The Great Irresponsibles? The United States, the Soviet Union, and World Order

Author(s):  
Hedley Bull
Author(s):  
William O. Walker

This chapter explores Richard Nixon’s and Henry Kissinger’s disdain for hegemony and search for primacy as they sought to refurbish America’s tarnished reputation. Through their pursuit of détente with the Soviet Union and China, their resort to the Nixon Doctrine (to exit as gracefully as possible from Indochina), and the meeting at the Smithsonian Institution in December 1971 to restore America’s global economic stature, they attempted to achieve U.S. primacy in world affairs. Their efforts to implement the novel grand strategy of strategic globalism fell short, as seen in the difficulty of extricating the United States from Vietnam, Nixon’s Watergate imbroglio, and the presence of competing visions of world order among allies, most notably in West Germany’s pursuit of Ostpolitik.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-9
Author(s):  
Jan Železný

The United States' approach to China since the Communist regime in Beijing began the period of reform and opening in the 1980s was based on a promise that trade and engagement with China would result in a peaceful, democratic state. Forty years later the hope of producing a benign People's Republic of China utterly failed. The Communist Party of China deceived the West into believing that the its system and the Party-ruled People's Liberation Army were peaceful and posed no threat. In fact, these misguided policies produced the emergence of a 21st Century Evil Empire even more dangerous than a Cold War version in the Soviet Union. Successive American presidential administrations were fooled by ill-advised pro-China policymakers, intelligence analysts and business leaders who facilitated the rise not of a peaceful China but a threatening and expansionist nuclear-armed communist dictatorship not focused on a single overriding strategic objective: Weakening and destroying the United States of America. Defeating the United States is the first step for China's current rulers in achieving global supremacy under a new world order based an ideology of Communism with Chinese characteristics. The process included technology theft of American companies that took place on a massive scale through cyber theft and unfair trade practices. The losses directly supported in the largest and most significant buildup of the Chinese military that now directly threatens American and allied interests around the world. The military threat is only half the danger as China aggressively pursues regional and international control using a variety of non-military forces, including economic, cyber and space warfare and large-scale influence operations.


Author(s):  
Amaney A. Jamal

This chapter offers a detailed historical analysis of the emergence of regime clientelism in Jordan and Kuwait. It illustrates how the end of the Cold War restructured the ways in which international hierarchy shifted debates about democratization at the domestic level. During the Cold War, the bipolar nature of the world order meant that if the United States were to lose its ally in Jordan, the Soviet Union would be able to step up on the back of a new regime. If the United States then decided to cut off economic and security ties to Jordan, Jordanians might find comfort in the fact that the Soviet Union could play a role in continuing to secure Jordan's interests. Thus, those who resisted anti-American presence in the Arab world could launch their concerns more effectively because of an alternate patron—the Soviet Union—in the global order.


1987 ◽  
Vol 1 ◽  
pp. 37-51 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stanley Hoffmann

International systems have historically come in two forms: those based on the balance of power and those of a revolutionary nature, including systems organized around bipolar competition. Hoffmann finds the world order of 1987 to contain both these systems and judges it both ambiguous and original. While the tension of these extremes can make the world appear “anarchical,” there are certain agreed upon rules by which the superpowers interact. These rules ultimately preserve order by embracing competition between the United States and the Soviet Union; superpower confrontation is prevented by each nation holding to their own ideals and sovereignty while embracing nuclear deterrence. Having revealed the rules of the superpower game, Hoffmann then subjects them to ethical judgment. Despite the historic duration of peace between superpowers that seems to have been sustained by these rules, Hoffmann finds them both ethically flawed and ultimately unstable. Turning to a brief consideration of United States foreign policy, he points to particular moral difficulties in U.S. stances and urges the development of superpower rules that are effective and ethical.


1991 ◽  
Vol 6 (0) ◽  
pp. 1-13
Author(s):  
Chong-Ki Choi

Order is not always the same as justice. But after radical changes of the Soviet Union and east Europe, most analysts and specialists of international politics are trying to predict new world order after Cold War. Of course order gives us concrete situation for making foreign policies and economic cooperation and pursuing them. And order at least frees us from instability of international politics. But order, at the same time, limits each country's right to take alternatives for her interests. At any rate, we need to analyze the international situation and predict new world order after Cold War. What will be the shape of the new world order? Some analyst, such as Prof. Paul Kennedy in the Rise and Fall of Great Powers describe the change in the world as the decline of the superpowers, including both the Soviet Union and the United States. Other specialists such as Prof. Joseph Nye in Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power describes that while the United States will remain the largest state, the world will see a diffusion of power and a growth of multiple inter-dependencies.


2016 ◽  
Vol 02 (04) ◽  
pp. 449-464
Author(s):  
Wu Chunsi

China, Europe, and the United States constitute a very important trilateral relationship in China’s diplomacy. This trilateral relationship is incomparable to that of China, the United States, and the Soviet Union during the Cold War not only in that “polar” is no longer a valid concept to describe major-power relations today, but also in that China-U.S.-Europe relations are not deliberately constructed for the three parties to balance each other or oppose any party. To be more specific, China’s deliberations on Europe’s role in the world have gone beyond the logic of balance of power. Especially after the 2008 global financial crisis, China has taken ever more efforts to strengthen its ties with European nations, both to meet its growing economic demands, and because it seeks to learn from the post-modern social governance experience in Europe. In comparison, China’s relationship with the United States is far more complex as the two countries have been engaged in increasing divergence and competition not only on specific issues, but more importantly, in trends of the world order. As three giants that have the potential to lead the world to a better future, China, Europe, and the United States need to deepen their mutual understanding and foster greater consensus about the future world order through closer communication and exchange, as well as enhanced cooperation on global governance.


Author(s):  
R. Väyrynen

Three alternative world orders can be imagined in the post-World War II international relations. During most of the Cold War a bipolar order, centered on the possession of nuclear weapons, existed. This world order was incomplete, however. The United States and the Soviet Union faced each other with equal capacity to destroy each other, but in terms of economic and global influence the United States was superior. The strengthening of economic and technological dynamics increased further the U.S. influence, but also sparked the power of non-states actors, including transnational corporations and banks, independent of states. Simultaneously with the globalization of the world, one could witness the rise of non-state actors in the military and political fields. The emergence of the world order of the third type has sometimes been called the neomedieval world in which some central tenets of feudalism has re-emerged. None of these world order models can be said to dominate in today’s world and none of them is likely to emerge victorious any time soon. In recent times., globalization has suffered from various setbacks and state-centric relations have reemerged. Their focus is not, however, any more on the military competition between the United States and Russia, although some of its elements remain in the arms competition between them. Globalization has brought in new ingredients in the rivalries between states and it has appeared most visibly in the U.S.-Chinese rivalry for economic and technological dominance of the globalized world economy. In other words, a new type of economic bipolarity is winning ground and is only secondarily manifesting itself in military relations. Patterns of warfare has in recent decades been colored by fighting of non-state military forces and the rise of new feudal patterns of behavior, but they have not been pronounced enough to justify the labeling of the entire world order by the name.


2018 ◽  
pp. 97-130
Author(s):  
Denzenlkham Ulambayar

Since the 1990s, when previously classified and top secret Russian archival documents on the Korean War became open and accessible, it has become clear for post-communist countries that Kim Il Sung, Stalin and Mao Zedong were the primary organizers of the war. It is now equally certain that tensions arising from Soviet and American struggle generated the origins of the Korean War, namely the Soviet Union’s occupation of the northern half of the Korean peninsula and the United States’ occupation of the southern half to the 38th parallel after 1945 as well as the emerging bipolar world order of international relations and Cold War. Newly available Russian archival documents produced much in the way of new energies and opportunities for international study and research into the Korean War.2 However, within this research few documents connected to Mongolia have so far been found, and little specific research has yet been done regarding why and how Mongolia participated in the Korean War. At the same time, it is becoming today more evident that both Soviet guidance and U.S. information reports (evaluated and unevaluated) regarding Mongolia were far different from the situation and developments of that period. New examples of this tendency are documents declassified in the early 2000s and released publicly from the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in December 2016 which contain inaccurate information. The original, uncorrupted sources about why, how and to what degree the Mongolian People’s Republic (MPR) became a participant in the Korean War are in fact in documents held within the Mongolian Central Archives of Foreign Affairs. These archives contain multiple documents in relation to North Korea. Prior to the 1990s Mongolian scholars Dr. B. Lkhamsuren,3 Dr. B. Ligden,4 Dr. Sh. Sandag,5 junior scholar J. Sukhee,6 and A. A. Osipov7 mention briefly in their writings the history of relations between the MPR and the DPRK during the Korean War. Since the 1990s the Korean War has also briefly been touched upon in the writings of B. Lkhamsuren,8 D. Ulambayar (the author of this paper),9 Ts. Batbayar,10 J. Battur,11 K. Demberel,12 Balảzs Szalontai,13 Sergey Radchenko14 and Li Narangoa.15 There have also been significant collections of documents about the two countries and a collection of memoirs published in 200716 and 2008.17 The author intends within this paper to discuss particularly about why, how and to what degree Mongolia participated in the Korean War, the rumors and realities of the war and its consequences for the MPR’s membership in the United Nations. The MPR was the second socialist country following the Soviet Union (the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics) to recognize the DPRK (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea) and establish diplomatic ties. That was part of the initial stage of socialist system formation comprising the Soviet Union, nations in Eastern Europe, the MPR, the PRC (People’s Republic of China) and the DPRK. Accordingly between the MPR and the DPRK fraternal friendship and a framework of cooperation based on the principles of proletarian and socialist internationalism had been developed.18 In light of and as part of this framework, The Korean War has left its deep traces in the history of the MPR’s external diplomatic environment and state sovereignty


Author(s):  
Joshua Kotin

This book is a new account of utopian writing. It examines how eight writers—Henry David Thoreau, W. E. B. Du Bois, Osip and Nadezhda Mandel'shtam, Anna Akhmatova, Wallace Stevens, Ezra Pound, and J. H. Prynne—construct utopias of one within and against modernity's two large-scale attempts to harmonize individual and collective interests: liberalism and communism. The book begins in the United States between the buildup to the Civil War and the end of Jim Crow; continues in the Soviet Union between Stalinism and the late Soviet period; and concludes in England and the United States between World War I and the end of the Cold War. In this way it captures how writers from disparate geopolitical contexts resist state and normative power to construct perfect worlds—for themselves alone. The book contributes to debates about literature and politics, presenting innovative arguments about aesthetic difficulty, personal autonomy, and complicity and dissent. It models a new approach to transnational and comparative scholarship, combining original research in English and Russian to illuminate more than a century and a half of literary and political history.


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