scholarly journals Judicial Consistency dalam Putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi tentang Pengujian Undang-Undang Penodaan Agama

2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 080
Author(s):  
Zaka Firma Aditya

Tulisan ini hendak membahas mengenai konsistensi putusan-putusan mahkamah konstitusi dalam pengujian undang-undang berdasarkan asas preseden. MK beberapa kali dipandang tidak konsisten karena kerap mengeluarkan putusan yang bersifat overrulling. Namun, sebenarnya tidak sedikit juga putusan MK yang konsisten mengikuti preseden. Meskipun penggunaan asas preseden hanya dikenal di negara yang menganut tradisi common law, MK ternyata juga menerapkannya. Putusan MK tentang pengujian UU Pencegahan Penodaan Agama adalah salah satu bentuk dianutnya asas preseden di MK. Putusan ini secara konsisten menyatakan bahwa UU Pencegahan Penodaan Agama tetap konstitusional karena akan terjadi kekosongan hukum apabila UU Pencegahan Penodaan Agama diputus inkonstitusional. Dalam perkara tersebut, MK mempertahankan ratio decidendinya terhadap konstitusionalnya UU Pencegahan Penodaan Agama karena meskipun MK sadar bahwa UU a quo banyak mengandung kelemahan. Konsistensi standing MK terhadap UU Pencegahan Penodaan Agama ini merupakan salah satu bentuk dari dipraktekannya doktrin preseden.This paper will discuss the consistency of the constitutional court decision in the judicial review cases based on the principle of precedent. MK several times deemed inconsistent because often issued a ruling that is overruling. However, there were actually a lot of MK decisions that consistently followed the precedent. Although the use of the precedent principle is only known in common law tradition, the Constitutional Court apparently also applies it. The Constitutional Court’s decision regarding the Blasphemy Prevention Act was one form of the principle of precedent in the Constitutional Court. This decision consistently states that the Blasphemy Prevention Act remains constitutional because a legal vacuum will occur if the Blasphemy Prevention Law was decided to be unconstitutional. In this case, the Court retained its ratio decidendi to the constitutionality of the Blasphemy Prevention Law, even though the Court was aware that the Law contained many weaknesses. The consistency of the Constitutional Court on the judicial review of the Blasphemy Prevention Act is one form of the practice of precedent doctrine.

2018 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 369
Author(s):  
Titis Anindyajati

Pada pokoknya, persekongkolan tender merupakan salah satu bentuk persekongkolan yang dilarang UU Nomor 5/1999 tentang Larangan Praktek Monopoli dan Persaingan Usaha Tidak Sehat dan juga menjadi perkara yang paling sering diproses KPPU. Namun baik secara teoritis maupun praktik menimbulkan permasalahan yaitu karena adanya pemaknaan yang bias akan frasa “pihak lain” dalam Pasal 22 UU Nomor 5/1999. Hal inilah yang melatarbelakangi adanya pengujian Pasal 22 ke MK. Dalam penulisan ini yang dibahas yaitu bagaimana pengaturan persekongkolan tender menurut peraturan perundang-undangan, bagaimanakah implikasi yuridis Putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi Nomor 85/PUU-XIV/2016 tentang pengujian Pasal 22 UU Nomor 5/1999 serta bagaimana analisis hukum terhadap pertimbangan hukum Putusan MK tersebut. Penelitian ini menggunakan penelitian yuridis normatif dimana obyek penelitian ini adalah peraturan perundang-undangan dan Putusan MK. Dalam hal ini Penulis menyimpulkan, yaitu, Pertama, persekongkolan tender yang merupakan suatu bentuk kerja sama antara dua pihak atau lebih untuk menguasai pasar yang bersangkutan dan/atau memenangkan peserta tender yang mengakibatkan terjadinya persaingan usaha tidak sehat diatur secara eksplisit dalam Pasal 1 angka 8 dan Pasal 22 UU Nomor 5/1999 serta Peraturan KPPU Nomor 2/2010, Kedua, Implikasi yuridis Putusan MK Nomor 85/PUU-XIV/2016 bermanfaat untuk menjamin kepastian hukum dan keadilan bagi para pihak seperti pengusaha utamanya masyarakat. Untuk itu, perlu adanya harmonisasi antara satu peraturan dengan peraturan lainnya, pengujian UU terhadap UUD terkait pengaturan persekongkolan tender dalam persaingan usaha tidak sehat ataupun revisi terhadap UU Nomor 5/1999.Principally, tender conspiracy is one form of conspiracy that subjected by the Law No. 5/1999 on The Prohibition of Monopolistic Practices and Unfair Business Competition, and also as a type of case that frequently occurred and processed by the KPPU. However, in theory, and in practice, there are some issues that plague the regulation, because of the occurrence of bias and unclear interpretation of the phrases “other parties” contained in Article 22 of Law 5/1999. This interpretation issue then became the background in the petition for review of Article 22 to the Constitutional Court. This paper mainly discussed the regulation of tender conspiracy according to the existing Law, and also to study the juridical implications of Constitutional Court Decision Number 85/PUU-XIV/2016 concerning the review of Article 22 Law 5/1999. This paper also delves into the legal analysis of the court considered in the aforementioned Decision. This paper utilized the means of normative juridical research methodology, with the existing regulations and Constitutional Court Decision as the object of research. In the paper, the writer concludes that, first, tender conspiracy is a form of cooperation between one party or more to control particular market and/or to determine the awardees of tenders which may cause unfair business competition explicitly regulated in Article 1 number 8 and Article 22 Law 5/1999 and also the KPPU Regulation Number 2/2010, second, the juridical implications of Constitutional Court Decision Number 85/PUU-XIV/2016 was necessary in order to guarantee the equitable legal certainty and fairness toward all parties especially business practising citizens. Thus, there is a necessity to achieve harmony among these regulations, which can be obtained through the judicial review of laws against the Constitution concerning the regulations of tender conspiracy and by means of legislative revision toward Law 5/1999.


2018 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 131
Author(s):  
Ade Adhari

ABSTRAKPutusan Nomor 003/PUU-IV/2006 menyatakan materiele wederrechtelijk dalam Undang-Undang Tindak Pidana Korupsi bertentangan dengan Pasal 28D ayat (1) UUD NRI 1945, dan tidak berlaku mengikat. Penelitian ini berupaya memahami apakah tepat atau tidak pertimbangan Mahkamah Konstitusi dalam putusan tersebut. Dalam menjawab permasalahan tersebut digunakan penelitian doktrinal, norma hukum serta asas yang melandasi lahirnya putusan tersebut. Berdasarkan hasil penelitian diketahui terdapat ketidaktepatan dalam pertimbangan Mahkamah Konstitusi. Mahkamah Konstitusi telah keliru dalam usahanya memvalidasi Penjelasan Pasal 2 ayat (1) Undang-Undang Tindak Pidana Korupsi dengan menguji berdasarkan asas legalitas yang terdapat dalam Pasal 1 ayat (1) KUHP. Padahal prinsipnya pengujian yang dilakukan oleh Mahkamah Konstitusi adalah menguji undang-undang terhadap UUD NRI 1945. Selain itu, Putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi berorientasi pada asas legalitas yang hanya mengutamakan rechtssicherheit dan mengesampingkan keberadaan gerechtigkeit dan zweckmässigkeit. Lebih dari itu, tidak diakuinya materiele wederrechtelijk telah meniadakan eksistensi hukum yang hidup di masyarakat sebagai sumber hukum untuk menyatakan suatu perbuatan bersifat melawan hukum. Hal ini bertentangan dengan mandat Pasal 18B ayat (2) UUD NRI 1945, dan berbagai peraturan perundang-undangan yang berlaku. Dengan demikian materiele wederrechtelijk tidak bertentangan dengan kontitusi.Kata kunci: materiele wederrechtelijk, korupsi, konstitusionalitas. ABSTRACT Constitutional Court Decision Number 003/PUUIV/2006 states unlawful criminal acts (materiele wederrechtelijk) in the Anti-Corruption Law is inconsistent with Article 28D paragraph (1) of the 1945 Constitution, and not binding. Doctrinal research, legal norms and principles underlying the birth of the court decision are used in answering whether the problem arising from the decision is justified. Based on the result of the research, there is an inaccuracy in the consideration of the Constitutional Court. The Constitutional Court has erred in its attempt to validate the Elucidation of Article 2 Paragraph (1) of Corruption Law by examining based on the legality principle contained in Article 1 paragraph (1) of the Criminal Code. Whereas in principle, what has been conducted by the Constitutional Court is a judicial review of the law against the 1945 Constitution. In addition, the Constitutional Court’s decision is oriented on the principle of legality which only prioritizes legal  certainty (Rechtssicherheit) and overrides justice (Gerechtigkeit) and utility (Zweckmässigkeit). Moreover, the unrecognized materiele wederrechtelijk has negated the existence of a living law in society as a source of law to declare unlawful acts. This is contrary to the mandate of Article 18B paragraph (2) of the 1945 Constitution and various prevailing laws and regulations. Thus, the material wederrechtelijk is not contradictory to the constitution. Keywords: materiele wederrechtelijk, corruption, constitutionality.


2021 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 286-308
Author(s):  
Febriansyah Ramadhan ◽  
Ilham Dwi Rafiqi

This article is the result of research on the heart article in the 3 Constitutional Court Decisions which canceled the entire contents of the law, namely the Constitutional Court Decision Number 001-021-022/PUU-I/2003 which canceled Law Number 20 of 2002 concerning Electricity, Constitutional Court Decision 006/PUU-IV/2006 which canceled Law 27 of 2004 concerning the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Constitutional Court Decisions 11-14-21-126 and 136/PUU-VII/2009 which canceled the Law Number 9 of 2009 concerning Legal Education Entities, and the Constitutional Court Decision 85/PUU-XI/2013 which canceled Law Number 7 of 2004 concerning Water Resources. The term 'heart article' is the term coined by the Constitutional Court and used as the main reason for canceling the entire contents of the law. Unfortunately, in these decisions, the Constitutional Court did not elaborate further on the concept and characteristics of an article categorized as the heart article. Departing from this issue, this research aims to find out what are the concepts and characteristics of the "heart article" of a law that was completely canceled by the Constitutional Court? To help answer this question, this research employed a normative method intended to trace all legal materials, both of the Constitutional Court decisions, statutory regulations, to the literature supporting the research. The importance of this research is to give meaning to the concept of the heart article, which, in the development of legal science, is still rarely discussed. Moreover, it can serve as a reference for petitioners to conduct the judicial review and to identify whether the article being tested is the heart article.


2017 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 22
Author(s):  
Bisariyadi Bisariyadi

Penetapan ukuran kerugian konstitusional memiliki kedudukan strategis sebagai pintu gerbang atas pengujian norma yang hendak diuji. Mahkamah Konstitusi merumuskan syarat kerugian konstitusional berdasarkan penafsiran Pasal 51 ayat (1) Undang-Undang Mahkamah Konstitusi. Doktrin kerugian konstitusional terdiri dari lima syarat yang dapat diklasifikasikan dalam dua kelompok. Kelompok pertama berisikan unsur-unsur yang harus dipenuhi pemohon terdiri dari (i) adanya hak dan/atau kewenangan konstitusional dan (ii) ada kerugian. Kelompok kedua merupakan prosedur pengujian mengenai ukuran kerugian yang diderita pemohon yang didalamnya yang terdiri dari (i) bentuk kerugian, (ii) hubungan kausalitas dan (iii) pemulihan kerugian. Kelima syarat ini bersifat kumulatif. Dalam penerapannya, doktrin kerugian konstitusional ini sangatlah dinamis. Ada kecenderungan bahwa doktrin ini menyimpan permasalahan. Tulisan ini berupaya mengidentifikasi masalah yang ada dalam penerapan doktrin kerugian konstitusional. Salah satunya adalah tumpang tindihnya antara pembuktian hak konstitusional pemohon dalam bagian kedudukan hukum dengan pengujian norma dalam pokok perkara. Sedangkan konkretisasi pembuktian unsur kerugian berkelindan dengan pengujiannya dalam kelompok doktrin kedua. Oleh karenanya, tulisan ini berkesimpulan bahwa telah ada kebutuhan untuk melakukan penyempurnaan doktrin kerugian konstitusional dengan melakukan penafsiran ulang atas Pasal 51 ayat (1) Undang-Undang Mahkamah Konstitusi dan tidak lagi mencantumkan kelompok pertama dalam doktrin kerugian konstitusional untuk pemeriksaan pengujian Undang-Undang di masa yang akan datang.The concept of constitutional injury is a substantial pre-requisite in the examination of judicial review case. The Constitutional Court drafted the concept as an interpretation of Article 51(1) of the Law on the Constitutional Court. It consists of five conditions that can be classified into two groups. The first group contains elements that must be met by the applicant which are (i) constitutional rights and/or authorities and (ii) injuries. The second group is the test in regard to the size of the injury suffered by the applicant therein consisting of (i) forms of injury, (ii) causality and (iii) redressability. The requirement is accumulative. Yet in practice the doctrine is variedly applied. There is tendency the doctrine itself causes problems. This paper seeks to identify the problems and aimed to give solution to the problem. Two problems are identified, one is an overlap examination of constitutional rights in standing and also in ratio decidendi. Another one is that the injury element in the doctrine intertwined with its own testing in the second group of the doctrine. Therefore, this paper concludes that there is a need to revise the doctrine with reinterpretation of Article 51 (1) of the Law and recommend not to exclude the first group of the doctrine.


2019 ◽  
Vol 67 (4) ◽  
pp. 899-930
Author(s):  
Han-Ru Zhou

Abstract Principles form part and parcel of our law and legal discourse, so much so that we seldom think of what they are and what they entail. For centuries they have been invoked daily to interpret and argue about the law. But when it comes to matters of constitutional law, principles are further called upon to perform a perennially controversial function: to help police the boundaries of state action. In most common law jurisdictions with a written constitution, this function of principles runs against the generally accepted view that the exercise of judicial review must ultimately be governed and restricted by the terms of the national constitution. This Article argues that the exercise of judicial review based on principles is not confined to that view, once the relationship between principles and the constitution is unpacked and recontextualized. While the English-language literature on principles over the past half-century has been dominated by a select group of Anglo-American scholars, there is a wealth of untapped insights from other parts of the world. One of the major contributions by continental legal theorists even predates the earliest modern Anglo-American writings on the subject by more than a decade. Overall, the law literature in common law and civil law systems reveals a significant degree of commonalities in the basic characters of principles despite the absence of initial evidence of transsystemic borrowings. The wider conceptual inquiry also displays a shift in the focus of the debate, from the protracted search for a clear-cut distinction between rules and principles towards a redefinition of principles’ relationship with “written” law, be it in the form of a civil code or a constitutional instrument. From this inquiry reemerge “unwritten” principles not deriving from codified or legislated law although they have been used to develop the law. Translated into the constitutional domain, these unwritten principles bear no logical connection with the terms of the constitution. Their main functions cover the entire spectrum from serving as interpretive aids to making law by filling gaps. The theoretical framework fits with an ongoing four-century-old narrative of the evolution of constitutional principles and judicial review across most common law-based systems. Constitutional principles are another area where Anglo-American law and legal discourse is less exceptional and more universal than what many assume. Throughout modern Western history, legal battles have been fought and ensuing developments have been made on the grounds of principles. Our law and jurisprudence remain based on them.


2020 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 452-474
Author(s):  
Priyo Handoko

The study aims to provide a constitutional analysis of judicial review (PK) in civil cases for more than once. The research-based is the decision of the Constitutional Court No. 108 / PUU-XIV / 2016 and No. 34 / PUU-XI / 2013 in which the two judgments provide a different classification between criminal and civil cases. The method used in this research is a normative juridical with a conceptual, legislation, and case approach. The results of the study assert that: first, the opportunity for judicial review (PK) more than once in a criminal case is an effort to uphold justice substantively by the Constitutional Court. Whereas the restriction of judicial review (PK) only once in civil cases is intended to guarantee legal certainty. Secondly, there is rational inconsistency in the arguments of the Constitutional Court which is indicated in Decision No. 108 / PUU-XIV / 2016 and No. 34 / PUU-XI / 2013. Both criminal and civil cases must seek to establish and maintain substantial justice, especially since there is a due process of law principle that requires that everyone can get the same opportunity before the law.


2019 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 474
Author(s):  
Elisabet . ◽  
Cut Memi

One of the authorities of the Constitutional Court governed by the Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia in 1945 was the examining of laws against the contitution or judicial review. Inside the regulations which governing the implementation of this authority, the Constitutional Court only acts as a negative legislator, namely canceling or reinforcing a norm tested by the Petitioner. But in practice, the Constitutional Court has changed its role to become a positive legislator, who is forming a new legal norm, which is the authority of legislators. The Constitutional Court should not be able to form a new legal norm because there is no legal basis which regulate that. But Constitutional Court can form a new legal norm in some urgent circumstances, relating to Human Rights, and preventing legal vacuum. In addition, the establishment of laws by lawmakers that require a long process and time. This is compelling Constitutional Court to make substitute norm before the law was established by the legislators. In the Decision of the Constitutional Court Number 46/PUU-XVI/2016, the Court actually wants to establish a new legal norm, but because the articles in the petitioned have criminal sanctions, and if the Constitutional Court approves the petition, the Constitutional Court has formulated a new criminal act that can only be formed by the lawmaker. Whereas in the Decision of the Constitutional Court Number 21/PUU-XII/2014, the Constitutional Court established a new norm because in the article a quo there were no criminal sanctions.


Author(s):  
Steven Gow Calabresi

This chapter examines the two models of judicial review that exist in the common law countries: the Diffuse Model and the Second Look Model. The Diffuse Model of judicial review originated in the United States and has spread to India, Canada, Australia, the United Kingdom, most of the countries of Latin America, the Scandinavian countries (except for the Netherlands), and Japan. It is premised on the idea that a country’s written constitution is its supreme law and that courts, when deciding cases or controversies that are properly before them, are thus duty-bound to follow the constitution, which is supreme law, and not a contrary statute whenever those two items conflict. Meanwhile, the essence of the Second Look Model of judicial review is that a Supreme or Constitutional Court ought to have the power of judicial review, subject to some kind of legislative power of override. This, it is said, best harmonizes the advantages of a written constitution and a bill of rights enforced by courts with the imperatives of democratic self-government. The underlying goal is to obtain the advantages of both constitutional government and also of democratic government.


Author(s):  
I Gede Pasek Pramana

This research aims to analyze about the significance of the Constitutional Court Decision No.46/PUU-VIII/2010 the position of anak astra in Bali customary law. The research method used is a normative study by selecting the type of statue approach and the conceptual approach. Sources of legal materials that were examined in this study consisted of primary legal materials and secondary legal materials and techniques were analyzed with the description, systematic, evaluation and argumentation. Based on the perspective ( review ) Constitutional Court Decision No. 46/PUU-VIII/2010, anak astra have a civil relationship with her biological father and his family along can be proved by science and technology and / or other evidence according to the law. The juridical consequences of the Constitutional Court Decision No. 46/PUU-VIII/2010 to the norms of Bali customary law about anak astra Bali is must conform to the directions of law in the Decision of the Constitutional Court.


2018 ◽  
Vol 54 ◽  
pp. 02006
Author(s):  
Riris Ardhanariswari ◽  
Muhammad Fauzan ◽  
Ahmad Komari

The Constitutional Court is one of the perpetrators of judicial power, in addition to the Supreme Court as referred to in Article 24 paragraph (2) of the 1945 Constitution. The Constitutional Court is also bound to the general principle of an independent judicial power, free from the influence of other institutions in enforcing law and justice. The Constitutional Court is the first and last level judicial body, or it can be said that it is the only judicial body whose decisions are final and binding. The existence of the Constitutional Court is at the same time to maintain the implementation of a stable state government and is also a correction to the experience of constitutional life in the past caused by multiple interpretations of the constitution. Judicial review towards the constitution is one of the authorities of the Constitutional Court that attracted attention. This shows that there has also been a shift in the doctrine of the parliamentary supremacy towards the doctrine of the supremacy of the constitution. The law was previously inviolable, but now the existence of a law is questionable in its alignment with the Constitution. The authority to examine the Law towards the Constitution is the authority of the Constitutional Court as the guardian of the constitution. This authority is carried out to safeguard the provisions of the Act so that it does not conflict with the constitution and / or impair the constitutional rights of citizens. This shows that the judicial review towards the Constitution carried out by the Constitutional Court is basically also to provide protection for human rights.


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