Presidents on the cycle: Elections, audience costs, and coercive diplomacy

2016 ◽  
Vol 34 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-26 ◽  
Author(s):  
Giacomo Chiozza

This study investigates an observable implication of audience cost theory. Building upon rational expectations theories of voters’ choice and foreign policy substitutability theory, it posits that audience costs vary over the electoral calendar. It then assesses whether US presidents’ major responses in international crises reflect the variability in audience costs in an analysis of 66 international crises between 1937 and 2006. Using out-of-sample tests, this study finds that tying-hand commitment strategies were more frequent closer to presidential elections, as expected from audience cost theory. It also finds that the fluctuation of audience costs over the electoral calendar is non-linear.

2018 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 205316801878711
Author(s):  
Akisato Suzuki

Does the state of the domestic economy change the size of the effect of audience costs? As public opinion research has shown, citizens assess the performance of their leaders based not only on foreign policy, but also on the domestic economy. Thus, if leaders are subject to audience costs, they should be even less able to afford failure in an international crisis when the economy is performing badly than when the economy is doing well. As a result, such leaders should be even more able to make their threats credible and, therefore, are more likely to be successful in coercive diplomacy. This novel prediction finds no empirical support in a replication study using Moon and Souva (2016). I discuss possible reasons for this result and avenues for further research.


1998 ◽  
Vol 92 (3) ◽  
pp. 623-638 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alastair Smith

Audience costs enable leaders to make credible commitments and to communicate their intentions to their adversaries during a crisis. I explain audience costs by simultaneously modeling crisis behavior and the domestic reelection process. I assume that a leader's ability influences the outcome of a crisis. As such, voters use outcomes as a signal of their leaders' quality. Leaders have incentives to make statements that deter their enemies abroad, since these statements also enhance their standing at home. Yet, such “cheap talk” foreign policy declarations are only credible when leaders suffer domestically if they fail to fulfill their commitments. In equilibrium, false promises are only made by the least competent types of leaders. Leaders that break their promises suffer electorally. Because initial domestic conditions and institutional arrangements affect the vulnerability of leaders to these domestic costs, such factors influence the credibility of policy declarations and, therefore, the crisis outcome.


2019 ◽  
Vol 24 (3) ◽  
pp. 371-406
Author(s):  
Michael J. Butler

Abstract By virtue of their defining criteria, international crises would seem unlikely candidates for conflict management and resolution. However, negotiations among crisis protagonists are not uncommon. Such behavior may reflect a desire to ‘exit’ the crisis dynamic. This article takes up the question of when and in what circumstances actors engaged in crisis situations turn to negotiation. Through an empirical analysis of over 1000 cases of foreign policy crises occurring between 1918 and 2015, this research examines a set of potential contextual, processual and structural correlates of crisis negotiation. The results of this analysis indicate that negotiation is less likely to occur in complex, high stakes, and especially violent crises, suggesting that negotiation is an unlikely and perhaps ill-suited response to more intense and severe crises.


2022 ◽  
Vol 17 (4) ◽  
pp. 187-200
Author(s):  
T. R. Khayrullin

The article examines the struggle of the Qatari- Turkish alliance for regional leadership in the Federal Republic of Somalia. The analysis revealed that the foreign policy activity of Turkey and Qatar in Somalia began during the events of the Arab Spring. Ankara and Doha used diplomatic, military and fi nancial instruments to strengthen their infl uence in the country. Moreover, Qatari money played an important role in promoting pro-qatari candidates to power during the 2012 and 2017 presidential elections. However, the eff orts of the Turkish- Qatari alliance to strengthen its position in Somalia have clashed with the interests of the Saudi- Emirati bloc seeking regional dominance. On the other hand, the inability to close the main cooperation with the central government in Somalia forced the UAE to support such autonomous regions as Somaliland, thereby intensifying the destabilization processes in the country.


Author(s):  
E. Ionova

The main result of the presidential elections in Uzbekistan held on October 24, 2021 was that President Sh. Mirziyoyev received a mandate to further implement his economic and political course which provisions were set out in his election program. In the elections opponents of the president, representing in general pro-government parties, were unable to provide an effective alternative to the president's program, which, moreover, accumulated many of their proposals. In the next five years, the republic which economy is the fastest growing in Central Asia will face further economic reforms. Their effect will largely depend on the objective conditions associated primarily with the pandemic. The social program of the president, if it is actually implemented, can help smooth out the negative consequences of market reforms. Mirziyoyev’s foreign policy reflected new geopolitical landmarks of the Central Asian countries, including Afghanistan and Turkey. At the same time, the development of relations between Uzbekistan and Russia is increasing, indicating the desire of Tashkent under the leadership of Mirziyoyev to maintain balance in relations with leading foreign policy players. As a result, it can be stated that today the President of Uzbekistan has strong positions both within the country and abroad.


Politeja ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (5(62)) ◽  
pp. 117-140
Author(s):  
David Darchiashvili ◽  
David Bakradze

The article views the geographical area between the EU and Russian borders as a battle space of two, drastically different foreign policy and ideological approaches. The authors argue that in the years since the end of the Cold War, a unique surrogate of former clash of liberal and communist worlds emerged, leading to and underpinning current Hybrid Warfare, underway from Ukraine to Georgia. Its roots lay in the Russian interpretation of the Western attitude towards the East as Neo-colonialist. Relying on the income from its vast energy resources, Russia also tries to develop its version of so called “Soft Power”, used by the West in this region. Though in Russian hands, it is coupled with Moscow’s imperial experiences and resentments, and is becoming a mere element in Hybrid or “non-linear” war. Speaking retrospectively, the Eastern Partnership Initiative of the European Union can be seen as a response to Hybrid threats, posed by Russia against its Western and Southern neighbors. But the question is, whether EU foreign policy initiatives towards this area can and will be efficient and sufficient, if continued to be mostly defensive and limited within Soft Power mechanisms and philosophy, while Russia successfully combines those with traditional Hard Power know-how? The authors argue that in the long run, European or Euro-Atlantic Soft Power tool-kits, spreading Human Rightsbased culture farther in the East, will remain unmatched. But in order to prevail over the Russian revisionist policy here and now, the West, and, particularly, the EU need to re-evaluate traditional foreign policy options and come up with a more drastic combination of Soft/Hard Powers by itself. As the Georgian case shows, the European community should more efficiently use Conditionality and Coercive Diplomacy, combined with clearer messages about partners’ membership perspectives.


Author(s):  
Max Gallop ◽  
Zachary Greene

Voters constrain democratic leaders’ foreign policy decisions. Yet, studies show that elite polarisation restricts the choices available to voters, limiting their ability to punish or reward incumbent governments. Building on a comparative elections and accountability perspective, we hypothesise that the governing context moderates the effectiveness of domestic punishment and reward. The rise of elite polarisation in many democracies undermines voters’ ability to sanction leaders through elections. Linking data on international crises to domestic polarisation, we find that leaders are more likely to be involved in the initiation of inter-state disputes, resulting disputes will be more likely to result in prolonged conflict, and ultimately that foreign policy outcomes exhibit greater variance. Results from our analysis and extensive robustness checks demonstrate evidence that increased dispersion of preferences among key actors can lead to extreme and negative foreign policy outcomes as electoral mechanisms fail to reign in and hold governing parties to account.


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