A New Basis for Judicial Review in Iraq

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-37
Author(s):  
Oday Talal Mahmood

Abstract Article 2 of the Iraqi Constitution of 2005, which states that Iraq is a modern Islamic constitutional democracy, contains a ‘repugnancy clause’, prohibiting enactment of any law contrary to Islam’s settled rulings, principles of democracy, and rights guaranteed in the Constitution. This clause allows the Constitutional Court to invalidate laws that violate the Constitution. Currently, the Iraqi Federal Supreme Court’s method for determining whether a particular law is repugnant to the Constitution and Islamic settled rulings as per Article 2 is inconsistent and arbitrary. Here the core question is: What is the best way to successfully implement the Iraqi Constitution’s Repugnancy Clause? We propose an approach focusing on maqāṣid, the classical Islamic concept meaning Sharīʿah’s intent, purpose, or objectives that will also fulfil the other purposes of Article 2 to ensure that the law is consistent with the principles of democracy and the principles of human rights.

2019 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 474
Author(s):  
Elisabet . ◽  
Cut Memi

One of the authorities of the Constitutional Court governed by the Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia in 1945 was the examining of laws against the contitution or judicial review. Inside the regulations which governing the implementation of this authority, the Constitutional Court only acts as a negative legislator, namely canceling or reinforcing a norm tested by the Petitioner. But in practice, the Constitutional Court has changed its role to become a positive legislator, who is forming a new legal norm, which is the authority of legislators. The Constitutional Court should not be able to form a new legal norm because there is no legal basis which regulate that. But Constitutional Court can form a new legal norm in some urgent circumstances, relating to Human Rights, and preventing legal vacuum. In addition, the establishment of laws by lawmakers that require a long process and time. This is compelling Constitutional Court to make substitute norm before the law was established by the legislators. In the Decision of the Constitutional Court Number 46/PUU-XVI/2016, the Court actually wants to establish a new legal norm, but because the articles in the petitioned have criminal sanctions, and if the Constitutional Court approves the petition, the Constitutional Court has formulated a new criminal act that can only be formed by the lawmaker. Whereas in the Decision of the Constitutional Court Number 21/PUU-XII/2014, the Constitutional Court established a new norm because in the article a quo there were no criminal sanctions.


2018 ◽  
Vol 54 ◽  
pp. 02006
Author(s):  
Riris Ardhanariswari ◽  
Muhammad Fauzan ◽  
Ahmad Komari

The Constitutional Court is one of the perpetrators of judicial power, in addition to the Supreme Court as referred to in Article 24 paragraph (2) of the 1945 Constitution. The Constitutional Court is also bound to the general principle of an independent judicial power, free from the influence of other institutions in enforcing law and justice. The Constitutional Court is the first and last level judicial body, or it can be said that it is the only judicial body whose decisions are final and binding. The existence of the Constitutional Court is at the same time to maintain the implementation of a stable state government and is also a correction to the experience of constitutional life in the past caused by multiple interpretations of the constitution. Judicial review towards the constitution is one of the authorities of the Constitutional Court that attracted attention. This shows that there has also been a shift in the doctrine of the parliamentary supremacy towards the doctrine of the supremacy of the constitution. The law was previously inviolable, but now the existence of a law is questionable in its alignment with the Constitution. The authority to examine the Law towards the Constitution is the authority of the Constitutional Court as the guardian of the constitution. This authority is carried out to safeguard the provisions of the Act so that it does not conflict with the constitution and / or impair the constitutional rights of citizens. This shows that the judicial review towards the Constitution carried out by the Constitutional Court is basically also to provide protection for human rights.


2021 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 151-159
Author(s):  
Xavier Nugraha ◽  
Kusuma Wardani Raharjo ◽  
Ahmad Ardhiansyah ◽  
Alip Pamungkas Raharjo

The Constitutional Court as the guardian of the constitution and the guardian of human rights has the duty to ensure that the Law does not contradict the constitution and does not violate human rights. One of the manifestations of this can be seen in the Constitutional Court Decision Number 1 / PUU-X / 2013, where the Constitutional Court removed the element "Some other deeds or unpleasant treatment/act" in Article 335 paragraph (1) of the Criminal Code. With the removal of the core elements of Article 335 paragraph (1) of the Criminal Code, raises questions related to the existence of the offense whether it still exists or not. Based on this, this study will examine 1) Application of Article 335 of the Criminal Code Before the Decision of the Constitutional Court Number 1 / PUU-X / 2013 and 2.) Application of Article 335 of the Criminal Code After the Decision of the Constitutional Court Number 1 / PUU-X / 2013. This research is a normative legal research with a statute approach, conceptual approach, and case approach. Based on this research, it was found that after the Constitutional Court Decision Number 1 / PUU-X / 2013 that offenses of unpleasant acts had been reconstructed into forced offenses.


Arena Hukum ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
Benediktus Handoyo ◽  

Abstract Judicial review is one of the authorities of the Constitutional Court most often exercised. This research examines the background of the establishment of Constitutional Court in Indonesia and the ideal construction of the constituendum for the Constitutional Court in implementing the judicial review. This normative research uses regulatory and conceptual approach. The results showes first, the authority to judicial review should be placed in one institution, namely the Constitutional Court, since the continental tradion of laws and regulations is systematic, hyrarchial and pyramidal in nature. Second, the Consttutional Court’s decisions that are often ignored by the law forming institutions have resulted in the Law annulled by the Court not immediately followed up with the issuance of a replacement law. Third, judicial review should not be limited to the statute being reviewed, because the statute concerned are, more likely, related to the other statutes. And fourth, the Constitutional Court’s decisions should be regarded as constitutional jurisprudence and become referrences for the theory of constitution in general.


2021 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 273
Author(s):  
Cekli Setya Pratiwi

This study examines the constitutionality of Indonesia’s Anti-Blasphemy Law, which has been challenged unsuccessfully at the Constitutional Court on three occasions, in 2009, 2012, and 2018. While the Court has acknowledged the law’s provisions are open to multiple interpretations, it insists on maintaining the law as it is, on the grounds that the right to religious expression is not absolute, as freedom and rights are restricted under Article 28J of the 1945 Constitution. The Court believes that canceling the law would create a dangerous legal vacuum. The ambiguity of the Court’s decisions on the constitutionality of the Anti-Blasphemy Law is illustrated in recent blasphemy cases that have not been explored in previous studies. This study uses a doctrinal legal approach to examine why the Anti-Blasphemy Law is flawed and to analyze to what extent the ‘particular constitutionalism’ approach influenced the Court’s decisions when declaring the constitutionality of the law. As such, the Court’s misinterpretation of the core principles of the competing rights – the right to religious freedom and the right to freedom of expression – and its standard limitation, have been ignored. The findings of this study show that in dealing with the Anti-Blasphemy Law, the Court has a narrow and limited recognition of human rights law. The Court’s fear of revoking the Anti-Blasphemy Law is based only on assumptions and is less supported by facts. The Court has failed to realize that the implementation of the flawed Anti-Blasphemy Law in various cases has triggered public disorder, with people taking justice into their own hands.


Author(s):  
Yaroslav Skoromnyy ◽  

The article presents the conceptual foundations of bringing judges to civil and legal liability. It was found that the civil and legal liability of judges is one of the types of legal liability of judges. It is determined that the legislation of Ukraine provides for a clearly delineated list of the main cases (grounds) for which the state is liable for damages for damage caused to a legal entity and an individual by illegal actions of a judge as a result of the administration of justice. It has been proved that bringing judges to civil and legal liability, in particular on the basis of the right of recourse, provides for the payment of just compensation in accordance with the decision of the European Court of Human Rights. It was established that the bringing of judges to civil and legal liability in Ukraine is regulated by such legislative documents as the Constitution of Ukraine, the Civil Code of Ukraine, the Explanatory Note to the European Charter on the Status of Judges (Model Code), the Law of Ukraine «On the Judicial System and the Status of Judges», the Law of Ukraine «On the procedure for compensation for harm caused to a citizen by illegal actions of bodies carrying out operational-search activities, pre-trial investigation bodies, prosecutors and courts», Decision of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine in the case on the constitutional submission of the Supreme Court of Ukraine regarding the compliance of the Constitution of Ukraine (constitutionality) of certain provisions of Article 2, paragraph two of clause II «Final and transitional provisions» of the Law of Ukraine «On measures to legislatively ensure the reform of the pension system», Article 138 of the Law of Ukraine «On the judicial system and the status of judges» (the case on changes in the conditions for the payment of pensions and monthly living known salaries of judges lagging behind in these), the Law of Ukraine «On the implementation of decisions and the application of the practice of the European Court of Human Rights».


Author(s):  
Egidijus Küris

Western legal tradition gave the birth to the concept of the rule of law. Legal theory and constitutional justice significantly contributed to the crystallisation of its standards and to moving into the direction of the common concept of the rule of law. The European Court of Human Rights uses this concept as an interpretative tool, the extension of which is the quality of the law doctrine, which encompasses concrete requirements for the law under examination in this Court, such as prospectivity of law, its foreseeability, clarity etc. The author of the article, former judge of the Lithuanian Constitutional Court and currently the judge of the European Court of Human Rights, examines how the latter court has gradually intensified (not always consistently) its reliance on the rule of law as a general principle, inherent in all the Articles of the European Convention on Human Rights, to the extent that in some of its judgments it concentrates not anymore on the factual situation of an individual applicant, but, first and foremost, on the examination of the quality of the law. The trend is that, having found the quality of the applicable law to be insufficient, the Court considers that the mere existence of contested legislation amounts to an unjustifiable interference into a respective right and finds a violation of respective provisions of the Convention. This is an indication of the Court’s progressing self-approximation to constitutional courts, which are called to exercise abstract norm-control.La tradición occidental alumbró la noción del Estado de Derecho. La teoría del Derecho y la Justicia Constitucional han contribuido decisivamente a la cristalización de sus estándares, ayudando a conformar un acervo común en torno al mismo. El Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos emplea la noción de Estado de Derecho como una herramienta interpretativa, fundamentalmente centrada en la doctrina de la calidad de la ley, que implica requisitos concretos que exige el Tribunal tales como la claridad, la previsibilidad, y la certeza en la redacción y aplicación de la norma. El autor, en la actualidad Juez del Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos y anterior Magistrado del Tribunal Constitucional de Lituania, examina cómo el primero ha intensificado gradualmente (no siempre de forma igual de consistente) su confianza en el Estado de Derecho como principio general, inherente a todos los preceptos que forman el Convenio Europeo de Derechos Humanos, hasta el punto de que en algunas de sus resoluciones se concentra no tanto en la situación de hecho del demandante individual sino, sobre todo y ante todo, en el examen de esa calidad de la ley. La tendencia del Tribunal es a considerar que, si observa que la ley no goza de calidad suficiente, la mera existencia de la legislación discutida supone una interferencia injustificable dentro del derecho en cuestión y declara la violación del precepto correspondiente del Convenio. Esto implica el acercamiento progresivo del Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos a los Tribunales Constitucionales, quienes tienen encargado el control en abstracto de la norma legal.


2018 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 73
Author(s):  
Umbu Rauta ◽  
Ninon Melatyugra

Tulisan ini ingin menjawab dua isu utama mengenai hubungan hukum internasional dan pengujian undang-undang oleh Mahkamah Konstitusi RI (MKRI). Isu pertama adalah legitimasi penggunaan hukum internasional sebagai alat interpretasi dalam pengujian undang-undang, sedangkan isu kedua adalah urgensi penguasaan hukum internasional oleh hakim MKRI. Tulisan ini merupakan penelitian hukum yang menggunakan pendekatan konseptual dan pendekatan historis dalam menjelaskan perkembangan pengujian undang-undang di Indonesia sekaligus menemukan legitimasi penggunaan hukum internasional oleh MK RI. Kesimpulan dari tulisan ini menegaskan bahwa hukum internasional memiliki sumbangsih yang penting dalam perannya sebagai alat interpretasi dalam proses pengujian undang-undang oleh Mahkamah Konstitusi, khususnya terkait hak asasi manusia. Justifikasi keabsahan praktik penggunaan hukum internasional tersebut ditarik dari tradisi ketatanegaraan yang secara implisit dikehendaki UUD NRI Tahun 1945. Manfaat positif yang diberikan hukum internasional nyatanya harus disertai juga dengan penguasaan hukum internasional oleh hakim MK RI supaya hukum internasional dapat digunakan secara tepat. Pembahasan dalam tulisan ini dibagi ke dalam empat sub bahasan inti yakni, pengujian undang-undang, penggunaan hukum internasional sebagai the interpretative tool dalam pengujian undang-undang oleh MK, legitimasi penggunaan hukum internasional sebagai the interpretative tool dalam pengujian undang-undang, pentingnya penguasaan hukum internasional oleh hakim MK.This article intentionally answers two principal issues regarding the relationship between international law and judicial review by the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Indonesia. The first issue is the legitimacy of international use as an interpretative tool in judicial review. The second issue talks about the necessity of urgent international law mastery by the Constitutional Court’s judges. This legal research utilizes both a conceptual approach and a historical approach to explain the development of judicial review in Indonesia, and to find legitimacy of international law by the Constitutional Court. The analysis in this article affirms that international law positively contributes as an interpretative tool in judicial review by the Constitutional Court, particularly pertaining to human rights. A justification of a legitimate international law use is withdrawn from constitutional tradition which is implicitly desired by the Indonesian Constitution (UUD NRI 1945). Since international law has provided better insights into norms, a mastery of international law should be encouraged. There are four main discussions in this article: judicial review, application of international law in judicial review process, legitimacy of international law application in judicial review, and the importance of international law mastering by Constitutional Court judges.


2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 080
Author(s):  
Zaka Firma Aditya

Tulisan ini hendak membahas mengenai konsistensi putusan-putusan mahkamah konstitusi dalam pengujian undang-undang berdasarkan asas preseden. MK beberapa kali dipandang tidak konsisten karena kerap mengeluarkan putusan yang bersifat overrulling. Namun, sebenarnya tidak sedikit juga putusan MK yang konsisten mengikuti preseden. Meskipun penggunaan asas preseden hanya dikenal di negara yang menganut tradisi common law, MK ternyata juga menerapkannya. Putusan MK tentang pengujian UU Pencegahan Penodaan Agama adalah salah satu bentuk dianutnya asas preseden di MK. Putusan ini secara konsisten menyatakan bahwa UU Pencegahan Penodaan Agama tetap konstitusional karena akan terjadi kekosongan hukum apabila UU Pencegahan Penodaan Agama diputus inkonstitusional. Dalam perkara tersebut, MK mempertahankan ratio decidendinya terhadap konstitusionalnya UU Pencegahan Penodaan Agama karena meskipun MK sadar bahwa UU a quo banyak mengandung kelemahan. Konsistensi standing MK terhadap UU Pencegahan Penodaan Agama ini merupakan salah satu bentuk dari dipraktekannya doktrin preseden.This paper will discuss the consistency of the constitutional court decision in the judicial review cases based on the principle of precedent. MK several times deemed inconsistent because often issued a ruling that is overruling. However, there were actually a lot of MK decisions that consistently followed the precedent. Although the use of the precedent principle is only known in common law tradition, the Constitutional Court apparently also applies it. The Constitutional Court’s decision regarding the Blasphemy Prevention Act was one form of the principle of precedent in the Constitutional Court. This decision consistently states that the Blasphemy Prevention Act remains constitutional because a legal vacuum will occur if the Blasphemy Prevention Law was decided to be unconstitutional. In this case, the Court retained its ratio decidendi to the constitutionality of the Blasphemy Prevention Law, even though the Court was aware that the Law contained many weaknesses. The consistency of the Constitutional Court on the judicial review of the Blasphemy Prevention Act is one form of the practice of precedent doctrine.


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