Eclecticism and the future of the burden-sharing research programme: Why Trump is wrong

2019 ◽  
Vol 41 (4) ◽  
pp. 507-521 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin Zyla

Since the birth of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Europeans and the Americans have disagreed about who should share how much of the collective security burden. The input side of alliance burden sharing – that is, how many troops a member state contributes to the alliance – has been the privileged variable, both at the political as well as the academic levels. Other output variables (e.g. numbers of troops deployed to a particular mission) are highly contested. This article offers an analytically eclecticist framework for studying Atlantic burden sharing that allows combining variables on the input and output sides of the alliance burden sharing debate with those that consider it a social practice.

1992 ◽  
Vol 32 ◽  
pp. 211-227
Author(s):  
Rowan Williams

To be told, ‘know thyself’ is to be told that I don't know myself yet: it carries the assumption that I am in some sense distracted from what or who I actually am, that I am in error or at least ignorance about myself. It thus further suggests that my habitual stresses, confusions and frustrations are substantially the result of failure or inability to see what is most profoundly true of me: the complex character of my injuries or traumas, the distinctive potential given me by my history and temperament. I conceal my true feelings from my knowing self; I am content to accept the ways in which other people define me, and so fail to ‘take my own authority’ and decide for myself who or what I shall be. The therapy-orientated culture of the North Atlantic world in the past couple of decades has increasingly taken this picture as foundational, looking to ‘self-discovery’ or ‘self-realization’ as the precondition of moral and mental welfare. And the sense of individual alienation from a true and authoritative selfhood mirrors the political struggle for the right of hitherto disadvantaged groups, especially non-white and non-male, to establish their own self-definition. The rhetoric of discovering a true but buried identity spreads over both private and political spheres. The slogan of the earliest generation of articulate feminists, ‘The personal is the political’, expresses the recognition of how this connection might be made.


1998 ◽  
Vol 47 (1) ◽  
pp. 174-192 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Woodliffe

History suggests that a military alliance will rarely survive major political change that results in the disappearance of the original danger that the alliance was first set up to combat. Since 1989 the reshaping of the political and strategic map of Europe has proceeded on a scale and at a pace such as to give rise to an expectation that the North Atlantic Alliance would become a victim of historical inevitability and thus be either formally dissolved or left to atrophy. Instead, the North Atlantic Alliance has embarked on a root and branch transformation of its structures, procedures and strategies for the twenty-first century. What is equally remarkable is that these changes have been accommodated within the framework of the original text of the North Atlantic Treaty drawn up in 1949,1thus obviating the need for large-scale formal amendment.


2017 ◽  
Vol 111 (3) ◽  
pp. 756-764

Throughout Donald Trump's presidential campaign and into the first months of his presidency, he has warned that the United States' commitment to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) may depend on whether its partner states increase their defense spending in line with previously adopted guidelines. While senior administration officials have reaffirmed U.S. commitments to the NATO alliance, including the North Atlantic Treaty's mutual defense obligation on several occasions, President Trump himself did not so until mid-June. Separately, the Trump administration signaled its support for NATO by supporting the admission of Montenegro as a new member state.


Author(s):  
Bastian Giegerich

NATO, founded as a collective defence alliance, has spent most of the post-cold-war period transforming itself into a security management organization. Its ability to adapt has been the basis of NATO’s continued relevance. At the same time, NATO’s adjustments in functional and geographic scope have triggered debate about its strategic direction and the political and military requirements necessary to fulfil current and future roles. This chapter will assess NATO’s evolution by concentrating on the bargaining processes among member states that shaped the direction of NATO’s strategic guidelines and its out-of-area operational activities. The objective is to trace the extent to which a common strategic outlook has emerged among the European members of NATO.


Author(s):  
Wojciech ZABOROWSKI

The paper presents a comparative analysis of two documents forming the political basis for the concept of civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, namely NATO Military Policy on Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) and Civil-Military Interaction (CMI) no. MC 0411/2, approved on 5 May 2014, and its predecessor entitled NATO Military Policy on Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC) no. MC 0411/1, published on 6 July 2001. The analysis of the structure of both documents, their substance and thematic scope as well as their origin and background made it possible to identify the principal directions in the transformation of the CIMIC concept since its beginnings and to present its new elements, mainly the issue of civil-military interaction. The article discusses also the further anticipated directions of changes arising from the assumptions of the new NATO policy for CIMIC and CMI and the progress made so far in operationalising the strategic assumptions contained in MC 0411/2, including in particular the works on a new NATO doctrine concerning CIMIC and CMI.


2004 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 22-74 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andreas Wenger

This article discusses how the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) overcame the challenged posed by France in the mid to late 1960s. French President Charles de Gaulle's decision to withdraw France's remaining forces from NATO's integrated military commands, and his visit to Moscow shortly thereafter, exposed the alliance to unprecedented tension. Yet as NATO moved toward a crisis, opportunities arose to define a new vision for the alliance in a time of détente. Trilateral talks among the United States, Britain, and the Federal Republic of Germany forged a consensus on strategy, force levels, burden sharing, and nuclear consultation a consensus that was endorsed by the other member-states. The Harmel exercise in 1967 restored NATO's political purpose, expanding its political role as an instrument of peace. By 1968 NATO had evolved into a less hierarchical military alliance of fourteen and a more political and participatory alliance offifteen (including France). This successful transformation of NATO moved the process of détente from the bilateral superpower accommodation of 1963 to the multilateral European rapprochement of the 1970s.


1963 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 298-300 ◽  

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Parliamentarians' Conference was held in Paris on November 12–16, 1962, and was attended by parliamentarians from all fifteen NATO countries.1 One of the Conference's principal objectives was to look into the possibility of turning itself into an Atlantic Assembly, and it took the first step toward this goal by accepting its political committee's recommendation to set up a special subcommittee, consisting of experienced parliamentarians, which would study the problems of such a reform. According to the political committee's report, the Atlantic nations were served by a multitude of separate international institutions, each controlled by a separate executive council. There were no formal means by which they could consult, plan, or act in coordination. The report complained that the present arrangements under which the NATO Parliamentarians' Conference received information from NATO was inadequate: it did not receive a formal annual report and did not have the right to put questions either to ministers or formally to the NATO secretariat.


1892 ◽  
Vol 34 (872supp) ◽  
pp. 13940-13941
Author(s):  
Richard Beynon

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