scholarly journals Organized violence 1989–2020, with a special emphasis on Syria

2021 ◽  
pp. 002234332110261
Author(s):  
Therése Pettersson ◽  
Shawn Davies ◽  
Amber Deniz ◽  
Garoun Engström ◽  
Nanar Hawach ◽  
...  

This article reports on trends in organized violence, building on new data by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP). The falling trend in fatalities stemming from organized violence in the world, observed for five consecutive years, broke upwards in 2020 and deaths in organized violence seem to have settled on a high plateau. UCDP registered more than 80,100 deaths in organized violence in 2020, compared to 76,300 in 2019. The decrease in violence in Afghanistan and Syria was countered by escalating conflicts in, for example, Artsakh (Nagorno-Karabakh), Azerbaijan and Tigray, Ethiopia. Moreover, the call for a global ceasefire following the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic failed to produce any results. In fact, the number of active state-based and non-state conflicts, as well as the number of actors carrying out one-sided violence against civilians, increased when compared to 2019. UCDP noted a record-high number of 56 state-based conflicts in 2020, including eight wars. Most of the conflicts occurred in Africa, as the region registered 30 state-based conflicts, including nine new or restarted ones.

2019 ◽  
Vol 56 (4) ◽  
pp. 589-603 ◽  
Author(s):  
Therése Pettersson ◽  
Stina Högbladh ◽  
Magnus Öberg

This article reports on trends in organized violence and peace agreements collected by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP). The number of fatalities in organized violence decreased for the fourth consecutive year, to reach the lowest level since 2012. In 2018, UCDP recorded almost 76,000 deaths: a decrease of 20% compared to 2017, and 43% compared to the latest peak in 2014. State-based armed conflict drives this downward trend in organized violence, with Syria accounting for much of the change. The number of civilians killed in one-sided violence also dropped in 2018, reaching its lowest level since 2012. In contrast, non-state conflict remained on a high level. The general decline in fatalities from organized violence does not correspond with the trend in the number of active conflicts. In fact, the world has seen a new peak in the number of conflicts after 2014, matched only by the number of conflicts in the early 1990s. In 1991, the peak in the number of armed conflicts corresponded with a similar peak in the number of signed peace agreements. This was followed by a decrease in the number of conflicts in the late 1990s and early 2000s. However, the most recent rise in armed conflicts has not been matched by a similar rise in the number of peace agreements. Two circumstances that characterize the recent rise in conflicts have also been found to make conflicts harder to solve: explicit religious claims and high levels of internationalization.


2018 ◽  
Vol 55 (4) ◽  
pp. 535-547 ◽  
Author(s):  
Therése Pettersson ◽  
Kristine Eck

This article reports on trends in organized violence from data collected by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP). With almost 90,000 deaths recorded by UCDP last year, 2017 saw a decrease for the third consecutive year to a level 32% lower than the latest peak in 2014. This trend in declining levels of organized violence is driven by state-based armed conflict, and by the case of Syria in particular. Forty-nine state-based conflicts were active in 2017, down by four compared to 2016, and ten of these reached the level of war, with at least 1,000 battle-related deaths. The overall decrease in fatalities lends support to the claim that conflict deaths are in decline and that the world is increasingly peaceful. This trend holds even more strongly when controlling for increases in world population. In contrast, non-state conflict has increased: a new peak of 82 active non-state conflicts was recorded in 2017 and fatalities have increased concurrently. Much of this is due to escalating violence in DR Congo and the Central African Republic. However, fatalities from non-state conflict remain but 15% of the total number of fatalities from organized violence. As for actors engaged in one-sided violence, their number also increased during 2017, although the number of fatalities remained at the same level as in 2016.


Author(s):  
Brandon Valeriano

Russia is the second most active state going on the offense in cyberspace. From early disruptive actions against Estonia and Georgia to degrading attacks on critical infrastructure in Ukraine and, finally, complex espionage actions seeking to bring down the democratic processes, Russia has been one of the most aggressive and destructive actors in cyberspace. Yet, its efforts focus on breaking norms and disrupting the system rather than cyber violence. Evaluating the efficacy of Russia hacking activities, this chapter questions the conclusion that Moscow achieves its ends in cyberspace. More often than not, Russia fails, doubles down, and fails again. Rather, Moscow uses low-cost, deniable cyber actions to amplify broader propaganda efforts, sowing discontent within the governments and populations of the targeted state. This case demonstrates the mixed results of cyber strategies. Moscow has not achieved much, but its actions have put the world on notice that Russia is capable and dangerous.


Societies ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 97
Author(s):  
Dolores Herrero

Armed conflicts and violence have always been concomitant with human history but it is undeniable that our perception of them has undergone some disturbing evolution of late. Whereas in the past wars and organized violence were mainly regarded as being temporary, that is, originating in a number of reasons and tensions that might become eventually solved and confined to very specific zones on the world map, nowadays most people feel that nobody can escape the scourge of indiscriminate violence and this is mainly due to terrorism, in particular to that associated with Muslim fundamentalism. The aim of this paper will be to discuss the origins of this form of terrorism, together with its inextricable relationship with the so-called ‘civilized’ West, putting the emphasis on its more secular aspects and implications so as to show how Tabish Khair’s novel, Just Another Jihadi Jane denounces the effects that this conflict can have upon average people, all the more so if they happen to be Muslim women living in the western world.


2012 ◽  
Vol 40 (1) ◽  
pp. 199-214 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shelley Trower

The final chapters of Bram Stoker's novel The Jewel of Seven Stars (1903) are set in a house on the “very verge” of a cliff in Cornwall, the peninsula located at the far south west of England. The narrator, Malcolm Ross, travels overnight from London to Cornwall, then describes his first sight of the house, and a little later the position of the dining-room, its walls hanging over the sea: We were all impressed by the house as it appeared in the bright moonlight. A great grey stone mansion of the Jacobean period; vast and spacious, standing high over the sea on the very verge of a high cliff. When we had swept round the curve of the avenue cut through the rock, and come out on the high plateau on which the house stood, the crash and murmur of waves breaking against rock far below us came with an invigorating breath of moist sea air . . .We had supper in the great dining-room on the south side, the walls of which actually hung over the sea. The murmur came up muffled, but it never ceased. As the little promontory stood well out into the sea, the northern side of the house was open; and the due north was in no way shut out by the great mass of rock, which, reared high above us, shut out the rest of the world. Far off across the bay we could see the trembling lights of the castle, and here and there along the shore the faint light of a fisher's window. For the rest the sea was a dark blue plain with here and there a flicker of light as the gleam of starlight fell on the slope of a swelling wave. (195–96; ch. 17) In this liminal place, there is a confusion of categories: the sea not only crosses the boundary into land (the sound of its “murmur” and its moistness in the air) but seems itself to become land (a “dark blue plain”). The actual land is in contrast invisible from the house, being shut out by a mass of rock that rears high above. From the far distant shore, on the other side of the bay, the lights vibrate across both land and sea, further collapsing the sense of a distinction between them: from the “trembling lights” of the castle to the intermittent “flicker of light” on the waves.


2019 ◽  
Vol 38 (1) ◽  
pp. 109-126 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hanne Fjelde ◽  
Lisa Hultman ◽  
Livia Schubiger ◽  
Lars-Erik Cederman ◽  
Simon Hug ◽  
...  

This article introduces the Ethnic One-Sided Violence dataset (EOSV) that provides information on the ethnic identity of civilian victims of direct and deliberate killings by state and non-state actors from 1989 to 2013. The EOSV dataset disaggregates the civilian victims in the one-sided violence dataset from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program by identifying which ethnic group they belong to, using the list of politically relevant ethnic groups from the Ethnic Power Relations data. By providing information on the ethnic targets of violence, EOSV enables researchers to explore new questions about the logic and dynamics of violence against civilians.


2019 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 249-270 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeremy Sarkin

This article examines issues concerning the scope and role of victimology specifically as far as they relate to missing and disappeared persons. It argues that victimology ought to have a greater effect on the world by dealing with more victims, and that it should not be a solely academic discipline. It is contended that victimology should confront the real issues that arise for the victims after the crimes they suffer, and thus it needs to play a far more pragmatic, practical role. It is reasoned that broadening the study of who victims are, how they become victims and how their fate and suffering could have been avoided will also have a meaningful effect. This is also true regarding what can be done to reduce the numbers of (potential) victims. The article specifically calls on victimology to deal with victims who have gone missing. It argues that even amongst victimologists studying the widest variety of affected victims, there is almost no focus on the missing. The article goes into detail about who the missing are, and analyses the circumstances surrounding missing persons, whether as a result of war, human rights abuses such as enforced disappearances, or disasters, organized violence, migration and many more. The article also touches upon the processes of finding missing persons and considers their legal, technical and societal implications.


Religions ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (10) ◽  
pp. 567
Author(s):  
Krause ◽  
Svensson ◽  
Larsson

Despite a growth in fatalities resulting from organized violence with Shia–Sunni dimensions over the last two decades, in this study, we show, using existing data-bases on interreligious dialogue and peacemaking, that only less than two percent of the interreligious peacemaking organizations in the world are specialized in dialogue between Shias and Sunnis. Why is there so little institutionalized Shia–Sunni dialogue occurring when the need for such dialogue is evident? This study identifies and discusses this lack of institutional initiatives designed to prevent violence, manage conflicts and facilitate processes of intra-Muslim de-sectarianization. We discuss what we see as the three seemingly most obvious explanations—(1) the dismissal of the relevance of a Shia–Sunni cleavage, (2) the inappropriateness of the interreligious dialogue concept in the Muslim context, and (3) the substitution of institutional interreligious dialogue by other channels. Although we suggest that the third is the most potent explanation to pursue, we do not aim to provide a comprehensive explanation for the Shia–Sunni religious dialogue deficit. Instead, our aspiration is mainly to present and substantiate a puzzle that has not been identified or discussed in previous research. This can set an agenda for a reinvigorated research endeavor into the contemporary challenges for interreligious peacemaking.


2017 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 20-41 ◽  
Author(s):  
Francisco Gutiérrez-Sanín ◽  
Elisabeth Jean Wood

To leverage the full range of observed variation in patterns of violence toward the development and testing of theories of political violence, scholars need adequate conceptual foundations: what should we mean by apattern of violenceon the part of an armed organization? Scholars often distinguish degrees or levels or types of violence across organizations and conflicts, but definitions and measures vary sharply. We argue that patterns of violence are not reducible in ways often assumed in the literature: lethal violence is not a good proxy for the overall pattern, and differences in patterns are not well captured in the binary “terror” versus “restraint.” To address these concerns, we provide a new conceptualization of political violence, defining an organization’spattern of violenceas the configuration of repertoire, targeting, frequency, and technique in which it regularly engages. This approach adds precision to the documentation and analysis of political violence, clarifies the evaluation of rival theories, and opens up new research questions. We demonstrate its utility through an analysis of violence against civilians in Colombia, drawing on an original database of massacres, judicial proceedings, and other sources, and show that the concept of “pattern” helps bring ideology and politics back into the analysis of organized violence.


Author(s):  
Erin K. Jenne ◽  
Milos Popovic

In their seminal study “Resort to Arms,” Small and Singer (1982) defined a civil war as “any armed conflict that involves (a) military action internal to the metropole, (b) the active participation of the national government, and (c) effective resistance by both sides.” Internationalized civil wars constitute a newer classification, denoting a conflict involving organized violence on two or more sides within a sovereign state, in which foreign elements play a role in instigating, prolonging, or exacerbating the struggle. Small and Singer defined civil war as one in which a “system member” intervenes into a substate conflict involving organized violence. Although Singer and Small conceived “system members” narrowly as external sovereign states engaged in military intervention into the civil war in question, the definition has since been expanded by the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) and Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) to include other foreign actors—such as nonstate or private actors, diasporas, IOs, corporations, or cross-border kin groups—any of which can intervene to intensify a domestic civil conflict. From superpower interventions during the Cold War to more recent conflicts in Syria and Ukraine, internationalized civil wars have garnered increasing scholarly attention, primarily because they tend to be far bloodier and more protracted than noninternationalized civil wars. How to end such wars is a problem long bedeviling the international community. Civil wars are already more difficult to end than interstate wars partly because there are more players to satisfy in civil war settings, with multiple conflict parties coexisting on a single territory, and multiple factions within each conflict party—each constituting a “veto player” that might plausibly spoil a peace agreement should the agreement not satisfy their needs. This problem is exacerbated by an order of magnitude when a civil war becomes internationalized. When outside actors get involved in a civil war, the number of veto players rises correspondingly to include not only domestic players and internal factions, but also the involved external players, which may include foreign governments, diaspora groups, foreign fighters, and/or transnational social networks. Managing or ending internationalized civil wars is thus a highly complicated balancing act requiring attention not just to internal, but also to external veto players represented by all involved parties both inside and outside the conflict state. The traditional methods of conflict management involve electoral engineering, power-sharing arrangements, or other peace deals that seek to satisfy the aspirations of involved internal parties, while ensuring that the peace deal is “self-enforcing.” This means that it will hold up even in the absence of outside pressure. In internationalized civil wars, however, conflict managers must also satisfy involved outside actors or otherwise neutralize external conflict processes. There are multiple methods for doing this, ranging from effective border control in cases of conflict spillover to decomposing internationalized conflicts into civil and international conflicts, which are solved separately, to outright peace enforcement involving international security guarantees.


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