The Jurisprudence of Unconscious Intent
Intention is a most difficult and illusory mental process. It is our contention that the law would become more functional and less convoluted (while not decreasing injustice) by abandoning distinctions based on this unprofitable phantasm. To this end, we first offer a paradigmatic definition of intention against which we survey its philosophical meaning and explore its boundaries. We examine the possibility that seemingly unintentional acts are, in fact, generated by the deliberations of the unconscious mind. We explore the consequences of bringing the jurisprudential concept of intention into harmony with Freudian doctrine. This, we conclude, necessitates expanding criminal and civil liability for one's actions from those called intentional under the current definition to include also those actions intentionally generated by the unconscious mind. Whatever benefit there is to society in holding one liable for consciously intentional acts extends, correspondingly, to unconsciously intentional acts as well. We explain how this may be done in practice.