South China Sea

2021 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 165-191
Author(s):  
Nguyễn Hồng Thao

Abstract Malaysia’s partial submission to the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf on its extended continental shelf beyond 200 nm limit made in December 2019 sparked a new legal battle of diplomatic notes on the South China Sea (scs) from claimant States (Brunei, China, Malaysia, the Philippines and Viet Nam) and non-claimant States (Australia, Germany, France, Japan, Indonesia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States). It has greater volume and significance compared to the first exchange of notes in 2009 – 2011. This article examines the impact of diplomatic notes among claimants on the prospect for the peaceful settlement of the maritime disputes in the scs.

2011 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
pp. 77-104 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carlyle A. Thayer

This article reviews Chinese assertive behaviour towards the Philippines and Vietnam over South China Sea issues in 2011. The article compares and contrasts Chinese diplomatic behaviour in the period before and after the adoption by ASEAN member states and China of Guidelines for the Implementation the Declaration on Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea in July. In the first period China aggressively asserted its claims to sovereignty by interfering with commercial fishing and oil exploration activities of vessels operating in the Exclusive Economic Zones of Vietnam and the Philippines. Both states resisted Chinese actions. The Philippines allocated increased funding for defence modernization, lobbied ASEAN states and shored up its alliance with the United States. Vietnam too protested Chinese action and undertook symbolic steps to defend national sovereignty. In the second period all states moved to contain South China Sea tensions from affecting their larger bilateral relations. It remains to be seen, however, if proposed confidence building measures will ameliorate Chinese assertiveness.


2019 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
pp. 325-349
Author(s):  
Fayokemi Ayodeji Olorundami

Abstract In July 2016, an Arbitral Tribunal handed down its award in the South China Sea dispute between the Philippines and China. In addition to considering the legal status of the controversial nine-dash line, the Tribunal also provided the first judicial interpretation of Article 121 of the LOSC, thereby shedding light on what maritime features may be regarded as islands and not rocks within the meaning of that article, and therefore entitled to an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and continental shelf. This article considers the decision reached by the Tribunal, and the views expressed in the literature, applying them to an analysis that attempts to answer whether the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands (sovereignty over which is disputed by China and Japan) in the East China Sea would qualify as islands, and thus entitled to an EEZ and as a continental shelf, or as rocks and therefore not so entitled.


Significance However, China's navy already has an operational sea-based nuclear deterrent based on Hainan Island. The deployment of nuclear-armed submarines, and their need to reach the mid-Pacific to threaten the continental United States, makes the South China Sea an arena not just of maritime disputes but of US-China military rivalry. Impacts The strategic importance of the Philippines, Taiwan and Singapore to the United States will increase. A new defence agreement with the Philippines will, as of last month, support US military activities in the area. Washington will encourage greater Japanese involvement in the South China Sea; as long as Shinzo Abe is prime minister, Japan will oblige.


Subject The South China Sea dispute. Significance China and the United States increased their military activities in the South China Sea in January and February, with US ‘freedom of navigation operations’ (FONOPs) pushing back on Chinese maritime jurisdictional claims in the area. The Philippines before June 2016 contested China’s expansive claims. Increased rivalry between Beijing and Washington in South-east Asia raises the risk of a dangerous naval confrontation. Impacts The Philippines will continue to solicit investment from China. China is unlikely to undertake actions in the South China Sea that would seriously irk the Philippines. South-east Asian countries will emphasise the importance of the region not becoming a theatre for China-US rivalry.


Author(s):  
Nataliya Gorodnia

This paper describes and discusses the major developments in the U.S.-Philippines security relations in 1991-2016, between signing an agreement to extend a rent of Subic Bay Naval base by the U.S. and inauguration of R. Duterte administration. The research has revealed three periods in the U.S.-Philippines security relations in 1991-2016. The first period started when the Philippines senate rejected to ratify the Subic Bay Agreement in September 1991, and the United States had to evacuate the naval base on November 1992. It lasted until the U.S. and the Philippines signed a Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) in 1998. The Philippines government’s interest in reaching a new agreement was caused by China’s 1995 military occupation of the Panganiban reef and other incidents at the disputed territories in the South China Sea. The Philippines claimed that they composed a part of their exclusive economic zone, according to the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. The second period lasted since ratification of the VFA by the Philippines parliament in 1999 until aggravation of the situation in the South China Sea in 2011. This period was featured by enhanced political and military cooperation between the U.S. and the Philippines, and significant U.S. assistance in modernization of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). In September 2001–2006, the security cooperation was focused on the counterterrorism activitiesin the Philippines by military means. In 2007–2011, the focus shifted to humanitarian operations and development assistance. During the third period, in March 2011 – June 2016, B. Aquino administration refocused attention from domestic security issues to the threats in the South China Sea. In 2014, the Philippines and the U.S. signed the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, which provided American ships, aircrafts and military personnel with an access to several military bases of the AFP on a rotating basis. The Agreement essentially improved U.S. strategic position in the Southeast Asia and the South China Sea.


Author(s):  
Zou Keyuan

This chapter assesses the legal regime of the South China Sea. It first discusses legal issues concerning the South China Sea, including sovereignty and territorial disputes, maritime disputes, the controversy over China's ‘U-shaped’ line, and the relation between conventional rights deriving from the UN Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC) and historic rights embodied in international customary law. It then considers the applicable international law in the South China Sea including the LOSC and regional arrangements such as the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea. The final section considers the latest developments in the South China Sea including the Philippines v China case. It discusses the possibility of cooperation in the region between or amongst claimants as well as between ASEAN and China through feasible means, such as joint development, joint management of fishery resources, common responsibilities for the protection of the marine environment and cooperation in non-traditional security issues.


Subject The outlook for China-Vietnam relations. Significance Vietnamese Communist Party Secretary General Nguyen Phu Trong’s visit to Beijing last month was a sign of significant, ongoing improvement in the contentious bilateral relationship over the past year. China and Vietnam are the two most likely belligerents in the South China Sea, having fought naval skirmishes in 1974 and 1988, so their relationship is vital to regional stability. However, unlike the Philippines’ abrupt tilt towards China under President Rodrigo Duterte, ties between Beijing and Hanoi have warmed gradually. Impacts Crisis management and confidence-building measures will advance as long as ties remain cordial, reducing the risk of future instability. Suppression of nationalist activism, particularly in Vietnam, will reduce the incentives for leaders to escalate or initiate crises. Vietnam will pursue substantive cooperation with China’s security rivals, notably India, Japan and the United States. Chinese South China Sea policy will be the most important factor affecting China-Vietnam ties.


2018 ◽  
Vol 48 (6) ◽  
pp. 1349-1365 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiaojiang Zhang ◽  
Xiaodong Huang ◽  
Zhiwei Zhang ◽  
Chun Zhou ◽  
Jiwei Tian ◽  
...  

AbstractSpatiotemporal variations in internal solitary wave (ISW) polarity over the continental shelf of the northern South China Sea (SCS) were examined based on mooring-array observations from October 2013 to June 2014. Depression ISWs were observed at the easternmost mooring, where the water depth is 323 m. Then, they evolved into elevation ISWs at the westernmost mooring, with a depth of 149 m. At the central mooring, with a depth of 250 m, the ISWs generally appeared as depression waves in autumn and spring but were elevation waves in winter. Seasonal variations in stratification caused this seasonality in polarity. On the intraseasonal time scales, anticyclonic eddies can modulate ISW polarity at the central mooring by deepening the thermocline depth for periods of approximately 8 days. During some days in autumn and spring, depression ISWs and ISWs in the process of changing polarity from depression to elevation appeared at time intervals of 10–12 h because of the thermocline deepening caused by internal tides. Isotherm anomalies associated with eddies and internal tides have a more significant contribution to determining the polarity of ISWs than do the background currents. The observational results reported here highlight the impact of multiscale processes on the evolution of ISWs.


Author(s):  
Nguyen Ha Trang

The South China Sea is one of the most important trade pathways in the world. Its strategic economic importance and its geographic location at the confluence of several spheres of influence have rendered it one of the “world’s hotspots”. The South China Sea issue began as a territorial dispute over the sovereignty of the islands and sea territory involving China, five ASEAN countries including Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, Indonesia, and Taiwan. While the South China Sea has been the subject of disputes of sovereignty for some time, the conflict began to intensify when China established its nine-dash line in 2012 outlining its territorial claims in the body of water. China’s aggressive stance has prompted reactions from ASEAN countries as well as the US. The South China Sea is an area with relevance to U.S.’s national economic, strategic, security interests, so that increased tension within this area may threaten U.S.'s national interests. Vietnam is also aware that the United States is a superpower that shares concerns about China, as well as its influence in the region can play an important role in balancing power in the South China Sea Conflict. U.S presence help to contain China's aggressive actions, and multilateralization or internationalization of the South China Sea issues is also a contributing factor to control conflict. Therefore, the dispute in the South China Sea is a factor making a closer relationship between the U.S. and Vietnam. Vietnam and the United States established a Comprehensive Partnership in 2013, under which the two countries will strengthen and expand cooperation. In the future, U.S. - Vietnam cooperation will promote strong development, including sensitive fields, because of based on common strategic interests, including "sensitive" fields such as security and defense.


2021 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 292-319
Author(s):  
Sukawarsini Djelantik

The South China Sea (LTS) has a strategic position and rich in natural resources. These waters are claimed by several countries such as China, the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei Darussalam, and Taiwan. The overlapping claims have not yet reached a resolution, even though tensions have increased and potentially to become an open conflict. The United States (US) and China have economic, political and strategic interests in winning the competition in the South China Sea. This paper answers the question what is China's position in the dispute in the South China Sea? Has China as a great power succeeded in utilizing its national power to control the waters? China's position is analyzed using the concept of national power consisting of Diplomacy, Information, Military and Economics (DIME), which is commonly used to assess state power. China's strength is compared indirectly with the US, which is the main competitor in the region from a diplomatic, military and economic point of view. From the diplomatic aspect, China controls countries in Southeast Asia which are part of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) infrastructure project, whose various projects are funded through the Asian Investment Infrastructure Bank (AIIB). To confirm the claim, China has carried out various constructions of artificial islands in the disputed area, which are equipped with military facilities. From an economic perspective, China's rapid growth in recent decades has made it one of the most respected world powers. These facts indicated that China is a great power that has managed to match the power and influence of the US in the region. In the case of the LTS dispute, it is likely that China will win the competition, influence and support from the disputing countries. China; South China Sea; diplomacy, information, military, economy


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document