Transformation of State Security and Intelligence Services in Poland – A Job Still Unfinished

Abstract This second part of a two-part article moves ahead in showing how the East German Ministry for State Security (Stasi) came to play a key role in the disinformation campaign launched by the Soviet State Security Committee (KGB) in 1983 regarding the origins of the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) and the Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS). The KGB launched the campaign itself, but in the mid-1980s it sought to widen the effort by enlisting the cooperation of intelligence services in other Warsaw Pact countries, especially the Stasi. From the autumn of 1986 until November 1989, the Stasi played a central role in the disinformation campaign. Despite pressure from the U.S. government and a general inclination of Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev to curtail the campaign by the end of 1987, both the KGB and the USSR's official Novosti press agency continued until 1989 to spread false allegations that HIV was a U.S. biological weapon. Even after the KGB curtailed its disinformation in 1989, the Stasi continued to disseminate falsehoods, not least because it had successfully maintained plausible deniability regarding its role in the campaign. The Stasi worked behind the scenes to support the work of Soviet–East German scientists Jakob Segal and Lilli Segal and to facilitate dissemination of the Segals’ views in West Germany and Great Britain, especially through the leftwing media, and to purvey broader disinformation about HIV/AIDS by attacking U.S. biological and chemical weapons in general.

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Intelligence Sector Reforms in Romania: A Scorecard

Surveillance & Society ◽

10.24908/ss.v16i3.6880 ◽

2018 ◽

Vol 16 (3) ◽

pp. 298-313

Author(s):

Lavinia Stan ◽

Marian Zulean

Keyword(s):

Human Rights ◽

Civil Society ◽

Transitional Justice ◽

Security Studies ◽

Intelligence Community ◽

State Security ◽

Intelligence Services ◽

Security Practices ◽

Established Democracies ◽

Mass Surveillance

Since 1989, reforms have sought to align the Romanian post-communist intelligence community with its counterparts in established democracies. Enacted reluctantly and belatedly at the pressure of civil society actors eager to curb the mass surveillance of communist times and international partners wishing to rein in Romania’s foreign espionage and cut its ties to intelligence services of non-NATO countries, these reforms have revamped legislation on state security, retrained secret agents, and allowed for participation in NATO operations, but paid less attention to oversight and respect for human rights. Drawing on democratization, transitional justice, and security studies, this article evaluates the capacity of the Romanian post-communist intelligence reforms to break with communist security practices of unchecked surveillance and repression and to adopt democratic values of oversight and respect for human rights. We discuss the presence of communist traits after 1989 (seen as continuity) and their absence (seen as discontinuity) by offering a wealth of examples. The article is the first to evaluate security reforms in post-communist Romania in terms of their capacity to not only overhaul the personnel and operations inherited from the Securitate and strengthen oversight by elected officials, but also make intelligence services respectful of basic human rights.

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Some Facts and Processes Related to the Turkish Population in the Razgrad District from the Late 1950s and in the 1960s and 1970s through the Documents of the Bulgarian State Security

Istoriya-History ◽

10.53656/his2021-3-4-razgr ◽

2021 ◽

Vol 29 (3) ◽

pp. 266-286

Author(s):

Dimitar Petkov

Keyword(s):

Armed Forces ◽

Turkish Population ◽

Central State ◽

State Security ◽

Long Run ◽

Intelligence Services ◽

1960S And 1970S ◽

State Archives ◽

The 1960S ◽

The Cold War

From the late 1950s and in the 1960s and 1970s of the XX century the Bulgarian communist party pursues a policy in Bulgaria of detachment of the Turkish population in the country from its fundamental religious and cultural environment. This article discusses some facts and processes from this policy of the Bulgarian communists in the Razgrad district. Basically, this is done through documents of the Bulgarian state security (from the Committee for Disclosing the Documents and Announcing Affiliation of Bulgarian Citizens to the State Security and Intelligence Services of the Bulgarian National Armed Forces). Documents from Bulgarian central state archives were also used. In this region among the Turks operates the Turkish intelligence services. The Turkish propaganda is very well developed here. The Bulgarian government and Turkey use the Turkish population in the Razgrad district (also in whole Bulgaria) for their own purposes. In the long run this population, not only in the Razgrad district, but also in the entire country becomes “a burning issue” in the political relation between Bulgaria and Turkey – two countries separated by the ideological conflict of the Cold War.

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Financial Oversight of the Civilian Intelligence Services in South Africa

Strategic Review for Southern Africa ◽

10.35293/srsa.v41i2.305 ◽

2020 ◽

Vol 41 (2) ◽

Author(s):

Sandy Africa

Keyword(s):

South Africa ◽

South African ◽

The State ◽

The South ◽

Standing Committee ◽

Financial Accountability ◽

State Security ◽

Intelligence Services ◽

Auditor General ◽

Financial Oversight

The article assesses the state of oversight of the budget and expenditure of the South African civilian intelligence services (now called the State Security Agency). The roles of various structures, including the National Treasury, the Executive, the Joint Standing Committee on Intelligence (JSCI) and the Auditor-General, during the period 1995 to 2014, are examined. The article argues that whilst the system of financial oversight has strengths, there are systemic weaknesses which have resulted in uneven levels of financial accountability over the years. The article therefore proposes that measures to strengthen the system of oversight are needed to improve financial accountability. These include reforming the relevant legislation and providing more robust powers to the oversight actors.

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Intelligence Agencies in Africa: a Preliminary Assessment

The Journal of Modern African Studies ◽

10.1017/s0022278x00011058 ◽

1992 ◽

Vol 30 (4) ◽

pp. 569-585

Author(s):

Roy Pateman

Keyword(s):

National Security ◽

Careful Examination ◽

Preliminary Assessment ◽

State Security ◽

Intelligence Collection ◽

Intelligence Services ◽

Intelligence Agencies ◽

External Assistance ◽

Liberation Movements ◽

Foreign Intelligence

The ostensible purpose of intelligence collection and activity is the preservation of national security. A careful examination of what has been published in this field in recent years has convinced me that all African régimes and liberation movements have established some form of secret state-security apparatus, in many cases with considerable external assistance. As for foreign intelligence services, such as America's C.I.A., Russia's K.G.B., and Israel's Mossad, they have proved to be effective major mechanisms for influencing the internal affairs of African nations.

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Death to Spies! Austrian Informants for Western Intelligence Services and Soviet Capital Punishment during the Occupation of Austria

Journal of Cold War Studies ◽

10.1162/jcws_a_00279 ◽

2012 ◽

Vol 14 (4) ◽

pp. 167-196 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Barbara Stelzl-Marx

Keyword(s):

Cold War ◽

Capital Punishment ◽

The West ◽

State Security ◽

Intelligence Services ◽

Security Personnel ◽

Eastern Zone ◽

Military Tribunal ◽

The Status ◽

The Cold War

Using recently declassified sources from Russian archives, this article discusses the status of the Soviet-controlled eastern zone of Austria during the postwar occupation (1945–1955) as a principal spying ground in Central Europe. The Western occupation powers hired many Austrians to gather information on the deployments of the Soviet Army and the Soviet authorities' exploitation of the “German assets” they had seized at war's end. The Austrians' principal incentive to spy was financial; they were well paid by their Western handlers. Austrian women had love affairs with Soviet soldiers and officers and then served as double agents for the West until the Soviet counterintelligence services caught up with them. From 1947 onward, some 500 Austrians disappeared after being detained by Soviet state security personnel and accused of spying. More than 100 of these Austrians were sentenced to death by Soviet Military Tribunal No. 28990 in Baden from 1950 until Iosif Stalin's death in March 1953, and they were then executed in Moscow. In retrospect the mismatch between the actions of these Austrian “spies” and the penalties meted out to them is striking. The Soviet penal system was exported to occupied areas during the Cold War in intelligence “games” against the West, with tragic consequences for “Stalin's last victims.”

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