First Person: The play is not the thing

2020 ◽  
Vol 101 (7) ◽  
pp. 58-59
Author(s):  
Susan Kinsky

When Susan Kinsky repeatedly confused the names of two sets of parents of Southeast Asian descent, she was appalled at her carelessness. In this reflection, she describes the exchanges, reflects on why she may have continued making the same mistake, and concludes that connection was the missing link. Her students’ parents needed to become real people to her, not just names on a list.

Episteme ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 363-382 ◽  
Author(s):  
L. A. Paul ◽  
John Quiggin

ABSTRACTIn the real world, there can be constraints on rational decision-making: there can be limitations on what I can know and on what you can know. There can also be constraints on my ability to deliberate or on your ability to deliberate. It is useful to know what the norms of rational deliberation should be in ideal contexts, for fully informed agents, in an ideal world. But it is also useful to know what the norms of rational deliberation should be in the actual world, in non-ideal contexts, for imperfectly informed agents, especially for big, life-changing decisions. That is, we want to know how to deliberate as best we can, given the real-world limitations on what we can know, and given real-world limitations on how we are able to deliberate. In this paper, our concern is with the norms of rational deliberation in certain, important, non-ideal contexts, where the reasoning occurs from the agent's first person, subjective point of view. The norms governing the process of deliberation for real people in the sorts of non-ideal contexts we'll consider need to reflect the way that real agents, with an incomplete grasp on the facts and an imperfect ability to deliberate, can be expected to proceed. Our central contention is that framing and exploring the deliberative process from the first person perspective allows us to uncover and explore important, real-world constraints on boundedly rational agents deliberating from the subjective perspective.


ASHA Leader ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 72-72
Author(s):  
Kelli Jeffries Owens
Keyword(s):  

2018 ◽  
Vol 77 (2) ◽  
pp. 69-82 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robin Wollast ◽  
Elisa Puvia ◽  
Philippe Bernard ◽  
Passagorn Tevichapong ◽  
Olivier Klein

Abstract. Ever since Fredrickson and Roberts (1997) proposed objectification theory, research on self-objectification and – by extension – other-objectification has experienced a considerable expansion. However, most of the studies on sexual objectification have been conducted solely in Western populations. This study investigates whether the effect of target sexualization on social perception differs as a function of culture (Western vs. Eastern). Specifically, we asked a Western sample (Belgian, N = 62) and a Southeast Asian sample (Thai, N = 98) to rate sexualized versus nonsexualized targets. We found that sexual objectification results in dehumanization in both Western (Belgium) and Eastern (Thailand) cultures. Specifically, participants from both countries attributed less competence and less agency to sexualized than to nonsexualized targets, and they reported that they would administer more intense pain to sexualized than to nonsexualized targets. Thus, building on past research, this study suggests that the effect of target sexualization on dehumanization is a more general rather than a culture-specific phenomenon.


2018 ◽  
Vol 23 (3) ◽  
pp. 189-205 ◽  
Author(s):  
Renatus Ziegler ◽  
Ulrich Weger

Abstract. In psychology, thinking is typically studied in terms of a range of behavioral or physiological parameters, focusing, for instance, on the mental contents or the neuronal correlates of the thinking process proper. In the current article, by contrast, we seek to complement this approach with an exploration into the experiential or inner dimensions of thinking. These are subtle and elusive and hence easily escape a mode of inquiry that focuses on externally measurable outcomes. We illustrate how a sufficiently trained introspective approach can become a radar for facets of thinking that have found hardly any recognition in the literature so far. We consider this an important complement to third-person research because these introspective observations not only allow for new insights into the nature of thinking proper but also cast other psychological phenomena in a new light, for instance, attention and the self. We outline and discuss our findings and also present a roadmap for the reader interested in studying these phenomena in detail.


Author(s):  
Matthias Hofer

Abstract. This was a study on the perceived enjoyment of different movie genres. In an online experiment, 176 students were randomly divided into two groups (n = 88) and asked to estimate how much they, their closest friends, and young people in general enjoyed either serious or light-hearted movies. These self–other differences in perceived enjoyment of serious or light-hearted movies were also assessed as a function of differing individual motivations underlying entertainment media consumption. The results showed a clear third-person effect for light-hearted movies and a first-person effect for serious movies. The third-person effect for light-hearted movies was moderated by level of hedonic motivation, as participants with high hedonic motivations did not perceive their own and others’ enjoyment of light-hearted films differently. However, eudaimonic motivations did not moderate first-person perceptions in the case of serious films.


1963 ◽  
Vol 8 (7) ◽  
pp. 261-262
Author(s):  
MARSHALL H. SEGALL
Keyword(s):  

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