scholarly journals The Federal Constitutional Court in the German Political System

1994 ◽  
Vol 26 (4) ◽  
pp. 470-491 ◽  
Author(s):  
DONALD P. KOMMERS
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Political System ◽  
Critical Role ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Parliamentary Democracy ◽  
Basic Law ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
The Guardian ◽  
German Court

The Federal Constitutional Court is an important policy-making institution in the German political system. As the guardian of the Basic Law, the Constitutional Court has played a critical role in umpiring the federal system, resolving conflicts among branches of the national government, overseeing the process of parliamentary democracy, monitoring the financing of political parties, and reviewing restrictions on basic rights and liberties. In each of these areas, the Court's decisions have shaped the contours of German life and politics. Its influence is fully the equal of that of the Supreme Court in American politics. Despite its “activist” record of nullifying laws favored by legislative majorities, the German Court has managed to retain its institutional independence as well as the trust of the general public.

The Basic Law at 60 – From 1949 to 2009: The Basic Law and Supranational Integration

2010 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 99-114 ◽  
Author(s):  
Juliane Kokott
Keyword(s):  
European Integration ◽  
Federal State ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Founding Fathers ◽  
The Core ◽  
Basic Law ◽  
The World ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
Supranational Integration ◽  
The Guardian

Sixty years after the entry into force of the Basic Law the world is much more interdependent. The concepts of statehood and sovereignty have changed. The following contribution examines how the Basic Law, as amended and interpreted by the Federal Constitutional Court, deals with this development. As a foundational matter, the Basic Law contains a commitment towards integration, although sixty years ago integration largely was seen as a promise. Now, 60 years later, the Federal Constitutional Court is developing limits to integration and recently ruled out Germany's participation in a European Federal State and sees itself as the guardian of German sovereignty. A change of paradigms seems to have taken place. For the founding fathers and mothers, a united—possibly even federal—Europe was considered to be the solution to protect against war and relapse towards an undemocratic, terroristic regime. But now the Federal Constitutional Court feels compelled to protect democracy and the core values of the Basic Law against “too much” European integration.

scholarly journals FORMS OF EXTREMISM IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

2020 ◽  
pp. 25-31
Author(s):  
Nadezhda G. Geymbukh ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Federal Republic ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Federal Republic Of Germany ◽  
Left Wing ◽  
Basic Law ◽  
The People ◽  
Democratic State ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
The Stability

Representatives of German state (constitutional) law define political extremism as "a set of political beliefs and aspirations... which are aimed at denying the democratic constitutional state and its fundamental values". Based on the definition, the criterion for recognising any "political belief or aspiration" as extremist is the notion of a democratic constitutional state. In line with this, the Federal Constitutional Court of the Federal Republic of Germany has given an expansive interpretation of a "free democratic state" that "constitutes a legal state order whose basis is the self-determination of the people according to the will of the majority, freedom and equality. It excludes all forms of despotism or arbitrariness. Among the basic principles of this order are at least: the protection of human rights as laid down in the Basic Law of Germany, the sovereignty of the people, the separation of powers, the responsibility of the government, the legitimacy of government, the independence of the judiciary and the principle of multi-partyism. According to article 21, paragraph 2 of the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany (1949), political parties that "endeavour to harm or destroy the foundation of the free demo-cratic order or to endanger the existence of the Federal Republic of Germany" are declared unconstitutional by the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany. The possibility to ban political parties as provided for in the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany guarantees the development of a democratic political system of the state. It is worth emphasising that the stability and democratism of the German political system and the stability of the constitutional order in the state depend not only on the prohibition provision in the Basic Law of the FRG, but above all on the ability of political parties to reach agreement on the basic principles of a "free democratic state system" and to implement these principles in the minds of the people. To realise these goals, Germany has the Federal Office for the Protection of the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany of 1949, a public authority whose task is to control and supervise the legality of the activities of political parties. The forms of extremism in the Federal Republic of Germany are "left-wing extremism" and "right-wing extremism". In right-wing extremism, the older generation is gradually being freed from the aggressive youth, in an increased willingness to use force. Left-wing extremism has become less focused on global global themes - it has become more local and regional, more relatable and at the same time integrated. Because of the new nature of the development of extremism in a united Germany a left-right antagonism has emerged. At the same time, different tendencies of West and East Germany can be observed: in West Germany the struggle "left vs. right" prevails, in East Germany the struggle "right vs. left" prevails.

Campaign and Party Finance in the West German “Party State”

1988 ◽  
Vol 50 (1) ◽  
pp. 30-48 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arthur B. Gunlicks
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
The United States ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Public Financing ◽  
Business Interests ◽  
Basic Law ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Party State ◽  
Billboard Advertising

In contrast to the United States, where there is little or no public financing of parties and candidates below the presidential level, the German “party state” grants generous subsidies in a variety of forms to the political parties, though not to individual candidates. The German Basic Law (constitution), various laws passed by the national and Land (state) parliaments, and the Federal Constitutional Court have been important factors in the development of a complex and costly system of public financing for election campaigns, parliamentary parties and party foundations and for free television and radio time and billboard advertising space. In addition, the federal government incurs large tax expenditures through the encouragement of tax deductible contributions to political parties. In spite of the crucial role which public financing has assumed, recent scandals have occurred involving illegal contributions from business interests. A revised party law of 1984 and a Federal Constitutional Court decision in July 1986 have brought about significant changes, but controversy in Germany over public financing and the impact of recent reforms continues.

The Federal Constitutional Court in Germany and the “Southwest Case”

1952 ◽  
Vol 46 (3) ◽  
pp. 723-731 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gerhard Leibholz
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Federal Law ◽  
Basic Law ◽  
Federal Constitution ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
German Constitution ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
Constitutional Tribunal ◽  
The Republic

The new German Constitution, the Basic Law for the German Federal Republic of May 23, 1949, provides in Article 92 that the highest judicial power shall be vested in a Federal Constitutional Court. Although the Bonn Basic Law thus created a new institution, it is an institution with a precedent in the former Weımar Constitution of 1919. In accordance with the latter, the Constitutional Tribunal (Staatsgerichtshof) had jurisdiction over constitutional controversies within any Land which had no tribunal of its own for the adjustment of such controversies, as well as over controversies, other than civil law matters, among the various Laender or between the Reich and one of the Laender. And the Supreme Court (Reichsgericht), as the highest authority, could establish finally whether disputed Land statutes were compatible with the federal Constitution.The Basic Law, however, grants the new Federal Constitutional Court considerably wider jurisdiction than that accorded either to the Constitutional Tribunal or to the Supreme Court under the Weimar Constitution. The Federal Constitutional Court must, above all, arbitrate both disputes which may arise among the constitutional organs of the Republic, the so-called “federal constitutional” cases, and the so-called “conflicting rules” (Normenkollisionen) cases—the latter designating disputes involving the compatibility of the written federal law or Land law with the Basic Law, as well as the compatibility of the Land law with the federal law.

scholarly journals Continuidad con carencias : la Reforma Constitucional en Hungría en el proceso de construcción política de Europa = Continuity with deficiencies : The new Hungarian Basic Law

2014 ◽  
Vol 1 (33) ◽  
pp. 379
Author(s):  
András Jakab ◽  
Pál Sonnevend
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
Ad Hoc ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Basic Law ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Judicial Administration ◽  
Conservative Christian ◽  
Chief Prosecutor ◽  
The Guardian ◽  
Court Proceeding

En abril de 2011, el Parlamento de Hungría aprobó la nueva Constitución del Estado, denominada "Ley Fundamental de Hungría". Sus disposiciones transitorias fueron aprobadas en un diferente trámite parlamentario, el 30 de diciembre de 2011. Ambas normas entraron en vigor el 1 de enero de 2012. La tesis principal de este artículo es que la mayor parte del contenido de la actual Ley Fundamental trae su causa, en realidad, en la anterior Constitución liberal democrática, a pesar de que retóricamente quiera vincularse a un historicismo cristiano conservador. Existen, de cualquier forma, ciertas deficiencias sustantivas en la nueva Ley Fundamental: el recorte de las competencias del Tribunal Constitucional, la destitución del Comisionado para la Protección de los Datos Personales y del Presidente del Tribunal Supremo, la atribución al jefe de la administración judicial y al fiscal general de la facultad de seleccionar ad hoc el tribunal llamado a resolver un procedimiento judicial, la posibilidad de emitir una sentencia a cadena perpetua y el uso exagerado de las leyes cardinales (orgánicas). Esto incluso quiebra principios generales del constitucionalismo o las obligaciones impuestas por el derecho comunitario y por el derecho internacional. Alguna de dichas deficiencias pueden ser solventadas a través de una interpretación creativa si el Tribunal Constitucional de Hungría aceptara esta tarea como guardián de los valores constitucionales europeos.On 18 April 2011 The Hungarian Parliament approved the country’s new Constitution, named the ‘Basic Law of Hungary’. Its transitory provisions were approved in a different act of the Parliament, on 30 December 2011. Both acts entered into force on 1 January 2012. The article’s main thesis is that most of the Basic Law’s content stems from the previous democratic liberal Constitution, but that the rhetoric has changed into a conservative Christian historicising one. There are, however, also some substantive deficiencies in the new Basic Law, such as the curtailing of the competences of the Constitutional Court, the dismissal of the Data Protection Commissioner and of the President of the Supreme Court, the ability of the head of the judicial administration and of the Chief Prosecutor to choose a court for any court proceeding, the possibility of a lifelong prison sentence and the exaggerated use of cardinal (organic) laws. These either breach general principles of constitutionalism, or European Union and international law obligations. Some of these deficiencies can be resolved by means of creative interpretation, if the Hungarian Constitutional Court accepts his task as the guardian of European Constitutional values.

International Treaties and The German Constitution

2019 ◽  
pp. 171-190
Author(s):  
Stefan Kadelbach
Keyword(s):  
German Law ◽  
Foreign Affairs ◽  
European Convention ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
International Treaties ◽  
Basic Law ◽  
The Status ◽  
German Constitution ◽  
Federal Constitutional

This chapter deals with the making, status, and interpretation of international treaties under the German Constitution. It describes the interrelationship of the different institutions in treaty-making and shows how a comparatively old provision of the German Basic Law has been adapted slowly to new circumstances over the past decades. Thus, even though foreign affairs has remained a domain of the executive, several developments have contributed to an enhanced role of Parliament over time. These developments are partly due to the role of special sectors of law such as EU law and the law governing the use of force and partly due to changes in constitutional practice. As for the status of treaties in German law, the Federal Constitutional Court has developed a stance according to which treaties generally share the rank of the legal act that implements them into domestic law. A notable exception is the European Convention of Human Rights, which has assumed a quasi-constitutional rank by means of consistent interpretation. Some reference is made to other continental systems to assess how far different constitutions bring about certain features; various systems appear similar in many respects at first sight, whereas features in which they differ may be a source of inspiration for future constitutional practice.

Public Sector Purchase Programme (PSPP) Case

2021 ◽  
Vol 192 ◽  
pp. 451-511
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
European Central ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Basic Law ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
German Federal Constitutional Court ◽  
German Federal Constitutional

451Economics, trade and finance — European Monetary Union — Fiscal sovereignty — Public debt — Monetary policy — Economic policy — European Union — Asset purchase programme — Quantitative easing — Central banks — European Central Bank — European System of Central Banks — BundesbankTreaties — Treaty-making powers — Constitutional limitations on treaty-making powers — Transfers of powers by States to intergovernmental and other transnational authorities — Whether compatible with constitutional prerogatives of national parliament — Overall budgetary responsibility — Basic Law of GermanyInternational organizations — European Union — Powers — Member States as masters of the treaties — Principle of conferral — Whether Union having competence to determine or extend its own powers — Principle of subsidiarity — Court of Justice of the European UnionRelationship of international law and municipal law — European Union law — Interpretation — Application — Judgment of Court of Justice of the European Union — Weiss — Principle of proportionality — Whether application of EU law having absolute primacy — Whether German Federal Constitutional Court having absolute duty to follow judgment of Court of Justice of the European Union — Compatibility with Basic Law of Federal Republic of Germany — Openness of German Basic Law to European integration — Whether purchase programme ultra vires — Whether ultra vires acts applicable in Germany — Whether having binding effect in relation to German constitutional organsJurisdiction — European Union institutions — Whether jurisdiction of German Federal Constitutional Court extending to Court of Justice of the European Union and European Central Bank — Whether acts of EU institutions subject to national constitutional review — Ultra vires review — Review of core identity of national constitution — Whether application of EU law having absolute primacy — Whether absolute duty to follow judgment of Court of Justice of the European Union — The law of Germany

Celebrating the Milk Maid: What Federal Constitutional Court President Limbach Doesn't Tell Us About the Court Says It All

2001 ◽  
Vol 2 (9) ◽  
Author(s):  
Viktor Winkler
Keyword(s):  
German Law ◽  
The Other ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Limited Size ◽  
Small Stature ◽  
Basic Law ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
Law Student

It's a small book. Actually, it is a very small book. Only one hundred and twenty-eight pages, it's a format so thin it could fit into a pocket. As a matter of fact, it is smaller than a copy of the Grundgesetz (German Basic Law) that a German law student would carry along to class. The book's title, however, is considerably more intrepid than the book's small stature. At the same time breathtakingly pithy and slightly immodest, the book is simply called Das Bundesverfassungsgericht (The Federal Constitutional Court). And at the top of the cover, just to make sure, the word “WISSEN” (KNOWLEDGE) appears in big letters. While one wonders how a publication of such limited size could deign to comprehensively present the important “knowledge” of the Federal Constitutional Court, the other words on the cover provide some assurance. Those words are the name of the book's author who obviously could not be more adequate for the task. The author, Jutta Limbach, is the current President of the Federal Constitutional Court presiding in her seventh year.

scholarly journals The Mediation Committee of the Bundestag and Bundesrat: A Special Institution of German Constitutional Law

2016 ◽  
Vol 44 (1) ◽  
pp. 35-42
Author(s):  
Claus Koggel
Keyword(s):  
Constitutional Law ◽  
Political Power ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Legislative Process ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Current Case ◽  
Basic Law ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
Legislative Procedure ◽  
German Constitutional Law

AbstractThe Mediation Committee of the Bundestag and Bundesrat – is it “one of the most felicitous innovations in our constitutional activities”, “the most positive institution in the entire Basic Law” or, as some critics assert “a substitute and superordinate parliament” or indeed the “mysterious darkroom of the legislative process”? This article seeks to provide answers to these questions. It is however clear that the Mediation Committee has become an important instrument for attaining political compromises in Germany's legislative procedure. The Committee's purpose is to find a balance between the differing opinions of the Bundestag and Bundesrat concerning the content of legislation, and, through political mediation and mutual concessions, to find solutions that are acceptable to both sides. Thanks to this approach, the Mediation Committee has helped save countless important pieces of legislation from failure since it was established over 65 years ago, thus making a vital contribution to ensure the legislative process works efficiently. The lecture will address the Mediation Committee's status and role within the German legislative process. It will explain the composition of this body as well as its most important procedural principles also against the backdrop of current case law from the Federal Constitutional Court. Finally, the lecture will consider how particular constellations of political power impact on the Mediation Committee's work.

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