Chung-ying Cheng’s Dialogue with Confucianism and Kant: A Gadamerian Critique

2021 ◽  
Vol 48 (4) ◽  
pp. 402-409
Author(s):  
Stephen R. Palmquist

Abstract Gadamer’s hermeneutics offers several strategies for critiquing Chung-ying Cheng’s synthesis of Confucianism and Kant. Interpreting Kant’s Groundwork, Cheng argues that the distinction between perfect and imperfect duties is too rigid: if the “life principle” is the ultimate root of Kant’s four types of duty, then human inclinations are good; Kant’s perfect duties turn out to be imperfect in some situations, while his imperfect duties such as benevolence (or ren, in Confucian philosophy) turn out sometimes to be perfect. Although Cheng’s synthesis does not satisfy the Groundwork’s universal aim, it does show how to apply Kant’s insights to empirical moral situations.

2020 ◽  
Vol 97 (4) ◽  
pp. 679-692
Author(s):  
Simon Hollnaicher

Abstract According to a well-known problem in climate ethics, individual actions cannot be wrong due to their impact on climate change since the individual act does not make a difference. By referring to the practical interpretation of the categorical imperative, the author argues that certain actions lead to a contradiction in conception in light of the climate crisis. Universalizing these actions would cause foreseeable climate impacts, making it impossible to pursue the original maxim effectively. According to the practical interpretation, such actions are morally wrong. The wrongness of these actions does not depend on making a difference, rather these actions are wrong because they make it impossible for others to act accordingly. Thus, apart from imperfect duties, for which has been argued convincingly elsewhere (Henning 2016; Alberzart 2019), we also have perfect duties to refrain from certain actions in the face of the climate crisis.


2004 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 201-217 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Lea

Abstract:In this paper, I specifically consider the issue of corporate governance and normative stakeholder theory. In doing so, I argue that stakeholder theory and responsibilities to non-shareholder constituencies can be made more intelligible by reference to Kant’s conception of perfect and imperfect duties. I draw upon Onora O’Neill’s (1996) work, Towards Justice and Virtue: A Constructivist Account of Practical Reasoning. In her text O’Neill underlines a number of relevant issues including: the integration of particularist and universalist accounts of morality; the priority of obligations over rights; the importance of the distinction between imperfect and perfect duties; and the relation between the virtues and imperfect duties. On the basis of the foregoing analysis, the paper argues that business ethicists should avoid recommending the institutionalising of stakeholder responsibilities in terms of legally defined sets of stakeholder rights. Instead, we should regard stakeholder responsibilities as uniformalised imperfect duties. Conceiving responsibilities to all stakeholder groups in this manner, allows the firm the freedom to perfect these duties in ways appropriate to cultural and societal setting, and in accordance with the capacity to do so.


2016 ◽  
Vol 65 (2) ◽  
pp. 268-283 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert E Goodin

Everyone agrees we have duties of charity, however restrictive a view they take of our duties of justice. But duties of charity can sometimes be stronger than duties of justice, and where they are, those owed duties of justice cannot complain when the duty-bearer discharges that duty of charity instead. Furthermore, duties of charity, being imperfect, require institutional specification to render them into perfect duties making clear who owes what to whom. Institutions do that by “consolidating” imperfect duties of charity. Such institutions would be very similar to those required by robust duties of justice. Anyone who takes appropriately seriously the duties of charity that everyone agrees we all have would thereby be led to prescribe broadly the same institutions as advocates of robust duties of justice.


2003 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 97-118 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Llewelyn

AbstractStay! That is to say, either stay with your decision or stay your hand. Demeure: either remain or delay. Morari or moriri: either life or death. The alternation is also a hyphenation, a connection-disconnection, as with that of Judaeo-Christianity and the ethicoreligious. How are these hyphenations construed in Kierkegaard's divergence from Kant and Hegel and in the responses of Derrida and Levinas to Johannes de silentio's story of what happened and did not happen on Mount Moriah? Perfect duties and imperfect duties fall under the responsibility of absolute duty. If the ethical is externally related to natural life, the life that is internal to the ethical is due to another externality, that of responsibility to the absolute other - or God, if you like. Another alternation. Another hyphenation? Or a dash? And would it be a dash that separates justice from love? And is love ever separate from self-love or from narcissisim? What sort of narcissism is exemplifed in Kierkegaard's search for salvation? Meanwhile Abraham waits, and with him or against him but without demur, so do Isaac (or is it Ishmael?), the ram, and a host of hostages, guests, and asylum-seekers, one by one.


2020 ◽  
pp. 089976402095426
Author(s):  
Rebecca C. Ruehle ◽  
Bart Engelen ◽  
Alfred Archer

Nudging techniques can help charities to increase donations. In this article, we first provide a systematic overview of prototypical nudges that promote charitable giving. Second, we argue that plenty of the ethical objections raised against nudges, such as the exploitation of power they involve and the arguably intrusive and deceptive nature, are not specific to nudging itself. Carefully designing nudges can help to avoid these worries. Third, given that most concerns boil down to the worry that nudges infringe on people’s autonomy, we analyze when this could nevertheless be justified. We differentiate between perfect duties, imperfect duties, and supererogatory acts and argue that nudges are (a) morally permissible (even when they violate autonomy) when it comes to perfect duties and can (b) provide the best available strategy when it comes to imperfect duties. That said, we also analyze the conditions under which nudging charitable giving is impermissible.


2021 ◽  
pp. 164-178
Author(s):  
Barbara Herman

This chapter shows how both perfect and imperfect duties require both agents and institutions to take responsibility for tracking moral value across their respective contexts of right and duty. The casuistry that belongs to perfect duties is contrasted with the exercise of discretion essential to acting on an imperfect duty. A defense of juridical imperfect duties is offered. Citizens and officials of the state acting under the auspices of a juridical right or duty may need to exercise the kind of discretion that is the mark of an imperfect duty. Questions about moral change in the content and locus of duties are introduced.


Author(s):  
Richard Reilly

The focus of this chapter is Schopenhauer’s On The Basis of Morality (1841). His distinctive views are that compassion marks one’s being as spontaneously motivated to relieve another’s suffering as one’s own and that this requires a metaphysical explanation for how one identifies with another. The author defends these views and shows in some detail how they mirror the Mahayana account of compassion in Shantideva’s The Way of the Bodhisattva. Next, the author outlines Schopenhauer’s case for compassion being the sole basis of moral value and defends this claim against the Kantian view that acting beneficently cannot (rationally) override so-called perfect duties to others. Finally, the author explores how Buddha Shakyamuni’s teachings cohere with Schopenhauer’s account of suffering and how mystical consciousness, as represented in Mahayana Buddhism’s “Middle Way,” coheres with Schopenhauer’s asceticism—the “denial of the will”—as the path to overcoming suffering.


Semiotica ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Fan Min

Abstract As the representative of Chinese classical works, the Analects represents a source of difficulty in both understanding and interpretation of Confucian philosophy. Confucian philosophy as a philosophy of creativity and otherness is closely related with the social and cultural values in society. Therefore, the study of Confucian philosophy in the Analects cannot be separated from the descriptive study of the effects of any and all aspects of society, including cultural norms, expectations, contexts, language use, and the effects of language use on society. This article attempts to explore how the meaning of Confucian philosophy in the Analects is interpreted and accepted by Western readers through complex social semiotic interactions. The article focuses on the interpretation of Confucian philosophy as a reflection of cultural assumptions, values and prohibitions, and the manipulation of the social semiotic resources in the process of understanding, translation, and acceptance of Confucian philosophy in the Analects through a discussion of its original text, different versions and the reasons behind the social semiotic activities. The article concludes with a consideration of significant social semiotic interactions that influence the translator’s interpretation and reader’s acceptance of Confucian philosophy so as to facilitate intercultural understanding.


2021 ◽  
pp. 097133362199044
Author(s):  
James H. Liu

Psychology has a pervasive but shallow engagement with Confucian philosophy, mainly referencing its popular form as a part of Chinese tradition. This special issue takes a more systematic view of Confucianism as comprehensive philosophy. Drawing from New Confucianism, it is argued that the signal contribution of Confucianism to psychology as human (rather than natural) science is an ontology of the moral mind (heaven and humanity in union). This holistic ontology makes the cultivation of benevolence (仁) a lifelong mission for Confucianists. Practices of self-cultivation are exemplified by a case study of Zeng Guofan, a Qing Dynasty official and scholar, who combined academics, calligraphy, meditation, diary writing and self-reflection to refine his character, nurture and educate his family, and be of service to society. Second, Confucianism’s traditional lack of interest in epistemology is addressed through the complementary (dialectical) principle of ‘one principle, many manifestations’, where methods of Western science can be incorporated into the investigation of practices such as brush calligraphy that are shown to have beneficial effects on mental and physical health. Confucianism can also be treated as an object of scientific inquiry: We find that even among highly educated Chinese people, understanding of Confucianism today is mostly fragmented and abstract. Confucian Psychology can be summarised as a psychology of aspirations for bettering the condition of humanity through character development and greater awareness of the situation to realise the endowment of moral mind. Finally, there are deep connections between Confucian and Indian psychology—both involve height psychology, a psychology of aspirations and for spiritual transformation.


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