Public diplomacy at the global level: The Alliance of Civilizations as a community of practice

2015 ◽  
Vol 50 (3) ◽  
pp. 402-417 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patricia M Goff
Keyword(s):  
Community Of Practice ◽  
Global Governance ◽  
International Organizations ◽  
Public Diplomacy ◽  
National Level ◽  
Public Private Partnerships ◽  
Intercultural Dialogue ◽  
Global Level ◽  
Oriented Activity ◽  
Important Form

Innovative mechanisms of global governance are increasingly common, yet they defy easy categorization. The Alliance of Civilizations, a UN initiative that seeks to promote intercultural dialogue, is one such example. It is a hybrid entity that exhibits elements of networks, international organizations, and public–private partnerships, among other things. Only when we shift our gaze to its patterned activities do we discover that it might best be understood as a community of practice specializing in global-level public diplomacy. Practice-based analysis, therefore, allows a deeper understanding of the Alliance and, in turn, prompts a fresh consideration of an increasingly important form of diplomacy. I argue, in particular, that public diplomacy is not solely a national-level, state-oriented activity. In turn, this inquiry invites practice theorists to reflect on the degree of fit required to associate a unique social form with an identifiable set of patterned activities.

Mechanisms of Global Governance: Economic Analysis

2013 ◽  
pp. 4-28 ◽  
Author(s):  
L. Grigoryev ◽  
A. Kurdin
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
Economic Analysis ◽  
Global Governance ◽  
International Organizations ◽  
Economic Activity ◽  
Global Level ◽  
Narrow Sense ◽  
Key Characteristics ◽  
Global Problems

The coordination of economic activity at the global level is carried out through different mechanisms, which regulate activities of companies, states, international organizations. In spite of wide diversity of entrenched mechanisms of governance in different areas, they can be classified on the basis of key characteristics, including distribution of property rights, mechanisms of governance (in the narrow sense according to O. Williamson), mechanisms of expansion. This approach can contribute not only to classifying existing institutions but also to designing new ones. The modern aggravation of global problems may require rethinking mechanisms of global governance. The authors offer the universal framework for considering this problem and its possible solutions.

scholarly journals Tax Competition as a Challenge to the Governance of Global Economy

2013 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 9-38
Author(s):  
Seppo Penttilä ◽  
Jukka Kultalahti
Keyword(s):  
Global Governance ◽  
Tax Competition ◽  
Global Economy ◽  
National Level ◽  
Soft Law ◽  
Global Level ◽  
Hard Law ◽  
Tax Harmonisation ◽  
Supranational Level

The paper analyses the role of tax competition in global economy. How can tax systems respond to the challenge – by international cooperation or by national rules, by tax harmonisation or by tax competition? In this paper we approach the question as a matter of global governance. Tax competition is seen both as a means and as an object of global governance. Our conclusion is that there is no universal answer to the question: competition or harmonisation? Attempts to govern the processes of global economy on a national level may easily lead to tax competition. On the other hand, at least at the supranational level, i.e. at regional or global level, the goals and mechanisms of governance seem to emphasise harmonisation. Nowadays especially the OECD has become an important actor or forum for cooperation in taxation. It has succeeded in many ways in preventing and reducing harmful tax competition. The soft law mechanisms developed by the OECD have often been converted into the hard law mechanisms on national level. The governance activities have been based on both soft law and hard law mechanisms.

Accountability in Global Governance

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gisela Hirschmann
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Global Governance ◽  
International Organizations ◽  
Third Parties ◽  
Human Rights Violations ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Economic Rights ◽  
The Right ◽  
Austerity Policy ◽  
Comprehensive Study

How can international organizations (IOs) like the United Nations (UN) and their implementing partners be held accountable if their actions and policies violate fundamental human rights? Political scientists and legal scholars have shed a much-needed light on the limits of traditional accountability when it comes to complex global governance. However, conventional studies on IO accountability fail to systematically analyze a related, puzzling empirical trend: human rights violations that occur in the context of global governance do not go unnoticed altogether; they are investigated and sanctioned by independent third parties. This book puts forward the concept of pluralist accountability, whereby third parties hold IOs and their implementing partners accountable for human rights violations. We can expect pluralist accountability to evolve if a competitive environment stimulates third parties to enact accountability and if the implementing actors are vulnerable to human rights demands. Based on a comprehensive study of UN-mandated operations in Afghanistan, Bosnia, and Kosovo, the European Union Troika’s austerity policy, and global public–private health partnerships in India, this book demonstrates how competition and human rights vulnerability shape the evolution of pluralist accountability in response to diverse human rights violations, such as human trafficking, the violation of the rights of detainees, economic rights, and the right to consent in clinical trials. While highlighting the importance of studying alternative accountability mechanisms, this book also argues that pluralist accountability should not be regarded as a panacea for IOs’ legitimacy problems, as it is often less legalized and might cause multiple accountability disorder.

Angling for Influence: Institutional Proliferation in Development Banking

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tyler Pratt
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
World Bank ◽  
Global Governance ◽  
International Organizations ◽  
Market Failures ◽  
Multilateral Development Banks ◽  
Institutional Control ◽  
Bretton Woods ◽  
Global Power ◽  
Identification Strategy

Abstract Why do states build new international organizations (IOs) in issue areas where many institutions already exist? Prevailing theories of institutional creation emphasize their ability to resolve market failures, but adding new IOs can increase uncertainty and rule inconsistency. I argue that institutional proliferation occurs when existing IOs fail to adapt to shifts in state power. Member states expect decision-making rules to reflect their underlying power; when it does not, they demand greater influence in the organization. Subsequent bargaining over the redistribution of IO influence often fails due to credibility and information problems. As a result, under-represented states construct new organizations that provide them with greater institutional control. To test this argument, I examine the proliferation of multilateral development banks since 1944. I leverage a novel identification strategy rooted in the allocation of World Bank votes at Bretton Woods to show that the probability of institutional proliferation is higher when power is misaligned in existing institutions. My results suggest that conflict over shifts in global power contribute to the fragmentation of global governance.

scholarly journals Fixing Technology with Society: The Coproduction of Democratic Deficits and Responsible Innovation at the OECD and the European Commission

2021 ◽  
pp. 016224392199910
Author(s):  
Nina Frahm ◽  
Tess Doezema ◽  
Sebastian Pfotenhauer
Keyword(s):  
European Commission ◽  
Global Governance ◽  
International Organizations ◽  
New Technologies ◽  
Responsible Innovation ◽  
Democratic Deficit ◽  
Major Barrier ◽  
Societal Participation ◽  
New Vision ◽  
Governance Institutions

Long presented as a universal policy-recipe for social prosperity and economic growth, the promise of innovation seems to be increasingly in question, giving way to a new vision of progress in which society is advanced as a central enabler of technoeconomic development. Frameworks such as “Responsible” or “Mission-oriented” Innovation, for example, have become commonplace parlance and practice in the governance of the innovation–society nexus. In this paper, we study the dynamics by which this “social fix” to technoscience has gained legitimacy in institutions of global governance by investigating recent projects at two international organizations, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and the European Commission, to mainstream “Responsible Innovation” frameworks and instruments across countries. Our analysis shows how the turn to societal participation in both organizations relies on a new deficit logic—a democratic deficit of innovation—that frames a lack of societal engagement in innovation governance as a major barrier to the uptake and dissemination of new technologies. These deficit politics enable global governance institutions to present “Responsible Innovation” frameworks as the solution and to claim authority over the coproduction of particular forms of democracy and innovation as intertwined pillars of a market-liberal international order.

Competition, cooperation, and adaptation: The organizational ecology of international organizations in global energy governance

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-21
Author(s):  
Christian Downie
Keyword(s):  
Global Governance ◽  
International Organizations ◽  
Empirical Data ◽  
Shared Governance ◽  
International Energy Agency ◽  
Organizational Ecology ◽  
Energy Agency ◽  
Global Energy ◽  
Material Resources ◽  
Energy Governance

Abstract In policy domains characterised by complexity, international organizations (IOs) with overlapping mandates and governance functions regularly interact in ways that have important implications for global governance. Yet the dynamics of IO interactions remain understudied. This article breaks new ground by building on the theoretical insights of organizational ecology to examine IO competition, cooperation, and adaptation in the domain of energy. Drawing on original empirical data, I consider three related hypotheses: (1) competition between IOs in the same population is likely to centre on material resources; (2) IOs are more likely to cooperate when they have a shared governance goal; and (3) individual IOs can adapt by changing their goals and boundaries. In considering these hypotheses, this article highlights the limits of the organizational ecology approach and the need to broaden it to account for the possibility that IOs do cooperate, and that individual IOs, such as the International Energy Agency, have the capacity to adapt to changes in their environment.

Change in or of global governance?

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-13 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Barnett
Keyword(s):  
Global Governance ◽  
International Organizations ◽  
International Order ◽  
Multiple Modes ◽  
Compelling Argument ◽  
Relative Neglect ◽  
Modes Of Governance ◽  
Core Features

Abstract Michael Zürn's Theory of Global Governance is an original, bold, and compelling argument regarding the causes of change in global governance. A core argument is that legitimation problems trigger changes in global governance. This contribution addresses two core features of the argument. Although I am persuaded that legitimacy matters, there are times when: legitimacy appears to be given too much credit to the relative neglect of other factors; other times when the lack of legitimacy has little discernible impact on the working of global governance; and unanswered questions about how the legitimacy of global governance relates to the legitimacy of the international order of which it is a part. The second feature is what counts as change in global governance. Zürn reduces change to either deepening or decline, overlooking the possible how of global governance. In contrast to Zürn's map of global governance that is dominated by hierarchies in the form of international organizations, an alternative map locates multiple modes of governance: hierarchies, markets, and networks. The kinds of legitimation problems that Zürn identifies, I argue, can help explain some of the movement from hierarchical to other modes of global governance.

Contribution to the taxonomy and distribution of Aciculidae (Mollusca: Gastropoda: Caenogastropoda) in Albania and the surroundings

Zootaxa ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 5004 (1) ◽  
pp. 131-150
Author(s):  
ROMILDA LIKA ◽  
TAMÁS DELI ◽  
ANILA PAPARISTO ◽  
ZOLTÁN P. ERŐSS ◽  
ZOLTÁN FEHÉR
Keyword(s):  
National Level ◽  
Distribution Data ◽  
Global Level ◽  
Neighbouring Region ◽  
New Distribution ◽  
Iucn Criteria

Reviewing historical and recently collected material of family Aciculidae from Albania and the neighbouring region, we synonymized two species and one subspecies, namely Platyla corpulenta Subai, 2009 under Platyla procax Boeters, E. Gittenberger & Subai, 1989; Platyla ceraunorum A. Reischütz, N. Steiner-Reischütz & P. L. Reischütz, 2016 under Platyla similis (Reinhardt, 1880) and Renea kobelti albanica Boeters, E. Gittenberger & Subai, 1989 under Renea kobelti (A. J. Wagner,1910). Four aciculid species are first mentioned for Albania: Platyla similis and Platyla procax that replace their junior synonyms; and Platyla feheri Subai, 2009 and Platyla gracilis (Clessin, 1877) that are new to the country. Furthermore, new distribution data are provided for Platyla albanica Subai, 2012, Platyla banatica (Rossmässler, 1842), Platyla wilhelmi (A. J. Wagner, 1910) and Renea kobelti (A. J. Wagner, 1910). In the light of new distribution data, their conservation statuses according to IUCN criteria are assessed at the national level and, when necessary, are re-assessed at global level.

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