The vertical spatial metaphor of moral concepts and its influence on cognition

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zeng Wang ◽  
Zhong-Yi Lu
Author(s):  
Asunción Herrera Guevara

resumenLa moralidad que se exige al individuo actual sólo se dará en una sociedad liberada. Cómo conseguir ambos aspectos es el quehacer moral y político más acuciante. En este artículo dilucidaré una respuesta buscando una lógica diferente a la binaria que permita desenmascarar la distancia tajante entre cuestiones de justicia y cuestiones de la vida buena. Partiré de la necesidad de encontrar un puente entre lo cognitivo y lo ético (I). Dos serán las propuestas que nos permitan escapar de las falsas reconciliaciones entre lo justo y lo bueno (II). La primera vendrá de la mano de Kierkegaard (II.1); la segunda de la obra de Adorno (II.2).palabras clavejusticia-vida buena-contradicción-falsa alternativaAbstractWe claim to current human a morality within of an emancipated society. The moral and political work must get both requirements. This paper reviews the distance between Justice and Good Life. I will try to find a link between both moral concepts (I). The paper shows the solution to problem in two Thinker (II). The first about the Philosophy of Kierkegaard (II.1) ; the second about the Philosophy of Adorno (II.2).keys wordsjustice- good life- contradiction- wrong alternative


Author(s):  
Diane Jeske

Emotions play a critical role in both moral deliberation and moral action. Understanding the emotions and how they ought to interact with theoretical principles is an important part of fulfilling our duty of due care in moral deliberation. By examining the Nazi police squads and the Nazi virtue of “hardness,” we can come to see how ordinary people can suppress their emotions in order to carry out morally odious tasks. We can then see that the methods we use to live with our treatment of nonhuman animals bear striking similarities to the methods used by those in the police squads. Ted Bundy, a psychopath, suggests that a lack of emotions can hinder our ability to grasp moral concepts, thus showing that even while emotions must be regulated by theory, they also play an important role in any full understanding of the significance of moral demands.


Author(s):  
Joshua May

Empirical research apparently suggests that emotions play an integral role in moral judgment. The evidence for sentimentalism is diverse, but it is rather weak and has generally been overblown. There is no evidence that our moral concepts themselves are partly composed of or necessarily dependent on emotions. While the moral/conventional distinction may partly characterize the essence of moral judgment, moral norms needn’t be backed by affect in order to transcend convention. Priming people with incidental emotions like disgust doesn’t make them moralize actions. Finally, moral judgment can only be somewhat impaired by damage to areas of the brain that are generally associated with emotional processing (as in acquired sociopathy and frontotemporal dementia). While psychopaths exhibit both emotional and rational deficits, the latter alone can explain any minor defects in moral cognition.


Author(s):  
Thomas DeGloma ◽  
Erin F. Johnston

This chapter explores the ways individuals account for cognitive migrations—significant changes of mind and consciousness that are often expressed as powerful discoveries, transformative experiences, and newly embraced worldviews. It outlines three ideal typical forms of cognitive migration: awakenings, self-actualizations, and ongoing quests. Building on prior approaches to such personal transformations, it develops the notion of cognitive migration to argue the following set of interrelated points. First, cognitive migrations take autobiographical form, which is to say they manifest as the narrative identity work of individuals who undergo them. Second, such narrative identity work provides a reflexive foundation for an individual’s understanding of self and identity in relation to other possible selves and identities—for seeing oneself as a relationally situated character. Third, individuals who articulate cognitive migrations use the plot structure and cultural coding at the root of their narratives to express their allegiance to a new sociomental community. They thereby take on new cognitive norms and identity-defining conventions while rejecting potential alternatives, locating themselves within a broader sociomental field. The spatial metaphor of cognitive migrations draws explicit attention to the broader sociomental field in which such radical changes of mind take place. Finally, such narrative identity work links self-understandings to the often-contested meanings of broadly relevant issues, events, and experiences; when individuals account for their cognitive migrations, they also advance claims that reach well-beyond their personal lives.


Author(s):  
PATRICK FRIERSON

Abstract This paper lays out the moral theory of philosopher and educator Maria Montessori (1870–1952). Based on a moral epistemology wherein moral concepts are grounded in a well-cultivated moral sense, Montessori develops a threefold account of moral life. She starts with an account of character as an ideal of individual self-perfection through concentrated attention on effortful work. She shows how respect for others grows from and supplements individual character, and she further develops a notion of social solidarity that goes beyond cooperation toward shared agency. Partly because she attends to children's ethical lives, Montessori highlights how character, respect, and solidarity all appear first as prereflective, embodied orientations of agency. Full moral virtue takes up prereflective orientations reflectively and extends them through moral concepts. Overall, Montessori's ethic improves on features similar to some in Nietzschean, Kantian, Hegelian, or Aristotelian ethical theories while situating these within a developmental and perfectionist ethics.


2019 ◽  
Vol 64 (2) ◽  
pp. 230-268
Author(s):  
Dirk Siepmann

Abstract Combining traditional methods with state-of-the-art corpus analysis, this article discusses problems associated with the translation of general academic lexis from German into English. In particular, it offers a more nuanced view on the often-made claim that there are ‘major differences’ between the two languages, many of which are said to stem from the spatial metaphorics underlying general academic German. Section 1 deals with problems that arise at the level of words and their lexico-syntactic environment, paying particular attention to spatial metaphor. Moving on to level of the paragraph, Section 2 continues the theme of spatial metaphor, showing how even quasi-terminological equivalents such as Struktur and structure exhibit subtle differences in use and may occasionally require re-metaphorization under the influence of the wider context. Section 3 provides a summary of the argument and suggests avenues for future research.


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