The Role of the Constitutional Court in the Development of the Rule of Law in Kosovo

2018 ◽  
Vol 43 (3) ◽  
pp. 274-313
Author(s):  
Enver Hasani

Kosovo’s Constitutional Court has played a role of paramount importance in the country’s recent history. The author uses a comparative analysis to discuss the role of the Court in light of the work and history of other European constitutional courts. This approach sheds light on the Court’s current role by analyzing Kosovo’s constitutional history, which shows that there has been a radical break with the past. This approach reveals the fact that Kosovo’s current Constitution does not reflect the material culture of the society of Kosovo. This radical break with the past is a result of the country’s tragic history, in which case the fight for constitutionalism means a fight for human dignity. In this battle for constitutionalism, the Court has been given very broad jurisdiction and a role to play in paving the way for Kosovo to move toward Euro-Atlantic integration in all spheres of life. Before reaching this conclusion, the author discusses the specificities of Kosovo’s transition, comparing it with other former communist countries. Among the specific features of constitutionalism in Kosovo are the role and position of the international community in the process of constitution-making and the overall design of constitutional justice in Kosovo. Throughout the article, a conclusion emerges that puts Kosovo’s Constitutional Court at the forefront of the fight for the rule of law and constitutionalism of liberal Western provenance.

2018 ◽  
pp. 51-70
Author(s):  
TUDOREL TOADER

The separation and balance of State powers constitute the basis of the rule of law. Observance of this principle requires framing of public authorities within the limits of competence established by the Constitution and the law, as well as loyal cooperation between them. From this perspective, the attribution of the constitutional courts for settling legal disputes of a constitutional nature is an important tool for correcting the tendencies of violation of these limits, as well as for identifying solutions for situations that do not find an explicit regulation in the constitutional texts. The present study analyses the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court of Romania in the field of legal disputes of a constitutional nature, revealing, together with the presentation of dispute situations, the vulnerabilities of the constitutional reference texts. It is also highlighted the role of the constitutional courts in the evolution of constitutional law institutions. The conclusion of the study, beyond the subject of legal disputes of a constitutional nature, bears on the necessity, even more so in this matter, of the certainty of jurisdictional interpretation. This certainty cannot be achieved as long as the interpretation is not authoritative; consequently, the assurance of the effectiveness of constitutional justice constitute a key issue of the rule of law.


2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 83-100
Author(s):  
Andraž Teršek

Abstract The central objective of the post-socialist European countries which are also Member States of the EU and Council of Europe, as proclaimed and enshrined in their constitutions before their official independence, is the establishment of a democracy based on the rule of law and effective legal protection of fundamental human rights and freedoms. In this article the author explains what, in his opinion, is the main problem and why these goals are still not sufficiently achieved: the ruthless simplification of the understanding of the social function and functioning of constitutional courts, which is narrow, rigid and holistically focused primarily or exclusively on the question of whether the judges of these courts are “left or right” in purely daily-political sense, and consequently, whether constitutional court decisions are taken (described, understood) as either “left or right” in purely and shallow daily-party-political sense/manner. With nothing else between and no other foundation. The author describes such rhetoric, this kind of superficial labeling/marking, such an approach towards constitutional law-making as a matter of unbearable and unthinking simplicity, and introduces the term A Populist Monster. The reasons that have led to the problem of this kind of populism and its devastating effects on the quality and development of constitutional democracy and the rule of law are analyzed clearly and critically.


Author(s):  
Pál Sonnevend

AbstractModern constitutionalism is based on the paradigm that courts are inherently entitled and obliged to enforce the constitution of the respective polity. This responsibility of courts also applies in the context of the European Union to both the CJEU and national constitutional courts. The present chapter argues that in the face of constitutional crises the CJEU and the Hungarian Constitutional Court shy away from applying the law as it is to the full. The reasons behind this unwarranted judicial self-restraint are most different: the CJEU aims to avoid conflicts with national constitutional courts whereas the Hungarian Constitutional Court has been facing a legislative power also acting as constitution making power willing to amend the constitution to achieve specific legislative purposes or to undo previous constitutional court decisions. Yet both courts respond to expediencies that do not follow from the law they are called upon to apply. It is argued that rule of law backsliding requires these courts to abandon the unnecessary self-restraint and exploit the means already available.


2009 ◽  
Vol 68 (1) ◽  
pp. 55-100 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan K. Ocko ◽  
David Gilmartin

This paper uses the concept of the “rule of law” to compare Qing China and British India. Rather than using the rule of law instrumentally, the paper embeds it in the histories of state power and sovereignty in China and India. Three themes, all framed by the rule of law and the rule of man as oppositional yet paradoxically intertwined notions, organize the paper's comparisons: the role of a discourse of law in simultaneously legitimizing and constraining the political authority of the state; the role of law and legal procedures in shaping and defining society; and the role of law in defining an economic and social order based on contract, property, and rights. A fourth section considers the implications of these findings for the historical trajectories of China and India in the twentieth century. Taking law as an instrument of power and an imagined realm that nonetheless also transcended power and operated outside its ambit, the paper seeks to broaden the history of the “rule of law” beyond Euro-America.


Author(s):  
Thomashausen André

This chapter recounts the history of constitutional developments in Angola leading up to the 2010 constitution. It introduces the new Angolan Constitutional Court and discusses the first and thus far only substantive decision of this Court—the Parliamentary Oversight Judgment of 9 October 2013—a serious constitutional conflict between parliament and the president. The Court held that the 2010 constitution had reduced the powers of parliament as compared to the previous text and that parliament lacked the power to question the executive or to summon ministers to hearings before it. Since these are presidential powers, the Court held, parliament may not arrogate them, though it may request the president to supply information or order his ministers before it. Although the conservative leaning of the Court in this dispute disappointed the opposition and many commentators, the judgment strengthened the rule of law and of the constitutional state.


TEME ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 1419
Author(s):  
Bálint Pásztor

The author of the article analyzes the specificities of the normative control of the law, i.e. the procedure of assessing the constitutionality and legality of the law in the Republic of Serbia, with the aim of detecting historical and legal preconditions of the effective functioning of the rule of law. The historical perspective of the development of the constitutional judiciary in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia, as well as the analysis of the experiences of various systems of control of constitutionality and legality, open the contextual, scientific-historical and pragmatic dimensions of understanding. The specificity of the system of normative control is reflected in its triplicity, meaning that three institutes are known that characterize different procedural possibilities (to initiate the process of assessing the constitutionality and legality of general acts). The paper is written in order to point out the dichotomy of the proposal and initiative of the procedure of the assessment of constitutionality and legality, as well as the advantages and disadvantages of the ex officio procedure. Furthermore, the author wanted to point out the essential and procedural differences between the proposal, the initiative and the constitutional complaint, especially analyzing the purpose of retaining the institute of the initiative in the light of the existence of the constitutional complaint and the fact that the initiative does not imply the automation of the initiation of proceedings. The dilemma that the article opens concerns the possibility that in the case of abolishing the initiative as an institution accessible to all, is it possible to preserve the democratic culture and the participation of citizens, furthermore is it possible to abolish the fundamental institutional values and freedoms of a legal state and the rule of law? The paper opens other issues of importance for the establishment of an effective constitutional architecture that concern: the width of the circle of authorized proposers of normative control before the Constitutional Court; the dual role of the constitutional judiciary: on the one hand protection of the Constitution, constitutionality and legality, on the other hand effective protection of human and minority rights and freedoms.


2020 ◽  
pp. 47-63
Author(s):  
MARIETA SAFTA

This study addresses a component of the constitutionalization process at the Union level, namely the act of justice, considering its importance for the evolution of the constitutionalization process. The significance and importance of the constitutionalization of the act of justice are analyzed, as well as the premises and mechanisms of the constitutionalization of the act of justice in the European Union, with particular reference to the jurisprudence of the Romanian Constitutional Court. In this context, the control of constitutionality appears as a decisive modeling factor of the normative action of the legislator and even of the public policies. The constructive dialogue – if we refer to the two legal orders, national and supranational – is all the more necessary, being noticeable the key role played by national courts – and in particular constitutional courts – in defending the rule of law in the European Union, including through their collaboration with the CJEU in cases and through the instruments provided for in the Constitutions and the Treaties.


2018 ◽  
pp. 75-83
Author(s):  
OLGA-ANDREEA URDA

The present article aims at presenting the Austrian fundamental law with the highlighting of some essential aspects regarding the exercise of the legislative, executive and judicial powers, the institutional particularities and, last but not least, the evolution of the regulation that was generated generated by the state's accession to the European Union. Constitutional control is another aspect that we have focused into the study, considering the important role of the Constitutional Court in the rule of law. The conducted analysis has significant valences, especially in the context in which it can signify a point of reference in the comparative study of constitutional regulations


Author(s):  
Peter N. Miller

Cultural history is increasingly informed by the history of material culture—the ways in which individuals or entire societies create and relate to objects both mundane and extraordinary—rather than on textual evidence alone. Books such as The Hare with Amber Eyes and A History of the World in 100 Objects indicate the growing popularity of this way of understanding the past. This book uncovers the forgotten origins of our fascination with exploring the past through its artifacts by highlighting the role of antiquarianism—a pursuit ignored and derided by modem academic history—in grasping the significance of material culture. From the efforts of Renaissance antiquarians, who reconstructed life in the ancient world from coins, inscriptions, seals, and other detritus, to amateur historians in the nineteenth century working within burgeoning national traditions, the book connects collecting—whether by individuals or institutions—to the professionalization of the historical profession, one which came to regard its progenitors with skepticism and disdain. The struggle to articulate the value of objects as historical evidence, then, lies at the heart both of academic history writing and of the popular engagement with things. Ultimately, this book demonstrates that our current preoccupation with objects is far from novel and reflects a human need to re-experience the past as a physical presence.


Author(s):  
Mathias Möschel

This contribution analyses the cases in which ordinary German judges have annulled statutes for being unconstitutional and thus exercise what is also known as ‘diffuse constitutionality review’. In the past, this used to be the case under the Weimar Constitution and in West Berlin. However, what is less known is that even today, certain statutes that are deemed to be pre-constitutional or certain legislative provisions from the former GDR can be declared as conflicting with the German Constitution. This contribution argues that such diffuse constitutionality review might also have contributed to a further strengthening of the rule of law in Germany. Ultimately, from a comparative constitutional law perspective, this contribution also provides a more nuanced view of the German model of constitutionality review, which has been traditionally classified as belonging to the centralized ‘European’ or ‘Kelsenian’ model, with a specific constitutional court, the Bundesverfassungsgericht, having the monopoly over such review.


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