Beyond the Duality of Normativity and Pragmatism

2021 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 327-352
Author(s):  
Andreas Grimmel ◽  
Julia Gurol

Abstract One of the EU’s key foreign policy objectives is to promote the values enshrined in its treaties, such as democracy, the rule of law and human rights. The EU’s self-conception of being a “rule maker” rather than a “rule taker” in international relations, however, is increasingly contested both by internal (e.g., democratic backsliding or a general tendency towards nationalist politics) as well as external challenges (e.g., the return of bilateralism or the rise of new actors). China’s Belt and Road Initiative (bri) is often understood as the most serious opposition on the external side to the EU’s model of international cooperation and global governance, in that it promotes a pragmatic instead of a norm-based approach, at least at first glance. The Chinese foreign policy model that the bri reflects, explicitly favours open membership, flexibility and economic gains over multilateral institutions and norm-based action. By drawing on original interviews and analysing central policy documents, this article shows how the juxtaposition of normativity and pragmatism has shaped the political and academic discourse on the EU’s foreign policy and idea of global governance. It argues that this duality of normativity versus pragmatism is misleading because it overlooks the fact that the EU and China both (a) constitute the framework for a certain practice and (b) are rooted in practice. Drawing on Kagan’s cultural thesis of foreign policy, it questions the real meaning of this juxtaposition and applies a practice-based reading to the EU’s and China’s modes of foreign policy making. The article further shows that scrutinising foreign policy through the prism of practice can provide a more context-sensitive and encompassing understanding of how the EU and China construct their foreign policies as well as of possible conflicts that arise from them.

Author(s):  
Nathanael Tilahun

Abstract By adopting a Global Human Rights Sanctions regime, the European Union took a new step in leveraging its power to respond to human rights violations globally. The regime has a general scope, and targets both state and non-state actors. This paper shows that this regime occupies a tension zone between two competing approaches to sanctions: a self-help approach that perceives sanctions as deriving authority from states’ sovereignty and subservient to their foreign policy, and a global governance approach that views sanctions as deriving authority from and bound by the objectives of specific international legal regimes they enforce. The tension between these approaches comes into stark view when constructing the listing criteria and policy objectives of the sanctions, which determine the scope of targets and duration of measures. Whether and how subsequent practice resolves this tension will be determined by certain legislative and interpretive moves by the EU Council and Court.


Author(s):  
Jean-Marc F. Blanchard

AbstractThis piece examines and critiques the massive literature on China’s ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). It details how research currently seems stuck on the road to nowhere. In addition, it identifies a number of the potholes that collective research endeavors are hitting such as that they are poorly synchronized. It also stresses that lines of analysis are proliferating rather than optimizing, with studies broadening in thematic coverage, rather than becoming deeper. It points out that BRI participants are regularly related to the role of a bit player in many analyses and research often is disconnected from other literatures. Among other things, this article recommends analysts focus on the Maritime Silk Road Initiative (MSRI) or Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB) in specific regions or countries. It also argues for a research core that focuses on the implementation issue (i.e., the issue of MSRI and SREB project implementation), project effects (i.e., the economic and political costs and benefits of projects), and the translation issue (i.e., the domestic and foreign policy effects of projects) and does work that goes beyond the usual suspects. On a related note, research need to identify, more precisely, participants and projects, undertake causal analysis, and take into account countervailing factors. Furthermore, studies need to make more extensive use of the Chinese foreign policy literature. Moreover, works examining subjects like soft power need to improve variable conceptualization and operationalization and deliver more nuanced analyses. Finally, studies, especially by area specialists, should take the area, not the China, perspective.


2019 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
pp. 451-469 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anne Jenichen

AbstractIt is a common—often stereotypical—presumption that Europe is secular and America religious. Differences in international religious freedom and religious engagement policies on both sides of the Atlantic seem to confirm this “cliché.” This article argues that to understand why it has been easier for American supporters to institutionalize these policies than for advocates in the EU, it is important to consider the discursive structures of EU and US foreign policies, which enable and constrain political language and behavior. Based on the analysis of foreign policy documents, produced by the EU and the United States in their relationship with six religiously diverse African and Asian states, the article compares how both international actors represent religion in their foreign affairs. The analysis reveals similarities in the relatively low importance that they attribute to religion and major differences in how they represent the contribution of religion to creating and solving problems in other states. In sum, the foreign policies of both international actors are based on a secular discursive structure, but that of the United States is much more accommodative toward religion, including Islam, than that of the EU.


2002 ◽  
Vol 3 (4) ◽  
pp. 299-313 ◽  
Author(s):  
Francis G. Castles

This article uses a simple statistical technique to examine whether there is a distinct European social policy model and whether such a model has consolidated during the 1980s and 1990s. In terms of total social expenditure and its major aggregates, it shows that Europe as a whole, and the countries presently constituting the EU, are somewhat more similar to each other than are the countries constituting a wider OECD grouping, but that this similarity is probably insufficient to warrant the label of European social policy model. In respect of individual programmes like pensions, health and unemployment benefits differences between Europe and the wider OECD are even less distinct. Over time, there is a general tendency for there to be greater coherence in total spending levels and in levels of expenditure on poverty alleviation and health care, but less coherence in respect of levels of social security spending. While the evidence for any kind of encompassing European social model is weak, the article does identify a Northern European grouping of countries, which, in several respects, manifests an expenditure profile quite distinct from OECD nations in general.


Author(s):  
Anthony Petros Spanakos

US-Venezuelan relations display both confrontation and cooperation. Chinese relations with Venezuela are a most likely case for rebellion against the global governance system over which the US presides. This chapter makes a structuralist argument, arguing that the way that the three countries are positioned within global and regional governance structures conditions the underlying character of their relations with each other. Simply put, the US, China, and Venezuela have very different interests and capabilities and their structural positions in South America explain why the increased Chinese presence in Venezuela is neither a threat to the US nor does it substantially aid Venezuelan intentions toward multi-polarizing the region or world. To make this argument, the chapter assumes that US foreign policy toward Venezuela is informed by its position as regional hegemon, Chinese foreign policy toward Venezuela is informed by its position as an extra-regional commercial state, and Venezuelan foreign policy toward both is informed by its position as a petrostate.


Author(s):  
Courtney J. Fung

Abstract A fundamental question facing global governance today is whether the UN peacekeeping regime can function with enough skilled troops to execute increasingly demanding and complicated mandates. The People’s Republic of China is informally thought of as a potential lead troop-contributing country. China typically deploys non-combat enabler troops, and recently began deploying combat troops, which may have to engage in live fire to defend the mandate. The risks and costs associated with dispatching combat troops challenge the benefits that China derives from supporting peacekeeping. I first establish China’s feedback mechanisms to facilitate simple and complex learning against China’s peacekeeping trajectory and motivations for participation. I then address the implications of China’s combat troop deployment, focusing on the UN Multidimensional Stabilization Mission in Mali and the UN Mission in South Sudan. The article draws insights from interviews with Chinese foreign policy elites and UN officials, and participant observation at the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations.


2020 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
pp. 35-64
Author(s):  
Joel Petersson Ivre ◽  
Eugene Lee

By treating militarism and personalism as institutional constraints on foreign policy, this article examines the role and influence of these constraints on the foreign policies of Russia and China. By looking at empirical evidence the authors argue that domestic institutional constraints in each country have exhibited distinctly different patterns throughout the last twenty years, and this can to some extent explain the difference in their respective foreign policies. However, institutional personalism in China has recently become more similar to that of Russia. The authors argue that current Russian foreign policy bears some elements of similarity suggesting future developments in Chinese foreign policy.


2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 295-331 ◽  
Author(s):  
Colin Flint ◽  
Zhang Xiaotong

Abstract In the past few years, China has made dramatic foreign policy decisions that have changed both the global landscape and the behaviour of other states. To understand fully the possibilities and limitations of China’s foreign policy, it is important to see its occurrences within geopolitical contexts. The main argument of this article is that geopolitical context must be theorised in order to understand the decisions of states. We define a political geography perspective within a world-systems analysis that creates a Space–Time matrix of context based on the core–periphery hierarchy of the capitalist world economy and economic and hegemonic cycles. Inspired by Chinese scholars and policymakers’ periodisations of Chinese diplomacy, we develop a new periodisation of Chinese diplomatic cycles from 1840 to 2039. Using this new periodisation of Chinese diplomacy, we situate the changing nature of Chinese foreign policy within our Space–Time matrix. We then evaluate the possibilities and challenges of China’s current foreign policy, with emphasis on the Belt and Road Initiative, by illustrating features of the contemporary geopolitical context. Finally, we discuss the implications of this for contemporary Chinese foreign policy.


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