Attitudes toward Working Mothers and Work-Oriented Fathers in the U.S.

2020 ◽  
pp. 0192513X2092906
Author(s):  
Gayle Kaufman ◽  
Molly Bair

While there is a wealth of research on gender ideology, most research focuses on attitudes toward women and women’s roles. This study aims to address the gap in our understanding of attitudes toward working fathers. Using the 2016 General Social Survey (GSS), we find more negative attitudes toward work-oriented fathers than working mothers. Results from multinomial logistic regression show that men, older individuals, Hispanics, and those who attend religious services more frequently are more likely to agree that both working mothers and work-oriented fathers are harmful to families. On the other hand, those whose mothers were employed when they were 16 years old and those who have a college or graduate degree are less likely to agree that only working mothers are harmful.

2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 82
Author(s):  
Sandra L. Hanson ◽  
John K. White

This paper examines the cooperation and influences between Poland and the U.S on their respective dreams, including the influence of the American Dream on Polish Americans and their potential distinctness from those who remain in Poland. Attitudes involving the American Dream that are examined include beliefs about freedom, liberty, democracy, getting ahead, status/mobility, and inequality. Although scholars have compared these belief systems across countries, there has been no distinct focus on Poland and the U.S., and those who immigrate between these countries. A conceptual framework that combines the American Dream, American exceptionalism, and beliefs about inequality guides the research. Data from the General Social Survey and the World Values Survey are used to answer the research questions. Findings show that Polish Americans agree with other Americans on a majority of items measuring elements of the American Dream. However, Americans and Poles have significantly different opinions on each of the American Dream items. Usually, (but not always) it is Americans who are more supportive of the American Dream. When considering the three groups, Polish Americans, Americans, and Poles, our conclusions suggest a trend where Polish Americans are a hybrid of other Americans and Poles when it comes to their views on the Dream. However, the differences often run in the direction that Polish Americans’ views are more like other Americans and distinct from Poles. Conclusions and implications are provided within the historical context of the long history of cooperation between the U.S. and Poland in fights for freedom and democracy.


2016 ◽  
Vol 06 (02) ◽  
pp. 40-52 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arthur Sakamoto ◽  
Chi-Tsun Chiu ◽  
Jing Li ◽  
Sharron Xuanren Wang

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chris Knoester ◽  
Qi Li

This study analyzes 2012 General Social Survey data (N = 1,089) about preferences for paid paternity leave availability, lengths of leave offerings, and government funding of leaves. It highlights gender and gendered parenting role attitudes as predictors of leave preferences. Descriptive results revealed sizable (i.e., 53%) support for leave availability and moderate (i.e., 33%) support for some government funding; still, only modest (i.e., 5 weeks) lengths of leave offerings were desired. Regression results indicated that women were typically more likely than men to support more generous leave offerings. Consistently, dual-earner expectations were positively associated with preferences for more generous leave offerings. Separate spheres attitudes appeared to be meaningful for women’s preferences, but not for men’s preferences. Importantly, the findings from this study suggest that there have been longstanding preferences for more generous and widespread paid paternity leave offerings in the U.S.—and more public policy action is long overdue.


2019 ◽  
pp. 20-50
Author(s):  
Tim Clydesdale ◽  
Kathleen Garces-Foley

The story of Ted, a World War II sailor for the U.S. Navy, and his teenage bride, Dottie, opens the chapter, setting up the contrast with emerging adulthood today. Their early marriage, five children, and Ted’s living wage from work for the electric company represent an era long gone. Financial independence today requires dual incomes and years of preparation, pushing back marriage and parenthood nearly a decade. Despite these changes, the religious lives of American twentysomethings demonstrate stability more than change. Survey analysis of the project’s National Study of American Twentysomethings (2013) and the National Science Foundation’s General Social Survey (1972–2016) demonstrate a stable proportion of religious committed young adults—about 1 in 4, and a rise in religiously unaffiliated young adults —from the ranks of the semi-religious. Widespread prayer, participation in worship, favorable attitudes toward congregations, and frustration with angry “religious people” are among the chapter’s notable findings.


Author(s):  
Peter V. Marsden

This book reports on social trends among U.S. adults between the early 1970s and the first decade of the 21st century. The chapters cover social and political phenomena arrayed across a wide spectrum. Some investigate and interpret changes in salient sociopolitical attitudes. Others ask whether confidence in major American institutions fell, or if connections to religious groups or other persons waned. Still others study shifts in how adults assessed their well-being as economic, political, and social conditions in U.S. society underwent sometimes-dramatic change. The 12 studies that follow rest on survey data assembled by the General Social Survey (GSS) project since 1972. This introductory chapter first provides context for these studies, drawing on prior research about change in the U.S. social, political, and economic landscape since the 1970s. Next comes an overview of this book's content, including some remarks about related GSS-based trend studies on other topics. It closes by briefly calling attention to the variety of approaches and explanations that the authors use when offering accounts for the patterns of change they report.


2020 ◽  
Vol 45 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Lois

The present study investigates the change of gender role attitudes in Germany between 1982 and 2016. Nine waves of the German General Social Survey are used (N = 26,389). In contrast to previous trend studies, which largely ignore age effects, a mechanism-based age-period-cohort model (Winship/Harding 2008) is applied. It becomes clear that age, period and cohort independently have an impact on gender role ideology. Compared to earlier research, new insights concerning the shape of cohort effects come to light: Specific to traditional gender ideology in Western Germany, it is apparent that the trend towards increasingly egalitarian attitudes comes to a halt in men born around 1956 and later and in women born 1966. For Eastern Germany we observe that the cohort-specific trend towards liberalisation in younger cohorts either is diminishing or even tends to reverse. This pattern of effects mainly mirrors the phases of the feminist movement in Western Germany and the rise and decline of the German Democratic Republic, respectively.


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philip N. Cohen

Gauchat (2012) reported that political conservatives in the United States lost confidence in the scientific community from the 1970s to 2010, but political liberals and moderates did not. As a result, a political divide opened up so that by 2010 conservatives had the lowest level of confidence in science. This analysis extends the trends through the 2018 General Social Survey (GSS). I find that political conservatives, Republicans, and Americans who attend religious services regularly, all report falling levels of confidence in the scientific community. Further, for the period 2012-2018, educational attainment, for conservatives, is not associated with increased levels of confidence in science, except at the graduate degree level (and even there confidence is lower among conservatives). In the Trump era, with an assault on facts and truth defining the president and his party, the growing political divide over confidence in science seems likely to further undermine political processes that rely on common knowledge and understanding. This updates the original 2018 version of this paper with the 2018 GSS data.


Social Forces ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 99 (1) ◽  
pp. 305-332 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marcus Mann ◽  
Cyrus Schleifer

Abstract The decline in trust in the scientific community in the United States among political conservatives has been well established. But this observation is complicated by remarkably positive and stable attitudes toward scientific research itself. What explains the persistence of positive belief in science in the midst of such dramatic change? By leveraging research on the performativity of conservative identity, we argue that conservative scientific institutions have manufactured a scientific cultural repertoire that enables participation in this highly valued epistemological space while undermining scientific authority perceived as politically biased. We test our hypothesized link between conservative identity and scientific perceptions using panel data from the General Social Survey. We find that those with stable conservative identities hold more positive attitudes toward scientific research while simultaneously holding more negative attitudes towards the scientific community compared to those who switch to and from conservative political identities. These findings support a theory of a conservative scientific repertoire that is learned over time and that helps orient political conservatives in scientific debates that have political repercussions. Implications of these findings are discussed for researchers interested in the cultural differentiation of scientific authority and for stakeholders in scientific communication and its public policy.


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