scholarly journals Collapse and Re-Emergence of the Two-Party System in Greece

2021 ◽  
Vol 65 (3) ◽  
pp. 73-80
Author(s):  
Y. Kvashnin

The article examines the Greek party system under the Third Republic and identifies the key trends in its development during the years of the “great recession” (2008–2016) and the subsequent post-crisis recovery. Economic and social cataclysms led to the political fragmentation, the decline of the once largest party PASOK, the rise of radical parties, both left and right wing. However, the period of political chaos was short-lived. As a result, Greece has come to a quasi-two-party system, similar to the one that functioned in the pre-crisis decades. The return to normalcy was partly caused by the failure of the anti-European agenda, which brought SYRIZA and Independent Greeks to power in 2015 on the crest of a populist wave. But there were other reasons. First, the revitalization of the bipartisan system was facilitated by a reinforced proportional electoral system, which gave 50 bonus seats to the leading party. Second, political competition is constrained by the conservatism of Greek society, its weak susceptibility to new ideas (liberal, «green», regionalist, etc.). Third, bipartisanship is cemented by widespread clientelistic ties between the largest parties and voters who receive public sector jobs and other benefits in exchange for their loyalty. Fourth, the lion’s share of media resources is concentrated in the hands of a small number of media moguls associated with the leading parties, and citizens receive rather scant information about smaller political actors. These factors contribute to political stability, but at the same time they limit political competition, which poses serious risks for the country.

2019 ◽  
Vol 49 (2) ◽  
pp. 157-173 ◽  
Author(s):  
Valeria Resta

AbstractAlthough the failed democratic transition in Egypt following the Arab Spring is unanimously held as a poster child for the stubbornness of authoritarianism in the MENA region, its determinants remain disputed. Contributing to this debate, this article focuses on the noxious effects of past electoral authoritarianism on the transitional party system. More specifically, through quantitative text analysis, the article demonstrates that transitional parties’ agency is largely the by-product of the way in which political competition was structured under the previous electoral autocracy. On the one hand, the uneven structure of opportunity upholding previous rule is central to the lack of pluralism. On the other hand, the previous regime's practice of playing opposition actors against each other through identity politics is at the root of the absence of common ground among the aforementioned parties during the transition.


Author(s):  
Agustí Bosch

This chapter examines the Spanish electoral system, meaning—first and foremost—the one used to elect the lower house (Congreso de los Diputados). After a brief description of its components, the chapter assesses how its scarce proportionality has traditionally led Spanish politics towards a two-party system. The chapter also assesses some other of its alleged outcomes (such as the malapportionment, the weight of the regional parties, or the robustness of democracy) and its prospects for the future. Finally, the chapter also examines the ‘other’ Spanish electoral systems—that is, the ones used to elect the Senate, the local councils, the regional parliaments, and the Spanish seats in the European Parliament.


2012 ◽  
Vol 40 (5) ◽  
pp. 767-782 ◽  
Author(s):  
Boyka Stefanova

This paper examines a less researched aspect of East European party politics: change within ethnic parties, which are conventionally regarded as stable or intransigent political actors. The main argument of the paper is that the decreasing relevance of a bipolar model of political competition has affected the relative positioning of ethnic parties. Their programmatic outlook, role in the party system, and mobilization strategies are being mainstreamed. Ethnic parties are no longer regarded as inevitable participants in power sharing and informal elite accommodation. They are increasingly treated by voters and the party system alike as national-level parties and national-level competitors. The paper applies the concept of mainstreaming to explain the long-term evolution of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms in Bulgarian party politics as a critical case study of ethnic party repositioning from proximity to government to parliamentary opposition. It builds an argument about the MRF's continued relevance to the party system, ensuring minority representation beyond ethnicity, as a liberal-centrist party representing distinct economic interests and political orientations within the Bulgarian electorate.


2009 ◽  
Vol 46 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marco Moreno

RESUMEN: El propósito del artículo es explorar las instituciones y reglas del juego que rigen el comportamiento y las relaciones entre los actores políticos chilenos desde una perspectiva de gobernabilidad democrática. Se examina en qué forma las instituciones y reglas del juego –formales e informales– contribuyen positiva o negativamente a la gobernabilidad democrática en Chile. Se centrará la atención primero en las instituciones políticas de carácter formal y después, en las de carácter informal. Al examinar las instituciones de carácter formal se distinguirá a aquellas que se vinculan más estrechamente con la forma de gobierno, los mecanismos de pesos y contrapesos, el sistema electoral y el sistema de partidos. En las informales se repasarán brevemente aquellas más visibles: clientelismo, circuitos extrainstitucionales del poder y captura del Estado. El punto de partida para este análisis recoge la idea de que un criterio clave para determinar el nivel de la consolidación democrática en un país es el que resulta de una adecuación razonablemente cercana entre reglas formales y comportamientos y prácticas de los actores.ABSTRACT: The intention of this article is to explore the institutions and rules of the game that govern the behavior of and relations between Chilean political actors from a perspective of democratic governability. It examines the ways in which the institutions and rules of the game –both formal and informal– contribute positively or negatively to democratic governability in Chile. It first focuses its attention on formal political institutions and later examines those that are informal in nature. When examining formal institutions, a special emphasis is put on those most closely linked to the form of government, the mechanisms of weights and counterweights, the electoral system and the party system. The examination of informal institutions concentrates on the most visible such institutions: clientelism, extrainstitutional circuits of power and the capture of the State. The point of departure for this analysis is the idea that a key criterion for determining the level of democratic consolidation in a country is the relative fit between formal rules and the behavior and practices of political actors.


2021 ◽  
Vol 65 (7) ◽  
pp. 106-115
Author(s):  
D. Malysheva

The article analyzes the innovations that determine the main directions and specific characteristics of international political competition in Central Asia. Particular attention is paid to political alternatives presented by the leading partners of the Central Asian countries – Russia, China, Turkey and Iran. In the context of the rivalry unfolding in the post-Soviet Central Asian space, the multi-vector policy of the five Central Asian states opens up a “window of opportunity” for various external forces to influence political and economic processes in the region in such a way that its states become objects of multilateral contention. Russia, which has the most powerful economic and military-political resource in the CIS, has a serious potential to promote its interests in Central Asia. They are primarily aiming at maintaining political stability in the Asian part of the post-Soviet space. Russia is also initiating many integration innovations in Central Asia, developing military cooperation with the countries of the region. At the same time, in Central Asia, Russia is confronted by rival forces. In the forefront is China. This great power has significantly expanded its influence in Central Asia, especially within the framework of the One Belt, One Road initiative. Economic, political, and cultural structures operating in Central Asia under the aegis of Turkey act often as alternatives to Russian integration projects. But Turkey, like Iran, has restrictions on its activities in Central Asia. Therefore, the effectiveness of the policy of these large Middle Eastern states is lower than that of Russia and China. China, Russia, and Iran are motivated to limit US influence in Eurasia, which occasionally drives them closer. In a sense, Turkey agrees with the idea of reducing the political presence of non-regional states in Central Asia. But when the US ceases to be a priority in the foreign policy of all four states, the rivalry between them may re-emerge. This will inevitably lead to a clash of interests, an increase in competition of ideas, integration projects, political and military strategies.


1952 ◽  
Vol 46 (4) ◽  
pp. 1069-1078 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maurice Duverger

To any observer the French party system is bewildering. On the one hand, he sees that ten parliamentary groups are officially established in the National Assembly (not including the Overseas Independents); and, at the same time, he notes that only five of them are really organized throughout the country, and so entitled to be considered “parties” in the true sense of the word: the RPF, the Radicals, the MRP, the Socialists, and the Communists. On the other hand, he observes that the ablest French specialists in electoral sociology—particularly André Siegfried and his disciple, François Goguel—consider that, behind the apparent profusion of political groups, two basic divisions are always found, the continuing opposition of which has supplied for more than a century the essential dynamics of French politics. These two divisions are, of course, the Right and the Left, traditionally called “Order” and “Movement.” Nevertheless, the brief history of the Fourth Republic reveals an attempt to break down these two blocs, and to build a “Third Force” from smaller units. Under various names, such a Third Force has governed France from March, 1947, to March, 1952; and if our hypothetical observer will look back and analyze the political life of the Third Republic, he will find the same tendency there, not so marked and not so strong, but always present.


2018 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 27-48 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zsófia Papp ◽  
Veronika Patkós

Covering the largest sample of countries to date, this study examines the effect of three country-specific factors on the tone of electoral campaigns across Europe: electoral system disproportionality, party system fragmentation, and the polarization of the electorate. We use an original dataset of statements made by political actors during eighteen electoral campaigns in nine European countries. Our multinomial logit model suggests that increasing disproportionality slightly increases negativity, while thanks to parties competing on the same market, less polarized electorates invite more negative political campaigns. Finally, we find a U-shaped relationship between party system fragmentation and negativity: Increasing the number of parties, negativity decreases first, only to start increasing again once the party system becomes very fragmented. We explain this with parties altering their coalition strategies with the changing number of parties: Less fragmentation makes it more likely to having to step into coalition with the competitors, thus decreasing negativity, while in very fragmented systems, parties not needed to any potential coalitions become easy targets to negative campaign.


2011 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Bernt Aardal

The electoral system is an integral part of any representative democracy, and the choice of system is an important framework for individual behavior and party competition. An electoral system is a result of compromise between parties with vested interests in the system setup. However, no system satisfies all ideal claims. This article is an introduction to the electoral system used in parliamentary elections in Norway; it emphasizes the political consequences of vital elements such as the balance between provincial and compensatory seats, and the geographical distribution of seats and electoral formulae. In sum, the system introduced in 2003 is more proportional in terms of the parties’ share of seats compared with votes, and the geographical distribution has become more systematic and less skewed, although the ideal of one vote-one value has not been achieved. Both the present and previous electoral systems combine elements reflecting different principles and concerns such as increased proportionality, on the one hand, and the fear of a fragmented party system on the other. The analyses show a complex interplay between different parts of the system. One and the same system may have different effects depending on the balance between the parties and between electoral districts. Thus, in order to study the effect of changes in the electoral system one needs to use simulations based on election outcomes over time.


2018 ◽  
Vol 37 (3) ◽  
pp. 139-171 ◽  
Author(s):  
Muhamad M. N. Nadzri

The results of the recent 2018 general election (GE14) in Malaysia were exceptional. The ruling party – Barisan Nasional (BN) – was ousted from power after over six decades of authoritarian rule, by a new opposition coalition – the Pakatan Harapan (PH). In this historic election, BN lost all the federal states in Peninsular Malaysia except for the two less developed ones of Perlis and Pahang. BN was also defeated in Sabah for the second time since its dramatic recapture in 1995. However, these results are not as surprising if one looks at the outcome from its historical and developmental perspectives. The indication of the breakdown of the one-party dominant state of Malaysia can (at least) be traced back to 10 years ago – since the 2008 general election (GE12). BN then lost several parliamentary seats in the urban centres, even with a less unified opposition. It had also lost four states on the west coast of Peninsular Malaysia, and had been fairly incompetent in reclaiming control over Selangor and Penang since that particular election. Five years later, in the 2013 general election (GE13), the results aggravated BN. It had lost its popular votes to the then opposition coalition – the Pakatan Rakyat (PR). The main objectives of this article, therefore, are twofold. First, it intends to shed light on the recent general elections through historical and developmental approaches by linking them to the electoral results, and political development in Malaysia, respective to GE12 and GE13. Second, it strives to make available for analysis the arguments on how the opposition pact managed to unseat BN in GE14. The analysis in this article is based on the data gathered by the author through a mixture of media studies, library research, and direct observation – as this author was one of the official observers appointed by the Election Commission of Malaysia for GE14. The main argument of this article on the breakthrough of PH to the federal government is that the opposition managed to reshape the multiparty electoral system to a “two-plus-one party system” from late 2016, which boosted the level of political competition between the two main parties in Malaysia – namely, BN and PH – in GE14. Four major factors have been identified as constituting the triumph of PH and the fall of BN in the election. These are: the existence of a credible representative and strong opposition, with the inclusion of Mahathir and two Malay/ Bumiputra (“the natives”) political parties; the rupture of the elites within the ruling regime; the presence of impactful issues surrounding Najib's administration; and, the advancement of information and communications technology as well as its impact on the emergence of a digital and much more participative society in Malaysia.


2018 ◽  
Vol 22 (3) ◽  
pp. 465-490 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paloma Caravantes

Little research has explored the gender dimension of political actors who have emerged in response to the erosion of Western mainstream parties after the Great Recession. This article analyzes the case of Podemos, a party inspired by the protest movement Indignados, which has disrupted the Spanish two-party system in only two years. Through the analysis of its leadership’s discourse, I expose the constitutive friction between Podemos’ commitment to “new” alternative practices and the “feminization of politics,” and the reproduction of “old” and “masculinized” politics through a competitive rationale. I characterize this rationale with four features that underlie a dominant masculine party culture: (1) emphasis on winning and aggressive strategy, (2) adversarial style and internal confrontation, (3) hierarchy based on intellectual authority, and (4) charismatic masculine leadership. I suggest that this originates from a populist notion of empowerment and political power that relies on a patriarchal and dominant understanding of successful politics.


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