Realising the Public Potential of Corporate Law: Twenty Years of Civil Penalty Enforcement in Australia

2014 ◽  
Vol 42 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-22 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michelle Welsh
2014 ◽  
Vol 42 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-22 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michelle Welsh

Traditionally corporate law has been viewed as having characteristics that are commonly associated with private law. Largely this view developed as a result of the “law and economics” scholarship which dominated the corporate law debate, especially in the United States, in the last quarter of last Century. While the traditional “law and economics” approach supports the view that corporate law should be treated as a branch of private law, and that the state should have no role in its enforcement, other scholars, particularly those that adopt a progressive approach, argue that corporate law has, and should be recognised as having characteristics that are usually associated with public law. Arguably, an area of Australian corporate law that displays characteristics that are usually associated with public law is the statutory directors’ duties and the civil penalty regime that supports them. This enforcement regime gives the state through the corporate regulator, standing to take court based proceedings to enforce what are in effect, contracts that established corporate governance structures. This article seeks to determine the appropriate role of a public regulator in these circumstances. The questions considered are: whose interests should the public regulator represent when it is tasked with the responsibility of enforcing the statutory directors’ duties that largely codify fiduciary and common law duties? Given that the duties are owed by directors to their company should the primary role of the public regulator be to represent the interests of the company, and its shareholders, who have suffered a loss as a result of the alleged contravention of the directors’ duties or should the primary role of the public regulator be to act in the interests of the members of the larger community? In these situations what are the interests of the larger community? Drawing on regulatory theory the argument advanced in this paper is that despite the fact that the statutory directors’ duties codify what are in effect private rights between directors and their companies, the primary role of a public regulator is not to utilise the enforcement mechanisms at its disposal in order to obtain compensation for companies who have suffered a loss. Rather, the regulator's primary role is to act in the interests of the larger community by utilising the enforcement mechanisms at its disposal strategically in order to encourage greater compliance.


2001 ◽  
Vol 2 (12) ◽  
Author(s):  
Theodor Baums

Just over a year ago, in the Spring of 2000, a Government Commission entitled \“Corporate Governance - Unternehmensführung (corporate management) - Unternehmenskontrolle (corporate control) - Modernisierung des Aktienrechts (Modernization of corporate law) and consisting of a group of selected lawyers and business practioners from the banking and insurance industry, took up the task of engaging in an in-depth analysis of the structure and challenges of \“German corporate governance.\” The Commission\'s work has drawn to an end and its 300 page report was presented to the public on July 10, 2001. It is German Law Journal\'s privilege to provide its readers with the first-hand insights of the Chair of the Commission, Professor Theodor Baums of the University of Frankfurt\'s Institute of Banking Law. In his discussion with GLJ, Professor Baums addressed specifics of the Commission\'s Report as well as the heritage of and the future prospects for German corporate and capital market law.


2020 ◽  
Vol 72 (4) ◽  
pp. 966-984 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Gindis

Abstract Jensen and Meckling’s 1976 definition of the firm as a legal fiction which serves as a nexus for contracts between individuals sits well with the Coasean narrative on the firm while at the same time being at odds with it. Available interviews with Jensen shed little light on the origins and meaning of this unusual definition. The article shows how the definition captured, and was a response to, the American socio-political context of the early and mid-1970s, and traces how Jensen and Meckling employed it once they themselves became immersed in the public debate about corporate responsibility and regulation in the late 1970s and early 1980s. It also considers Jensen and Meckling’s place in the literature on the economics of corporate law developed mostly in the 1980s.


Author(s):  
Mateusz Grześków

This paper is dedicated to the issue of the notion of the public company in  Polish corporate law. This term, contrary to foreign legal systems, is detached from the fact of whether a given company’s shares are listed on the stock exchange, as it is based solely on the technical aspect of whether shares are issued in dematerialized form. This approach should be deemed inappropriate. First of all, it blurs the distinction between a public company and a private company as it does not at all address in substance the nature of listed companies. Secondly, it introduces into the legal system an obsolete category of public companies which are not equivalent to listed companies. Thirdly, the legislator wrongly adopts the private joint-stock company as the model joint-stock company in the Code of Commercial Companies the “CCC” instead of its variant listed on the stock exchange. Consequently, a company which in practice has more in common with a limited liability company than with a listed company has been adopted as a model of a pure capital company. Due to these reasons it is the author’s proposition to redefine the public and private company within the CCC and the capital markets regulation. This paper describes and positively assesses recent legislative proposals concerning the redefinition of the public company through linking its nature with the fact of its shares’ admission to public trading. Koncepcja spółki publicznej w polskim prawie spółekNiniejszy artykuł został poświęcony analizie ujęcia „spółki publicznej” w polskim prawie handlowym, które w odróżnieniu od systemów prawnych państw obcych oderwane jest od faktu notowania akcji danej spółki na giełdzie papierów wartościowych, gdyż zostało oparte wyłącznie na technicznym aspekcie formy dokumentowej akcji. Ujęcie to należy uznać za błędne z kilku przyczyn. Po pierwsze, prowadzi ono to zatarcia granicy między spółką publiczną a spółką prywatną w ten sposób, że w ogóle nie odnosi się ono merytorycznie do specyfiki funkcjonowania spółek giełdowych. Po drugie, wprowadza do systemu prawnego zbędną kategorię spółek publicznych, która nie jest równoważna z kategorią spółek giełdowych. Po trzecie, ustawodawca błędnie przyjmuje, że modelową spółką akcyjną w kodeksie spółek handlowych jest jej podtyp niepubliczny w miejsce podtypu publicznego, przez co za wzorzec spółki kapitałowej przyjęto spółkę, którą w praktyce obrotu więcej łączy ze spółką z ograniczoną odpowiedzialnością niż ze spółką giełdową. Z tych względów postuluje się przedefiniowanie tych kategorii w obrębie kodeksu spółek handlowych oraz prawa rynku kapitałowego. Artykuł omawia oraz aprobuje wytyczony kierunek reformy prawa rynku kapitałowego, zgodnie z którym ma dojść do zredefiniowania pojęcia spółki publicznej przez powiązanie jej istoty z faktem dopuszczenia jej akcji do obrotu giełdowego.


Author(s):  
Anita Indira Anand

This chapter discusses the existing conception of the public corporation and questions whether any of these ideas appropriately account for the rise of shareholder-driven corporate governance (SCG). In particular, it considers the contractarian model of the corporation as well as the agency theory, which explains the division of ownership and control as an agency relationship that necessarily produces agency costs. The chapter also addresses a newer and contrasting idea called principal cost theory, which argues that principal (or shareholder) control also comes at a cost, resulting from shareholders’ lack of expertise and the potential for conflicts of interest among them. This theory offers an important counterpoint to the normative arguments for SCG because it emphasizes the potential failings of shareholders and challenges the supposition that they are necessarily well positioned to play an active role in governance.


2022 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christoph Badenheim

The regulation of banks' internal corporate governance is characterized by an interplay between banking supervisory law and corporate law. This book examines the resulting special corporate law of banks from a legal-doctrinal and functional-economic perspective. First, the economic specifics of the corporate governance of banks are examined. Then, the current legal framework is analysed and the corporate objective of banks – as a guiding principle for directors’ duties – is determined. Finally, the special corporate law of banks is subjected to a functional analysis against the backdrop of the regulatory objectives – risk prevention in the public interest – and corresponding reform proposals are made.


2018 ◽  
Vol 41 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michał Białek

AbstractIf we want psychological science to have a meaningful real-world impact, it has to be trusted by the public. Scientific progress is noisy; accordingly, replications sometimes fail even for true findings. We need to communicate the acceptability of uncertainty to the public and our peers, to prevent psychology from being perceived as having nothing to say about reality.


1999 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 202-203
Author(s):  
Robert Chatham

The Court of Appeals of New York held, in Council of the City of New York u. Giuliani, slip op. 02634, 1999 WL 179257 (N.Y. Mar. 30, 1999), that New York City may not privatize a public city hospital without state statutory authorization. The court found invalid a sublease of a municipal hospital operated by a public benefit corporation to a private, for-profit entity. The court reasoned that the controlling statute prescribed the operation of a municipal hospital as a government function that must be fulfilled by the public benefit corporation as long as it exists, and nothing short of legislative action could put an end to the corporation's existence.In 1969, the New York State legislature enacted the Health and Hospitals Corporation Act (HHCA), establishing the New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation (HHC) as an attempt to improve the New York City public health system. Thirty years later, on a renewed perception that the public health system was once again lacking, the city administration approved a sublease of Coney Island Hospital from HHC to PHS New York, Inc. (PHS), a private, for-profit entity.


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