scholarly journals Is All Politics Local? Determinants of Local and National Election Campaigns

2018 ◽  
Vol 51 (14) ◽  
pp. 1899-1934
Author(s):  
Colm A. Fox
Keyword(s):  
National Level ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Election Campaigns ◽  
Electoral Rules ◽  
Campaign Strategies ◽  
Party Leaders ◽  
Policy Objectives ◽  
National Orientation ◽  
Mixed Electoral System ◽  
Textual Content

In recent decades election campaigns have shifted their focus from the local to the national level, increasingly featuring party leaders, labels, and national platforms. Despite this trend, there remains significant variation in the local/national orientation of campaigns across countries and parties. This article tests several propositions on why campaigns adopt a local or national orientation by analyzing a unique collection of more than 12,000 geocoded Thai election posters. Specialized software was used to measure the spatial proportions of visual and textual content on each poster. Using Thailand’s mixed electoral system to enable a controlled comparison of electoral rules, I demonstrate that proportional rules were associated with national campaign strategies whereas majoritarian rules fostered local strategies. In addition, large parties ran party-centered, policy-focused campaigns whereas small parties relied more on their leader’s image. This contrasts with Western countries, where large parties increasingly promote their leader’s image and small parties emphasize narrower policy objectives.

Electoral Incentives in Mixed-Member Systems: Party, Posts, and Zombie Politicians in Japan

2006 ◽  
Vol 100 (2) ◽  
pp. 183-193 ◽  
Author(s):  
ROBERT PEKKANEN ◽  
BENJAMIN NYBLADE ◽  
ELLIS S. KRAUSS
Keyword(s):  
Electoral System ◽  
Proportional Representation ◽  
Parallel System ◽  
Electoral Rules ◽  
Legislative Organization ◽  
Party Leaders ◽  
Electoral Incentives ◽  
Members Of Parliament ◽  
Different Types ◽  
The Individual

How do electoral incentives affect legislative organization? Through an analysis of Japan's mixed-member electoral system, we demonstrate that legislative organization is strongly influenced not only by the individual legislators reelection incentives but also by their interest in their party gaining power and maintaining a strong party label. Electorally vulnerable legislators are given choice legislative positions to enhance their prospects at the polls, whereas (potential) party leaders disproportionately receive posts with greater influence on the party's overall reputation. Members of Parliament elected from proportional representation (PR) lists and in single member districts also receive different types of posts, reflecting their distinct electoral incentives. Even small variations in electoral rules can have important consequences for legislative organization. In contrast to Germany's compensatory mixed-member system, Japan's parallel system (combined with a “best loser” or “zombie” provision) generates incentives for the party to allocate posts relating to the distribution of particularistic goods to those elected in PR.

scholarly journals An Analysis of Some of the Factors that Affect the Role of Party Leaders in Election Campaigns in Albania

2021 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 96
Author(s):  
Lorenc Ligori
Keyword(s):  
Political Communication ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Election Campaigns ◽  
Collective Identities ◽  
Party Leaders ◽  
Electoral Campaign ◽  
General Elections ◽  
The Media ◽  
Local Party

In recent election campaigns in Albania, whether general or local, party leaders have become increasingly important. There is a dominance of party leaders in political communication in an electoral campaign. Increasingly the media focus is on leading individuals, neglecting parties and collective identities. Political leaders now serve as a shortcut to informing the electorate. But why does this happen? Is this a feature of the Albanian electoral reality or a trend and influence from developed democracies? What are some of the specific circumstances in the country that enabled this change? Is it a demand from the electorate or an imposition on it? What role does media play in this regard? These and other matters related to it such as: how the party leaders are elected, internal party democracy issues, the methods and tactics of campaign organization, the role of electoral rules and the type of electoral system, etc. shall be briefly addressed in this paper, which is based on observations and analysis of three election campaigns, two general elections (2017 - 2021) and one local (2015).

Selection

2018 ◽  
pp. 115-178
Author(s):  
Daniel M. Smith
Keyword(s):  
Democratic Party ◽  
National Level ◽  
Liberal Democratic Party ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Supply Side ◽  
Demand Side ◽  
Diverse Range ◽  
Party Leaders ◽  
Liberal Democratic ◽  
Dynastic Politics

This chapter examines dynastic candidate selection in Japan under the single nontransferable vote (SNTV) electoral system and the changes that have occurred since the adoption of a mixed-member majoritarian (MMM) system, which combines first-past-the-post and closed-list proportional representation. Dynasties under SNTV were more common in larger, decentralized parties—especially the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). The MMM system shifted the focus of elections from candidates to parties. Subsequent party reforms within the LDP have expanded the pool of candidates and placed greater control over nominations with national-level party leaders, who have selected a more diverse range of candidates. Legacy candidates are still nominated, but recently, only the most powerful and longest-serving incumbents are likely to be succeeded in politics by a family member. This suggests that demand-side incentives have changed, leaving mainly supply-side incentives to explain the continued persistence of dynastic politics.

scholarly journals Political Constraints and the Limited Effect of Electoral System Change on Personal Vote-Seeking in Hungary

2017 ◽  
Vol 32 (1) ◽  
pp. 119-141 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zsófia Papp ◽  
Burtejin Zorigt
Keyword(s):  
Electoral System ◽  
Institutional Setting ◽  
The Political ◽  
Electoral Rules ◽  
Structured Interviews ◽  
Limited Effect ◽  
Campaign Strategies ◽  
Political Constraints ◽  
Staff Members

This article aims at capturing how the recent changes in Hungary’s mixed-member electoral system altered the candidates’ personal vote-seeking strategies. Based on the literature, one might expect that strengthening the role of the Single-Member District (SMD) tier increases the incentives for personalisation. By utilizing the data from two consecutive waves of the Comparative Candidate Survey, we show that contrary to these expectations the average level of campaign personalisation decreased from 2010 to 2014. Semi-structured interviews with nine campaign staff members confirm that the political constraints were more important in determining campaign strategies than the institutional setting. Our findings challenge the dominating effect of electoral rules on personal vote-seeking.

Comparing the PRI Experience to Kenya and Taiwan

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joy K. Langston
Keyword(s):  
Electoral Competition ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Authoritarian Regimes ◽  
Executive Power ◽  
Party Organization ◽  
Electoral Rules ◽  
National Union ◽  
Party Leaders ◽  
The Impact

The final chapter applies the argument based on the Mexican experience to other authoritarian regimes with strong parties that transitioned to democracy: Kenya and Taiwan. Kenya African National Union (KANU) practically disappeared because electoral rules allowed politicians to win elections without strong labels. In Taiwan, the Kuomintang survived and returned to power after two terms out of executive power, in large part because its divisions did not lead to fragmentation and because voters continued to support the label. Thus, the work’s argument: that party leaders must learn to garner electoral victories under democratic circumstances while avoiding the pressures to fragment, holds. Federalism, the mixed-member electoral system, and generous party financing all play a role in determining how electoral competition creates winners and losers within the party organization. These institutions also reduce the impact of the electoral opening on the party’s tendency to fragment.

Electoral Systems in Context

2017 ◽  
pp. 942-964
Author(s):  
Karen E. Ferree
Keyword(s):  
Party System ◽  
Contextual Factors ◽  
National Level ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Party Systems ◽  
African National Congress ◽  
Electoral Institutions ◽  
Electoral Rules ◽  
National Assembly ◽  
Institutional Expectations

South Africa’s post-apartheid election outcomes demonstrate how contextual factors interact with electoral rules to shape party systems. South Africa’s national electoral system represents one of the most permissive in the world, combining parliamentary rules with an extreme form of proportional representation. These rules were selected to encourage broad representation of parties in the National Assembly. However, South Africa’s party system consistently defies expectations, with a low effective number of seat-winning parties at the national level and dominance by a single party, the African National Congress (ANC). Provincial and municipal outcomes also confound simple institutional expectations. In addition to describing electoral rules and party systems at all three levels of South Africa’s political system, this chapter argues that contextual factors like the salience of racial divisions and the ability of the ruling party to shape institutions and resource flows critically interact with electoral institutions to shape party system outcomes.

Democratization and the Dynamics of Candidate Selection Rule Change in Mexico, 1991––2003

2006 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 33-56 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steven T. Wuhs
Keyword(s):  
Selection Rule ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Candidate Selection ◽  
Selection Rules ◽  
Party Leaders ◽  
Party Organizations ◽  
Rule Change ◽  
Party Activists ◽  
Mixed Electoral System

Party leaders in Mexico face the challenge of maintaining party unity while remaining competitive in a democratizing context. Candidate selection rules are central to achieving both objectives. I argue that leaders must decide between ““open”” rules that nominate electable candidates and ““closed”” rules that build strong party organizations, and suggest that strategic interests are the most powerful determinant of rule choice. Despite an evident trend toward greater openness, however, party leaders have taken advantage of Mexico's mixed electoral system to preserve their own influence and placate party activists, while reaping the benefits of open rules. Los lííderes de los partidos polííticos en Mééxico se enfrentan al reto de mantener la cohesióón de sus partidos mientras buscan seguir ganando las elecciones. Los procesos de seleccióón de los candidatos son cruciales para lograr los dos objetivos. Planteo que los lííderes deben elegir entre procesos ““abiertos”” que producen candidatos atractivos y procesos ““cerrados”” que fortalecen los partidos mismos, y que las metas estratéégicas de los partidos tienen la mayor influencia en la seleccióón de las reglas. A pesar de una tendencia hacia mayor apertura, los lííderes, por medio del sistema electoral ““mixto”” de Mééxico, han conservado su propia influencia, conciliando con los activistas, mientras se aprovechan de los beneficios electorales de los procesos abiertos.

The Never-ending Story of Law and Electoral System in Lesotho

2018 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Hoolo Nyane
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Prime Minister ◽  
Legal Discourse ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Constitutional Democracy ◽  
Electoral Outcomes ◽  
Electoral Laws ◽  
Run Up ◽  
Mixed Electoral System ◽  
2012 Election

While electoral discontent has been the enduring feature of constitutional democracy in Lesotho since independence, disagreement over electoral system is a fairly recent phenomenon. When the country attained independence in 1966 from Britain, electoral system was not necessarily one of the topical issues of pre-independence constitutional negotiations. The major issues were the powers of the monarch, the office of prime minister, the command of the army and many more.  It was taken for granted that the country would use the British-based plurality electoral system.  This is the system which the country used until early 2000s when the electoral laws were reformed to anchor a new mixed electoral system.  When the new electoral laws were ultimately passed in 2001, the country transitioned from a plurality electoral system to a two-ballot mixed member proportional system. By this time, electoral system had acquired prominence in politico-legal discourse in Lesotho.  In the run-up to 2007 elections, bigger political parties orchestrated the manipulation of electoral laws which culminated in clearly distorted electoral outcomes. The manipulations motivated further reforms in the run-up to 2012 election which resulted in the single-ballot mixed member proportional system. The purpose of this paper is to critically evaluate how electoral laws have anchored electoral system reforms throughout the various historical epochs in Lesotho since independence. The paper contends that while the country has been courageous, unlike most of its peers, to introduce far-reaching electoral system changes, the reform of electoral laws has not been so helpful in attaining the higher objectives of political inclusivity, constitutionalism and stability in Lesotho.

Constituency Effects and Legislative Dissent Under Closed-List Proportional Representation

2021 ◽  
Vol 63 (2) ◽  
pp. 78-99
Author(s):  
Eduardo Alemán ◽  
Juan Pablo Micozzi ◽  
Pablo M. Pinto ◽  
Sebastián Saiegh
Keyword(s):  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Proportional Representation ◽  
Roll Call ◽  
Electoral Rules ◽  
Party Leaders ◽  
Electoral Incentives ◽  
Party Line ◽  
Ideological Space ◽  
Using Data ◽  
Unique Dataset

ABSTRACTAccording to conventional wisdom, closed-list proportional representation (CLPR) electoral systems create incentives for legislators to favor the party line over their voters’ positions. However, electoral incentives may induce party leaders to tolerate “shirking” by some legislators, even under CLPR. This study argues that in considering whose deviations from the party line should be tolerated, party leaders exploit differences in voters’ relative electoral influence resulting from malapportionment. We expect defections in roll call votes to be more likely among legislators elected from overrepresented districts than among those from other districts. We empirically test this claim using data on Argentine legislators’ voting records and a unique dataset of estimates of voters’ and legislators’ placements in a common ideological space. Our findings suggest that even under electoral rules known for promoting unified parties, we should expect strategic defections to please voters, which can be advantageous for the party’s electoral fortunes.

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