scholarly journals The Power of Nations: Measuring What Matters

2018 ◽  
Vol 43 (2) ◽  
pp. 7-44 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Beckley
Keyword(s):  
Goodness Of Fit ◽  
Balance Of Power ◽  
The United States ◽  
Important Variable ◽  
World Politics ◽  
Great Powers ◽  
Military Power ◽  
The Past ◽  
Policy Analysts ◽  
Leading Journals

Power is the most important variable in world politics, but scholars and policy analysts systematically mismeasure it. Most studies evaluate countries’ power using broad indicators of economic and military resources, such as gross domestic product and military spending, that tally their wealth and military assets without deducting the costs they pay to police, protect, and serve their people. As a result, standard indicators exaggerate the wealth and military power of poor, populous countries, such as China and India. A sounder approach accounts for these costs by measuring power in net rather than gross terms. This approach predicts war and dispute outcomes involving great powers over the past 200 years more accurately than those that use gross indicators of power. In addition, it improves the in-sample goodness-of-fit in the majority of studies published in leading journals over the past five years. Applying this improved framework to the current balance of power suggests that the United States’ economic and military lead over other countries is much larger than typically assumed, and that the trends are mostly in America's favor.

scholarly journals Regional Order in the Arctic: Negotiated Exceptionalism

Politik ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Heather Exner-Pirot ◽  
Robert W. Murray
Keyword(s):  
International Society ◽  
Balance Of Power ◽  
The United States ◽  
Great Powers ◽  
The Arctic ◽  
The Past ◽  
Transnational Ties ◽  
Regional Order ◽  
Western Arctic ◽  
The One

Traditional theories of International Relations have thus far failed to explain the unusual degree of cooperation seen in the Arctic between Russia on the one hand, and the seven Western Arctic states led by the United States on the other.  Rather than witnessing a devolution into competition and conflict over strategic shipping routes and hydrocarbon resources, regional Arctic institutions have continued to grow in strength and number in the past several years, and transnational ties have deepened. This has prompted some observers to describe the Arctic as ‘exceptional’ – somehow immune to or isolated from global political competition.This paper argues that the Arctic regional order is exceptional insofar as Arctic states and those states with involvement in the region have worked to negotiate an order and balance of power predicated on norms such as cooperation and multilateralism. The establishment of an Arctic international society has seen great powers and smaller powers come together to form an order aimed at promoting norms and institutions not seen elsewhere in the world. By using an English School approach to understand the Arctic, we contend that Arctic international society has been deliberately negotiated in a way that promotes cooperation between Arctic states. However this order can be disrupted if Arctic international society does not take conscious steps to maintain a strong institutional framework that protects Arctic internationalism.

U. S. Foreign Policy and the Balance of Power

1948 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 76-83
Author(s):  
Robert Strausz-Hupe
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
Balance Of Power ◽  
The United States ◽  
World Politics ◽  
Exact Science ◽  
Future Developments ◽  
The Past ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
The World ◽  
Historical Developments

International politics, like nature, is a system of processes. There are no simple causes and effects of historical developments. The record of the past tends to determine the present — until circumstance intervenes. Peoples, like individuals, are at the mercy of what is called chance, and an apparently meaningless combination of circumstances may frustrate the culmination of long-developed tendencies. Tendency is conservative of past forms, and circumstance may appear formless, but their balanced interplay is the source of novel forms. It is only within the frame of reference of these three terms — tendency, circumstance and novelty — that forecasting future developments can derive its warrant from an exact science of prediction. The basic conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union is the central issue of world politics. Sir Halford Mackinder's celebrated theorem — the juxtaposition of the continental empire of Eurasia and the Oceanic Powers, and the contest over the vast rimland interposed be-between the “heartland” and the littoral of Eurasia — is today as brilliant a summation of the world strategic problem as it was forty years ago when it was first propounded.

After Victory

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
G. John Ikenberry
Keyword(s):  
Comparative Politics ◽  
World Order ◽  
Balance Of Power ◽  
The United States ◽  
Big Bang ◽  
World Politics ◽  
Napoleonic Wars ◽  
Power Politics ◽  
The Cold War

The end of the Cold War was a “big bang” reminiscent of earlier moments after major wars, such as the end of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815 and the end of the world wars in 1919 and 1945. But what do states that win wars do with their newfound power, and how do they use it to build order? This book examines postwar settlements in modern history, arguing that powerful countries do seek to build stable and cooperative relations, but the type of order that emerges hinges on their ability to make commitments and restrain power. The book explains that only with the spread of democracy in the twentieth century and the innovative use of international institutions—both linked to the emergence of the United States as a world power—has order been created that goes beyond balance of power politics to exhibit “constitutional” characteristics. Blending comparative politics with international relations, and history with theory, the book will be of interest to anyone concerned with the organization of world order, the role of institutions in world politics, and the lessons of past postwar settlements for today.

scholarly journals Strategic Triangles and Balancing in World Politics

2021 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
pp. 23-43
Author(s):  
D. A. Degterev ◽  
M. S. Ramich
Keyword(s):  
International Relations ◽  
Composite Index ◽  
World Order ◽  
Balance Of Power ◽  
World Politics ◽  
Modern World ◽  
The Past ◽  
Regional Conflicts ◽  
Buffer States

Trilateral diplomacy is a common format of interaction in international relations, which forms various configurations of the balance of power within the framework of triangles. The concept of a “triangle” is characterized by ambivalence, has a variety of characteristics and principles of formation.The article provides an overview of the theoretical discourse on strategic triangles, as well as of practical examples of trilateral diplomacy of the past and present day. The main characteristics of strategic triangles and the features of changes in their configuration are identified (the case of USA–PRC–USSR triangle). Classification of both symmetric and asymmetric triangles (unicenter and bicenter) are given, the concept of buffer states, as well as regional conflicts with the participation of a great power as a defender, are presented.The most influential countries at the global and regional levels, forming geopolitical triangles, are identified basing on the Composite Index of National Capability (CINC). The concept of pivot states is analyzed permitting to indicate relatively small but geopolitically important countries, forming triangles together with influential states.The main strategic triangles of the modern world order are analyzed, presenting mostly countries of Asia (China, Japan, India), Russian Federation, USA and EU. The main trends of global competition based on geopolitical triangles in the XXI-st century are identified.

scholarly journals China in Global Governance: Ideology, Theory, and Instrumentation

2020 ◽  
Vol 18 (4) ◽  
pp. 132-153
Author(s):  
Evgeny N. Grachikov
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Global Governance ◽  
World Order ◽  
The United States ◽  
World Politics ◽  
The West ◽  
Cultural Traditions ◽  
The Past ◽  
Spheres Of Influence ◽  
Distribution Of Power

Over the past few years, the global political landscape has changed dramatically. Trump’s aggressive foreign policy has broken the precarious balance between the centers of world politics established in the past two decades. The U.S. trade war with China and accusations of creating COVID-19 have added a significant imbalance to the distribution of power in global governance. The current political global space is characterized by a tough struggle between the main centers of power for spheres of influence in macro regions, global power and redistribution of world incomes. In fact, it is a struggle for competition in setting the principles, norms and models of the future world order. Most of the developing countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America are distancing themselves from the West on many international issues, and advocating the creation of national concepts of world order (in “non-West,” “post-West,” “outside the West” formats), which would take into account the political and cultural traditions of their countries, and the specific experience of their interaction with neighboring states and the world as a whole. Thus, the competition in global governance between the United States and China is for a new global order, including influence on the vast Global South. This article offers an analysis of China’s strategy of global governance and Chinese academic discourse on this issue. The paper also examines China’s instrumentation for formatting its own structure of global governance and forms of strategic rivalry with the United States.

scholarly journals From Wealth to Power

2000 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 117-123
Author(s):  
Amr Sabet
Keyword(s):  
American Foreign Policy ◽  
International System ◽  
The United States ◽  
World Politics ◽  
Great Powers ◽  
Dutch Disease ◽  
The Body ◽  
State Structure ◽  
The Us ◽  
The One

From Wealth to Power is a study in the social and historical dynamics contributingto the rise and fall of essential actors in the international system. Itattempts to join history with social sciences theory in order to shed light onbroad theoretical topics in world politics, such as the rise of new great powers.In so doing it seeks to add to the body of scholarship that combined the studyof state structure with traditional international relations theory. The particularfocus is on the expansive rise of the United States, not only to world prominence,but also as a modem state. American foreign policy during the period1865-1908 is examined in light of changes in the state structure along the fourmajor variables- scope, autonomy, coherence, and capacity (p. 40)- touchingupon that country's domestic and administrative development.The first of the six chapters of the book poses the main questions that Zakariaattempts to address: ''What turns rich nations into 'great powers'?'' "Why, as states grow increasingly wealthy, do they build large annies, entangle themselvesin politics beyond their borders, and seek international influence?""What factors speed or retard the translation of material resources into politicalinterests?" (p. 3) and finally, "Under what conditions do states expand theirpolitical interests abroad?" (p. 18). Such questions visualize, on the one hand,a strong and direct correlation between great powers' economic rise and falland their growth or decline. Anomalies, on the other hand, are explained as a"Dutch disease," or the malady that does not allow "a nation of unequalledindividual prosperity and commercial prowess from remaining a state of greatinfluence and power" (pp. 4-5). The latter, Zakaria claims, was an Americanaffliction during the second half of the nineteenth century. This was particularlytrue during the relatively long period of nonexpansion and isolation followingthe Civil War (1860--64). Despite a tremendous increase in wealth, productivity,and power, it was not until the 1890s that the US began expandingagain. Zakaria considers this to be an aberration, reflecting a "highly unusualgap between power and interests" that lasted for some thirty years (p. 5). Anexplanation, according to him, would not only require a full historical account,but also "first-cut theories" which clarify national behavior (p. 8) ...

Grand Strategy in 10 Words

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sven Biscop
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
European Union ◽  
21St Century ◽  
The United States ◽  
World Politics ◽  
Great Powers ◽  
Grand Strategy ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Strategic Decisions ◽  
Key Terms

This book introduces ten key terms for analysing grand strategy and shows how the world's great powers - the United States, China, Russia and the European Union (EU) - shape their strategic decisions today and shows how the choices made will determine the course of world politics in the first half of the 21st century.

The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers in the Twenty-first Century: China's Rise and the Fate of America's Global Position

2016 ◽  
Vol 40 (3) ◽  
pp. 7-53 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen G. Brooks ◽  
William C. Wohlforth
Keyword(s):  
The United States ◽  
Great Powers ◽  
First Century ◽  
Global Politics ◽  
China’S Rise ◽  
The Past ◽  
Technological Level ◽  
China's Rise ◽  
Twenty First Century ◽  
New Framework

Unipolarity is arguably the most popular concept used to analyze the U.S. global position that emerged in 1991, but the concept is totally inadequate for assessing how that position has changed in the years since. A new framework that avoids unipolarity's conceptual pitfalls and provides a systematic approach to measuring how the distribution of capabilities is changing in twenty-first-century global politics demonstrates that the United States will long remain the only state with the capability to be a superpower. In addition, China is in a class by itself, one that the unipolarity concept cannot explain. To assess the speed with which China's rise might transform this into something other than a one-superpower system, analogies from past power transitions are misleading. Unlike past rising powers, China is at a much lower technological level than the leading state, and the gap separating Chinese and U.S. military capabilities is much larger than it was in the past. In addition, the very nature of power has changed: the greatly enhanced difficulty of converting economic capacity into military capacity makes the transition from a great power to a superpower much harder now than it was in the past. Still, China's rise is real and change is afoot.

Balancing on Land and at Sea: Do States Ally against the Leading Global Power?

2010 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jack S. Levy ◽  
William R. Thompson
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  
Coalition Formation ◽  
Balance Of Power ◽  
The United States ◽  
Great Powers ◽  
Global System ◽  
Power Theory ◽  
Global Power ◽  
European System ◽  
The Cold War

Scholars often interpret balance of power theory to imply that great powers almost always balance against the leading power in the system, and they conclude that the absence of a counterbalancing coalition against the historically unprecedented power of the United States after the end of the Cold War is a puzzle for balance of power theory. They are wrong on both counts. Balance of power theory is not universally applicable. Its core propositions about balancing strategies and the absence of sustained hegemonies apply to the European system and perhaps to some other autonomous continental systems but not to the global maritime system. Sea powers are more interested in access to markets than in territorial aggrandizement against other great powers. Consequently, patterns of coalition formation have been different in the European system and in the global maritime system during the last five centuries. An empirical analysis demonstrates that counterhegemonic balancing is frequent in Europe but much less frequent in the global system. Higher concentrations of power in the global system lead to fewer and smaller rather than more frequent and larger balancing coalitions, as well as to more frequent and larger alliances with the leading sea power than against it.

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