scholarly journals Respecting Human Rights While Countering Terrorism

2020 ◽  
Vol 30 (1-4) ◽  
pp. 39-55
Author(s):  
Piet de Klerk

This is an article by a practitioner who has worked on two sides of the divide between countering terrorism and protecting human rights, both as Netherlands Human Rights Ambassador and later as the Dutch Special Counterterrorism Envoy. What was most striking in looking at these two periods that were roughly a decade apart, was how different the issues and perspectives at the junction of countering terrorism and respecting human rights were. These can be attributed to three factors: 1) that in the first period the shock of 9/11 was still new and the US was in overdrive; 2) the differences between al-Qaeda and the Islamic State; and 3) revolutionary technological changes that have an impact on human rights and on the way a terrorist organization can function these days.

2016 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 231-246 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jerome H. Kahan

Abstract Nine days after the transformational 9/11 attacks, President G.W. Bush proclaimed that the nation is fighting a Global War on Terror (GWOT), an attention-grabbing phrase designed as a rallying cry for America to win the battle against al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations threatening our homeland as well as our allies and interests abroad. Eight years later, President Obama inherited what had become an even more dangerous situation, which led to the unexpected and courage attack that felled bin Laden and splintered al Qaeda. However, this success was short-lived when the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) suddenly emerged as our primary terrorist adversary – a new and brutal threat that President Obama vowed to “degrade and ultimately destroy” by doing what it takes to win the war against this and other terrorist organizations. While there has been some progress in halting and reversing ISIS territorial gains with the US providing support to newly trained Iraqi forces, this terrorist organization is not fully contained and far from being destroyed.


Author(s):  
Farhan Zahid

Pakistan remains a country of vital importance for Al-Qaeda. It is primarily because of Al-Qaeda’s advent, rise and shelter and not to mention the support the terrorist organization found at the landscape of Pakistan during the last two decades. The emergence of in Pakistan can be traced back to the Afghan War (1979-89), with a brief sabbatical in Sudan the Islamist terrorist group rose to gain prominence after shifting back to Afghanistan. It then became a global ‘Islamist’ terrorist entity while based in neighboring Afghanistan and found safe havens in the erstwhile tribal areas of Pakistan in the aftermath of the US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. Prior to its formation in 1988 in Peshawar (Pakistan), it had worked as Maktab al-Khidmat (Services Bureau) during the Afghan War.2 It had its roots in Pakistan, which had become a transit point of extremists en route to Afghanistan during the War. All high profile Al-Qaeda leaders, later becoming high-value targets, and members of its central Shura had lived in Pakistan at one point in their lives. That is the very reason the Al-Qaeda in Pakistan is termed as Al-Qaeda Core or Central among law enforcement practitioners and intelligence communities. Without going into details of Al-Qaeda’s past in Pakistan the aim of this article is to focus on its current state of affairs and what future lies ahead of it in Pakistan.


Author(s):  
Simon Staffell

The history of the jihadist movement in Egypt provides important lessons about its possible future trajectories. This chapter sets out the history of jihadism in Egypt from Al-Gama‘a al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group) and Egyptian Islamic Jihad in the 1980s and 90s, through the al-Tawhid w‘al Jihad and Al-Qaeda affiliate the Abdullah Azzam Brigades in the 2000s. The chapter then considers how jihadism has developed after the 25 January 2011 revolution. It examines the rise of IS in Egypt - the organizational changes involved and how these were accompanied by changes in ideology and narrative. By situating these changes in the context of the history of salafi-jihadism in Egypt, it argues that IS’s ability to gain a foothold, were in part due to their global narrative, but more notably were due to the way in which the Ansar Beit al-Maqdis/Wilayat Sina leadership were willing and able to adapt this narrative to the particularities of the Egyptian context. Egyptian jihadism has not historically accepted IS’s approach, and this may ultimately prove to be their downfall in the country.


Author(s):  
Donald Holbrook

This chapter analyses statements released by Ayman al-Zawahiri in the context of MENA uprisings and the rise of the Islamic State organization. The chapter traces Zawahiri’s aggregate narrative during this period, discussing how the Al-Qaeda leader framed these key events and how these framing efforts evolved. This discussion highlights issues regarding legitimate leadership of jihadist vanguards, the role of public opinion in that equation and the way in which al-Zawahiri has sought to exploit and address those challenges in his efforts to retain momentum and relevancy within a complex jihadi universe. The chapter concludes by considering the particulars of al-Zawahiri’s most recent discursive emphases in light of his public rhetoric to date in order to highlight the evolution and, at times, contradictions of this narrative.


Author(s):  
Timothy Andrews Sayle

In March 2003 US and coalition forces invaded Iraq. US forces withdrew in December 2008. Approximately 4,400 US troops were killed and 31,900 wounded during the initial invasion and the subsequent war. Estimates of Iraqi casualties vary widely, ranging from roughly 100,000 to more than half a million. The invasion was launched as part of the US strategic response to the terror attacks of September 11, 2001, and ended the rule of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. After the collapse of the regime, Iraq experienced significant violence as former regime loyalists launched insurgent attacks against US forces, and al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), a group linked to al-Qaeda, also attacked US forces and sought to precipitate sectarian civil war. Simultaneously with the increasing violence, Iraq held a series of elections that resulted in a new Constitution and an elected parliament and government. In 2007, the United States deployed more troops to Iraq to quell the insurgency and sectarian strife. The temporary increase in troops was known as “the Surge.” In November 2008, the US and Iraqi governments agreed that all US troops would withdraw from Iraq by December 2011. In 2014, AQI, now calling itself the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), attacked and captured large swaths of Iraq, including several large cities. That year, the United States and allied states launched new military operations in Iraq called Operation Inherent Resolve. The government of Iraq declared victory over ISIL in 2017.


Significance The move should open the way to 'intra-Afghan' talks involving government and Taliban representatives. This may help prop up the February deal between the US government and the Taliban, which has frayed as milestones are missed or misread. Impacts The Taliban leadership will be forced to take difficult decisions, putting added strain on their already weak cohesion. A faltering peace process would offer Iran a route to rebuilding influence with the Taliban leadership. Islamic State will use any opportunity such as the recent Jalalabad mass prison escape to undermine peace steps.


2018 ◽  
Vol 67 (3) ◽  
pp. 438-455 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eric Bonds

Based on a qualitative content analysis of human rights reports, US military statements, and newspaper accounts, this article describes the ascendency of ‘humanitized violence,’ which characterizes airstrikes in the US war against the Islamic State (2014–2017). This hyper-rationalized violence utilizes precision weaponry, technical and administrative procedures to limit civilian deaths, and calculations to achieve goals in ‘proportionality.’ This method of violence is further accompanied by a discourse of precision, care, legality, and regret. The article further shows that leading nongovernmental critics of this violence largely accept its logic. Consequently, rather than offering opposition, humanitarian NGOs instead reinforce the humanitization of violence by calling on governments to be more precise and to exercise more care when striking enemy targets. Noting the high numbers of civilian deaths that can accompany humanitized violence, along with the US government’s continued capacity for total war, the author cautions that its rise does not necessarily portend a more peaceful future.


2013 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 538-548 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roland Paris

The US-led invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001, which deposed the Taliban regime, was followed by a major international effort to stabilize that country. More than a decade later, this effort has yielded neither security nor political stability in Afghanistan. After having been ousted from power, the Taliban reestablished itself in the borderlands of Pakistan and began fighting an effective guerrilla war against international and Afghan government forces. Despite heavy losses in recent years, the insurgency shows no sign of giving up. Meanwhile, attempts to establish a credible and legitimate Afghan government have been similarly disappointing. President Hamid Karzai, once hailed as the country's democratic savior, came to be seen instead as the leader of one of the most corrupt regimes on the planet, a perception that has damaged his government's legitimacy both at home and abroad. Afghanistan's development and human rights indicators have improved, but it remains to be seen if these gains can be sustained as the international effort is scaled back. Finally, although the United States and its partners succeeded in weakening Al Qaeda in the region, both Afghanistan and nuclear-armed Pakistan appear to have become considerably less stable over the course of the mission, with untold consequences for the future.


2018 ◽  
pp. 89-94
Author(s):  
Stanislav Mezentsev

The paper investigates aspects of the practical work, organizational features, relations, financing issues and support for the so-called non-governmental structure internationally known as the White Helmets, which operated in the territories of Syria captured by the terrorist organization Islamic State (ISIS) and controlled by the anti-government (“democratic”) opposition and al Qaeda / an-Nusrah fighters,. Specific manipulative technologies for misleading international public opinion are reviewed.


2020 ◽  
Vol V (III) ◽  
pp. 87-96
Author(s):  
Ijaz Khalid ◽  
Hina Malik ◽  
Aneela Akbar
Keyword(s):  
Al Qaeda ◽  
The Us ◽  
To Come ◽  

The paper analysis the US talks with the Taliban since they attacked Afghanistan and eliminated Al-Qaeda in October 2001. The piece of study highlights the role-played Islamabad in patching up both Taliban and American for dialogue to come up with a peaceful solution to the US War in Afghanistan. Washington always uses divers’ players for holding talks with the Taliban including, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Germany, UAE and the Afghan government, to achieve its objective. The study found that the US never sincere in their move of dialogue with the radical forces in Afghanistan. The study also come to the conclusion that the different actors involved by the US have their own interests to pursue rather than achieving US interests. Additionally, Washington never gave a free hand to any one of the actors to hold talks with the Taliban. These factors are responsible for blocking the way of peace in the graveyard of Empires.


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