Mitigated Freedom? Thomas Pröpper’s Reappraisal as Theological Tribute to Autonomy

2019 ◽  
Vol 75 (4) ◽  
pp. 494-503
Author(s):  
Mathias Wirth

Thomas Pröpper’s (1941–2015) systematic theology, that was deemed particularly innovative especially in the German-speaking Catholic realm but thus far has garnered hardly any international attention, poses the question of whether a reflection of the is and ought of freedom yields any returns for the question of God and moreover for ethics. 1 A theological way of thinking should be established that helps with understanding faith whilst also offering philosophical justification. 2 For eminently theological reasons, Pröpper pursues a theology of freedom because God’s self-revelation as love can be adequately inferred through concepts of freedom. 3 Pröpper’s theological approach of a question of the contemporary philosophy of subject and freedom also involves the inclusion of authority-critical thought. 4 According to Pröpper’s own information, Hermann Krings’s freedom thinking in particular alongside his transcendental philosophy, 5 tracing back to Immanuel Kant and Johann Gottlieb Fichte, is applicable to Pröpper’s own approach. 6 Consequently, for Pröpper a theological argument can be given only from man ( ex parte hominis). For such an argument to be convincing, it must fulfil satisfy two criteria: it must be able to exist in the application of one’s own reason (“im Gebrauch der eigenen Vernunft”) and in the execution of freedom (“im Vollzug der Freiheit”). 7

2018 ◽  
Vol 63 (1 (247)) ◽  
pp. 9-23
Author(s):  
Malwina Rolka

The main aim of the paper is reconstruction of the concept of Bildung (considered as forming the man’s personality) in an educational novel entitled Henry von Ofterdingen written by Novalis (Friedrich von Hardenberg). Novalis’s novel – inspired by Goethe’s Wilhelm Meister Lehrejahre – is one of the most original early romantic works which prove the importance of the idea of Bildung for German culture at the beginning of the 19th century. In the first part of the text the author discusses the literary image of Bildung presented in the plot of the novel and then indicates its inner contradiction. In the second part of the article the author reconstructs the philosophical roots of this ideal regarding Novalis’s notion of Bildung in light of the thought of German idealism (transcendental philosophy of Immanuel Kant and Johann Gottlieb Fichte in particular) because the theory of romantic progressive poetry (elaborated most fully by Friedrich Schlegel) originates there. The perspective taken in the paper allows the author to reveal the universal significance of the inner contradiction of the romantic idea of forming man’s personality as a sign of the fundamental crisis of the modern ideal of humanity.


GEOgraphia ◽  
2010 ◽  
Vol 10 (19) ◽  
pp. 103
Author(s):  
Alexandre Domingues Ribas ◽  
Antonio Carlos Vitte

Resumo: Há um relativo depauperamento no tocante ao nosso conhecimento a respeito da relação entre a filosofia kantiana e a constituição da geografia moderna e, conseqüentemente, científica. Esta relação, quando abordada, o é - vezes sem conta - de modo oblíquo ou tangencial, isto é, ela resta quase que exclusivamente confinada ao ato de noticiar que Kant ofereceu, por aproximadamente quatro décadas, cursos de Geografia Física em Königsberg, ou que ele foi o primeiro filósofo a inserir esta disciplina na Universidade, antes mesmo da criação da cátedra de Geografia em Berlim, em 1820, por Karl Ritter. Não ultrapassar a pueril divulgação deste ato em si mesma só nos faz jogar uma cortina sobre a ausência de um discernimento maior acerca do tributo de Kant àfundamentação epistêmica da geografia moderna e científica. Abrir umafrincha nesta cortina denota, necessariamente, elucidar o papel e o lugardo “Curso de Geografia Física” no corpus da filosofia transcendental kantiana. Assim sendo, partimos da conjectura de que a “Geografia Física” continuamente se mostrou, a Kant, como um conhecimento portador de um desmedido sentido filosófico, já que ela lhe denotava a própria possibilidade de empiricização de sua filosofia. Logo, a Geografia Física seria, para Kant, o embasamento empírico de suas reflexões filosóficas, pois ela lhe comunicava a empiricidade da invenção do mundo; ela lhe outorgava a construção metafísica da “superfície da Terra”. Destarte, da mesma maneira que a Geografia, em sua superfície geral, conferiu uma espécie de atributo científico à validação do empírico da Modernidade (desde os idos do século XVI), a Geografia Física apresentou-se como o sustentáculo empírico da reflexão filosófica kantiana acerca da “metafísica da natureza” e da “metafísica do mundo”.THE COURSE OF PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHY OF IMMANUEL KANT(1724-1804): CONTRIBUTION FOR THE GEOGRAPHICALSCIENCE HISTORY AND EPISTEMOLOGYAbstract: There is a relative weakness about our knowledge concerningKant philosophy and the constitution of modern geography and,consequently, scientific geography. That relation, whenever studied,happens – several times – in an oblique or tangential way, what means thatit lies almost exclusively confined in the act of notifying that Kant offered,for approximately four decades, “Physical Geography” courses inKonigsberg, or that he was the first philosopher teaching the subject at anyCollege, even before the creation of Geography chair in Berlin, in 1820, byKarl Ritter. Not overcoming the early spread of that act itself only made usthrow a curtain over the absence of a major understanding about Kant’stribute to epistemic justification of modern and scientific geography. Toopen a breach in this curtain indicates, necessarily, to lighten the role andplace of Physical Geography Course inside Kantian transcendentalphilosophy. So, we began from the conjecture that Physical Geography hasalways shown, by Kant, as a knowledge carrier of an unmeasuredphilosophic sense, once it showed the possibility of empiricization of hisphilosophy. Therefore, a Physical Geography would be, for Kant, theempirics basis of his philosophic thoughts, because it communicates theempiria of the world invention; it has made him to build metaphysically the“Earth’s surface”. In the same way, Geography, in its general surface, hasgiven a particular tribute to the empiric validation of Modernity (since the16th century), Physical Geography introduced itself as an empiric basis toKantian philosophical reflection about “nature’s metaphysics” and the“world metaphysics” as well.Keywords: History and Epistemology of Geography, Physical Geography,Cosmology, Kantian Transcendental Philosophy, Nature.


Author(s):  
Marcel Buß

Abstract Immanuel Kant states that indirect arguments are not suitable for the purposes of transcendental philosophy. If he is correct, this affects contemporary versions of transcendental arguments which are often used as an indirect refutation of scepticism. I discuss two reasons for Kant’s rejection of indirect arguments. Firstly, Kant argues that we are prone to misapply the law of excluded middle in philosophical contexts. Secondly, Kant points out that indirect arguments lack some explanatory power. They can show that something is true but they do not provide insight into why something is true. Using mathematical proofs as examples, I show that this is because indirect arguments are non-constructive. From a Kantian point of view, transcendental arguments need to be constructive in some way. In the last part of the paper, I briefly examine a comment made by P. F. Strawson. In my view, this comment also points toward a connection between transcendental and constructive reasoning.


2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 0
Author(s):  
Balanovskiy Valentin

The author attempts to answer a question of whether the fact that Immanuel Kant’s theory of experience most likely has a conceptual nature decreases an importance of Kant’s ideas for contemporary philosophy, because if experience is conceptual by nature, then certain problems with the search for means to verify experiential knowledge arise. In particular, two approaches are proposed. According to the first approach, the exceptional conceptuality of Kant’s theory of experience may be a consequence of absence of some important chains in arguments contained in the Critique of Pure Reason, which could clarify a question of how the conceptual apparatus of the subject corresponds to the reality. The author puts a hypothesis that the missing chains are not a mistake, but Kant’s deliberate silence caused by the lack of accurate scientific information that could not have been available to humankind in Enlightenment epoch. According to the second approach even if Kant’s theory of experience is exclusively conceptual by nature, this cannot automatically lead to a conclusion that it is unsuitable for obtaining reliable knowledge about reality, since transcendental idealism has powerful internal tools for verifying data in the process of cognition. The central position among them is occupied by transcendental reflection.


Author(s):  
Nathan Brown

Twenty-first century philosophy has been drawn into a false opposition between speculation and critique. In this important intervention, Nathan Brown argues that the key to overcoming this antinomy is rethinking the relation between rationalism and empiricism. If Kant’s transcendental philosophy attempted to displace the opposing claims of those competing schools, any speculative critique of Kant will have to reopen and consider anew the conflict and complementarity of reason and experience. Rationalist Empiricism shows that the capacity of reason and experience to both extend and delimit one another has always been at the core of philosophy and science, and that coordinating their discrepant powers is what enables speculation to move forward in concert with critique. Sweeping across ancient, modern, and contemporary philosophy, as well as political theory, science, and art, Brown engages with such major thinkers as Plato, Descartes, Hume, Hegel, Marx, Heidegger, Bachelard, Althusser, Badiou, and Meillassoux, while showing how the concepts he develops illuminate recent projects in the science of measurement and experimental digital photography. With conceptual originality and argumentative precision, Rationalist Empiricism is a book that reconfigures the history and the future of philosophy, politics, and aesthetics.


2009 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-30 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Landy

One recent trend in Kant scholarship has been to read Kant as undertaking a project in philosophical semantics, as opposed to, say, epistemology, or transcendental metaphysics. This trend has evolved almost concurrently with a debate in contemporary philosophy of mind about the nature of concepts and their content. Inferentialism is the view that the content of our concepts is essentially inferentially articulated, that is, that the content of a concept consists entirely, or in essential part, in the role that that concept plays in a system of inferences. By contrast, relationalism is the view that this content is fixed by a mental or linguistic item's standing in a certain relation to its object. The historical picture of Kant and the contemporary debate about concepts intersect in so far as contemporary inferentialists about conceptual content often cite Immanuel Kant not only as one of the founding fathers of a tradition that leads more or less straightforwardly to contemporary inferentialism, but also as the philosopher who first saw the fatal flaws in any attempt to articulate the content of our concepts relationally.


Author(s):  
Liesbet de Kock

German scientist Hermann von Helmholtz (1821–1894) is widely acknowledged as one of the leading intellectuals and scientists of his time. Originally trained as a physiologist, Helmholtz contributed substantially to the fields of mathematics, physics, acoustics, ophthalmology, and the emerging science of psychology, amongst others. Not only did Helmholtz’s research interests cover a vast array of different topics, he furthermore paired his scientific endeavors with a continuous philosophical reflection upon the nature of science and knowledge, and of human cognition in general. Helmholtz’s philosophical interests were especially salient in his theory of perception, in which he attempted to reconcile his empirical viewpoint with insights derived from the idealist philosophies of Immanuel Kant and Johann Gottlieb Fichte. This dovetailing between empiricism and (transcendental) idealism has fascinated philosophers ever since the publication of Helmholtz’s work. Although Helmholtz famously rejected Kant’s theory of space, he considered his own theory of perception as a further elaboration and empirical confirmation of Kant’s and (to a lesser degree of) Fichte’s philosophical systems. Notwithstanding the abiding philosophical interest in the nature and extent of Helmholtz’s allegiance to German Idealism, the philosophical dimension of his work has not received the attention it deserves in the historiography of psychology. Revisiting Helmholtz’s intellectual relation to transcendental idealism, however, could not only help correct and enrich simplified accounts of his psychological and epistemological position, it furthermore provides a highly interesting illustration of the hitherto poorly understood relation between (neo-)Kantianism and the dawn of scientific psychology in 19th-century Germany.


Vox Patrum ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 68 ◽  
pp. 73-84
Author(s):  
Maria Laura Di Paolo ◽  
Vito Limone

The aim of this study is to outline the use of the terms airesis and airetikos according the two main representatives of the Alexandrine School, Clement and Origen. In the Stromateis the word airesis has many meanings and, first of all, it is related to “the act of choice”, then, it is also a synonym for a “school” or a “sect”, hence it signifies Christian “heresy”. The connection between human freedom and schools, mainly philosophical ones, but also the schools of medicine, points out that Clement conceives “heresy” as an error, an incorrect way of thinking due to a wrong, even malicious choice, often of an intellectual nature; it sug­gests conscious deformation of a message. Hence, Clement contrasts the Gnostic airetikos and the “true Gnostic”, the man of faith who by studying the biblical texts and the Greek disciplines is enlightened by Christ (Stromata VII 92, 7). About the Origen’s usage of the term a†resij in his Contra Celsum it is worth to note that, firstly, the word a†resij always indicates the philosophical schools of Late Antiquity (cf. Contra Celsum 4, 45; 8, 53); secondly, that Origen aims at persuading his enemy, Celsus, that Christian religion is neither a refusal of philo­sophical schools nor something very different from them, but it may be regarded as an a†resij too and, in order to argue this, he shows that not only Christian reli­gion and philosophical schools share some moral and cosmological topics (Contra Celsum 3, 66; 3, 80), but also that both Christians and philosophers are moved by the some ¥logoj for£ (Contra Celsum 1, 10). Therefore, in Origen’s Contra Celsum the a†resij means not only the philosophical schools of the II and III centuries, but also the Christian religion as long as it is accepted by the Heathens. In conclusion, this study shows, once again, that, as the two representatives of Alexandria were in dialogue with the brilliant exponents of the contemporary philosophy, they were called to explain the importance of faith on the intellectual side, using some terms and conceptions of the main schools, on the one side, and by distinguishing Christian faith from them, on the other.


This volume offers a selection of essays by leading specialists on modality and the metaphysics of modality in the history of modern philosophy, from the seventeenth to the twentieth centuries. It revisits key moments in the history of modern modal doctrines, and illuminates lesser-known moments of that history. With this historical approach, the book aims to contextualize and even to offer alternatives to dominant positions within the contemporary philosophy of modality. Hence the volume contains not only new scholarship on the early-modern doctrines of Baruch Spinoza, G. W. Leibniz, Christian Wolff, and Immanuel Kant, but also work relating to less familiar nineteenth-century thinkers such as Alexius Meinong and Jan Łukasiewicz, together with essays on celebrated nineteenth- and twentieth-century thinkers such as G. W. F. Hegel, Martin Heidegger, and Bertrand Russell, whose modal doctrines have not previously garnered the attention they deserve. The volume thus covers a variety of traditions, and its historical range extends to the end of the twentieth century, since it addresses the legacy of Willard Van Orman Quine’s critique of modality within recent analytic philosophy.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document