Welcoming Another CMD Instrument — The MES: But Don't Throw out the MJI or DIT Just Yet!

1996 ◽  
Vol 6 (4) ◽  
pp. 517-522 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Weber

AbstractThis review offers a cautious acceptance of the Multidimensional Ethics Scale (MES) developed by Robin, Gordon, Jordan and Reidenbach. While the contribution of the MES to future empirical research of individuals’ moral reasoning is welcomed, a number of reservations or criticisms are raised regarding theory confusion, instrument confusion, and fears arising when using the MES. I conclude that the MES is a valuable compliment to existing moral reasoning instruments — the Moral Judgment Interview and the Defining Issues Test — but not a replacement of these instruments.

2016 ◽  
Vol 57 (7) ◽  
pp. 1440-1464
Author(s):  
James Weber

Most business ethics scholars interested in understanding individual moral cognition or reasoning rely on the Defining Issues Test (DIT). They typically report that managers and business students exhibit a relatively high percentage of principled moral reasoning when resolving ethical dilemmas. This article applies neurocognitive processes and Bloom’s Taxonomy of Educational Objectives, and its more recent revision, as theoretical foundations to explore whether differences emerge when using a recognition of learning task, such as the DIT or similar instruments, versus a formulation of knowledge task, such as the Moral Judgment Interview or similar instruments, to assess individual moral reasoning. The data show that significantly different levels of moral reasoning are detected when using a recognition-based versus formulation-based moral reasoning instrument. As expected, the recognition-based approach (using a DIT-like instrument) reports an inflated, higher moral reasoning score for subjects compared with using a formulation-based instrument. Implications of these results for understanding an individual’s moral reasoning are discussed.


2008 ◽  
Vol 40 (2) ◽  
pp. 274-287
Author(s):  
Jovan Miric

First and foremost, this paper provides a short historical reminder of the emergence of the field of psychology of development of moral reasoning. In the second part of the paper, the author offers a problem-oriented overview of the field, that is, one possible classification of particular groups of problems for empirical research. This overview does not only point out to the problems that were more and that were less studied (e.g.. evaluative moral judgment and reasoning, distinguishing between moral and extra-moral rules and norms) and to those that were relatively neglected (i.e. understanding moral situations), but also to the problems that psychologists did not even recognize as research problems. Such are the problems of development of moral concepts, meaning of moral words etc. Finally, the author also points out to the fact that this classification could be taken as one way to define the field, that is, the way to determine the boundaries of its subject of studying.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Youn-Jeng Choi ◽  
Hyemin Han ◽  
Meghan Bankhead ◽  
Stephen J. Thoma

Introduction The Defining Issues Test (DIT) aimed to measure one’s moral judgment development in terms of moral reasoning. The Neo-Kohlbergian approach, which is an elaboration of Kohlbergian theory, focuses on the continuous development of postconventional moral reasoning, which constitutes the theoretical basis of the DIT. However, very few studies have directly tested the internal structure of the DIT, which would indicate its construct validity. Objectives Using the DIT-2, a later revision of the DIT, we examined whether a bi-factor model or 3-factor CFA model showed a better model fit. The Neo-Kohlbergian theory of moral judgment development, which constitutes the theoretical basis for the DIT-2, proposes that moral judgment development occurs continuously and that it can be better explained with a soft-stage model. Given these assertions, we assumed that the bi-factor model, which considers the Schema-General Moral Judgment (SGMJ), might be more consistent with Neo-Kohlbergian theory. Methods We analyzed a large dataset collected from undergraduate students. We performed confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) via weighted least squares. A 3-factor CFA based on the DIT-2 manual and a bi-factor model were compared for model fit. The three factors in the 3-factor CFA were labeled as moral development schemas in Neo-Kohlbergian theory (i.e., personal interests, maintaining norms, and postconventional schemas). The bi-factor model included the SGMJ in addition to the three factors. Results In general, the bi-factor model showed a better model fit compared with the 3-factor CFA model although both models reported acceptable model fit indices. Conclusion We found that the DIT-2 scale is a valid measure of the internal structure of moral reasoning development using both CFA and bi-factor models. In addition, we conclude that the soft-stage model, posited by the Neo-Kohlbergian approach to moral judgment development, can be better supported with the bi-factor model that was tested in the present study.


1978 ◽  
Vol 42 (1) ◽  
pp. 283-289 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jerry L. Whiteman ◽  
Karl B. Zucker ◽  
Liam K. Grimley

198 students in Grades 7 through 12 were assessed for their level of moral reasoning and their perceptions of others. The respective instruments were James Rest's Defining Issues Test and the Paired Hands Test-Secondary developed by Karl Zucker and others. A one-way analysis of variance and correlation statistics showed a consistent relationship between students' level of moral development and their others-concept. Those students who had reached the higher (principled) stages of moral development perceived and/or felt more positively about other people than students who were at a lower stage of moral development. Students who were at the antiestablishment stage had an especially low others-concept. Since it is thought that a person's others-concept indicates how he feels about other people as well as how he perceives others, the results of this study suggest that the complex relationship between thoughts and feelings, and their respective roles in moral education should be reexamined. Perhaps a cognitive-affective-developmental model would be more helpful for developing approaches to moral education than the cognitive-developmental model currently supported by many authorities.


1978 ◽  
Vol 43 (1) ◽  
pp. 307-312 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Bode ◽  
Roger Page

Three measures of moral reasoning (Kohlberg's Moral Judgment Interview, Rest's Defining Issues Test, and Maitland and Goldman's Moral Judgment Scale) were administered to classes of college students to examine the relationship between the instruments as well as their internal consistency. The Kohlberg and Rest instruments showed the strongest relationship while the Maitland and Goldman measure correlated poorly with both. The Kohlberg measure produced the highest coefficient of internal consistency (which is perhaps to be expected given the nature of the scoring procedures), while the Maitland and Goldman measure produced the lowest coefficient of internal consistency.


Author(s):  
Joshua May

Empirical research apparently suggests that emotions play an integral role in moral judgment. The evidence for sentimentalism is diverse, but it is rather weak and has generally been overblown. There is no evidence that our moral concepts themselves are partly composed of or necessarily dependent on emotions. While the moral/conventional distinction may partly characterize the essence of moral judgment, moral norms needn’t be backed by affect in order to transcend convention. Priming people with incidental emotions like disgust doesn’t make them moralize actions. Finally, moral judgment can only be somewhat impaired by damage to areas of the brain that are generally associated with emotional processing (as in acquired sociopathy and frontotemporal dementia). While psychopaths exhibit both emotional and rational deficits, the latter alone can explain any minor defects in moral cognition.


2002 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 278-280 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carol A. Smith ◽  
Sharon E. Strand ◽  
Camille J. Bunting

This study investigated the impact of a 15-week outdoor experiential program on the moral reasoning of college students. One hundred and ninety-six university students volunteered to participate in this study, which utilized Rest's (1979) Defining Issues Test (DIT). The DIT investigates how individuals arrive at making decisions, and formulates a “P” (Principled moral reasoning) score for each subject. The groups were found to be homogeneous in moral reasoning at the pretest (outdoor experiential x = 36.07; control x = 33.08; F = 0.05). There was a statistically significant difference on the posttest scores of the outdoor experiential program participants (x = 40.98) in relation to the control group (x = 34.14) (F = 3.84). The results of this study demonstrated that the outdoor experiential program participants were significantly different from the control group at posttest. It is postulated that even though improved moral reasoning was not a stated objective, the outdoor experiential students, through front-loading, reflection, critical thinking, problem solving, and adherence to the full value contract, did enhance their level of moral reasoning. Through the combined modeling of behavior and discussion, changes in behavior can occur. The nature of outdoor experiential programs seems well suited to positively influence moral and ethical reasoning.


1997 ◽  
Vol 80 (3) ◽  
pp. 967-975 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chang-Ho C. Ji

This study investigated the relations among ethnicity, moral reasoning, and collectivism by administering the Defining Issues Test and the Individualism-Collectivism Scale to 165 Euro-American and Asian graduate students. To the data were applied analyses of variance, correlation, t test, and regression analyses. The analysis indicated that the Asian subjects had lower P scores on the Defining Issues Test so Kohlberg's model may not incorporate the concerns and experience of Asian people. The study also showed that scores on collectivism were not necessarily associated with low P scores.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maria Guadalupe Jean-Tron ◽  
Diana Ávila-Montiel ◽  
Horacio Márquez-González ◽  
Gina del Carmen Chapa-Koloffon ◽  
José Antonio Orozco-Morales ◽  
...  

Abstract Background. When we talk about morality, a question arises as to whether it is a natural characteristic of humans—that is, whether it is what people should pursue as individuals or whether it is a social construct. Kohlberg established six progressive stages of moral judgment that form three levels of moral development, showing the development of people’s thinking on moral issues that is characterized by the aforementioned criteria. Methods. This study’s objective was to compare the level of moral reasoning among graduate students in medicine with a group of young graduates from other degrees and a group of non-professional adults.The moral reasoning questionnaire (Defining Issues Test, DIT) designed by James Rest based on Kohlberg’s theory (Rest 1979) was applied. In total, 304 questionnaires were completed. Results. Depending on the population studied, differences have been found in the profile of moral development. The profile of family clinic users showed a very high predominance of subjects in category 1 at 70%, but only 4.5% in category 3, while in the group of pediatric specialty students, 37.5% were found in category 1 and 34% in category 3. They were the group with the highest percentage in this category. This vast difference could be because the differences in the age and socio-education levels of the beneficiaries are much wider than that of the residents. However, differences are also found if the profiles of residents are compared with those of master’s students because the latter comprised 56% in category 1 and 19% in category 3. We also found differences in the profiles of moral development based on the highest education level. Conclusions. Based on the results of this study, the population could be classified into three levels of moral development, the first level being the predominant one and the third the least common, as we expected prior to the study. The reason why some individuals reach the highest level while others do not remains a question to be addressed. The results show us that there is a difference in some populations depending on education level and even the type of degree pursued.


2004 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 53-71 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christine E. Earley ◽  
Patrick T. Kelly

In light of recent accounting scandals and the ensuing “crisis in confidence” facing the public accounting profession, there is a new challenge to accounting educators: how to effectively incorporate ethics into accounting courses, and increase the moral reasoning abilities of their students. Providing accounting students with the ability to reason effectively with respect to moral dilemmas may help to minimize future judgment errors in accounting and auditing settings. This article describes several different educational interventions that were adopted in an undergraduate auditing course. Students' moral reasoning was assessed both at the beginning and the end of the course to determine whether their moral reasoning scores improved based on the interventions. This was done over two semesters: one occurring in 2001 (“pre-Enron”), and one occurring in 2002 (“post-Enron”). Accounting context-specific scores were collected in both semesters (using Thorne's [2000] Accounting Ethical Dilemma Instrument [AEDI]), and general moral reasoning scores (Rest's [1979] Defining Issues Test [DIT]) were also collected in the post-Enron semester. Results indicate increases in AEDI scores, which were robust over both semesters. There was no corresponding increase in DIT scores, which is consistent with previous research; however, students' DIT scores were not significantly different than AEDI scores, which is contrary to the findings of Thorne (2001). In addition, the educational interventions appear to be equally effective in both the pre-Enron and post-Enron semesters, indicating the absence of an “Enron effect.”


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