EL JUEZ COMPETENTE PARA CONOCER DEL PROCEDIMIENTO MONITORIO: CUESTIONES PRÁCTICAS

Author(s):  
AINHOA GUTIÉRREZ BARRENENGOA

El procedimiento monitorio se concibe en la Ley 1/2000, de Enjuiciamiento Civil como un procedimiento de tutela privilegiada de determinados créditos. Sin embargo, estos postulados se contradicen con los problemas que, en la práctica forense, se han suscitado, en muchos casos, por la determinación de la competencia del órgano que debe conocer del procedimiento. En el presente estudio, se analizan las principales cuestiones que se han suscitado en relación con la determinación de la competencia objetiva y territorial en el procedimiento monitorio, con un repaso crítico de las distintas soluciones doctrinales aportadas, y una revisión de la última doctrina jurisprudencial en la materia. Prozedura monitorioa Prozedura Zibilaren 1/2000 Legeak taxutu zuen, zenbait kredituren tutoretza pribilejiatua izateko prozedura moduan. Hala eta guztiz ere, postulatu horiek ez datoz bat praktika forentsean sortu diren arazoekin; izan ere, maiz, prozedura ezagutu behar duen organoaren eskumena nork duen jakitea ez da gauza argia. Lan honetan, prozedura monitorioaren inguruan eskumen objektiboa eta lurraldekoa zehaztu beharraz sortu diren eztabaida nagusiak aztertzen dira, horri buruz agertu izan diren konponbide doktrinalen azterketa kritikoa eginez, eta gaiari buruzko azken jurisprudentzia-doktrina ere lantzen da. The payment procedure is envisaged by Act 1/2000 on the Civil Procedural Code as a procedure for a privileged guarantee of some debts. However, theses propositions conflict with the problems which arose in practice when deciding the subject-matter and territorial jurisdiction in payments procedures. By this study, main questions regarding the subject-matter and territorial jurisdiction within the payment procedure are analyzed with a critical review of the given different doctrinal solutions and a revision of the last case law doctrine on the topic.

2017 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 63-89 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jozef Valuch ◽  
Tomáš Gábriš ◽  
Ondrej Hamuľák

Abstract The aim of this paper is to evaluate and differentiate between the phenomena of cyberwarfare and information warfare, as manifestations of what we perceive as postmodern warfare. We describe and analyse the current examples of the use the postmodern warfare and the reactions of states and international bodies to these phenomena. The subject matter of this paper is the relationship between new types of postmodern conflicts and the law of armed conflicts (law of war). Based on ICJ case law, it is clear that under current legal rules of international law of war, cyber attacks as well as information attacks (often performed in the cyberspace as well) can only be perceived as “war” if executed in addition to classical kinetic warfare, which is often not the case. In most cases perceived “only” as a non-linear warfare (postmodern conflict), this practice nevertheless must be condemned as conduct contrary to the principles of international law and (possibly) a crime under national laws, unless this type of conduct will be recognized by the international community as a “war” proper, in its new, postmodern sense.


Author(s):  
Denise Mifsud

“Harry Wolcott uses fifty years of experience to take the reader inside the process of constructing an ethnographic study, offering a wealth of lessons from one of the masters of the genre”. This is indeed a concise description by the publisher. The text is constructed around the author’s five major studies. Wolcott thus gives a unique contribution to the field of ethnography as he presents some critical components of ethnography in his desire to share with us readers the results of his career-long search for the essence of ethnography. The book is divided into eight chapters. I give a critical review of the book, attempting to present the subject matter to potential readers, while drawing on its strengths and weaknesses.


Author(s):  
Hartley Trevor C

This chapter discusses the ‘subject-matter scope’ of Brussels 2012, Lugano 2007, and the Hague Convention. ‘Subject-matter scope’ refers to the scope covered by a measure as regards its subject matter, that is to say the branches and areas of the law to which it applies. For the three legal instruments under consideration, the relevant provisions are contained in Article 1 of Brussels 2012 and Lugano, and Articles 1 and 2 of Hague. A review of case law shows that the distinction between a civil matter and public matter is far from straightforward. There is a significant grey area in which the Court of Justice of the European Union could legitimately go either way.


1978 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 348-374
Author(s):  
Christopher D. Gilbert

The abolition of all appeals from the High Court to the Privy Council, coupled with the High Court's recent statement that it no longer regards itself as bound by Privy Council decisions, highlights the fact that appeals still lie, in many matters of State jurisdiction, from State Supreme Courts direct to the Privy Council. In this article, Mr Gilbert is primarily concerned to examine the extent to which section 106 of the Commonwealth Constitution may provide protection for these “direct” appeals. To this end, Mr Gilbert examines what case-law exists on section 106, and attempts to place the section in perspective in relation to the rest of the Constitution. The difficult (and largely unexplored) relationship between section 106 and section 51 is considered, to discover the possible reaches of Commonwealth legislative power with respect to the subject-matter protected by section 106. The position of “direct” appeals within the States’ constitutional structures is looked at, in order to determine the possible ambit of whatever protection is offered by section 106, and finally, Mr Gilbert analyses the recent comments by Mr Justice Murphy that the abolition of Privy Council appeals from the High Court has meant the consequential demise of “direct” appeals from State courts.


Author(s):  
Florian Faust

This chapter discusses the relationship between comparative law and economic analysis of law. After providing an overview of the characteristics of the economic analysis of law, it explains how one of the two disciplines can operate as an ancillary discipline to the other; this has been termed ‘Comparative Law and Economics’. The next section describes how comparative law and economic analysis of law can be brought together by making one discipline the subject matter of the other. It suggests that the role of economic analysis of law may be greater in case law systems than in codified systems and that this role may vary according to the subject of legislation. The section concludes with considerations on the role comparative law plays and should play in different contexts. Finally, it is argued that comparative law and economics should not be considered a discipline on its own.


2009 ◽  
Vol 52 (2) ◽  
pp. 53-67
Author(s):  
Miljana Milojevic

The main concern of this paper is John Perry's attempt to analyze phenomenal knowledge in a way that avoids the objection which states that the non-deducibility of this kind of knowledge leads to the ontological conclusion that physicalism must be false. The attempt in question determines the content of phenomenal knowledge with a help of the reflexive-referential semantic theory which enables us to explain a growth in knowledge without introducing new (non-physical) facts on the subject matter level as the object of this new knowledge. I will argue that even on the assumption that the case of phenomenal knowledge is just another case of recognition knowledge, as Perry argues, the end result of the analysis suffers from unavoidable inconsistencies and the given analysis of the content of phenomenal knowledge proves to be incompatible with the basic assumptions of the central argumentation.


2019 ◽  
Vol Special Issue ◽  
pp. 105-124
Author(s):  
Agnieszka Choromańska

The paper addresses legal solutions concerning the model of witness interviewing. The discussion is of comparative nature, as it refers both to the regulations contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1928, as well as to the provisions of the current criminal procedure. It aims at a synthetic analysis of key changes in the model of interviewing a witness taking into consideration historical factors, as well as their impact on the current shape of the provisions in the Criminal Procedure Regulation. While reviewing legal solutions, the author pays special attention to the process of questioning at a distance supported by devices enabling simultaneous image and sound transmission. This issue is discussed in many aspects, taking into account the views of the doctrine and the analysis of case law. Apart from the assessment of the current legal status in genere, the paper also presents the proposals of solutions in the subject matter.


2019 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Javier Saladich Nebot

Diagnostic methods have been gaining medical recognition and social importance as innovations that can be useful to provide individuals with a diagnosis, prognosis or prediction with regard to a condition that they currently have or that they are in risk of developing. Despite the great amount of resources deployed to produce these health technologies and their potential benefits for healthcare systems and patients or prospective patients alike, their exclusive protection in the United States has faced resistance from patent examiners and courts on the basis that diagnostics constitute a dubious innovation. Inconsistent arguments used for the refusal of patent protection have led to a labyrinth where innovators in the diagnostics sector cannot reasonably expect their application or their protection after the patent is in place to stand.  This paper aims to convey the doctrine of subject matter eligibility as applied to diagnostic methods and the relevant guidelines and case law. In doing so, it aims to depict the pitfalls resulting from the general application of a non-patentability rule to diagnostics, and to suggest opportunities still available for innovators to overcome uncertainty by filing compliant applications while maximizing the likeliness of enjoying protection once the patent is awarded.


2018 ◽  
Vol 36 (1) ◽  
pp. 125-141
Author(s):  
Joanna Jaroszyk-Pawlukiewicz

Summary The article concerns the transfer of ownership of forest property, nationalized after World War II. It covers the subject matter of the process of property acquisition by way of nationalization decrees, in particular in the area of the so-called Regained Territories and dilemmas related to the issue of reprivatization. The work includes issues proposed over the years and existing statutory solutions, as well as case law affecting the interpretation of legal norms.


2021 ◽  
Vol 36 (1) ◽  
pp. 153-190
Author(s):  
Sywia Łakoma

The aim of this study is to present social assistance benefits in cash in terms of the jurisprudence of administrative courts. The analysis of the provisions of the Act on Social Assistance and the case law related to the indicated subject matter confirms that the granting of optional benefits in cash – which are the subject of this part of the article – takes place under administrative approval. As a result, meeting the positive prerequisites for a given benefit, with the simultaneous lack of negative prerequisites, does not have to mean that the expected aid is to be obtained. In this case, the principles and objectives of social assistance, including the principle of subsidiarity, are of a great importance. This principle results, first of all, in the obligation to independently undertake actions – by persons or families interested in receiving assistance – in order to overcome a difficult life situation. Only when this is not possible, support is provided by social assistance bodies. Then, however, great importance – which is emphasized in the judicature – is attached to the cooperation of individuals or families with social assistance bodies. The jurisprudence presented in the study also confirms that the significance for granting optional benefits is the use by an individual in the past or at the time of applying for of other social assistance specific benefits. These circumstances, in the best case, may affect the amount of the benefit granted, but may also result in refusal of performing its payment, among others, due to the justified needs of other people. Additionally, the judicature points out that the refusal to grant optional cash benefits may also be affected by the limited financial capacity of the social assistance body (Article 3 (4) of the Act on Social Assistance). This is one of the elements that distinguish these benefits from obligatory benefits in cash, including, in particular, the periodic allowance, where the limited financial capacity of the social assistance body may only affect the amount of the benefit, but may not be the basis for refusal to grant it.


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