A militant defence of democracy in hard times

2020 ◽  
pp. 019145372097471
Author(s):  
Seyla Benhabib

Cristina Lafont gives an impressive defence of deliberative democracy against its critics. This article considers in detail her engagement with the ‘deep pluralist’ position that characterizes Nadia Urbinati’s, Jeremy Waldron’s and Richard Bellamy’s positions. After considering Lafont’s threefold argument against the deep pluralists, I contend that she vacillates between a substantialist and recursive-iterative defence of the democratic ideal. Her defence of judicial review does not consider some of the strategic ways in which civil society groups may approach the process. I conclude by arguing that constitutionalization is not always a salutary move for resolving controversial issues in a democracy.

2021 ◽  
pp. 179-197
Author(s):  
Chiara Valentini

Roberto Gargarella has infused into constitutional theory a deliberative approach to constitutional review and rights adjudication. By this, he has enriched our understanding of deliberative democracy as a political system in which the judiciary can play a central role, especially through the institution of constitutional review. Furthermore, he has provided us with crucial insights into the deliberative potential of this institution, shedding light on the different ways in which it may serve to secure the essential conditions of democratic deliberation. The article centers on this twofold, crucial contribution of Gargarella – to constitutional theory and to deliberative democratic theory – with a focus on the relationship between social rights and constitutional review. First, it presents the main controversial issues raised by this relationship, concerning both social rights justiciability and adjudication. Second it highlights the resources provided by Gargarella to understand and address both orders of issues, based on his account of deliberative democracy and constitutional review. Third, the article addresses the resulting view of the action of courts on social rights. In particular, it inquires into the idea of a “third way” for judicial action, requiring to modulate judicial review so as to mediate between judicial inertia and activism.


PROPAGANDA ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 12-22
Author(s):  
M. Masad Masrur

The discussion room for the Work Creation Bill is officially located at the DPR RI Building. The discussion, which involved various interest groups, was deemed insufficient to accommodate the “rejecting” aspirations expressed by various community groups. Several community groups who are members of various civil society movements, held demonstrations outside the DPR RI Building as a venue for discussion of the Job Creation Bill. Demonstrations that also took place in these areas have caused damage to public facilities. According to Habermas's opinion, this condition is the result of structural domination, where the ruling group directs various forms of policy with instrumental communication that will not create understanding. In agreement with Gramsci, in this case, there is a political hegemony between one group against another. The government, which has an interest in immediately completing the deliberation of the Job Creation Bill, through the power of political domination, seeks to exercise hegemony against the civil society movement, causing violent conflict. Conflict resolution in the discussion of the Work Creation Bill is structurally carried out by using the state law approach in accordance with the prevailing laws and regulations. In accordance with the mandate of the constitution, all matters relating to regulations, a judicial review can be carried out at the Constitutional Court.


Author(s):  
Oliver Gerstenberg

By looking both at the European and contemporary US constitutional theory debates, this chapter proposes an analytic taxonomy of contemporary non-court centric approaches to constitutional interpretation: those that have concluded that the most promising response to persistent concerns about a democratic deficit is to shift the focus from courts as a forum of principle to the dialogue between courts and other actors, ranging from (other) courts to legislatures, administrative agencies, private actors, civil society stakeholders, and the wider public, in the jurisgenerative process. The goal is, by following the emergent literature on ‘weak’, proceduralist, and democratic-experimentalist forms of judicial review, to argue the virtues of the latter. Democratic experimentalism denotes a modality of judicial review that allows judges to enforce avowedly open-ended, fundamental, constitutional commitments in a way that institutionalizes—rather than excludes—continuing, social, and democratic determination and the progressive clarification of what constitutional commitments can and should come to mean in practice. Judicial review may deepen democracy rather than limit it by providing a focus and reason for public deliberation. The hope is to provide, by setting out contrasting positions, a foil for discussion and to show that the desirability of judicial review is not merely complacent assumption in contemporary constitutional and political thought, but can be supported on democratic grounds as deliberation-enhancing.


2019 ◽  
pp. 101-137
Author(s):  
Cristina Lafont

This chapter analyzes “lottocratic” conceptions of deliberative democracy. Their defenders put their democratic hopes on the generalized use of deliberative minipublics such as citizens’ juries, citizens’ assemblies, and deliberative polls. Some propose conferring political decisional-power upon minipublics as a way of increasing citizens’ democratic control over the political process. Against this view, the chapter argues that such proposals cannot be defended on participatory grounds. By expecting citizens to blindly defer to the political decisions of a randomly selected group of citizens, the generalized use of minipublics for decision-making would decrease rather than increase the citizenry’s ability to take ownership over and identify with the policies to which they are subject, as the democratic ideal of self-government requires. Lottocrats are right to highlight the democratic potential of minipublics. But in order to unleash that potential we must resist the temptation of taking the “micro-deliberative shortcut” and keep our eyes on the macro-deliberative goal. Instead of empowering minipublics to make decisions for the rest of the citizenry, citizens should use minipublics to empower themselves.


2020 ◽  
Vol 7 (83) ◽  
Author(s):  
Daria Levchenko ◽  
◽  
Volodymyr Tsvykh ◽  

2020 ◽  
pp. 019145372097472
Author(s):  
Maeve Cooke

Lafont argues for a participatory version of deliberative democracy that shares key features with other contemporary approaches, while departing from them in decisive ways. It is based on the Rousseauian–Kantian idea of democratic self-legislation, interpreted as the idea that citizens must be able to see themselves as the authors of the laws and public policies to which they are subject. She insists that her specification of the ideal of democratic self-legislation is a general one, aiming to appeal to readers with different understandings of the core democratic values of equality, freedom and democratic control. This is questionable. I show that she interprets the democratic ideal of freedom as a distinctive, normatively robust conception of citizen self-determination. Those drawn to travel with her on the long participatory road should be aware of this and ready to explore the implications. By downplaying the distinctiveness and normative robustness of her idea of freedom, she does her model a disservice.


Author(s):  
O.I. Tumanova ◽  

The article is devoted to the benefits of the public discussion, which form the basis of the model of deliberative democracy. Institutions operating within this type of political system can also be effectively used for the development of civil society.


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