The Jurisprudence of Unconscious Intent

1996 ◽  
Vol 24 (4) ◽  
pp. 511-580
Author(s):  
Daniel I. A. Cohen

Intention is a most difficult and illusory mental process. It is our contention that the law would become more functional and less convoluted (while not decreasing injustice) by abandoning distinctions based on this unprofitable phantasm. To this end, we first offer a paradigmatic definition of intention against which we survey its philosophical meaning and explore its boundaries. We examine the possibility that seemingly unintentional acts are, in fact, generated by the deliberations of the unconscious mind. We explore the consequences of bringing the jurisprudential concept of intention into harmony with Freudian doctrine. This, we conclude, necessitates expanding criminal and civil liability for one's actions from those called intentional under the current definition to include also those actions intentionally generated by the unconscious mind. Whatever benefit there is to society in holding one liable for consciously intentional acts extends, correspondingly, to unconsciously intentional acts as well. We explain how this may be done in practice.

Author(s):  
Jeremy Horder

This chapter discusses property offences. These include theft, taking a conveyance without consent, robbery, blackmail, burglary, handling stolen goods, and criminal damage. Amongst these, the offence receiving the most detailed treatment is theft. The current definition of theft dates back to 1968, long before the time when it became possible to hold and transfer money and other items (such as photographs) electronically, and the courts have sought to interpret the law in such a way that in can meet this challenge. But, in seeking to modernize the law’s approach to new forms of property holding and transfer, has the definition become too wide?


2010 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 193-201 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elisabeth Norman

A series of vignette examples taken from psychological research on motivation, emotion, decision making, and attitudes illustrates how the influence of unconscious processes is often measured in a range of different behaviors. However, the selected studies share an apparent lack of explicit operational definition of what is meant by consciousness, and there seems to be substantial disagreement about the properties of conscious versus unconscious processing: Consciousness is sometimes equated with attention, sometimes with verbal report ability, and sometimes operationalized in terms of behavioral dissociations between different performance measures. Moreover, the examples all seem to share a dichotomous view of conscious and unconscious processes as being qualitatively different. It is suggested that cognitive research on consciousness can help resolve the apparent disagreement about how to define and measure unconscious processing, as is illustrated by a selection of operational definitions and empirical findings from modern cognitive psychology. These empirical findings also point to the existence of intermediate states of conscious awareness, not easily classifiable as either purely conscious or purely unconscious. Recent hypotheses from cognitive psychology, supplemented with models from social, developmental, and clinical psychology, are then presented all of which are compatible with the view of consciousness as a graded rather than an all-or-none phenomenon. Such a view of consciousness would open up for explorations of intermediate states of awareness in addition to more purely conscious or purely unconscious states and thereby increase our understanding of the seemingly “unconscious” aspects of mental life.


Author(s):  
Eva Steiner

This chapter examines the French law of tort. Although French law takes a broad approach to civil liability, when looking more closely at the way in which French judges have dealt with claims in tort, it becomes apparent that the need to avoid extending the scope of civil liability to an unlimited extent has also been present in French law. Indeed, in order to achieve desirable results, French judges have on many occasions used their discretion to interpret restrictively the elastic concepts of fault, damage, and causation. Hence, they end up dismissing claims which, for policy reasons, would have created unjust results or would have opened the gates to a flood of new claims. Thus, even though French judges do not admit to it openly in their judgments, they are influenced as regards the matter of deciding the limits of liability by general policy considerations, especially the ‘floodgates arguments’ which their English counterparts also readily understand.


Author(s):  
Simon Deakin ◽  
David Gindis ◽  
Geoffrey M. Hodgson

Abstract In his recent book on Property, Power and Politics, Jean-Philippe Robé makes a strong case for the need to understand the legal foundations of modern capitalism. He also insists that it is important to distinguish between firms and corporations. We agree. But Robé criticizes our definition of firms in terms of legally recognized capacities on the grounds that it does not take the distinction seriously enough. He argues that firms are not legally recognized as such, as the law only knows corporations. This argument, which is capable of different interpretations, leads to the bizarre result that corporations are not firms. Using etymological and other evidence, we show that firms are treated as legally constituted business entities in both common parlance and legal discourse. The way the law defines firms and corporations, while the product of a discourse which is in many ways distinct from everyday language, has such profound implications for the way firms operate in practice that no institutional theory of the firm worthy of the name can afford to ignore it.


Legal Studies ◽  
1993 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 308-322
Author(s):  
Mitchell C. Davies

The objectives of the Criminal Law Revision Committee when drafting the radical reforms proposed by the 1966 Theft Bill were described by a contemporary commentator2 as being: ‘. . . to do away with the more embarrassing and restrictive technicalities of the existing law . . .’In the same place it was observed that the Committee faced a choice between creating a specific definition of the various theft offences and their elements, or one whose generality would allow it to evolve to meet the challenges presented by ever more complex and sophisticated dishonest dealing.


1984 ◽  
Vol 49 (1) ◽  
pp. 47-50 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frederic B. Fitch

In [3] a definition of negation was presented for the system K′ of extended basic logic [1], but it has since been shown by Peter Päppinghaus (personal communication) that this definition fails to give rise to the law of double negation as I claimed it did. The purpose of this note is to revise this defective definition in such a way that it clearly does give rise to the law of double negation, as well as to the other negation rules of K′.Although Päppinghaus's original letter to me was dated September 19, 1972, the matter has remained unresolved all this time. Only recently have I seen that there is a simple way to correct the definition. I am of course very grateful to Päppinghaus for pointing out my error in claiming to be able to derive the rule of double negation from the original form of the definition.The corrected definition will, as before, use fixed-point operators to give the effect of the required kind of transfinite induction, but this time a double transfinite induction will be used, somewhat like the double transfinite induction used in [5] to define simultaneously the theorems and antitheorems of system CΓ.


2021 ◽  
Vol 67 (2) ◽  
pp. 133-144
Author(s):  
Ermek B. Abdrasulov

This article examines the issues of differentiation of legislative and subordinate regulation of public relations. It is noted that in the process of law-making activities, including the legislative process, practical questions often arise about the competence of various state bodies to establish various legal norms and rules. These issues are related to the need to establish a clear legal meaning of the constitutional norms devoted to the definition of the subject of regulation of laws. In particular, there is a need to clarify the provisions of paragraph 3 of Article 61 of the Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan in terms of the concepts "the most important public relations", "all other relations", "subsidiary legislation", as well as to establish the relationship between these concepts. Interpretation is also required by the provisions of p. 4 of Article 61 of the Constitution in terms of clarifying the question of whether the conclusion follows from mentioned provisions that all possible social relations in the Republic of Kazakhstan are subject to legal regulation, including those that are subject to other social and technical regulators (morality, national, business and professional traditions and customs, religion, standards, technical regulations, etc.). Answering the questions raised, the author emphasizes that the law and bylaws, as a rule, constitute a single system of legislation, performing the functions of primary and secondary acts. However, the secondary nature of subsidiary legislation does not mean that they regulate "unimportant" public relations. The law is essentially aimed at regulating all important social relations.


Entropy ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 20 (8) ◽  
pp. 572
Author(s):  
Pier Bissiri ◽  
Stephen Walker

The current definition of a conditional probability enables one to update probabilities only on the basis of stochastic information. This paper provides a definition for conditional probability with non-stochastic information. The definition is derived by a set of axioms, where the information is connected to the outcome of interest via a loss function. An illustration is presented.


2016 ◽  
Vol 9 (6) ◽  
pp. 61
Author(s):  
Samira Soltani ◽  
Ahmad Ramazani

One of the innovations of Islamic Penal Code in 2013 was to accept criminal liability of legal entities. By accepting criminal liability of legal entities, the way to punish them is arisen. As a legal person cannot commit any crime, any punishments are not applicable to them. Accordingly, Article 20 of this Law enumerated a list of penalties applicable to legal persons and it was tried to use penalties in accordance with the legal entities to deal with them. Punishments such as dissolution, confiscation, cash fine, announcement of the judgment, Diyeh, social and economic exclusion; such as a ban on business activities, prohibition of the public invitation to raise capital and ban from drawing business documents listed in Article 20 and Article 14, are a set of punishments which relatively different from usual punishment for individuals. These penalties are relative diversity, but what is objectionable is that the details and conditions of implementation of each of these punishments are not clear. If legislator described the details exactly or provided the condition to require the adoption of The Executive Bylaw of the punishment, it would be better. Given that all the points and issues about penalties for legal persons are not stated in this law as well as ambiguities in the law for a comprehensive definition of legal person, the way to implement main and supplementary punishments, In this study it was tried to evaluate and criticize the legal entities penalties including main and supplementary ones and their grading.


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