Harm, Rights, and Liberty: Towards a Non-Normative Reading of Mill's Liberty Principle

2009 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 196-217 ◽  
Author(s):  
Keyword(s):  
Liberal Society ◽  
Moral Concepts ◽  
Important Respect ◽  
Moral Framework ◽  
Harm To Others ◽  
Liberty Principle

AbstractMany commentators have argued that Mill's Liberty Principle is most reasonably construed as limiting social interference to cases where an individual's action either harms or increases the probability of harm to others. The convention when it comes to understanding harm seems to be to build into the concept a normative component such that what it means to harm someone is that we have wronged them in some important respect. But such an understanding of harm will vary depending upon which particular moral framework is adopted, and as such, will not achieve the sort of neutrality necessary for the Liberty Principle to be accepted by a liberal society. However, I am unconvinced that we need to appeal to moral concepts in order to fully analyze Mill's Liberty Principle and the ultimate aim of this article is to sketch an account of how his principle could be non-normatively explicated.

J. S. Mill's Doctrine of Freedom of Expression

Utilitas ◽  
2005 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 147-179 ◽  
Author(s):  
JONATHAN RILEY
Keyword(s):  
Free Speech ◽  
Regulatory Authority ◽  
Freedom Of Expression ◽  
Social Regulation ◽  
Severe Damage ◽  
Harm To Others ◽  
Laissez Faire ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Other Regarding ◽  
Liberty Principle

Mill's free speech doctrine is distinct from, yet compatible with, his central principle of ‘purely self-regarding’ liberty. Using the crucial analogy with trade, I claim that he defends a broad laissez-faire policy for expression, even though expression is ‘social’ or other-regarding conduct and thus legitimately subject to social regulation. An expedient laissez-faire policy admits of exceptions because speakers can sometimes cause such severe damage to others that coercive interference with the speech is justified. In those relatively few contexts where interference is called for, however, the central principle of self-regarding liberty sets absolute limits to the scope of society's regulatory authority. Regulation can never amount to an outright ban of any type of expression that can be consumed by the individual without direct and immediate harm to others. Nevertheless, and perhaps surprisingly, the central liberty principle admits censorship of certain extraordinary types of expression which necessarily harm others.

4. The Place of Liberty

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan Wolff
Keyword(s):  
Harm Principle ◽  
Sufficient Condition ◽  
Do No Harm ◽  
Intrinsic Good ◽  
Harm To Others ◽  
Freedom Of Thought ◽  
Liberty Principle ◽  
Freedom Of Action ◽  
The Harm Principle ◽  
Tyranny Of The Majority

This chapter explores the theory that, to avoid the ‘tyranny of the majority’, we should be given the liberty to act just as we wish, provided that we do no harm to others. The focus is on John Stuart Mill's Liberty Principle (also known as the Harm Principle), according to which you may justifiably limit a person's freedom of action only if they threaten harm to another. The chapter considers Mill's arguments based on the Liberty Principle, including his claim there should be complete freedom of thought and discussion, and that harming another's interests is not a sufficient condition to justify constraint. It also discusses justifications for the Liberty Principle by focusing on issues of rights and utility, individuality and progress, and liberty as an intrinsic good. It concludes with an analysis of some of the problems of the kind of liberalism espoused by Mill's Liberty Principle.

The Projectability Challenge to Moral Naturalism

2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (5) ◽  
pp. 471-498
Author(s):  
John Bengson ◽  
Terence Cuneo ◽  
Andrew Reisner
Keyword(s):  
Moral Epistemology ◽  
Moral Experience ◽  
Moral Concepts ◽  
Important Respect ◽  
Moral Naturalism

Abstract The Projectability Challenge states that a metaethical view must explain how ordinary agents can, on the basis of moral experience and reflection, accurately and justifiably apply moral concepts to novel situations. In this paper, we argue for two primary claims. First, paradigm nonnaturalism can satisfactorily answer the projectability challenge. Second, it is unclear whether there is a version of moral naturalism that can satisfactorily answer the challenge. The conclusion we draw is that there is an important respect in which nonnaturalism holds an advantage over its most prominent naturalist rivals. The conclusion is interesting if only because it is widely assumed that naturalism has an easier time handling thorny problems in moral epistemology. We argue that there is at least one such problem of which this assumption is not true.

Rights, Consequences, and Mill on Liberty

1983 ◽  
Vol 15 ◽  
pp. 167-180
Author(s):  
D. A. Lloyd Thomas
Keyword(s):  
Social Pressure ◽  
The State ◽  
Moral Foundations ◽  
P 75 ◽  
Moral Position ◽  
Harm To Others ◽  
Liberty Of Conscience ◽  
Liberty Principle

Mill says that the object of his essay On Liberty is to defend a certain principle, which I will call the ‘liberty principle’, and will take to say the following: ‘It is permissible, in principle, for the state (through law) or society (through social pressure) to control the actions of individuals “only in respect to those actions of each, which concern the interest of other people”’. The liberty principle is a prescription of intermediate generality. Mill intends it to support more specific political prescriptions, such as liberty of conscience, of expressing and publishing opinions, of framing a plan of life to suit our own character, and of combination for any purpose not involving harm to others (p. 75). The liberty principle is more general than these prescriptions but less general than its possible moral foundations, such as utilitarianism. My concern will be with attempts to defend the liberty principle by showing it to be supported by an acceptable moral position.

Rights, Consequences, and Mill on Liberty

1983 ◽  
Vol 15 ◽  
pp. 167-180 ◽  
Author(s):  
D. A. Lloyd Thomas
Keyword(s):  
Social Pressure ◽  
The State ◽  
Moral Foundations ◽  
P 75 ◽  
Moral Position ◽  
Harm To Others ◽  
Liberty Of Conscience ◽  
Liberty Principle

Mill says that the object of his essay On Liberty is to defend a certain principle, which I will call the ‘liberty principle’, and will take to say the following: ‘It is permissible, in principle, for the state (through law) or society (through social pressure) to control the actions of individuals “only in respect to those actions of each, which concern the interest of other people”’. The liberty principle is a prescription of intermediate generality. Mill intends it to support more specific political prescriptions, such as liberty of conscience, of expressing and publishing opinions, of framing a plan of life to suit our own character, and of combination for any purpose not involving harm to others (p. 75). The liberty principle is more general than these prescriptions but less general than its possible moral foundations, such as utilitarianism. My concern will be with attempts to defend the liberty principle by showing it to be supported by an acceptable moral position.

scholarly journals Charting Moral Psychology’s Significance for Bioethics: Routes to Bioethical Progress, its Limits, and Lessons from Moral Philosophy

Diametros ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (64) ◽  
pp. 36-55 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Klenk
Keyword(s):  
Moral Psychology ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Decisive Role ◽  
Normative Ethics ◽  
Decision Situation ◽  
Moral Concepts ◽  
Moral Framework ◽  
Moral Frameworks ◽  
Radical Revision

Empirical moral psychology is sometimes dismissed as normatively insignificant because it plays no decisive role in settling ethical disputes. But that conclusion, even if it is valid for normative ethics, does not extend to bioethics. First, in contrast to normative ethics, bioethics can legitimately proceed from a presupposed moral framework. Within that framework, moral psychology can be shown to play four significant roles: it can improve bioethicists’ understanding of (1) the decision situation, (2) the origin and legitimacy of their moral concepts, (3) efficient options for implementing (legitimate) decisions, and (4) how to change and improve some parts of their moral framework. Second, metaethical considerations suggest that moral psychology may lead to the radical revision of entire moral frameworks and thus prompt the radical revision of entire moral frameworks in bioethics. However, I show that bioethics must either relinquish these radical implications of moral psychology and accept that there are limits to progress in bioethics based on moral psychology or establish an epistemic framework that guides radical revision.

Analyzing Language in Suicide Notes and Legacy Tokens

Crisis ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 37 (2) ◽  
pp. 140-147 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael J. Egnoto ◽  
Darrin J. Griffin
Keyword(s):  
Text Analysis ◽  
Low Cost ◽  
Computer Software ◽  
Student Writing ◽  
Computer Assisted ◽  
Automated Identification ◽  
Completed Suicide ◽  
Suicide Notes ◽  
Self Harm ◽  
Harm To Others

Abstract. Background: Identifying precursors that will aid in the discovery of individuals who may harm themselves or others has long been a focus of scholarly research. Aim: This work set out to determine if it is possible to use the legacy tokens of active shooters and notes left from individuals who completed suicide to uncover signals that foreshadow their behavior. Method: A total of 25 suicide notes and 21 legacy tokens were compared with a sample of over 20,000 student writings for a preliminary computer-assisted text analysis to determine what differences can be coded with existing computer software to better identify students who may commit self-harm or harm to others. Results: The results support that text analysis techniques with the Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC) tool are effective for identifying suicidal or homicidal writings as distinct from each other and from a variety of student writings in an automated fashion. Conclusion: Findings indicate support for automated identification of writings that were associated with harm to self, harm to others, and various other student writing products. This work begins to uncover the viability or larger scale, low cost methods of automatic detection for individuals suffering from harmful ideation.

Communicating moral reasoning in medicine as an expression of respect for patients and integrity among professionals

2014 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 177-183 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lauris Christopher Kaldjian
Keyword(s):  
Moral Reasoning ◽  
Moral Reasons ◽  
Moral Pluralism ◽  
Moral Integrity ◽  
Moral Beliefs ◽  
Moral Framework ◽  
Beliefs And Values ◽  
Moral Frameworks ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Do So

The communication of moral reasoning in medicine can be understood as a means of showing respect for patients and colleagues through the giving of moral reasons for actions. This communication is especially important when disagreements arise. While moral reasoning should strive for impartiality, it also needs to acknowledge the individual moral beliefs and values that distinguish each person (moral particularity) and give rise to the challenge of contrasting moral frameworks (moral pluralism). Efforts to communicate moral reasoning should move beyond common approaches to principles-based reasoning in medical ethics by addressing the underlying beliefs and values that define our moral frameworks and guide our interpretations and applications of principles. Communicating about underlying beliefs and values requires a willingness to grapple with challenges of accessibility (the degree to which particular beliefs and values are intelligible between persons) and translatability (the degree to which particular beliefs and values can be transposed from one moral framework to another) as words and concepts are used to communicate beliefs and values. Moral dialogues between professionals and patients and among professionals themselves need to be handled carefully, and sometimes these dialogues invite reference to underlying beliefs and values. When professionals choose to articulate such beliefs and values, they can do so as an expression of respectful patient care and collaboration and as a means of promoting their own moral integrity by signalling the need for consistency between their own beliefs, words and actions.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document