nato, International Organizations and Functional Immunity

2016 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 211-254
Author(s):  
Daniël M. Grütters

The development of international law vis-à-vis international organizations has been limited and not seen an evolution of mechanisms to settle conflicts involving international organizations. In a world in which the role and importance of international organizations continues to grow, their opaque status under international law is a problem. This article discusses the position of the North Atlantic treaty Organization (‘nato’) as an international organization under international law within the context of military operations. If nato has a distinct legal personality and relevant conduct can be attributed to it, it could face potential claims. In this article I will argue that the procedural bar of functional immunity is limiting claimants from bringing such claims, not only impeding access to justice for individual claimants, but also obstructing the development of the position of international organizations under international law, and that the scope and operation of functional immunity should therefore be limited.

Author(s):  
Fleck Dieter ◽  
Newton Michael A ◽  
Grenfell Katarina

This chapter discusses the use of multinational military units. Some European States, such as Germany, have incorporated large, if not most, parts of their national military forces in permanent multinational units. Many other States including the US are forming ad hoc military units for specific operations. The UN, NATO, and other international organizations are pursuing standby arrangements and high readiness commitments to allow for rapid response. In all these situations command and control issues are to be considered. While there are many different forms of multinational military cooperation, and Sending States will avoid regulating these matters in status-of-forces agreements (SOFAs) with the Receiving State, they are nevertheless relevant for the law and practice of Visiting Forces. This chapter draws some conclusions on the concept of multinational military operations for the North Atlantic Alliance, the European Union, and beyond.


2020 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 201-233
Author(s):  
Kristina Daugirdas

Abstract This article argues that international organizations ‘as such’ can contribute directly to the creation of customary international law for three independent reasons. First, the states establishing an international organization may subjectively intend for that organization to be able to contribute to the creation of at least some kinds of customary international law. Second, that capacity may be an implied power of the organization. Third, that capacity may be a byproduct of other features or authorities of the international organization – specifically, the combination of international legal personality and the capacity to operate on the international plane. Affirming international organizations’ direct role in making customary international law will not dramatically change the content of customary international law or the processes by which rules of customary international law are ascertained. But recognizing that role is significant because it will reinforce other conclusions about how international organizations fit into the international legal system, including that customary international law binds international organizations. Such recognition may also shift the way lawyers within international organizations carry out their work by affecting the sources they consult when answering legal questions, the materials they make publicly available and the kinds of expertise that are understood to be necessary to discharge their responsibilities. Finally, affirming international organizations’ role in creating customary international law may make international organizations more willing to comply with those rules.


Author(s):  
Łukasz Jureńczyk ◽  
Jildiz Nicharapova

The main research question of the article is what attitude present the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and the Collective Security Treaty Organization towards Afghanistan after 2014? A number of detailed questions were also put to help to answer the main question. The article consists of eight chapters. The first chapter discusses the methodological assumptions of the article. Chapter two covers literature review and theoretical framework of the article. The following chapters include an analysis of the approach to Afghanistan of the three indicated international organizations. The article ends with conclusion that contain the main theses.


2018 ◽  
Vol 04 (S1) ◽  
pp. 67
Author(s):  
Manjula Jain ◽  
Himanshu Gupta ◽  
◽  

It has been constantly viewed that the developed economies unevenly ruled the governance structures in the international organizations such as International Monetary Fund (MF). The continuous development in Emerging and Developing Economies (EDEs) over the last 20 years witnessed their growing importance in the world economy, but at the same time little increase in their voice in the IMF. There are reasons for the discontent of the EDEs in the present structure such as the increase of regional monetary arrangements, uneven distribution of quota shares, IMF quota reforms, and IMF voting structure. The world economy is witnessing a tremendous growth of these EDEs and is now at the verge where Asian economies are capable of leading, rather than the North Atlantic economies. This issue should be acknowledged properly and must be responded adequately. This paper makes an attempt to understand the prime issues that should be fixed in the current quotas system and voting structure in the IMF.


2019 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 275-297 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jose Duke BAGULAYA

AbstractInternational organizations have been described metaphorically as the Frankenstein of international law. They are created by states and yet more often than not they assume powers that humble their creators. This paper presents a different metaphor to describe the Association of Southeast Asian Nations [ASEAN]. Created in 2007, ASEAN, it is argued, resembles the fetteredwayang kulitin Indonesian theatre. It is an international organization which is controlled by its Member States in various ways. This paper analyzes three forms of ASEAN's fetters: constitutional, extra-constitutional, and practical. Constitutional fetters refer to the structural control embedded in the ASEAN Charter. Extra-constitutional fetters refer to rules of procedure that close the openness of the constitutional text. Finally, practical fetters refer to the ways the Member States limit ASEAN's legal personality in practice. Through these control mechanisms, ASEAN has so far acted on the stage of world politics according to the narrative of its puppet masters.


Author(s):  
Noemi Gal-Or

SummaryThis article challenges the argument that the World Trade Organization (WTO) is devoid of executive or governing functions and, hence, immune from the regime set out in the International Law Commission’s 2011 Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations (RIO). A brief drafting history of the RIO, clarification of the terminology associated with matters of international responsibility, and two hypothetical examples illustrating the potential for WTO responsibility set the stage for the article’s main argument. The author examines the WTO’s nature by analyzing its constituent law, its sui generis mandate and functions, its international legal personality, and its own use of terminology in presenting itself to the world. Critical analysis of RIO Articles 64 (on lex specialis) and 10 (on the existence of a breach of an international obligation), and their application to the WTO, completes the argument. The author thus refutes both the notions that (1) the WTO is exclusively member driven and, hence, not an executive, governing organization but a sui generis entity and (2) the WTO is therefore unable to breach an international obligation and thus immune from the RIO regime. The article concludes that, while a breach by the WTO of an international obligation may be exceedingly rare, it nonetheless — as any international organization — comes within the ambit of the RIO regime. The WTO should therefore consider adjusting its internal rules accordingly.


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