Taoying Li
Keyword(s):  
Dynamic Pricing ◽  
Consumer Satisfaction ◽  
Service Providers ◽  
Time Constraints ◽  
Optimal Pricing ◽  
Pricing Strategies ◽  
Pricing Model ◽  
Logistics Service ◽  
Distribution Services ◽  
Perishable Goods

The problem of pricing distribution services is challenging due to the loss in value of product during its distribution process. Four logistics service pricing strategies are constructed in this study, including fixed pricing model, fixed pricing model with time constraints, dynamic pricing model, and dynamic pricing model with time constraints in combination with factors, such as the distribution time, customer satisfaction, optimal pricing, etc. By analyzing the relationship between optimal pricing and key parameters (such as the value of the decay index, the satisfaction of consumers, dispatch time, and the storage cost of the commodity), it is found that the larger the value of the attenuation coefficient, the easier the perishable goods become spoilage, which leads to lower distribution prices and impacts consumer satisfaction. Moreover, the analysis of the average profit of the logistics service providers in these four pricing models shows that the average profit in the dynamic pricing model with time constraints is better. Finally, a numerical experiment is given to support the findings.

scholarly journals The Impact of Food Quality Information Services on Food Supply Chain Pricing Decisions and Coordination Mechanisms Based on the O2O E-Commerce Mode

2018 ◽  
Vol 2018 ◽  
pp. 1-18 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiaoqiu Yu ◽  
Xiaoxue Ren
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Food Quality ◽  
Food Supply ◽  
Food Processing ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Information Service ◽  
Quality Information ◽  
Food Supply Chain ◽  
Quantity Discount ◽  
Pricing Decisions

This paper considers the price conflict problem between the online channel of a food processing factory and the offline channel of the food retailers in food supply chains by analyzing the pricing decisions and coordination mechanisms between the food processing factory and food retailers under the influence of a food quality information service. First, the Stackelberg game method and the Bertrand game method are used to optimize the pricing decisions with the goal of maximizing the profits of the food processing factory and retailer. The analysis shows that the food quality information service level is positively correlated with the price of the factory’s own channel, and the influence of the food quality information service level on the price of the food processing factory’s or the food retailer’s own channel is stronger than its influence on the price of a competitor’s channel. Second, the food supply chain members’ pricing decisions are analyzed using the case analysis method by considering practical problems in the food supply chain. The results indicate that the food processing factory should use the Stackelberg game to make pricing decisions. However, it is optimal for the food retailer to make pricing decisions under the Bertrand game, and the total profit of the food supply chain is optimized under centralized decision making. Finally, we use both the quantitative discount mechanism and the Stackelberg game method to analyze the profits obtained by the food processing factory and retailer. The results indicate that the food processing factory should implement a quantitative discount mechanism when the quantity discount coefficient is greater than 0.4, and the retailer should implement a quantity discount mechanism when the quantity discount coefficient is in the range of 0.25 to 0.4.

scholarly journals A stochastic differential game of low carbon technology sharing in collaborative innovation system of superior enterprises and inferior enterprises under uncertain environment

2018 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 607-622 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shi Yin ◽  
Baizhou Li
Keyword(s):  
Differential Game ◽  
Cooperative Game ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Innovation System ◽  
Stochastic Differential Game ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Nash Game ◽  
Low Carbon Economy ◽  
Collaborative Innovation ◽  
Technology Level

AbstractConsidering the fact that the development of low carbon economy calls for the low carbon technology sharing between interested enterprises, this paper study a stochastic differential game of low carbon technology sharing in collaborative innovation system of superior enterprises and inferior enterprises. In the paper, we consider the random interference factors that include the uncertain external environment and the internal understanding limitations of decision maker. In the model, superior enterprises and inferior enterprises are separated entities, and they play Stacklberg master-slave game, Nash non-cooperative game, and cooperative game, respectively. We discuss the feedback equilibrium strategies of superior enterprises and inferior enterprises, and it is found that some random interference factors in sharing system can make the variance of improvement degree of low carbon technology level in the cooperation game higher than the variance in the Stackelberg game, and the result of Stackelberg game is similar to the result of Nash game. Additionally, a government subsidy incentive and a special subsidy that inferior enterprises give to superior enterprises are proposed.

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