scholarly journals Analysis of the RDEU Game Model in Mass Emergencies with Maintained Legal Rights by Emotion

2018 ◽  
Vol 2018 ◽  
pp. 1-10
Author(s):  
Kunpeng Jing ◽  
Rui Shi
Keyword(s):  
Numerical Simulation ◽  
Decision Making ◽  
Expected Utility ◽  
Vulnerable Groups ◽  
Legal Rights ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Emotional States ◽  
Extreme Resistance ◽  
Emotional Factor ◽  
Rank Dependent Expected Utility

The emotional factor in mass emergencies with maintained legal rights significantly influences the decision-making of the powerful and vulnerable groups and the course of events. In this paper, we established the game model of rank-dependent expected utility for the powerful and vulnerable groups in mass emergencies with maintained legal rights. And we also explored the influence of different emotional states on the results of strategic equilibrium of both sides of a game. Results show that the behaviours of the powerful or vulnerable groups are not only affected by the choice of their other strategies, but also influenced by the degree of emotion. The more optimistic they are, the more inclined they are to solve the mass emergencies with maintained legal rights; the more pessimistic they are, the more inclined they are to take extreme resistance behaviours and the more likely pessimism is to adversely affect the two groups’ behaviour choices. The numerical simulation with MATLAB further validates this conclusion. Therefore, the emotions of both sides should be controlled and understood when managing mass emergencies to solve problems effectively and reasonably.

scholarly journals Research on the Collaborative Application of BIM in EPC Projects: The Perspective of Cooperation between Owners and General Contractors

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-14
Author(s):  
Chengshuang Sun ◽  
Min Wang ◽  
Fengyong Zhai
Keyword(s):  
Numerical Simulation ◽  
Decision Making ◽  
Dynamic Method ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Final Decision ◽  
Game Model ◽  
General Contractors ◽  
Punishment Mechanism ◽  
Reducing Costs ◽  
Collaborative Application

As an effective way to reduce costs and increase efficiency of EPC projects, BIM technology has drawn a lot of attention in numerous countries. Existing studies have failed to reveal the BIM decision-making mechanisms of owners and general contractors in EPC projects in a dynamic method. This study investigates the underlying logic of the collaboration application of BIM by analyzing the dynamic behaviors of owners and general contractors based on evolutionary game model. The results show that the most effective suggestions to promote the BIM collaboration application in EPC projects are “increasing the proportion of BIM application initially strategies,” “increasing incremental revenue of BIM collaborative application,” “reducing costs of BIM collaboration application,” “avoiding excessive hitchhiking,” and “establishing reasonable reward and punishment mechanism.” On the basis of numerical simulation to illustrate the influence of the different initial strategies and parameters on the final decision in different situations, five solutions were proposed for the effective BIM collaboration application between owners and general contractors. This article can facilitate researchers pondering the dynamics of collaboration among stakeholders in projects, and it can also facilitate participants picking up proper strategies for improved collaboration.

scholarly journals Research on a Triopoly Dynamic Game with Free Market and Bundling Market in the Chinese Telecom Industry

2018 ◽  
Vol 2018 ◽  
pp. 1-11
Author(s):  
Junhai Ma ◽  
Tiantong Xu ◽  
Wandong Lou
Keyword(s):  
Numerical Simulation ◽  
Decision Making ◽  
Dynamic Model ◽  
Free Market ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Real Situation ◽  
Complementary Product ◽  
Stable Space ◽  
Telecom Industry

Based on the real situation of telecom industry in China, we establish a triopoly game model, which includes two competitive telecom firms and their correlative corporation which produces the complementary product. Both free market and bundling market will be concerned in this dynamic model. Moreover, we consider a one-to-many bundling way instead of two complementary products in terms of the proportion of one to one in a bundling product. By numerical simulation, we find that stable space will decrease and decision chaos appears when the degree of the competition becomes fierce between the two competitive telecom firms. Besides, increasing the amount of bundling services provided by a telecom firm can lead to different impacts on the prices of the three firms investigated. This paper enriches the decision-making for the strategy of bundling pricing and will be valuable for the telecom operators.

scholarly journals Risk Attitude in Real Decision Problems

2008 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Fabrizio Botti ◽  
Anna Conte ◽  
Daniela Teresa Di Cagno ◽  
Carlo D'Ippoliti
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Significant Role ◽  
Expected Utility ◽  
Unobserved Heterogeneity ◽  
Risk Attitude ◽  
Decision Problems ◽  
Probability Weighting ◽  
Decision Making Under Risk ◽  
Rank Dependent Expected Utility ◽  
Better Than

Abstract We use data from 298 showings of the television program "Affari Tuoi," which involves contestants making decisions between risky prospects with possible prizes of up to half a million euros, to estimate three models of decision-making under risk: Expected Utility, Rank-Dependent Expected Utility and Regret-Rejoice. We find that Regret-Rejoice does not significantly improve upon Expected Utility, while Rank-Dependent outperforms it. Interestingly, we find that the CARA specification fits significantly better than the conventionally-adopted CRRA specification. Crucially, we find a significant role for unobserved heterogeneity, implying that our estimates provide more superior estimates of risk attitude and of probability weighting than other studies.

Evaluating Risk-Propensity Assessment Methods: Patterns in Repeated Exposure to Emotional Stimuli

2020 ◽  
Vol 64 (1) ◽  
pp. 283-287
Author(s):  
Sahinya Susindar ◽  
Harrison Wissel-Littmann ◽  
Terry Ho ◽  
Thomas K. Ferris
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Emotion Regulation ◽  
Assessment Method ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
Decision Task ◽  
Emotional States ◽  
Affective States ◽  
Risk Propensity ◽  
Emotional Stimuli ◽  
Comparison Results

In studying naturalistic human decision-making, it is important to understand how emotional states shape decision-making processes and outcomes. Emotion regulation techniques can improve the quality of decisions, but there are several challenges to evaluating these techniques in a controlled research context. Determining the effectiveness of emotion regulation techniques requires methodology that can: 1) reliably elicit desired emotions in decision-makers; 2) include decision tasks with response measures that are sensitive to emotional loading; and 3) support repeated exposures/trials with relatively-consistent emotional loading and response sensitivity. The current study investigates one common method, the Balloon Analog Risk Task (BART), for its consistency and reliability in measuring the risk-propensity of decision-makers, and specifically how the method’s effectiveness might change over the course of repeated exposures. With the PANASX subjective assessment serving for comparison, results suggest the BART assessment method, when applied over repeated exposures, is reduced in its sensitivity to emotional stimuli and exhibits decision task-related learning effects which influence the observed trends in response data in complex ways. This work is valuable for researchers in decision-making and to guide design for humans with consideration for their affective states.

Revenue Sharing Contract of Green Supply Chain under Manufacturer Risk-Aversion

2014 ◽  
Vol 697 ◽  
pp. 482-487
Author(s):  
Shi Ying Jiang ◽  
Chun Yan Ma
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Risk Aversion ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Product Price ◽  
Revenue Sharing Contract

Background on two stages green supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer, considering the degree of risk aversion and product greenness, consumer preferences and other factors, the centralized decision-making game model and manufacturer-leading Stackelberg game model are established.Then two game models are compared. The interaction of product greenness, wholesale price, product price,and risk aversion utility for manufacturers and retailers are also disscussed. Finally, the revenue sharing contract is applied to coordinate the green supply chain . The results show that:(1) In the centralized decision-making model, there is a critical value of the product green degree; (2)In manufacturer-leading Stackelberg game model, the higher the green degree of the product, the higher the manufacturer's wholesale price,and the wholesale price increases as risk aversion degree of manufacturers improves;(3)The revenue sharing contract can coordinate this type of green supply chain under manufacturers risk-averse.

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