How Would You Feel versus How Do You Think She Would Feel? A Neuroimaging Study of Perspective-Taking with Social Emotions

2004 ◽  
Vol 16 (6) ◽  
pp. 988-999 ◽  
Author(s):  
Perrine Ruby ◽  
Jean Decety

Perspective-taking is a complex cognitive process involved in social cognition. This positron emission tomography (PET) study investigated by means of a factorial design the interaction between the emotional and the perspective factors. Participants were asked to adopt either their own (first person) perspective or the (third person) perspective of their mothers in response to situations involving social emotions or to neutral situations. The main effect of third-person versus first-person perspective resulted in hemodynamic increase in the medial part of the superior frontal gyrus, the left superior temporal sulcus, the left temporal pole, the posterior cingulate gyrus, and the right inferior parietal lobe. A cluster in the postcentral gyrus was detected in the reverse comparison. The amygdala was selectively activated when subjects were processing social emotions, both related to self and other. Interaction effects were identified in the left temporal pole and in the right postcentral gyrus. These results support our prediction that the frontopolar, the somatosensory cortex, and the right inferior parietal lobe are crucial in the process of self/ other distinction. In addition, this study provides important building blocks in our understanding of social emotion processing and human empathy.

2020 ◽  
Vol 54 (5) ◽  
pp. 528-538
Author(s):  
Hye Yoon Park ◽  
Kyoungri Park ◽  
Eunchong Seo ◽  
Se Jun Koo ◽  
Minji Bang ◽  
...  

Objective: Defects in self-referential processing and perspective-taking are core characteristics that may underlie psychotic symptoms and impaired social cognition in schizophrenia. Here, we investigated the neural correlates of self-referential processing regardless of the perspective taken and third-person perspective-taking regardless of the target person to judge relevance in individuals at ultra-high risk for psychosis. We also explored relationships between alterations in neural activity and neurocognitive function and basic self (‘ ipseity’) disorder. Methods: Twenty-two ultra-high-risk individuals and 28 healthy controls completed a functional magnetic resonance imaging task. While being scanned, participants were asked to take a first-person perspective or to put themselves in their close relative’s place thereby adopting a third-person perspective during judgments of the relevance of personality trait adjectives to one’s self and a close relative. Results: For self-referential (vs other-referential) processing, ultra-high-risk individuals showed less neural activity in the left ventromedial prefrontal cortex/medial orbitofrontal cortex, which was correlated with poor working memory performance. When taking a third-person perspective (vs first-person perspective), ultra-high-risk individuals showed more activity in the middle occipital gyrus. Conclusion: Taken together, our findings suggest that ultra-high-risk individuals already show aberrant neural activity during self-referential processing which may possibly be related to engagement of working memory resources.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sima Ebrahimian ◽  
Bradley Mattan ◽  
Mazaher Rezaei

Abstract Background: Lack of empathy is one of the main characteristics of narcissists. However, it is not clear whether there is a similar deficit in other facets of mentalizing, such as perspective-taking.Method: In this study, we measured the taking visual perspectives ascribed to different targets (e.g., first-person self, third-person self-avatar, and third-person stranger avatar). Our study focused on separate groups of individuals with high and low self-reported narcissistic traits. Results: Participants reporting high Narcissism scores showed higher accuracy in a third-person perspective-taking task than did their low-Narcissism counterparts. However, when the first-person perspective was incongruent with the third-person (first person vs. self- tagged avatar), the accuracy of their responses decreased.Conclusions: The discrepancy between the two types of perspective taking of people with high narcissism can probably mean that the narcissistic people perfectly identify / empathize with one object (person, avatar, character, etc.) and therefore their perspective-taking is disrupted when they need to identify with more than one object that represent their self-attributed perspectives.


Author(s):  
Janet Brenya ◽  
Katherine Chavarria ◽  
Elizabeth Murray ◽  
Karen Kelly ◽  
Anjel Friest ◽  
...  

Only by understanding the ability to take third-person perspective can we begin to elucidate the neural processes responsible for one’s inimitable conscious experience. The current study examined differences in hemispheric laterality during a first-person perspective (1PP) and third-person perspective (3PP) taking task, when using Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (TMS). Participants were asked to take either the 1PP or 3PP when identifying the number of spheres in a virtual scene. During this task, single-pulse TMS was delivered to the motor cortex of both the left and right hemispheres of 10 healthy volunteers. Measures of TMS-induced motor-evoked potentials (MEPs) of the contralateral abductor pollicis brevis (APB) were employed as an indicator of lateralized cortical activation. The data suggest that the right hemisphere is more important in discriminating between 1PP and 3PP. These data add a novel method for determining perspective taking and add to the literature supporting the role of the right hemisphere in meta representation.


2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 513
Author(s):  
Elizabeth Murray ◽  
Janet Brenya ◽  
Katherine Chavarria ◽  
Karen J. Kelly ◽  
Anjel Fierst ◽  
...  

Only by understanding the ability to take a third-person perspective can we begin to elucidate the neural processes responsible for one’s inimitable conscious experience. The current study examined differences in hemispheric laterality during a first-person perspective (1PP) and third-person perspective (3PP) taking task, using transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS). Participants were asked to take either the 1PP or 3PP when identifying the number of spheres in a virtual scene. During this task, single-pulse TMS was delivered to the motor cortex of both the left and right hemispheres of 10 healthy volunteers. Measures of TMS-induced motor-evoked potentials (MEPs) of the contralateral abductor pollicis brevis (APB) were employed as an indicator of lateralized cortical activation. The data suggest that the right hemisphere is more important in discriminating between 1PP and 3PP. These data add a novel method for determining perspective taking and add to the literature supporting the role of the right hemisphere in meta representation.


2012 ◽  
Vol 7 (4) ◽  
pp. 263-280 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Ciccoricco

Faith, the protagonist of Mirror’s Edge, marks an empowered female character that is not hypersexualized, and the decision to employ a first-person perspective (thereby subverting any gaze offered by a third-person view) supports this design objective through gameplay. But despite Faith’s welcome debut on the main stage of commercial gaming, the game raises more significant questions through its engagement with the multifarious concept of “fluidity” or “flow,” which is integral to both the gameplay of Mirror’s Edge and the themes in it. Is Faith’s flow—in line with radical critical moves in literary history and cultural theory of the late 20th century to gender this trope—essentially or inevitably feminine, or for that matter, feminist? Does the game ultimately avoid, perpetuate, or contest the gendered discourses that it evokes? What can its simulations of a fictional mind in action tell us about our own? This article draws on cognitive, feminist, and narrative theoretical frameworks to question what the concept of fluidity means for a video game that mobilizes it through both narrative design and gameplay.


2021 ◽  
pp. 174702182110092
Author(s):  
Quentin Marre ◽  
Nathalie Huet ◽  
Elodie Labeye

According to embodied cognition theory, cognitive processes are grounded in sensory, motor and emotional systems. This theory supports the idea that language comprehension and access to memory are based on sensorimotor mental simulations, which does indeed explain experimental results for visual imagery. These results show that word memorization is improved when the individual actively simulates the visual characteristics of the object to be learned. Very few studies, however, have investigated the effectiveness of more embodied mental simulations, that is, simulating both the sensory and motor aspects of the object (i.e., motor imagery) from a first-person perspective. The recall performances of 83 adults were analysed in four different conditions: mental rehearsal, visual imagery, third-person motor imagery, and first-person motor imagery. Results revealed a memory efficiency gradient running from low-embodiment strategies (i.e., involving poor perceptual and/or motor simulation) to high-embodiment strategies (i.e., rich simulation in the sensory and motor systems involved in interactions with the object). However, the benefit of engaging in motor imagery, as opposed to purely visual imagery, was only observed when participants adopted the first-person perspective. Surprisingly, visual and motor imagery vividness seemed to play a negligible role in this effect of the sensorimotor grounding of mental imagery on memory efficiency.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sahba Besharati ◽  
Paul Jenkinson ◽  
Michael Kopelman ◽  
Mark Solms ◽  
Valentina Moro ◽  
...  

In recent decades, the research traditions of (first-person) embodied cognition and of (third-person) social cognition have approached the study of self-awareness with relative independence. However, neurological disorders of self-awareness offer a unifying perspective to empirically investigate the contribution of embodiment and social cognition to self-awareness. This study focused on a neuropsychological disorder of bodily self-awareness following right-hemisphere damage, namely anosognosia for hemiplegia (AHP). A previous neuropsychological study has shown AHP patients, relative to neurological controls, to have a specific deficit in third-person, allocentric inferences in a story-based, mentalisation task. However, no study has tested directly whether verbal awareness of motor deficits is influenced by either perspective-taking or centrism, and if these deficits in social cognition are correlated with damage to anatomical areas previously linked to mentalising, including the supramarginal and superior temporal gyri and related limbic white matter connections. Accordingly, two novel experiments were conducted with right-hemisphere stroke patients with (n = 17) and without AHP (n = 17) that targeted either their own (egocentric, experiment 1) or another stooge patient’s (experiment 2) motor abilities from a first-or-third person (allocentric in Experiment 2) perspective. In both experiments, neurological controls showed no significant difference between perspectives, suggesting that perspective-taking deficits are not a general consequence of right-hemisphere damage. More specifically, experiment 1 found AHP patients were more aware of their own motor paralysis when asked from a third compared to a first-person perspective, using both group level and individual level analysis. In experiment 2, AHP patients were less accurate than controls in making allocentric, third-person perspective judgements about the stooge patient, but with only a trend towards significance and with no within-group, difference between perspectives. Deficits in egocentric and allocentric third-person perspective taking were associated with lesions in the middle frontal gyrus, superior temporal and supramarginal gyri, with white matter disconnections more predominate in deficits in allocentricity. This study confirms previous clinical and empirical investigations on the selectivity of first-person motor awareness deficits in anosognosia for hemiplegia and experimentally demonstrates for the first time that verbal egocentric 3PP-taking can positively influence 1PP body awareness.


2021 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 147-158
Author(s):  
Renata Zieminska

The paper presents the concept of masculinity within the non-binary and multilayered model of gender/sex traits. Within that model, masculinity is not a simple idea, but rather is fragmented into many traits in diverse clusters. The experience of transgender men and men with intersex traits suggests that self-determined male gender identity is a mega trait that is sufficient for being a man. However, masculinity is not only psychological, as the content of the psychological feeling of being a man refers to social norms about how men should be and behave. And male coded traits are described as traits that frequently occur within the group of people identifying as men. Therefore, I claim that there are two interdependent ideas in the concept of masculinity: the self-determined male gender identity (first-person perspective) and a cluster of traits coded as male (third-person perspective). Within non-binary model the interplay between the two interdependent ideas allows to include borderline masculinities.


2014 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-29 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jordan Zlatev

Abstract Mimetic schemas, unlike the popular cognitive linguistic notion of image schemas, have been characterized in earlier work as explicitly representational, bodily structures arising from imitation of culture-specific practical actions (Zlatev 2005, 2007a, 2007b). We performed an analysis of the gestures of three Swedish and three Thai children at the age of 18, 22 and 26 months in episodes of natural interaction with caregivers and siblings in order to analyze the hypothesis that iconic gestures emerge as mimetic schemas. In accordance with this hypothesis, we predicted that the children's first iconic gestures would be (a) intermediately specific, (b) culture-typical, (c) falling in a set of recurrent types, (d) predominantly enacted from a first-person perspective (1pp) rather than performed from a third-person perspective (3pp), with (e) 3pp gestures being more dependent on direct imitation than 1pp gestures and (f) more often co-occurring with speech. All specific predictions but the last were confirmed, and differences were found between the children's iconic gestures on the one side and their deictic and emblematic gestures on the other. Thus, the study both confirms earlier conjectures that mimetic schemas “ground” both gesture and speech and implies the need to qualify these proposals, limiting the link between mimetic schemas and gestures to the iconic category.


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