Government Capacities and Policy Making by Decree in Latin America

What is the effect of constitutional decree authority (CDA) on the policy-making process of a presidential regime? Despite recent efforts to answer this question, there is still much uncertainty in the literature about the extent to which decree powers may allow presidents to control the legislative process. This article argues that in a separation-of-powers system, the existence of CDA effectively enhances executives’ ability to act as agenda setters. This capacity, however, is not uniform across all cases. Developing a simple spatial model of decree games, the author argues that the bargaining power of an executive to promote legal changes through decrees varies according to three interrelated factors: decree approval rules, the extent of the executive’s partisan support in the legislature, and the strength of the presidential veto. These propositions are supported by a comparative analysis of the process of constitutional design and the implementation of decrees in Brazil and Argentina, two cases presenting significant variation in each of the independent variables.

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Executive Veto Power and Constitutional Design

The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, Volume 2 ◽

10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190469771.013.47 ◽

2019 ◽

pp. 93-113

Author(s):

Nicholas R. Miller

Keyword(s):

Spatial Model ◽

Strategic Behavior ◽

Separation Of Powers ◽

Strategic Interaction ◽

Veto Power ◽

Constitutional Design ◽

One Dimensional ◽

Executive Veto

A “separation of powers” system provides for an executive and legislature with independent powers. While only the legislature can pass bills, executive approval is commonly required for them to become law. The executive exercises veto power by withholding approval. Executive veto power is simple if the executive can only approve a bill or reject it in its entirety; it is constructive if he can amend a bill in certain ways. It is qualified if the legislature can override a veto; it is unqualified otherwise. Any such system creates a gamelike strategic interaction between the legislature and executive. The chapter provides an expository sketch of a variety of such veto games. The analysis is based on a one-dimensional spatial model given three different behavioral assumptions: sincere behavior by both the legislature and executive, strategic behavior by both, and strategic behavior coupled with the possibility of a credible veto threat by the executive. Several extensions and qualifications are briefly noted.

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An Independent President or Administrator?

The Dual Executive ◽

10.11126/stanford/9780804799973.003.0007 ◽

2017 ◽

Author(s):

Michelle Belco ◽

Brandon Rottinghaus

Keyword(s):

Full Advantage ◽

Final Stage ◽

Policy Making ◽

Legislative Process ◽

Dual Roles ◽

Policy Making Process

Chapter 7 investigates the dual roles of the executive after laws have been passed by Congress. At this stage, independent presidents issue unilateral orders to adapt legislation to suit their needs and administrators use them to faithfully implement legislation. This is the final stage in the policy-making process and one where the president has the duty to execute law. The challenge for presidents is to shape the outcome of the legislative process to their favor. This is the president’s final opportunity, and at the height of his or her powers the president takes full advantage of this privileged place.

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Policy analysis and the legislature in Colombia

Policy Analysis in Colombia ◽

10.1332/policypress/9781447347712.003.0006 ◽

2020 ◽

pp. 81-98

Author(s):

Mónica Pachón ◽

Manuela Muñoz

Keyword(s):

Policy Making ◽

Party System ◽

Separation Of Powers ◽

Evidence Based ◽

The Public ◽

Legislative Branch ◽

Public Policy Process ◽

Policy Making Process ◽

Legislative Output

This chapter describes the operation of the legislative branch in Colombia and the challenges of applying evidence-based analysis in the public policy process that occur within such a highly politicized environment. It summarizes some of the previous findings of the research conducted on the role of Congress in the contemporary policy-making process. It also shows how Congress has played an important part in reacting to executive bills, protecting constituency interests, leading public debates, and occasionally affecting the agenda impeding governmental action. The chapter covers the period after the 1991 Constitution, examining mostly the legislative output of Congress. It underscores the rules establishing the separation of powers and evaluates the nature of the party system determining the separation of purpose among the branches and the legislative output.

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INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS IN SOUTH AFRICA: A TWENTY YEAR REVIEW

Strategic Review for Southern Africa ◽

10.35293/srsa.v37i2.242 ◽

2020 ◽

Vol 37 (2) ◽

Author(s):

Fritz Nganje

Keyword(s):

Foreign Policy ◽

International Relations ◽

Policy Making ◽

Intergovernmental Relations ◽

National Development ◽

Foreign Affairs ◽

Constitutional Design ◽

The Past ◽

Policy Making Process ◽

Ruling Party

This article analyses relations between South Africa's national and provincial governments on foreign affairs over the past 20 years. It departs from the premise that the idea of relative autonomy ofsubnational governments, which is embedded in South Africa's 1996 constitution, has remained largely underdeveloped owing to factors such as inherent ambiguities in the constitutional design, a strong centralising ethos on the part of the ruling party and generally weak provincial capacities. Consequently, relations between the national and provincial governments on foreign affairs have been low-key, predominantly focused on technical matters and generally of a top-down nature. Provincial governments have been virtually absent from the foreign policy-making process despite constitutional provisions to that effect. What is more, the article notes that intergovernmental processes intended to coordinate provincial international relations and align them with national development priorities and South Africa's foreign policy have for the most part been ineffective and inefficient.

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On Judicial Review in a Separation of Powers System

Political Science Research and Methods ◽

10.1017/psrm.2014.44 ◽

2015 ◽

Vol 3 (3) ◽

pp. 473-492 ◽

Cited By ~ 10

Author(s):

Tiberiu Dragu ◽

Oliver Board

Keyword(s):

Judicial Review ◽

Policy Making ◽

Separation Of Powers ◽

Checks And Balances ◽

Governmental Policy ◽

Proper Role ◽

Policy Making Process ◽

Legal Accountability ◽

The Government

The institution of judicial review is an important mechanism of holding the government legally accountable, nevertheless questions remain about its proper role in a separation of powers system. This article analyzes the effect of judicial review on the policy-making process from an expertise perspective. It shows that the exercise of non-expert judicial review can induce more informed policies and that non-expert courts have incentives to exercise judicial review in a manner consistent with institutional concerns for expertise. In addition to its importance as a mechanism of legal accountability, our analysis underscores another virtue of judicial review: legal review of governmental policy by non-expert courts can improve the amount of information available for policy making. The article contributes to a literature on the scope and legitimacy of judicial review and has broader implications for understanding the effect of institutional checks and balances on the quality of policy making.

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A New Theory and Approach to Studying Unilateral Orders

The Dual Executive ◽

10.11126/stanford/9780804799973.003.0002 ◽

2017 ◽

Author(s):

Michelle Belco ◽

Brandon Rottinghaus

Keyword(s):

Policy Process ◽

Agenda Setting ◽

Policy Making ◽

Power Sharing ◽

Legislative Process ◽

Organizational Model ◽

Dual Roles ◽

Policy Making Process ◽

Three Stages

Chapter 2 presents an organizational model to chart the process of when in the policy process a unilateral order is issued. This model conceptualizes the use of unilateral orders based on the dual roles of the executive at one of three stages in the policy-making process: at the agenda-setting stage before bills have been introduced into the legislative process, during the president’s bargaining with Congress after bills have reached the agenda, and when the president is implementing law passed by Congress. This provides a basis for exploring the theoretical expectations derived from the institutional and power-sharing arrangements.

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Positive Reintegration as a Way of Small and Medium-Sized Business Development

Voprosy Ekonomiki ◽

10.32609/0042-8736-2012-6-83-88 ◽

2012 ◽

pp. 83-88

Author(s):

A. Zolotov ◽

M. Mukhanov

Keyword(s):

Policy Implementation ◽

Policy Making ◽

Economic Reforms ◽

Alternative Possibility ◽

New Approach ◽

Compensation Mechanisms ◽

Policy Making Process ◽

Monitoring And Enforcement ◽

The Subject ◽

Modernization Process

А new approach to policy-making in the field of economic reforms in modernizing countries (on the sample of SME promotion) is the subject of this article. Based on summarizing the ten-year experience of de-bureaucratization policy implementation to reduce the administrative pressure on SME, the conclusion of its insufficient efficiency and sustainability is made. The alternative possibility is the positive reintegration approach, which provides multiparty policy-making process, special compensation mechanisms for the losing sides, monitoring and enforcement operations. In conclusion matching between positive reintegration principles and socio-cultural factors inherent in modernization process is provided.

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