The System of International Law: The Right to Self-Determination, Minority Rights and Patterns of Human Rights Violations ― Connections with the Breakup or Implosion of States

2001 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 65-83
Author(s):  
Anthony Carty
2012 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-25
Author(s):  
Fozia N Lone

If a group wishes to exercise the right to self-determination, they need to establish that they are a “people” within the international law definition, thereby triggering the ability to claim this right.  Thus, the definition of the term “people” is the key in cases of self-determination and always posits difficult challenges.  This article aims to determine whether the “Kashmiri people” could be identified as a group that fits within the contemporary non-exhaustive definition of people.  Having ascended from the level of subjects of an autocratic rule to victims of human rights violations, are Kashmiris now in a position to exercise a right to self-determination?  


2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 269-305
Author(s):  
Amrei Müller

Abstract Recent literature and United Nations documents advocate that most armed non-state actors (ANSAs) should be bound by human rights law. This article takes a more critical stance on this issue. It argues that only a limited number of ANSAs should potentially become human rights duty-bearers: those that exercise de facto (human rights) jurisdiction and thus have considerable institutional and military capacities, as well as particular normative characteristics. It specifies these capacities and characteristics with an analysis of ANSAs’ practice that tentatively indicates that some of these entities may indeed exercise de facto jurisdiction. The argument is justified by highlighting the broader consequences that recognising ANSAs as human rights duty-bearers will entail. It will also endow them with privileges that will legitimise their authority over time. This is grounded in the normative logic of human rights law that emphasises the interrelationship between human rights, equality and democracy that also permeates the notion of jurisdiction and is further supported by a political understanding of the right to self-determination. The article closes with a brief sketch of two complementary ways to develop international law binding ANSAs to be further explored in future research: the so-called ‘responsibilities for human rights’ and an adapted law of occupation.


2017 ◽  
Vol 24 (3) ◽  
pp. 254-272
Author(s):  
Parvathi Menon

The legitimacy of secessionist movements has emerged as an important debate, while the protection of minorities within a democracy has become merely of peripheral interest to international law. My project suggests that the advent of universalized (minority) rights re-conceptualized the majority-minority relationship and its balance, reducing the possibilities of political processes to balance the relationship. What was construed as a redress for dichotomous relationships between the oppressor and the oppressed through (the right to) self-determination, became a discourse between minority (identity) rights and a democratic entitlement, post-colonially. These norms universalized a demand to rethink minority protection, no longer from the perspective of advantaged and disadvantaged; rather, to introduce perspectives of individuals polarized around a personal characteristic in their identity thus establishing/reinforcing the inferiority of their identity within the hierarchy.


Author(s):  
Aoláin Fionnuala Ní

Principle 29 deals with restrictions on the jurisdiction of military courts. Under this Principle, the adjudication of human rights violations by military courts is explicitly excluded, and ordinary domestic courts are mandated as the only appropriate venue of judicial oversight. Nevertheless, military courts remain functionally important for the routine and uncontroversial deployment of military law consistent with international law. The chapter first provides a contextual and historical background on Principle 29 before discussing its theoretical framework and how military courts are used in various countries such as Ireland and Turkey. Issues arising when civilians find themselves within the jurisdiction of military courts are also examined, along with the difficulties of ensuring fair trials in military courts. This chapter shows that military courts, while certainly serving important functions within the military forces of states, remain subject to human rights and humanitarian law compliance.


2017 ◽  
Vol 19 (4-5) ◽  
pp. 443-484
Author(s):  
Gaetano Pentassuglia

Abstract In this article I examine selective dimensions of the nexus among the right to self-determination, human rights, and the ‘nation-state’ as they relate to claims made by certain ethno-cultural minority groups. I first discuss some conceptual extensions of ‘national’ claims and their underlying relation to international law and state sovereignty. Then, I critique elements of ‘national’ self-determination that are supposedly constitutive of the law of self-determination, including arguments about sub-national groups as ‘peoples’, and discuss some alternative approaches to the role of international law vis-à-vis this sort of claims. Finally, I argue that international human rights law can offer a synthesis of the above nexus insofar as it works, not so much as a platform for accepting or rejecting seemingly ‘absolute’ rights or solely enabling legal-institutional ad hocism, but rather as a general process-based framework for assessing group- related pathologies that are (directly or indirectly) of international law’s own making.


2016 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Munafrizal Manan

This paper discusses the right of self-determinationfrom  international  law  and international human rights law perspective. It traces the emergence and development of self-determination from political principle to human right. It also explores the controversy of the right of self-determination. There have been different and even contradictory interpretations of the right of self-determination. Besides, there is no consensus on the mechanism to apply the right of self-determination. Both international law and international human rights law are vague about this.


Author(s):  
Ambos Kai

Principle 19 outlines the duties of States with regard to the administration of justice for victims of serious human rights violations and other international crimes. Under this Principle, States must ensure that those responsible for serious crimes under international law are prosecuted, tried and adequately punished. A state’s (criminal) justice obligations have long been recognized by regional human rights courts and international human rights bodies. While the fight against impunity is the explicit aim of the International Criminal Court (ICC) and a major goal of the United Nations, the duty to prosecute lies primarily with the domestic justice system with regional or international mechanisms being subsidiary or complementary. This chapter first provides a contextual and historical background on Principle 19 before discussing its theoretical framework and how human rights courts and treaty bodies have interpreted the duty of States to investigate and prosecute serious human rights violations.


1997 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 16-20
Author(s):  
René Lefeber ◽  
David Raič

We agree with André de Hoogh that the Chechens did not possess a right to external self-determination prior to the massive indiscriminate use oi military force by Russia in December 1994. At no point have we argued or suggested otherwise. Hence, up to December 1994, the Chechen claim did indeed not meet the conditions set by paragraph seven of the Friendly Relations Declaration. However, the Friendly Relations Declaration needs to be interpreted in view of usus and opinio iuris. In other words, one has to analyse how this paragraph has developed in customary international law. According to our analysis of the law of self-determination, the emergence of a right to external self-determination depends on two cumulative conditions, viz. 1) the serious and persistent violation of the right to internal self-determination and 2) the exhaustion of all total and international peaceful remedies by the people concerned to effectuate its right to internal self-determination. These conditions must be deemed fulfilled if the parent state seriously and massively violates the fundamental human rights and freedoms – in particular by an arbitrary violation of the right to life – of the persons belonging to the people concerned.


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