The British War Crimes Trials Of Suspected Italian War Criminals, 1945-1947

Author(s):  
Jane L. Garwood-Cutler
1998 ◽  
Vol 41 (2) ◽  
pp. 543-565 ◽  
Author(s):  
PRISCILLA DALE JONES

This article addresses one aspect of the legal proceedings known collectively as the ‘Nuremberg trials’: British policy towards, and trials of, Nazi war criminals in the British zone of occupied Germany. The killing of fifty allied airmen after their escape from Stalag Luft III illustrates how atrocities against British POWs affected British war crimes policy. The article examines one part of that policy: the efforts to expedite trials and the decision to end them. It examines the ambivalence that characterized British attitudes towards war crimes trials, and also discusses British hopes for an expeditious trial programme and political and legal objections to delays in prosecutions. Finally, it shows that concerns about the Stalag Luft III case led to extensions in the trial programme, but that eventually the programme was subordinated to Britain's broader policy of reintegrating Germany into the western fold.


2013 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 337
Author(s):  
Lisa Lee

In the aftermath of World War II, Australia undertook domestic trials of suspected Japanese war criminals between 1945 and 1951. This article focuses on Australia’s war crimes trial of Lieutenant-General Nishimura as held at the Los Negros court in mid-June 1950, and the subsequent petitioning period and confirmation process. The Australian war crimes courts were military courts vested with broad discretionary powers that facilitated the expeditious trials of accused. The procedure of war crimes courts differed from that of field general courts-martial in two main areas: admissible evidence and sentencing range — and this article highlights concomitant problems arising during the trial and subsequent case on review. This article examines the prosecution of the case entirely on documentary evidence; the impact of low admissibility thresholds for evidence; issues regarding the voluntariness and reliability of witness evidence; and the option of capital punishment in the Nishimura trial.


Author(s):  
Fred L. Borch

The post-World War II trials of war criminals in the Netherlands East Indies (NEI) are not well known, and the chief goal of this book is to change that forever, if only because these prosecutions were unique in legal history.Between September 1946 and December 1949, Dutch colonial authorities convicted 1,038 Japanese (and Koreans and Formosans) and a handful of Europeans, Eurasians, Chinese, and Indonesians for war-related offenses. NEI authorities convened nearly 450 “temporary courts-martial” in twelve locations in the archipelago known today as Indonesia; only U.S. authorities conducting war crimes trials in the Asiatic-Pacific Theater held more trials....


2019 ◽  
Vol 55 (5) ◽  
pp. 652-665
Author(s):  
Md. Awal Hossain Mollah

The aim of this paper is to examine the trial process and standard of the International Crimes Tribunal (ICT) in Bangladesh. The main aim of the paper is to explore whether the trial is about justice or politics. Two International Crimes Tribunals (ICTs) have been established following the amended ICT Act 2009 after 40 years of independence. To date, more than 30 verdicts have been delivered by the tribunals and most of the accused have been proved to be war criminals, as collaborators with the Pakistani army, and involved in the politics of Jamaat who have penalized for capital punishment. Jammat is name of a political party in Bangladesh. Although the tribunal is named ‘the International Crimes Tribunal’, no international judges or prosecutors – like those who have taken part in the tribunals of Nuremberg, Tokyo, Rwanda, Yugoslavia or the permanent International Criminal Court of The Hague – have been involved in this trial process. The Pakistani military who were involved and accused as war criminals have also been excluded from prosecution. Therefore, a lot of criticisms have made about the trial process and standard; however, some unique features can be found, such as an appeal to the Supreme Court and a mercy petition to the President. It has also been proved that politics are involved in the war crimes and even the trial process, which is not influenced solely by the abstract notions of justice. The paper takes the form of a descriptive case study and is based on mainly secondary sources of information.


1987 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 377
Author(s):  
Edward A. Schaefer ◽  
Norman E. Tutorow

2011 ◽  
Vol 205 ◽  
pp. 152-172 ◽  
Author(s):  
Justin Jacobs

AbstractThe lack of official government attention to Japanese war crimes during the Mao years has been widely acknowledged. Yet in the summer of 1956, years of preparatory work by Zhou Enlai culminated in the little-known and summarily dismissed trials of 1,062 self-confessed Japanese war criminals in Shenyang and Taiyuan. The extraordinarily lenient sentences given to 45 of the worst offenders – and wholesale pardons of 1,017 – were prompted by larger geopolitical considerations that effectively hamstrung PRC authorities from bringing the trials into closer alignment with previous ones in Europe and Japan. Zhou's determination to adopt a “policy of leniency” towards the Japanese prisoners, however, was sorely at odds with the sentiments of the general public. The need to prepare the people for a counterintuitive mass clemency saw a sudden and drastic shift in media discourse in 1954, followed by a series of remarkable cultural and intellectual campaigns that were designed to persuade the Chinese people that they should henceforth let bygones be bygones.


2016 ◽  
Vol 41 (2) ◽  
pp. 140-187 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gary J. Bass

This article expands the study of the politics of international criminal justice, restoring the crucial but overlooked case of Bangladesh, today the largest population confronting the aftermath of genocide. Bangladesh is one of the most important cases where the prosecution of war criminals was foiled, resulting in a disturbing impunity for one of the bloodiest incidents of the Cold War. Using unexplored declassified Indian government documents from archives in Delhi, this article uses detailed process-tracing to reveal for the first time why India and Bangladesh abandoned their plans to put accused Pakistani war criminals on trial after the 1971 war between India and Pakistan. In the face of Pakistani defiance, the Indian and Bangladeshi governments reluctantly bargained away justice in order to pursue their national security, with peacemaking with Pakistan proving more important than war crimes trials. This episode furthers the general understanding of both the causes and results of impunity for mass atrocities, while extending the study of international justice into Asia. Bangladesh's tragic experience shows the primacy of international security, while also tentatively suggesting that even when amnesty is necessary for peacemaking, it can leave a toxic legacy for future politics.


2016 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 69-85 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sam MCFARLAND ◽  
Katarzyna HAMER

Raphael Lemkin is hardly known to a Polish audiences. One of the most honored Poles of theXX century, forever revered in the history of human rights, nominated six times for the Nobel PeacePrize, Lemkin sacrificed his entire life to make a real change in the world: the creation of the term“genocide” and making it a crime under international law. How long was his struggle to establishwhat we now take as obvious, what we now take for granted?This paper offers his short biography, showing his long road from realizing that the killing oneperson was considered a murder but that under international law in 1930s the killing a million wasnot. Through coining the term “genocide” in 1944, he helped make genocide a criminal charge atthe Nuremburg war crimes trials of Nazi leaders in late 1945, although there the crime of genocidedid not cover killing whole tribes when committed on inhabitants of the same country nor when notduring war. He next lobbied the new United Nations to adopt a resolution that genocide is a crimeunder international law, which it adopted on 11 December, 1946. Although not a U.N. delegate – hewas “Totally Unofficial,” the title of his autobiography – Lemkin then led the U.N. in creating theConvention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, adopted 9 December, 1948.Until his death in 1958, Lemkin lobbied tirelessly to get other U.N. states to ratify the Convention.His legacy is that, as of 2015, 147 U.N. states have done so, 46 still on hold. His tomb inscriptionreads simply, “Dr. Raphael Lemkin (1900–1959), Father of the Genocide Convention”. Without himthe world as we know it, would not be possible.


2006 ◽  
Vol 14 (4) ◽  
pp. 441-455 ◽  
Author(s):  
ALAN KRAMER

The Nuremberg tribunal following the Second World War is universally considered as the foundation stone of international law with regard to war crimes and crimes against humanity. It may come as a surprise, however, to learn that the first international attempts to prosecute war crimes and crimes against humanity came at the end of the First World War, with trials held at Allied prompting in Turkey and Germany.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document