Commentary on “Democracy and Scandal: A Research Agenda”

2013 ◽  
Vol 12 (6) ◽  
pp. 863-871 ◽  
Author(s):  
Scott Brenton

Abstract In my original article “Scandals as a Positive Feature of Liberal Democratic Politics: A Durkheimian perspective” (2012b), I argued that scandals are actually a positive feature of liberal democratic politics, and rather than representing a threat to political stability serve an important function. Scandals provide a “safety valve” for the expression of negativity towards political actors while reinforcing collective values and ultimately strengthening the system, consistent with Durkheim’s ideas. The response to this article certainly contains some thought-provoking examples, but they do not contradict my argument that scandal can only occur in liberal democracies due to the necessity of freedom of speech, an open and aggressive media and strong political competition.

2012 ◽  
Vol 11 (6) ◽  
pp. 815-844 ◽  
Author(s):  
Scott Brenton

Abstract Political scandals are an indicator of freedom of speech, an open and aggressive media and strong political competition. Émile Durkheim’s ideas on social cohesion have a particular resonance in liberal democracies, and raise the question of whether scandals can only occur in liberal democracies. Scandals enable an interrogation of the collective moral code and public opinion is used to punish the “deviant” behaviour of politicians, who are elevated to a symbolic position of moral authority. This form of non-violent social conflict between competing political groups performs a positive role in maintaining a healthy and vigilant democracy, albeit with the presence of some negative side-effects, such as incursions into the private sphere.


2002 ◽  
Vol 96 (3) ◽  
pp. 495-509 ◽  
Author(s):  
ARASH ABIZADEH

This paper subjects to critical analysis four common arguments in the sociopolitical theory literature supporting the cultural nationalist thesis that liberal democracy is viable only against the background of a single national public culture: the arguments that (1) social integration in a liberal democracy requires shared norms and beliefs (Schnapper); (2) the levels of trust that democratic politics requires can be attained only among conationals (Miller); (3) democratic deliberation requires communicational transparency, possible in turn only within a shared national public culture (Miller, Barry); and (4) the economic viability of specifically industrialized liberal democracies requires a single national culture (Gellner). I argue that all four arguments fail: At best, a shared cultural nation may reduce some of the costs liberal democratic societies must incur; at worst, cultural nationalist policies ironically undermine social integration. The failure of these cultural nationalist arguments clears the way for a normative theory of liberal democracy in multinational and postnational contexts.


2013 ◽  
Vol 12 (6) ◽  
pp. 851-862 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jensen Sass ◽  
Thomas Crosbie

Abstract In a recent edition of this journal, Scott Brenton (2012) announced a refreshing perspective on the relationship between political scandal and liberal democratic institutions: though scandals are often thought anathema to democratic politics, a cause of public distraction or a sign of institutional degradation, their effect may actually be to reinforce and rejuvenate the polity. We consolidate and then challenge this perspective. We begin by reconstructing Brenton’s observations on scandal as a process model which we term the “scandal reform cycle”. We then suggest a raft of challenges to the model to reveal the complexity of scandals and their uncertain institutional effects. Our larger ambition is to articulate the relationship between scandal and democracy not as a simple question but rather as an ambitious and timely research agenda.


2021 ◽  
Vol 65 (3) ◽  
pp. 73-80
Author(s):  
Y. Kvashnin

The article examines the Greek party system under the Third Republic and identifies the key trends in its development during the years of the “great recession” (2008–2016) and the subsequent post-crisis recovery. Economic and social cataclysms led to the political fragmentation, the decline of the once largest party PASOK, the rise of radical parties, both left and right wing. However, the period of political chaos was short-lived. As a result, Greece has come to a quasi-two-party system, similar to the one that functioned in the pre-crisis decades. The return to normalcy was partly caused by the failure of the anti-European agenda, which brought SYRIZA and Independent Greeks to power in 2015 on the crest of a populist wave. But there were other reasons. First, the revitalization of the bipartisan system was facilitated by a reinforced proportional electoral system, which gave 50 bonus seats to the leading party. Second, political competition is constrained by the conservatism of Greek society, its weak susceptibility to new ideas (liberal, «green», regionalist, etc.). Third, bipartisanship is cemented by widespread clientelistic ties between the largest parties and voters who receive public sector jobs and other benefits in exchange for their loyalty. Fourth, the lion’s share of media resources is concentrated in the hands of a small number of media moguls associated with the leading parties, and citizens receive rather scant information about smaller political actors. These factors contribute to political stability, but at the same time they limit political competition, which poses serious risks for the country.


Author(s):  
Anushka Singh

The life of a law exists both within and beyond the statute books and courts’ interpretations. This assertion has been made in this work in the exploration of the journey of the law of sedition primarily at three levels—the first concerns itself with analysing the language of the law of sedition; the second, with studying the judicial discourse on sedition; and the third pertains to interrogating the quotidian aspects of law as it unfolds on the ground. While this work offers a focused study on Indian democracy at all these levels, it has broadened its scope by including experiences from the liberal democracies of the west in its analysis. This work has used sedition as a lens to probe the fate of political speech in liberal democracies which claim to give constitutional and legal protection of varying degrees to the right to free speech, of which political speech and the right to dissent are extensions. Despite the claims to protection, the working of such democracies has shown that the freedom of speech in relation to political speeches particularly has always been in danger. The liberal-democratic space has continued to shrink for dissident voices despite the progression of liberal democracies towards free speech jurisprudence and annulment or modification of laws related to sedition....


2018 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 81-91 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jason Stanley ◽  
John B. Min

Stanley and Min discuss how propaganda works in liberal democratic societies. Stanley observes that the inability to address the crisis of liberal democracies can be partially explained by contemporary political philosophy’s penchant for idealized theorizing about norms of justice over transitions from injustice to justice. Whereas ancient and modern political philosophers took seriously propaganda and demagoguery of the elites and populists, contemporary political philosophers have tended to theorize about the idealized structures of justice. This leads to a lack of theoretical constructs and explanatory tools by which we can theorize about real-life political problems, such as mass incarceration. Starting with this premise, Stanley provides an explanation of how propaganda works and the mechanisms that enable propaganda. Stanley further theorizes the pernicious effects that elitism, populism, authoritarianism, and “post-truth” have on democratic politics.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-26
Author(s):  
Henry Farrell ◽  
Abraham L. Newman

Abstract Scholars and policymakers long believed that norms of global information openness and private-sector governance helped to sustain and promote liberalism. These norms are being increasingly contested within liberal democracies. In this article, we argue that a key source of debate over the Liberal International Information Order (LIIO), a sub-order of the Liberal International Order (LIO), is generated internally by “self-undermining feedback effects,” that is, mechanisms through which institutional arrangements undermine their own political conditions of survival over time. Empirically, we demonstrate how global governance of the Internet, transnational disinformation campaigns, and domestic information governance interact to sow the seeds of this contention. In particular, illiberal states converted norms of openness into a vector of attack, unsettling political bargains in liberal states concerning the LIIO. More generally, we set out a broader research agenda to show how the international relations discipline might better understand institutional change as well as the informational aspects of the current crisis in the LIO.


2001 ◽  
Vol 25 ◽  
pp. 31-46 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yeşim Arat

The development of liberalism with both the courage and the capacity to engage itself with a different world, one in which its principles are neither well understood nor widely held, in which indeed it is, in most places, a minority creed, alien and suspect, is not only possible, it is necessary.-Clifford Geertz. 2000.Available Light.Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, p. 258.Over the past two decades, the debate over multiculturalism challenged the justice of neutral, “difference blind” rules in liberal democracies. Allegedly neutral institutions were shown to be implicitly biased toward the priorities, experiences, or interests of the dominant groups in the society. Criticism of difference-blind rules and claims for justice to minority groups defined the relationship between government and opposition in many contexts. Arguments for special rights to protect minorities, women, or ethnocultural groups gained legitimacy (Young 1990, Jones 1990, Phillips 1991, Taylor 1994, Kymlicka 1995, Kymlicka and Norman 2000).


2021 ◽  
pp. 089692052110138
Author(s):  
Myles Carroll

This article draws on Gramsci’s theory of passive revolution to explore the second tenure of Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzō from 2012 to 2020. It sees the high degree of political stability that Abe achieved as a contrast to the preceding two decades of Japanese politics and asks what accounts for Abe’s success in restoring Liberal Democratic Party’s (LDP) dominance in an era of enduring economic and social crisis. The article argues that Abe executed a strategy of passive revolution that incorporated two “faces”: an “outward” face oriented around consent and an “inward” face rooted in coercion. The former involved economic policies (in particular “Abenomics”) designed to appear capable of resolving chronic economic stagnation, growing inequality and other social and economic problems, restoring popular support for the LDP without undermining conditions for capital accumulation or empowering subaltern classes. In contrast, the latter involved various low-profile security and administrative policies that enabled the Abe government to dramatically increase its power while silencing or disarming potential rivals and critics. The article sees this two-sided strategy of passive revolution as effective in restoring LDP dominance but unlikely to prove the basis for a more expansive hegemony or a resolution to Japan’s organic crisis.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document